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ABSTRACT
The thesis explores the interplay between hegemonic discourses and domestic 
institutional arrangements. The purpose of the study is twofold. First, to use primary 
and comparative material in order to shed light on what is a hegemonic discourse, 
what it does, and how it does it. Second, to examine the role of different political 
economies and different domestic structures and institutional arrangements in the 
dissemination and materialisation of hegemonic discourses. To do so the thesis 
develops a theoretical framework, a ‘hegemonic-discourse-communication model’, 
that allows the questions about the nature and the function of hegemonic discourses to 
be addressed in the framework of comparative institutional analysis.
For the purposes of the above research globalisation is taken as an instance of a 
hegemonic discourse, and Greece and Ireland are selected as countries belonging to 
different models of political economy (the Mediterranean/Continental and the Anglo- 
Saxon models respectively). Within this framework the thesis scrutinises the impact 
that globalisation had on the discourses and policies of key institutional actors, such 
as political parties, workers’ unions, employers’ associations, the press and the church, 
in the two countries, during the 1990s.
The thesis concludes that understanding and studying hegemonic discourses entails 
moving beyond the general categories of models of political economy and 
institutional arrangements to case and spatiotemporally specific characteristics that 
affect the dynamics between the ‘hegemonic’ and the ‘publics’ of the ‘international’. 
Furthermore, the thesis suggests and evaluates the potentials of a Hegemonic 
Discourse Approach (HDA) in the study of change and continuity in world politics 
and economics.
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INTRODUCING THE THESIS
Introduction
Over the last two decades, two issues have (re-)emerged in the agenda of Political 
Science: on the one hand the importance of institutions, and on the other hand the 
importance of knowledge, ideas and discourse. The respective bodies of literature 
have generated important insights in the study and understanding of world politics 
and economics. The research project conducted here is based on these theoretical 
developments. It subscribes to the statement that if one wants to understand 
international relations/international political economy (ir/ipe)1 one cannot exclude the 
study of institutions and ideas. But the great challenge is not to recognise the 
importance of institutions and ideas but rather to develop an analytical framework 
capable of studying the conditions of their co-existence and the nature of their 
interaction.
To this end, the concept of hegemonic discourses is proposed. The latter are 
conceptualised as sets of practices and meanings that dominate world politics and 
economics during particular historical periods. The aspiration of this project is to 
explicate the conditions of existence of hegemonic discourses, and the relationship 
developed between these discourses and national social milieux. Through such an 
investigation two important research goals are met: first, to explore the nature of the 
interplay between hegemonic discourses and national institutional arrangements, and 
to assess the role of the latter in the communication of hegemonic discourses; second, 
to shed light on the nature of hegemonic discourses, and their validity as an analytical 
tool for studying change and continuity in world politics.
1 The acronyms ‘IR/IPE’, in capital letters, are referring to the respective academic disciplines. The 
acronyms ‘ir/ipe’, in small letters, are referring to the everyday reality o f world politics/international 
political economy.
The issue of hegemonic discourse communication by states, is Janus-faced. One face 
is internal/national, and mainly concentrates on the domestic political arena and the 
game played therein. The other is external/international, and searches for the causes 
of the domestic game beyond national borders . This thesis will try to exemplify that 
these two faces are inexorably related, and that their essence is common: social life, 
and how it is produced, reproduced and changes. It is within this context that the 
thesis introduces ‘everyday life’ as a key level of analysis that allows the question 
about the function of hegemonic discourses to be addressed in the context of 
comparative institutional analysis. Along these lines, Chapter 1 relates hegemonic 
discourses to the (re)production of everyday life within the international.
This introductory chapter has five main targets: (a) to present the research questions, 
the theoretical challenge, and the aims of the thesis, (b) to explicate the research 
strategy adopted by the project, (c) to offer short definitions of the key concepts, (d) 
to introduce the broader academic chessboard on which the research project is taking 
place, and (e) to present the chapters of the thesis.
The Theoretical Puzzle and the Aims of the Thesis
The research project proposed here attempts to scrutinise the nature of the interplay 
between hegemonic discourses and national institutional settings. In particular, it 
focuses on the post-Cold War period, and asks how did the hegemonic discourse o f 
globalisation emerge into two different national politico-economic systems, that o f 
Greece and Ireland (a Mediterranean and an Anglo-Saxon political economy 
respectively)3. To do so it compares and contrasts the discourses and strategies of 
key, national institutional actors (e.g. political leaders and political parties, employers, 
workers, the church, the press) in the two countries during the period 1995 -  2001. 
The purpose is to answer two research questions:
2 For this tradition of thought see the seminal article of Gourevitch (1978), ‘The Second Image 
Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics’.
3 This choice is justified in Chapter 2.
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(a) whether and how different political economies and different domestic 
structures and institutional arrangements result in different ways of 
communicating and materialising hegemonic discourses; and
(b) what the above (potential) differences or similarities tell us about the 
nature of hegemonic discourses and their conditions of existence and 
change.
Hence, the theoretical puzzle of the thesis is as follows: there is a common hegemonic 
discourse (globalisation) that at a certain point in time appears to be external to two 
states (early 1990s). Furthermore these two states are characterised by different types 
of political economy (Anglo-Saxon vs. Mediterranean). At a later point in time, 
however, this hegemonic discourse appears to dominate in both states (late 1990s). 
How did this change take place? What was the impact -  if any -  of the different 
domestic institutional arrangements of the two countries in the communication of the 
hegemonic discourse? What conclusions can be drawn about the nature of hegemonic 
discourses, and the interplay between the hegemonic/international and the 
public/domestic?
These questions, and in general the study of the nature of the hegemonic, have gained 
additional weight in the post-Cold War period, where the US has emerged as the sole 
superpower. Where do the practices and meanings that dominate world politics and 
economics come from? How does this domination take place? Do states have a 
choice with regard to their policy options? Does the hegemonic discourse of 
globalisation have a core? What are the (pre)conditions for the reproduction or 
change of a hegemonic discourse? These are important questions, both conceptually 
and politically, for they attempt to put under scrutiny the concept of the hegemonic 
and the notion of hegemony in international relations, rather than take them for 
granted. They are questions that attempt to re-examine the ways in which world 
politics and economics are governed and reproduced. Thus, they are questions that 
invite new thinking on the social condition of world politics, and aspire to reflect on 
alternative ways of living and participating in the international. We hope the findings 
of this thesis speak to these questions and generate a number of hypotheses with
13
regard to the nature of the hegemonic and the conditions of its reproduction and 
change -  even if conclusive answers would require further research.
In positivistic terms: The above research cannot be accurately described in positivistic 
terms. In the project domestic structures and institutions are treated as the 
independent variable, and national discourses and policies as the dependent ones. 
The purpose of the project is to conceptualise how the independent variable links 
hegemonic discourses with the dependent variable, and how the nature of this linkage 
influences the formation of domestic social spheres and the direction of national 
policies (dependent variables).
Based on the above, the thesis aspires:
(a) to test and sharpen existing hypotheses in comparative and international politics 
and economics on the role of domestic structures and institutions in discourse 
communication. In particular the main hypothesis of the above literature is that 
different domestic structures lead to different and distinctive ways of 
communicating discourses. Would the empirical evidence of the thesis verify this 
hypothesis? If yes, what is the relationship between particular types of domestic 
structures and modes of communicating discourses? Thus the proposed research 
project joins a second wave in institutional theorising that has shifted the focus of 
the analysis from the question of whether institutions matter to the question of 
how they matter.
(b) to suggest a specific way of approaching and studying the dissemination and 
communication of hegemonic discourses. To do so it develops a theoretical 
framework, a hegemonic-discourse-communication model, that allows the 
questions about the nature and the function of hegemonic discourses to be 
addressed in the framework of comparative institutional analysis/comparative 
domestic structure analysis. Furthermore, based on the analysis of the case 
studies the thesis suggests and evaluates the potential and usefulness of a 
Hegemonic Discourse Approach (HDA) to the study of change and continuity in 
world politics and economics.
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(c) to create new hypotheses on the conditions of existence and change of the 
international. Indeed the comparative method adopted by the thesis does not only 
aim to verify or falsify a hypothesis, but to present new evidence that will help us 
to reflect on new working hypotheses about, and new conceptualisations of, the 
international4.
The Research Strategy: Capturing and Analysing Hegemonic Discourses
This section presents the strategy followed in order to capture and study the 
communication of the hegemonic discourse of globalisation in Greece and Ireland. 
This can be divided into two steps.
First Step: Identifying Actors
As is argued in Chapter 1, the communication of a hegemonic discourse is an integral 
part of the domestic ideology-production processes. Thus, the identification of the 
actors engaged in these ideology-production processes is the first and one of the most 
important steps in the process of capturing hegemonic discourses and studying their 
communication.
Two factors determine the selection of these actors5. First, is the nature of the 
domestic structures and institutional arrangements. Thus for instance one would 
focus on different actors to study the case of a secular-democratic and a theocratic or 
a military regime; or, a presidential and a parliamentary democracy. In our case, both 
Greece and Ireland are characterised by stable, secular, democratic regimes based on 
parliamentary systems. This general consideration of the nature of the domestic 
regime must be combined with a more focused analysis on the institutional 
arrangements that define each country’s domestic mechanisms of ideology production.
4 For the distinction between ‘hypothesis-generating’ and ‘theory-confirming’ or ‘theory-inflrming’ 
comparative studies see, Lijphart, 1971: 691-693.
5 We derive these criteria from the existing literature on ideas communication. See. Hall, 1989a,b.
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In our case, the elaboration of these case-specific characteristics takes place in 
Chapter 2, where the cases of Greece and Ireland are analysed.
The second factor that determines the selection of actors has to do with the nature of 
the discourse under examination. If a thematic discourse is selected for study, e.g. a 
discourse on armaments or Keynesianism (see Hall, 1989a), then certain social actors 
and groups would gain primacy in the investigation, e.g. in the case of a discourse on 
armaments, the Ministry of Defence, the army, the defence industry etc. Yet, as is 
demonstrated in Chapter 1, hegemonic discourses do not have an authoritative source 
of definition; they are not limited within or produced by an epistemic or otherwise 
specific community; they concern the conditions of social life reproduction and thus 
have an all-pervasive societal effect.
To tackle the all-encompassing nature of hegemonic discourses the thesis employed 
the criterion of inclusion. Therefore an effort has been made to include all the 
institutional actors with a considerable role in ideology production, in the public 
discourses of Greece and Ireland. These actors include the main political parties and 
their leaders, the workers, the employers, the church and the press. It needs to be 
stressed here that these actors and their interaction do not by any means exhaust the 
complexity of ideology production within their respective institutional settings. Yet, 
we consider that the ‘signals’ one gets from this set of actors, spread as they are 
through the body politic, are representative of the trends and changes underway in the 
everyday of these two institutional settings. Put differently, the range of the 
institutional actors examined is significant, for it is wide enough to capture social 
trends and changes that exceed the confines of elite-level phenomena. To use a 
metaphor from the natural science world, the thesis treats the actors under 
examination as meter stations that record the time, intensity, epicentre and behaviour 
of globalisation. These stations have many problems and shortcomings but remain 
the best option we have.
The next important step with regard to our research strategy is how to study these 
actors and their involvement in the communication of the hegemonic discourse of 
globalisation, i.e. how the above mentioned signals can be collected and ‘decoded’?
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Second Step: Capturing the Communication Effect at the National Level
The main difficulty with the study of hegemonic discourses is that the key actors 
involved in their communication process are numerous and thus the primary material 
that is needed to be collected and studied almost unlimited (including official 
documents, speeches, interviews, statistical data etc.). In order to tackle this problem 
the following strategy was followed.
First, the research was limited to the period between 1995-2001. The rationale for 
this choice has two elements. First, in general this was the period in which the 
‘globalisation of the globalisation discourse’ (Beck, 2001) took place in most 
countries around the world. Two milestones define this period; the creation of the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995 and the anti-globalisation protests in 
Seattle, during the ‘Millennium Round’ of the same organisation, in November and 
December 1999. This general context was then combined with domestic, country- 
specific (historical) junctures and events. The purpose was to explore how the 
globalisation discourse was implicated in the discourses and strategies of domestic 
forces that attempted to redefine the public discourses of their countries. We expand 
on this issue in the chapters that focus on Greece and Ireland. It is also important to 
stress here that the rise of a globalisation discourse in the 1990s became possible only 
after the collapse of the Cold War, i.e. the system (practices and meanings) that 
defined world politics and economics throughout the post-WWII period until 1989- 
1990.
Second, the analysis was based on primary material, mainly official publications and 
speeches, in which the actors summarised, publicised and/or justified their annual 
activities and their positions and policies. This does not pretend to be an exhaustive 
strategy, nor does it apply strictly to all actors (e.g. the press). But it was used as an 
objective criterion for the collection of the primary material. The chapters on Greece 
and Ireland offer specific information on the nature and the rationale of the selected 
material for each and every actor examined.
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Third, the use of interviews. A number of interviews (see Appendix A at the end of 
the Thesis) were conducted with institutional actors that had a strategic role in the 
reproduction and change of their domestic discourses e.g. newspapers’ editors, 
presidents of workers’ and employers’ associations etc. It is important to note here 
that these interviews were used more as a way of double-checking the conclusions 
derived from the above primary material. Moreover, these interviews were used as a 
means of inquiring how key actors in the ideology production at the national level 
were themselves thinking about how ideology is produced at the national level, what 
is globalisation, and how the various social forces at the national level reacted to it.
Fourth, globalisation as a word vs. globalisation as a world and a ‘practice’ in the 
analysis of the primary material; i.e. how do we study hegemonic discourses through 
documents? The thesis, conceptualising globalisation as a hegemonic discourse, did 
not enforce a narrow a priori definition of globalisation on the research project. Thus, 
it left the actors to speak for themselves, taking globalisation as whatever these actors 
are referring to, or expressing, when they use the term globalisation. It is through this 
methodology that the thesis attempted to trace and capture the hegemonic discourse 
of globalisation in the examined documents. The main questions were: When did the 
term globalisation enter into the vocabulary of the actors? How did the frequency of 
its usage evolve? What was the context in which it was used? What was the purpose 
of its usage and what was its content (i.e. positive or negative)? The strongest 
advantage of this methodology is its ‘blind’ objectivity. What was, and what was not, 
globalisation did not rest with the researcher’s judgement but with the social actors. 
Nonetheless, such a research strategy has a number of grey areas. Most importantly, 
what if globalisation in Greece or Ireland had a different name? Or more generally, 
what if the debates, attitudes and practices in one country also existed in the other but 
appeared absent due to superficial differences in language? And in this case, what 
difference did the language used make, and how did this difference affect our analysis 
of hegemonic discourses?
As is developed in Chapter 1, a hegemonic discourse concerns the production of 
social identities and life. In this regard language is very important. It is through 
language that reality becomes intelligible; it is through language that practices and 
meanings come to be constituted as such. Yet there is a huge gap between these
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assumptions and an instrumental analysis of language through content analysis, or in 
the case of this project, between the study of globalisation discourse and a plain study 
of references to globalisation. The thesis addressed this problem by placing the 
quantitative methodology of content analysis within a qualitative analytical 
framework, based on comparative institutionalism and discourse theory. Thus the 
focus of the research was not on the word globalisation itself but on the 
(re)production of institutional identities and through them on the production of 
meaning and ideology at the national level. This focus allowed us to go beyond the 
(important in other regards) ‘vessel’ of the word globalisation. It allowed us for 
instance to see a non-ideological space in the Irish politico-economic life. It also 
allowed us to trace and capture the Irish Celtic Tiger discourse (an Irish-specific 
globalisation discourse) and contrast it with aspects of the globalisation discourse in 
Greece.
These examples aim at making it clear that even though the concept of globalisation 
was the driving force of the research, every possible effort was made in order: (a) not 
to impose the concept where it did not exist, and (b) not to reduce the analysis to a 
meaningless quantification exercise. Three points are of particular importance here: 
(i) The selection of the sources (i.e. what the thesis has taken to be a representative 
and encapsulating piece of the actors’ voices within the public discourse), was not 
influenced by the existence or not of references to globalisation. Thus the overall 
research design was not based on a globalisation selection bias6, (ii) The referent 
‘globalisation’ was used as a tool to trace emerging or changing practices and policies 
associated with globalisation by the social actors themselves. Thus the concept/word 
‘globalisation’ was used as a means to trace and monitor policies and practices o f 
globalisation, (iii) The reading of the selected material was not exclusively 
globalisation-driven. To this end, a second reading of the material, independent of 
the term globalisation, was adopted. Thus the question of where the term 
globalisation was located within the various institutional discourses, and how this 
term was used, was always balanced/qualified with the question of what were the 
dominant objects (including themes, practices, policies, rationalities) of these
6 Two exceptions apply here. The ‘press sample’ and the speeches o f party leaders. Yet in these cases 
a ‘selection bias’ does not really apply as a problem, as the purpose was to find how these actors 
understood and communicated the concept of globalisation.
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ndiscourses irrespective of the term/concept globalisation . Furthermore, the dominant 
objects that came to the surface through this second reading were contrasted with the 
various dominant objects of the globalisation discourse itself (e.g. flexibility, 
liberalisation, deregulation, speculative capital) to find out whether there was a 
relationship between them or not. It was through the above strategy that this thesis 
tried to bring together the words and the worlds of the research, outlining, even 
faintly, an integrated Hegemonic Discourse methodology.
To conclude, the purpose of the adopted research strategy was not to find repetitive 
isolated themes and references, but to capture changing self-conceptualisations, 
emerging rationalities and identities, changing power relationships and changing 
organisation structures. This quest was based on the conceptualisation of 
globalisation as a hegemonic discourse, i.e. as an ordering power that comes ‘from 
below’ or ‘from within’ (see Chapter 1) to enforce its terms on the prevailing -  in 
terms of social life organisation -  national institutional apparatuses. Thus what the 
thesis aimed at monitoring/capturing was not static institutional discourses, but 
hegemonic re-orderings materialised through the reproduction of everyday life, and 
expressed in changing policies, rationalities, vocabularies, identities and societal 
ordering principles.
Table 1 summarises the actors and material studied in both countries. More resources 
were mobilised when available and necessary at a country or institutional level. For 
instance in the case of Greece we traced and classified the books that were published 
on globalisation during the period 1990-2001, while in the case of Ireland, the 
newspaper Irish Independent was frequently used to complement the analysis of The 
Irish Times.
7 The only exception to this ‘double-reading methodology’ was the analysis o f the press sample. Even 
in this case, however, the quantitative factor (i.e. references to globalisation) was combined with 
qualitative factors such as the identity of the authors of the references, or the section of their 
publication.
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TABLE 1. ACTORS AND SOURCES STUDIED
A. ACTORS: Political Parties and their Leaders *
MATERIAL: Electoral Manifestos, Speeches of Party Leaders.
GREECE IRELAND
Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) Fianna Fail (FF)
New Democracy (ND) Fine Gael (FG)
Communist Party of Greece (KKE) Labour Party (LP)
Coalition of the Left and Progress (Synaspismos) Progressive Democrats (PD)
B. ACTORS: The Main Social Partners *
MATERIAL: Annual Reviews, Annual Conference Proceedings, Monthly
Newsletters, Chairpersons Speeches, Specialised reports or
publications.
GREECE IRELAND
The Greek General Confederation of Labour (GSEE) Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU)
The Federation of Greek Industries (SEV) Irish Business and Employers Confederation (IBEC)
The Economic and Social Council of Greece (OKE) National Economic and Social Council (NESC)
C. ACTOR: The Church *
MATERIAL: Speeches of the Head of the two Churches, and relevant references in
the press.
GREECE IRELAND
Greek Orthodox Church Catholic Church
(Archbishop Christodoulos) (Cardinal Connell)
D. ACTOR: Press (a sample) *
MATERIAL: All the published articles that made a reference to the term
globalisation throughout the period 1996-2001.
GREECE IRELAND
Newspaper: TO VIMA (1996-2001) Newspaper: The Irish Times (1996-2001)
The next section moves on to introduce three key ‘categories’ of the thesis: ideational 
factors/discourses, domestic structures and institutions, and everyday life. The 
purpose is twofold: first, to survey how these categories are conceptualised in the 
IR/IPE literature, and second, to present the working definitions adopted in this 
project.
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Definition of Key Concepts
a. Ideas in World Politics and Economics: Diverse Understandings and Competing 
Concepts
The category of ideas is not a single, solid category in the IR/IPE literature. Hence, 
under the key-word ideas one can find many different things, such as norms, 
discourses, paradigms, theories, beliefs, world views, preferences or simply ideas. 
What follows is first a survey of how these different concepts are defined, and second 
an analysis of where this thesis stands in regard to this category.
Goldstein and Keohane (1993) define ideas as beliefs held by individuals. They 
furthermore argue that there are three types of beliefs: worldviews, principled beliefs 
and causal beliefs. Finnemore (1996), argues that a distinction must be made 
between ideas and norms. The former are held by individuals, the latter are 
intersubjective. Furthermore, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) argue that norms can be
o
defined as standards of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity . They 
further distinguish between two types of norms: the constitutive, which create new 
actors, interests or categories for action, and the regulative norms that order and 
constrain actors’ behaviour (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 891)9. Checkel (1997) 
subscribes to the definition of ideas by Goldstein and Keohane. Hence he attributes 
ideas to individuals, but with Finnemore and Sikkink, he distinguishes between ideas 
and norms. He argues that norms and ideologies are historically constructed and 
often embedded in organisational structures or other shared collectivities. Jacobsen 
(1995) adopts a different stance by defining economic ideas as ‘shared beliefs’. He 
furthermore distinguishes between (a) consensual social beliefs that shape the
8 To reach this definition they borrow from the works of Katzenstein, 1996: 5; Finnemore, 1996: 22; 
and Klotz, 1995. Along the same lines Krasner (1983: 2) defines norms as standards of behaviour 
defined in terms of rights and obligations. Finally, as Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) observe, where 
political scientists use the concept of ‘norms’, sociologists and other social scientists many times use 
the concept of ‘institutions’ to prescribe the same phenomenon.
9 The distinction between constitutive and regulative rules has been established in IR by constructivist 
scholars. The most powerful statements in this regard are the Rules, Norms, and Decisions, published 
by Kratochwil (1989), and the World o f Our Making, published by Onuf (1989). These works defined 
the parameters for the rule-oriented constructivism in IR. See also Kratochwil and Ruggie, 1986, and 
Ruggie, 1998.
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legitimate ends of economic activity and (b) economic ideas that are the means for 
reaching socially approved ends. Bernstein (2000) in a rather different manner refers 
to ideas as proposals for new norms, whether the latter are meant to be ideologies, 
worldviews or principled beliefs. In this line of reasoning an idea can become a norm 
if it provides an orientation to action and gain collective legitimation.
Campbell (1998) in an insightful article, combining historical and organisational 
institutionalism, identifies four types of ideas: (a) Paradigms, defined as cognitive 
background assumptions that constrain action by limiting the range of perceivable 
alternatives, (b) Public sentiments, defined as normative background assumptions that 
constrain action by limiting the range of acceptable and legitimate alternatives, (c) 
Programmes, defined as cognitive concepts and theories that facilitate action, (d) 
Frames, defined as normative concepts that are used to legitimise these programs. 
Furthermore he argues that the first two types are second-order concepts, constituting 
the underlying ideas upon which the other two first-order concepts rest.
Hall (1986) uses the term ideology to refer to a well-developed network of ideas that 
prescribes a course of economic or political action. Moreover he defines policy 
paradigms as the overarching framework of ideas that structures policy-making in a 
particular field (Hall, 1990). An often-quoted definition of ideology is that given by 
Freeden (1996) who conceptualises ideologies as systems of political thinking, loose 
or rigid, deliberate or unintended, through which individuals and groups construct an 
understanding of the political world they, or those who preoccupy their thoughts, 
inhabit, and then act on that understanding. Moravcsik (1997) on the other hand 
proposes the concept of state preferences. He argues that societal ideas, interests and 
institutions shape state preferences, defined as the fundamental social purposes that 
underline the strategic calculations of governments.
Last to be mentioned here is the concept of discourse. The latter is often loosely used 
in the literature to define a set of policy ideas, e.g. the discourse of neoliberalism or 
the discourse of human rights. Schmidt (2000, 2001, 2002) has pushed this 
conceptualisation further defining discourse as both a set of policy ideas and values, 
and an interactive process of policy construction and communication. The concept of 
discourse has also been used to define a variety of different phenomena and levels.
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For instance, Schmidt (2000) uses the concept of public discourse to refer to the sum 
of political actors’ accounts of the polity’s purposes, goals and ideals which serve to 
explain political events, to justify political actions, to develop political identities, to 
reshape and/or reinterpret political history, and, all in all to frame the national 
political discussion. Yet the concept of discourse is nowhere more dominant than in 
post-structural political analysis (see Milliken, 1999). Within this tradition Laclau 
and Mouffe (1985: 105) define discourse as a structured totality based on an 
articulatory practice; that is, a practice establishing such a relation among different 
elements that their identity is modified as a result of it. Foucault (1972: 49) in his 
well-quoted definition argues that discourses are practices that systematically form 
the objects of which they speak.
This thesis argues that the majority of the literature that deals with ideational factors 
fails to capture a whole set of ideational phenomena concerning the mode of 
production and reproduction of social life (see Chapter 1). To address this gap, the 
project builds on Michel Foucault’s conceptualisation of discourse, proposing the 
concept of hegemonic discourses. Hegemonic discourses are construed as social 
technologies -  i.e. sets of social practices and meanings -  that determine specific 
modes for the production and reproduction of everyday life within the international 
(ibid.). Yet, this working definition of hegemonic discourses remains to be 
scrutinised and tested through the examination of the effect of globalisation in Greece 
and Ireland. In this examination the role of the domestic structures and institutional 
arrangements of these two states are of central importance. The definition of these 
concepts is the subject of the next section.
b. Conceptualising Domestic Structures and Institutional Arrangements
In this thesis the concept of the domestic structures of a state is defined in terms of (a) 
the nature of political institutions, (b) the structure of civil society, (c) the nature of 
state-society relations and (d) the values and norms embedded in the political system 
(political culture). This definition mainly draws from Katzenstein (1977a,b) and has 
been advanced by Risse-Kappen (1991: 486, 1994: 187). With slight differentiations
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it finds a common acceptance in the literature (see, Evangelista, 1995: 9, and Krasner, 
1995: 258).
The concepts of institutional arrangements and institutions are used by the thesis 
almost in an interchangeable manner with the concept of domestic structures. 
Nonetheless, as it is shown below, these concepts have slightly different focus10. One 
of the most widely used definitions of institutions is that of Douglass North. North 
(1990) defines institutions as the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, the 
humanly devised constraints, formal or informal, that shape human interaction and 
structure human incentives. Thus, institutions reduce uncertainty by providing a 
structure to everyday life. One more widely used approach is that of James March 
and Johan Olsen (1984), proposed in their seminal article, ‘The New Institutionalism: 
Organisational Factors in Political Life’. In particular the authors use the term 
political structure to include almost everything. They argue that the term signifies a 
collection of institutions, rules of behaviour, norms, roles, physical arrangements, 
buildings, and archives that are relatively invariant in the face of turnover of 
individuals and relatively resilient to the idiosyncratic preferences and expectations of 
individuals (ibid.: 741). Hall (1986) in a rather different way defines institutions as 
the historically formed formal rules, compliance procedures and standard operating 
practices that bind the components of the state together and structure its relations with 
the society. He thus excludes from his definition informal rules, procedures and 
practices.
Based on the above approaches, as well as on the historical institutionalist approach 
as outlined by Hall and Taylor (1996: 937-942) 11 this thesis construes 
institutions/institutional arrangements as the formal and informal procedures, 
practices, routines, norms and conventions which are embedded in the organisational 
structure of any polity/political economy and shape/re-shape and structure/re­
structure both human interactions and the aforementioned organisational structure 
itself.
10 For a thoughtful analysis of how different strands of institutional analysis focus on different levels of 
reality see, Hollingworth, 2000: 600-623; see also Ikenberry, 1988: 226-229.
11 Hall and Taylor (1996: 938) write: ‘[historical institutionalists] define...[institutions]...as the formal 
or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organisational structure of 
the polity or political economy’.
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The above sections have briefly surveyed the literature on ideas/discourses and 
domestic structures and institutional arrangements. They have also specified how this 
project conceptualises and mobilises these concepts. The next section moves the 
analysis on to the category of everyday life. The latter is not only a significant part of 
the definition of hegemonic discourses, but also offers a most significant plane for 
analysing the interplay between hegemonic discourses and domestic institutions. We 
return to this issue in Chapter 1. Below we offer a brief overview of the 
contemporary development of the category of everyday life in social sciences.
c. Everyday Life as a Social Science Category
The everyday has occasionally been in the spotlight of social science theorising in the 
second half of the twentieth century, but, at least in politics broadly construed, it has 
never managed to secure a stable position on the research agenda. We see the golden 
age of everyday life theorising from the mid-1950s to the 1970s; a product of the 
various social and intellectual movements which emerged at that time. Special 
reference in this regard should be made to the ‘Situationist International’ (SI), a 
movement consisted of a small group of avante-garde artists and intellectuals that was 
organised around the magazine Situationiste Internationale (founded in 1957), which 
was at the heart of the events of May 1968. For Situationists the fulfilment of 
‘revolutionary possibilities’ was to happen through the reinvention of everyday life. 
They furthermore suggested that such a ‘reinvention’ could take place through the 
creation of situations in the everyday that would have a transformative effect on 
people’s lives and beliefs12. The most influential text within the Situationist 
movement remains Guy Debord’s Society o f Spectacle, originally published in 1967.
12 For instance see Guy Debord’s, ‘The Situationists and the New Forms of Action in Art and Politics’ 
(Debord, 1963). For the foundation of the Situationist movement see also Michele Bernstein, 1964. 
The policy of their magazine, Internationale Situationniste, is indeed interesting: ‘All texts published 
in Internationale Situationniste may be freely reproduced, translated and adapted, even without 
indication o f origin’. Most, if not all the texts published by Situationists are available on line at their 
website: http://www.cddc.vt.edu/sionline.
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Raoul Vaneigem’s The Revolution o f Everyday Life is also considered one of the most 
important texts produced by Situationists13.
Nevertheless, the author that was to exercise the widest and most lasting influence on 
everyday life as a subject-matter of study was the French social theorist Henri 
Lefebvre. Lefebvre was part of the fermentations taking place in Paris in the mid 
1960s14, but his first important work on everyday life dates back to 1947. The book 
was entitled Critique o f Everyday Life15. Lefebvre argued that the most significant 
social changes take place in ‘the unmysterious depths of everyday life’. Therefore he 
was suggesting that history, psychology and social sciences ‘must become a study of 
everyday life’ (Lefebvre, 1991 [1958]: 137). Work, family/private life and leisure 
activities were proposed as the defining elements of the everyday, and Marxist theory 
was worked out and presented as a ‘critical knowledge of everyday life’ (ibid. 148- 
175). Finally, the last chapter of the book proposed the concept of the possible as an 
integral ontological element of social reality, which needs to be taken into 
consideration along with the categories of the ‘past’ and the ‘present’, when studying 
social action and social change (ibid.: 228-252). Lefebvre continued to work on and 
sharpen the subject-matter of everyday life and in 1968 he published a book entitled, 
Everyday Life in the Modem World (see, Lefebvre, 1971 [1968]). He has proposed 
three interrelated concepts: daily life (la vie quotidienne), the everyday (le quotidian), 
and everydayness (quotidiennete).
Let us simply say about daily life that it has already existed, but permeated with 
values, with myths. The word everyday designates the entry of daily life into 
modernity: the everyday is the object of programming, whose unfolding is imposed 
by the market, by the system of equivalences, by marketing and advertisements. As 
to the concept of ‘everydayness’, it stresses the homogenous, the repetitive, the 
fragmentary in everyday life (Lefebvre, 1988: 87).
13 Guy Debord was the central personality and self-proclaimed leader of Situationist International. Raul 
Veneigem was one of the movement’s strongest voices and a frequent editor of its magazine. Along 
with the above mentioned official SI website, a well-organised and clearly documented on-line source 
for the personalities, texts and images related with the SI can be found at: 
http://www.nothingness.org/SI.
14 For the relationship between Lefebvre and the Situationists see Elden, 2004 and Gardiner, 2000: 
102-126.
15 The 1947 edition was followed by a second revised edition in 1958, in which Lefebvre added an 
extensive foreword.
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In addition to the work of Lefebvre, the work of Michel de Certeau16 is also formative 
in the evolution of everyday life as a subject matter. Of particular importance here is 
his book The Practice o f Everyday Life and a collective work that published as 
volume two of this book, under the same title (Certeau et al, 1998). As Gardiner 
(2000: 157-179) notes, Certeau extends the Situationists’ and Lefebvre’s analyses by 
exploring everyday life through concrete daily practices, e.g. the appropriation of 
city-space for walking, living etc. In this way Certeau shifts the analysis of everyday 
life from a more abstract and holistic level to more concrete everyday practices and 
procedures17.
With regard to IR/IPE it can be said that the themes of everyday and everyday life are 
not new. The effort to bring everyday life to the forefront of the study of world 
politics started in the 1980’s, and was led by post-structuralist (e.g. Walker, 1986a) 
and feminist (e.g. Enloe, 1989) scholars. Critical IPE has also been very active in this 
regard (e.g. Gill, 1995; Sinclair, 1999; Harmes, 2001, 2002; Langley, 2003), 
including the organisation of panels during the annual conferences of the 
International Studies Association (e.g. ‘Globalisation as Everyday Life’ at ISA 1997 
in Toronto) and the British International Studies Association (e.g. ‘Global Finance in 
the Everyday’ at BISA 2002 in London). In addition to these dynamics, a new wave 
of theorising on the everyday seems to emerge either inspired by thinkers like Henri 
Lefebvre, Maurice Blanchot and Michel De Certeau (see for instance Davies and 
Niemann, 2002), or by the recent biopolitical turn in politics based, among others, on 
Antonio Negri and Giorgio Agamben.
For this thesis everyday life is a key-concept for it is both the object and the subject 
of hegemonic discourses (see Chapter 1 and Epilogue). It is the object of hegemonic 
discourses because it constitutes the social body on which hegemonic discourses 
invest and are enacted -  for, hegemonic discourses concern the governance of 
everyday life. But, it is also the subject of hegemonic discourses because it is what
16 Certeau was Director of Studies at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, in Paris.
17 Here it is worth noticing that Gardiner’s book Critiques o f Everyday Life offers a most interesting 
and insightful introduction to critical approaches to everyday life and their intellectual history 
(Gardiner, 2000).
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reproduces and changes these discourses -  for, hegemonic discourses exist and 
change only through the myriad transactions that take place at the realm of the 
everyday. The examination of the various institutional actors in Greece and Ireland 
aims at giving us a representative sample of the production of the everyday in these 
two countries, and an insight on the nature and function of hegemonic discourses.
Before closing this section, we would like to note a similarity between the 
Foucaultian approach adopted in this project, and the aforementioned work of 
Lefebvre. Lefebvre sees the everyday as the entry of daily life into modernity; a 
process materialised through the transformation of the everyday into an object of 
programming. Foucault on the other hand, notes in a similar manner that the 
emergence of the era of bio-politics in the 18 century marked ‘the entry of life into 
history, that is the entry of.. .the life of the human species into the order of knowledge 
and power, into the sphere of political techniques’ (Foucault, 1978: 141-142, 
emphasis added). Thus both thinkers bring to the core of their analysis the moment at 
which life becomes an object of administration and justified political intervention 
aiming at its (i.e. life’s) investment with particular manners and mannerisms.
The above research project takes place on a broader academic chessboard. Having 
defined the theoretical puzzle and the key categories of this thesis, the next section 
moves on to unfold this chessboard, i.e. to present how the existing literature treats 
the relationship among ideas, interests and material factors.
Background Academic Debates
The study of the communication and dissemination of hegemonic discourses is 
mainly related to two literatures; one concerning ideational factors and knowledge, 
and the other concerning domestic structures and institutional arrangements. These 
two aspects/literatures are often treated as opposite, i.e. ideational considerations vs. 
interests and material factors.
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Ideas, Interests and Material Factors
Ideas and ideational factors have always constituted an integral part of the study of 
world politics and economics; from the Peloponnesian War, and the importance that 
Thucydides paid to the ideologies of the Athenian and Spartan regimes, to 
positivistic models of conflict resolution. Of course, the importance that is ascribed to 
ideas by the different approaches diverges considerably. Furthermore, there have 
been periods in which the study of ideas was rather marginal in the academic circles 
of ER/IPE, as for instance during the behaviouralist revolution of the 1960s, and 
periods in which ideas were at the forefront, as during the post-behaviouralist era or 
the period from the late 1980s until the present (Jacobsen, 1995: 283-284; Finnemore 
and Sikkink, 1998: 889-891)18.
The aim here is not to offer an account of the history of the study of ideas in IR/IPE. 
The following paragraphs are confined to delineating two broad debates about ideas, 
which are of particular interest for this thesis. Of course these debates are neither 
completely independent one from the other nor are they only about ideas. They must 
be conceptualised as two intersecting axes along which overlapping debates on the 
relationship among ideas, interests and power are taking place. Thus the contrasting 
tendencies within each debate should be conceptualised as different ways of 
approaching socio-political reality; as different lenses of observing and understanding 
politics, in its broader sense. What follows is an outline of these debates.
The First Debate: Ideas and Reality
The first and more abstract debate concerns the ontological status of ideas in the 
world. On the one extreme of this axis one finds the thesis that ideas simply mirror 
the world; they are mere epiphenomena based on power relationships; or in a softer 
version, they are responses to the evolving needs of social life. An example of this 
soft version can be found in the study of the development of Social Sciences
18 For the reasons of this recent ‘return of ideas’ in IR/EPE see: Goldstein and Keohane, 1993: 4; 
Majone, 1996; Blyth, 1997.
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(Wiitrock and Wagner, 1996: 91), whereas instances of the stronger version can be 
found in the study of regimes (Strange, 1983) or in the analysis of the concept of 
sovereignty as organised hypocrisy (Krasner, 1999). Crude historical materialism is 
also to be included in this latter version. Hence, this tradition of thought gives 
supremacy to a material conceptualisation of the social world and to factors related to 
power and interest. Ideas constitute epiphenomena which are based on and/or reflect 
material social reality, and power relationships exist therein. We refer to this 
approach as ‘ideas, only on the surface’.
At the other extreme of the axis one finds the view that ideas do not (simply) reflect 
the world, they (rather) constitute it. Hence, ideas are not epiphenomena but rather 
constituent elements of the substratum of social reality. Here the influence of the 
post-positivist and post-structuralist sociological traditions is apparent. Instances of 
this approach can be found in relation to the construction of national identities, and to 
the construction of anarchy (Wendt, 1992) or of the European Union (Thomas 
Christiansen et al, 2001). This tradition gives primacy to the ideational and cognitive 
nature of reality. Beyond mirroring social reality, ideas construct a reality on their 
own. Foucault, responding to critics of this approach, developed a knowledge/power 
approach (Wiitrock and Wagner, 1996: 92), elaborating on how power produces 
knowledge and ideas, and how knowledge and ideas presuppose and at the same time 
constitute power relations (Foucault, 1977). For this extreme of the debate the label 
‘ideas, all the way down’ is proposed.
The Second Debate: Ideas and Policy
The second interrelated debate refers to what ideas do in relation to policy. The logic 
of this axis is not different from the first one. On the one extreme one finds theorists 
arguing that ideas function as the washing powders on the shelves of supermarkets. 
Politicians pick and choose the one that justifies better their choices and their policies. 
Put differently ideas function as ‘hooks’, in a sense that competing elites seize on 
ideas to propagate and legitimise their interests (Shepsle, 1985: 231-237, quoted in 
Goldstein and Keohane, 1993: 4). Therefore this extreme assumes that ideas 
participate in politics only as instruments of justification; they do not have a causal
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role in the policy process, and they do not influence policy, at least in any substantial 
way. As Krasner puts it, it is new political practices that create a need for 
legitimating rationales; not the other way round (Krasner, 1993, and in particular: 
261-264).
On the other extreme one finds people arguing that ideas do influence policy. The 
range though of this influence, and the way in which this influence takes place, is 
rather a matter of disagreement (see the contributions in Hill and Beshoff, 1994). 
Keohane and Goldstein, in an attempt to organise this part of the debate, distinguish 
among three ‘causal pathways’ through which ideas can influence policy outcomes. 
In the first, ideas function as road maps that increase actors’ clarity about goals or 
ends/means relationships. In the second, ideas function as focal points, providing 
cooperative solutions in situations where no unique equilibrium exists, or function as 
coalitional glue, facilitating and enhancing cohesion within particular groups19. 
Finally, through the third causal pathway ideas influence policy by becoming 
embedded in political institutions, independently of how and why these ideas 
originated (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993: 3-30). Yet, this analysis is limited by its 
rather rationalistic approach to ideas. In a constructivist or/and symbolic interaction 
perspective, the facts and the cognitive framework of policy process, or the way in 
which the policy process per se is conceptualised, are context-specific and constitute 
or are based on intersubjective understandings (Yee, 1996: 95-96; Kratochwil, 1989; 
Wendt, 1992: 392, 1995; Ruggie, 1998: 12; Finnemore, 1996; Onuf, 1989; Dessler, 
1989; Colin and Watson, 1999; Bernstein, 2000; Charon, 1998: 44-46).
In summary two broad tendencies can be distinguished. The first places significant 
emphasis on the importance of power/material capabilities and interests. Ideas do not 
matter on their own; they have no causal influence in politics or policy. They are 
used by power (i.e. powerful actors/states) to serve specific interests and justify 
specific choices. The second tendency adopts the exact opposite stand. It holds that 
ideas and ideational factors do matter and do have a standing on their own.
19 Along the same lines Keohane (1984) argues that regimes reduce the transaction costs of 
international politics, and Stein (1983) that they provide solutions to co-ordination problems. In 
addition Hall (1989b), studying the impact of Keynesian ideas argues that the latter: (a) introduced a 
new set of concepts in macroeconomic theory, (b) provided a rationale for more active government 
management of the economy and (c) argued for a particular set of policy prescriptions.
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Nevertheless, within this tendency, the claims about the degree of ideas’ importance 
and their actual role in policy and politics vary. Therefore for some researchers ideas 
may only function as ‘road maps’, but for others they are the foundation of politics 
and social reality.
The thesis subscribes to the position that neither ideas, nor interests or power can 
alone explain our world. Therefore the distinction between ideas, interests and 
power/material capabilities is useful in so far as it is conceptualised as just an 
analytical distinction. At the level of social reality, ideas, interests and power are 
inexorably related. Ideas include and express interests and power; interests include 
and express ideas and power, as far as power includes and expresses ideas and 
interests. The difference of this position from that sceptical towards ideas is the 
following: ideas may be inexorably related to interests, preferences and power factors, 
but they are not reducible to these factors. They constitute a structural property of 
the social reality, along with interests and power, and as such they have a standing of 
their own. Yet, as stressed above, none of these three elements (i.e. ideas, interests or 
power) can be studied meaningfully in separation from each other. That is why we 
need to develop analytical frameworks and theories able to account for social reality 
in its richness and totality. This thesis attempts to make a small contribution in this 
respect.
The Chapters of the Thesis
In the first chapter the theoretical framework of the research project is developed. 
Here we define the concept of hegemonic discourse and suggest a hegemonic- 
discourse-communication model. The proposed framework is based on a synthesis of 
comparative institutionalism and discourse theory, and is focused on the interaction 
between the hegemonic and the national public discourses. This chapter acts as a 
conceptual map that brings together and unites in a single research project the 
elements of the thesis, as presented above. The final part of this chapter discusses 
why the thesis focuses on globalisation, and what does it mean to approach 
globalisation as a hegemonic discourse.
33
The second chapter introduces the case studies of the thesis, i.e. Greece and Ireland, 
and their rationale, and explores the theoretical potentials of the comparison of the 
two countries. The next two chapters focus on the communication of the hegemonic 
discourse of globalisation in Greece and Ireland. These chapters serve a double aim. 
First they present in detail the empirical findings of the thesis, concerning the effect 
of globalisation discourse on the two countries. Here the thesis, rather than assuming 
globalisation to be everywhere in the late 1990s, attempts to shed light on when, by 
whom and how globalisation discourse emerged in the two national contexts. The 
second aim of these empirical chapters is to offer a concrete example of how 
hegemonic discourses can be captured and analysed. In this regard the empirical part 
of the thesis has a most important methodological and theoretical standing on its own. 
It is on the ‘empirical details’ of these chapters that the proposed conceptualisation of 
hegemonic discourse is based, and against which its validity and usefulness is tested.
Chapter five sums up and juxtaposes the findings from the Greek and Irish cases. 
Hence, rather than offering separate summaries-of-findings at the end of the two case- 
study chapters, the thesis offers a single, comparative summary. In doing so we aim 
to subject the comparison of the two cases to both a vertical and a horizontal angle of 
analysis. Thus while the main research material is organised in chapters 3 and 4 
vertically, i.e. the key category is that of the state, the recapitulation of this material is 
organised horizontally, i.e. the focus is on the various domestic institutions (e.g. 
political parties, employers, workers, etc.) rather than on states. Through this 
combination of comparative methods we aim to cross-examine and double-check our 
research material and its interpretation. The juxtaposition of the two cases reveals 
that while the same hegemonic discourse prevailed in both countries during the 1990s, 
the way in which it was communicated and materialised at the national level was 
fundamentally different. Indeed we can talk about two different facets of the 
hegemonic/globalisation; political in the case of Greece, and apolitical in the case of 
Ireland.
Chapter six offers insights and conclusions on the nature and the determinants of the 
hegemonic discourse communication process. Here the thesis evaluates the role of 
the political economy and the domestic institutional arrangements in the 
communication and materialisation of hegemonic discourses, and attempts to
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elucidate what part of the observed differences in Greece and Ireland was due to these 
factors (i.e. the model of political economy and the domestic institutional 
arrangements) and what part was not. We then use this analysis to draw broader 
conclusions regarding the communication of hegemonic discourses. These 
conclusions are suggested by the thesis as new working hypotheses in the literature of 
comparative and international politics and economics. Chapter six closes with an 
overall evaluation of the research project and the potentials for the development of a 
new Hegemonic Discourse Approach for the study of change and continuity in the 
international. Finally an Epilogue aims to recover the broader and historically 
enduring sociological and philosophical debates upon which the thesis touches.
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Part One
Theoretical Framework and the Case Studies
CHAPTER 1 
COMMUNICATING DISCOURSES: THE 
‘PUBLIC’ THROUGH THE ‘HEGEMONIC’ 
AND THE ‘HEGEMONIC’ THROUGH THE
‘PUBLIC’
Introduction: Domestic Structures, National Institutional Arrangements and the 
Communication of Hegemonic Discourses
The aim of this chapter is to offer a theoretical framework for studying and 
understanding hegemonic discourses and their function and effects. It is suggested 
that the domination of a hegemonic discourse signifies a complex communication 
process that directly involves national discursive realities, domestic institutional 
arrangements and agents/subjects. Therefore what is under scrutiny in the chapter is 
this communication process itself, in order to illustrate what this process signifies, 
how it should be conceptualised, what are its constitutive elements, and how concepts 
such as change and continuity should be interpreted in this context. In real terms the 
thesis proposes the concept of hegemonic discourse as an analytical framework for 
studying the conditions of production, reproduction and change of social life within 
the international.
Most political scientists would agree that discourses (loosely defined as sets of policy 
ideas, e.g. deregulation) are diffused into national politico-economic systems. But 
what is the nature of this diffusion and how does it take place? For sure, there are
international institutions that act as powerful channels for the generation and 
surveillance of these discourses. But still this does not say very much about how 
these discourses are introduced and communicated at the national level, or what is the 
nature of the relationship between these discourses and the public/domestic sphere. 
This problem becomes even more acute if we shift our focus from sets of policy ideas 
onto systems of political or politico-economic governance (e.g. liberal democracy and 
capitalism), or onto what we have defined in the Introduction as hegemonic 
discourses. There seems to be a black box in the stage of national communication of 
either policy ideas or hegemonic discourses which needs to be opened; and indeed it 
is this observation that constitutes the point o f departure of this research.
This Chapter offers a way of analysing the interplay between hegemonic discourses 
and national institutional arrangements. The main claim here is that the 
dissemination of hegemonic discourses should be conceptualised as an interaction 
process between two discursive realities: the hegemonic discourses on the one hand, 
and the public discourses on the other. In order to do so two bodies of literature are 
combined: comparative institutionalism and discourse theory. The aim is to propose 
an understanding of hegemonic discourse communication as an integral part of 
national ideology-production mechanisms. The term integral is crucial here. The 
aforementioned two discursive realities (the ‘hegemonic’ and the ‘public’) are 
conceptualised as parts of a single discursive ensemble; their relationship is a 
relationship of mutual presupposition; and their analytical separation aims at stressing 
and clearly delineating this mutual presupposition, rather than obfuscating or denying 
it. For, as is analysed, the hegemonic forms the outside (for the public), but it lies 
within1.
The purpose of combining comparative institutionalism and discourse theory is to 
capture the dynamic relationship between institutions and discourses. It can be 
assumed that without institutions, there would be no discourses, but also that without 
discourses, institutions would only exist in disarray, if they existed at all. Put 
differently discourses offer a cognitive level of institutionalisation which allows the 
diverse elements of a polity to hang together. Hence it is argued that in order to
1 For an elaboration of such a relationship see Deleuze, 1988: 70-93.
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understand hegemonic discourses, what they are and what they do, one has to study 
and understand the nature of the relationship between the institutional and the 
discursive. Such an approach shares a lot with the Gramscian tradition. As Gramsci 
(1971: 177) argued ‘[i]t is the problem of the relations between structure and 
superstructure which must accurately be posed and resolved if the forces which are 
active in the history of a particular period are to be correctly analysed and the relation 
between them determined’. In many regards it is this Gramscian tradition that the 
theoretical framework suggested here aims to push further by studying the interplay 
between a biopolitical approach to politics (i.e. the study of the production of 
human/social life itself), and a traditional analysis based on a who-gets-what-when- 
and-how analysis.
To develop our theoretical framework first we elaborate on the weakness of the 
existing literature to account for a wide range of discursive phenomena. Then we 
focus on the concept and the function of hegemonic discourses, and we suggest what 
their dissemination signifies and how it should be conceptualised and studied. Lastly, 
we reflect on how the concept of hegemonic discourses can be operationalised for the 
research purposes of this project.
The Ideas Literature, Hegemonic Discourses and the (Reproduction of Life
Ideas-Do-not-Float-Freely vs. Discursive Formations
The thesis aims to contribute to the existing body of literature of Comparative Politics, 
International Relations and International Political Economy that deals with ideas and 
discourse communication (among others, Hall, 1989, 1992; Risse-Kappen, 1991, 
1994, 1995; Evangelista, 1995; Wittrock and Wagner, 1996; Czamiawska and 
Joerges, 1996; Checkel, 1997; Blyth, 1997; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; McNamara, 
1998; Hay, 1998,2001; Kjcer and Pedersen, 1998; Rosamond, 1999,1999a; Banchoff, 
1999; Risse-Kappen et al, 1999; Hay and Rosamond, 2000; Schmidt, 2000, 2001, 
2002). The (re)emergence of the importance of the study of ideas in IR/IPE has 
indeed produced an important body of literature, generating several hypotheses on 
how specific ideas and discourses have been disseminated and produced policy
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changes. Therefore, insightful research -  albeit not as extended as one would expect 
-  has been done on the role of particular actors in the dissemination of 
ideas/discourses. Such actors include epistemic communities (Haas, 1992), advocacy 
coalitions (Sabatier, 1998; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993), advocacy networks 
(Keck and Sikkink, 1998), think-tanks (Stone, 1996; Stone et al., 1998, 2004) and 
transnational networks (Risse-Kappen, 1994,1995; Evangelista, 1995).
Moreover there is a relatively developed literature on how and why common 
‘external’ challenges (ideas could also be included here) produce different national 
responses. Put differently, why do different states respond differently to common 
incentives (see for instance Katzenstein, 1977, 1984; Hall, 1986, 1989; Ikenberry, 
1988; Kjcer and Pedersen, 1998; Garrett and Lange, 1999; Risse-Kappen, 1991,1994, 
1995; Campbell, 1998; Banchoff, 1999; Schmidt, 2000, 2001; Wittrock and Wagner, 
1996). Finally, there is a more specialised literature on how particular technical 
international norms, such as those produced by the International Standardization 
Organisation (e.g. ISO 9000), have been internalised into different national contexts 
(see, for instance, Casper and Hancke, 1999).
It is within the above debates that institutions and ideas talk to each other within 
IR/IPE, and even though an integrated framework of analysis remains to be 
developed, important contributions towards this aim have been made (see for instance 
Hall, 1989; Risse et al., 1999; Campbell, 1998; Hay 2001a). It is also within the 
above debates that the study of discourse managed gradually to acquire attention, 
leading recently to a new strand of institutional analysis, called discursive 
institutionalism (see for instance Schmidt, 2000, 2001, 2002; Kjaer and Pedersen, 
2001; Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004, 2004a, 2005). Yet the terms in which the study of 
discourse has been developed within most of the above literature have important 
limitations. Laffey and Weldes (1997) have argued that most of the ideas literature 
reproduces a set of rationalistic bias and assumptions of which is supposedly a 
critique. In particular, they argue that: (i) the mainstream ideas literature treats ideas 
and interests as rival explanations. As a result ‘the investigation of the social 
construction of interests is in practice disavowed because it is assumed.. .that interests 
are given and can be determined in isolation from ‘ideas” (ibid.: 200). (ii) Within this 
body of literature ideas are in fact conceived as causal factors in a conventional neo­
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positivist sense. As a result, only certain ideational factors ‘pass the test’ of what is to 
be studied: ‘the important questions concern not the broad conditions of possibility 
[e.g. alternative socio-economic systems or world orders] which are conceptualised in 
such a way that they do not seem directly to affect or ‘cause’ policy, but concern 
instead the impact of the narrower ‘causal’ beliefs, which do’ (ibid.: 201). (iii) Ideas 
are treated as individual possessions (usually as beliefs or shared beliefs), and their 
analysis is based on an understanding of ‘ideas as commodities’. Thus ideas are 
constructed as discrete objects, which in order to be causally effective they require 
political entrepreneurs -  an analysis which not only reproduces the ideas/interests 
dichotomy, but is also ‘symptomatic of the difficulties in treating social phenomena 
in individualist terms’ (ibid.: 206). To overcome these bias and limitations Laffey 
and Weldes present a thoughtful analysis of how to move ‘beyond beliefs’ to an 
understanding of ideas as ‘symbolic technologies’. Along similar lines Campbell 
(1998: especially Epilogue) criticises the positivistic bias found in the way in which 
mainstream constructivist approaches have appropriated the concepts of ‘culture’ and 
‘identity’. Within these approaches, he argues / ‘culture’ is figured as no more than 
that which is not material, the ideas and beliefs that make up the domestic domain, 
which can be isolated as variables possessing at least some causal autonomy’ (ibid.: 
218). This analysis then evolves in one of the following ways: Either ‘policy 
makers...are regarded as being engaged in a sort of conscious and deliberate 
construction of reality’, as if they were located outside of the domain of social 
constitution, or, the factor language or culture ‘becomes an omnipotent force so 
deterministic that ‘it’ acts as the governing subject such that all accounts of human 
agency are expunged’ (ibid.: 219). Campbell then exemplifies how this analysis 
reproduces the idealist/materialist dichotomy and its problems, failing to engage with 
the issue of the materiality of discourse . This Chapter aspires to enrich the above 
critique by delineating a range of very important discursive phenomena, that the ideas 
literature does not seem capable of conceptualising and addressing. The following 
paragraphs elaborate on this point.
An underlying assumption of the ideas literature is that ideas do not float freely 
(Risse-Kappen, 1994). The discourses of disarmament, of ozone depletion, of
2 For a critique of the contemporary ideas literature from a different standpoint, see also Hay, 2004.
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Keynesianism, of neoliberalism, of human rights, of globalisation, to mention a few 
examples found in the literature, had not floated freely, and actually (the argument 
goes) they could not have done so. Ideas cannot exist without agents even though 
they are not reducible to them (see Adler’s analysis on social facts (1997). In this 
thesis I do not aim to challenge this assumption. I want to argue however that this 
assumption, in relation to certain type of discourses may be a misleading one. The 
existing literature, in response to the aforementioned underlying assumption (i.e. 
ideas do not float freely) has tried to find the (potential) ‘carriers’, the agents that 
carry the ideas. Such attempts refer -  as already mentioned -  to epistemic 
communities, advocacy coalitions, advocacy networks, think-tanks and transnational 
networks. I would like to argue, however, that the idea of the carrier is not the only 
possible response to the assumption that ideas do not float freely. The diffusion and 
function of discourses into societies cannot always be understood and studied in terms 
of a carrier. I do not mean to simplify the aforementioned approaches or to 
downgrade their diversity. In this manner reference to a carrier should not be 
interpreted as signifying a single agent (collective or not), or a single channel. The 
carrier in most of the aforementioned approaches is a network (rather than a single 
agent), and each approach attributes different characteristics to this network. For 
instance, it can be a knowledge-based network, as in the case of epistemic 
communities and the ozone depletion discourse, or a winning coalition of domestic 
and transnational actors, as in the case of transnational networks and the arms control 
discourse. Nevertheless, all the above approaches prescribe a critical 
channel/network/agent in the communication of ideas/discourses.
I should like, however, to argue that there is a type of discourse which cannot 
comfortably fit in the above models of ideas/discourse communication. In this type 
of discourse, there is no critical channel, network or agent involved in its 
communication/dissemination/diffusion. Rather, this type of discourse, which is 
defined here as hegemonic, has an all-pervasive multilevel societal effect. Its general 
and all-encompassing nature does not allow its communication in societies to have an 
authoritative sourcing of definition. In these cases, rather than the discourse to be 
characterised by privileged objects, such as ozone depletion and supply-side 
economics, it is characterised ‘by the way in which it forms objects that are in fact 
highly dispersed’; by its capacity to ‘give birth simultaneously or successively to
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mutually exclusive objects, without having to modify itself (Foucault, 1972: 44). 
This is a point that is missing from, or is not clearly addressed in, the existing 
literature, and thus there is a gap in the conceptualisation and study of this type of 
discourses, their communication and their effects. In these cases the communication 
type escapes from the carrier model and takes a more complex and social- 
constructivist form (see also Campbell, 1998; Laffey and Weldes, 1997). In these 
cases it can be argued that the assumption that ideas do not float freely is rather a 
misleading one. For, the metaphor of floating leads to the concept of a carrier. If 
ideas do not float on their own, then somebody or something has to carry them in 
order to be disseminated.
This thesis argues that in order to understand and study these cases, one must escape 
from the metaphor of ideas floating, and adopt a more complex and dispersed logic 
and approach based on the discursive formation of objects, processes and thus of 
realities and of life itself. Such a study ceases to be a study of ideas-held-by- 
individuals, and turns out to be a study of the role of the ideational in the constitution 
of the subject. In fact, following this route, one has to abandon the vocabulary of 
ideas, and move from the category of the ideational to that of the discursive .
The next section attempts to develop a framework of analysis suitable for addressing 
this gap in the ideas literature. To do so first we define the phenomenon of 
hegemonic discourses, and we argue that in order to study these discourses, a political 
and a biopolitical approach to politics need to be combined. Then we move to the 
issue of how hegemonic discourses are communicated and materialised. The focus of 
the analysis is on what this process of hegemonic discourse communication signifies 
and how it can be conceptualised and studied. Here the thesis explores what makes a 
discourse hegemonic, and in doing so it brings into the analysis the concept of the 
public discourse. It is suggested that the hegemonic is the social technology of the 
public’s reproduction, i.e. the biopolitics of the public.
3 In an insightful article Milliken (1999) argues that three theoretical claims constitute the common 
denominator of the various approaches found in the category of the discursive: First, that discourses 
are structures of signification which construct social realities. Second, that discourses are 
productive/reproductive of the things which they define. Third, that all discourses are unstable grids 
requiring work to ‘articulate’ and ‘rearticulate’ their knowledges and identities, and thus are constantly 
open to change (see also Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000; Howarth, 2000).
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Conceptualising Hegemonic Discourses
The conceptualisation of hegemonic discourses in this thesis comes from a post- 
structural tradition (indicative works within IR include, Walker, 1986, 1993; Ashley, 
1987; Hoffman, 1988; Shapiro and Der Derian, 1989; George, 1989, 1994; George 
and Campbell, 1990; Ashley and Walker, 1990; Campbell and Dillon, 1993; Der 
Derian, 1990; Devetak, 1995; Dillon, 1996, 2000; Smith, 1997). In particular, 
hegemonic discourses are conceptualised as historically specific, overarching social 
technologies, concerning the (re)production o f (everyday) life within the international. 
Along these lines one could distinguish among two hegemonic discourses in the post- 
WWn period. First, the Cold War discourse which dominated and defined the 
conditions of production of social life in the international from the end of the WWII 
until the end of the 1980s, and second the neoliberal globalisation discourse that 
replaced in the 1990s the hegemonic discourse of Cold War as the dominant mode of 
social life production. Certainly this change in the conditions of reproduction of the 
international was a gradual one. Thus, as we analyse below, elements of the 
hegemonic discourse of globalisation were well in place since the late 1970s.
Some conceptual clarifications are necessary here. The ‘re’ in the term reproduction 
is put in parenthesis in the above definition in order to signify that new modes of 
production of social life can only take place through the already existing social 
subjects, i.e. through the reproduction of social life. In this context, reproduction 
should be understood as a continuum of ever anew-activated productions. The term 
everyday in the definition is in parenthesis to signify the tension between the social 
and the subjective, inherent to the human condition. Thus a hegemonic discourse is a 
certain mode of everyday life reproduction. Yet this realm, i.e. the realm of everyday, 
is the realm where human beings are constituted as social subjects. Thus, bracketing 
the term everyday aims to signify that a certain mode of everyday life reproduction is 
a certain mode of producing social subjects; therefore, in essence, a hegemonic 
discourse is about the production of social subjects. Finally, the concept of social 
technology draws from the Foucaultian tradition. Thus a social technology is 
conceptualised as as a set of meanings and practices concerning the mode in which
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social life is organised and reproduced (Foucault, 1972: 49; see also Laclau and 
Mouffe, 1985: 105). To sum up, in this thesis the concept of hegemonic discourse 
signifies the historically-specific set of practices and meanings that dominate in the 
(re)production of social life in the international. Therefore, the level-of-analysis 
found in the study of hegemonic discourses is that of the production and reproduction 
of everyday life. Along these lines Gill (1995), for instance, analyses globalisation as 
the civilisation of the market, Sinclair (1999) attempts to develop the international 
political economy of the commonplace, whilst feminist scholars have attempted to 
exemplify the ways in which ‘the personal is political’ (e.g. Enloe, 1989; Hutchings, 
1994).
The most important reason for mobilising the Foucaultian tradition in the definition of 
hegemonic discourses is that it carries the legacy of power/knowledge analysis. The 
benefit of the latter is that it provides an analytical framework which is able to 
capture the ‘trinity’ of social reality, i.e. the unity of ideas/knowledge, interests and 
power. Knowledge and power in this tradition of thought are intrinsically related, for 
power is one of the conditions of knowledge, and knowledge is one of the conditions 
for power (Foucault, 1977: 27). Following such a line of reasoning hegemonic 
discourses are not conceptualised as neutral, abstract ideologies. They are not 
ideational constructs independent from interests and power relationships. But neither 
are they reducible to them. They are intrinsically bio-political in the sense that they 
concern the (re)production of human life. Power within this context (i.e. bio-power) 
‘is not so much a matter of imposing constraints upon citizens as of ‘making up’ 
citizens capable of bearing a kind of regulated freedom. Personal autonomy is not the 
antithesis of political power, but a key term in its exercise, the more so because most 
individuals are not merely the subjects of power but play a part in its operations’ 
(Rose and Miller, 1992: 174). Along these lines Foucault also argues that power must 
produce truth as it produces wealth, and specifically ‘it must produce truth in order to 
produce wealth in the first place’ (1980: 93-94).
A clarification of the concept of biopolitical is important here. The concepts of 
biopolitics and biopower have been central in the archaeology of the subject of 
Michel Foucault, i.e. his attempts to discover and analyse how the modem subject has 
come to constitute itself as such. In the first volume of his work on the history of
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sexuality, he argues: ‘For a long time.. .[t]the sovereign exercised his right of life only 
by exercising his right to kill, or by refraining from killing...The right which was 
formulated as the ‘power of life and death’ was in reality the right to take life or let 
live...Since the classical age [however] the West has undergone a very profound 
transformation (1978: 135-136) ... Now it is over life, throughout its unfolding, that 
power establishes its dominion; death is power’s limit, the moment that escapes it 
(ibid.: 138) ... The old power of death that symbolised sovereign power was now 
carefully supplanted by the administration of bodies and the calculated management 
of life.. .marking the beginning of an era of ‘bio-power” (ibid.: 139-140)4. Foucault’s 
intellectual trip, which is impossible to meaningfully fit into a short paragraph, 
created a biopolitical tradition of thought in social sciences, followed in different 
ways (and among others) by Deleuze and Guattari (1988), Butler (1997), Agamben 
(1998), and Hardt and Negri (2000)5. Within this context, Hardt and Negri (2000: 23- 
24) define biopower as a ‘form of power that regulates social life from its interior, 
following it, interpreting it, absorbing it, and rearticulating it. Power can achieve an 
effective command over the entire life of the population only when it becomes an 
integral, vital function that every individual embraces and reactivates of his or her 
own accord.. .Biopower thus refers to the situation in which what is directly at stake 
in power is the production and reproduction o f life itself (emphasis added).
Following this analysis the emphasis put by this thesis on the biopolitical nature of 
hegemonic discourses serves two purposes. First, is to stress the point that what is at 
stake in these discourses is the (re)production of social life, i.e. hegemonic discourses 
are not only about the production of wealth and power relationships, but also about 
the production of subjects, peoples and societies. Second, is to stress the fact that the 
reproduction or change of these discourses depends on the actions or reactions of 
social subjects, i.e. hegemonic discourses not only produce subjects and societies, but 
are also produced by them. In this manner the biopolitical is used by this thesis as a
4 This work led Foucault to a latter stage of his work to a research project on ‘govemlnentality, 
(Foucault, 1991), and the political technology of individuals; how ‘we have been led to recognise 
ourselves as a society...’ (Foucault 1998b: 146). Integral to this project was the study o f the 
technologies of self that permit ‘individuals to effect by their own means...a certain number of 
operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being...’ (Foucault 1998a: 
18); a study that constitutes a ‘history of how an individual acts upon himself (ibid.: 19).
5 See also Rose, 1999; Dean, 1999. For a critique o f the way in which the concepts of biopolitics and 
biopower have been mobilised by Negri and Agamben, see, Rabinow and Rose, 2003.
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means for bringing everyday life and the subject to the forefront of the analysis of 
world politics and economics.
A story from the writings of Cornelius Castoriadis would be enlightening here6. 
Castoriadis on many occasions presented his ideas, on the centrality of the factory in 
the reproduction of capitalism, to workers. He found however that the workers ‘had 
little to say and appeared disappointed’. Their main problem was that they were 
hearing boring and uninteresting things about the importance of their everyday life, 
rather than things that ‘really mattered’, such as the dynamics of overproduction/ 
underconsumption and the law of the falling rate of profit. ‘It seemed unbelievable to 
them that the evolution of modem society is determined far more by the daily 
movements and gestures of millions of workers in factories all over the world than by 
some great and mysterious hidden laws of the economy discovered by theoreticians’. 
For Castoriadis the ‘idea that workers have that how they live, what they do, and how 
they think ‘doesn’t really matter’ is ...the gravest manifestation o f ...[an] ideological 
enslavement... For ... [the current system] can survive only if people are persuaded 
that what they themselves do and know is a private little matter of their own that does 
not really matter, and that really important matters are the monopoly of the big shots 
and specialists in various fields of endeavour’ (italics in the original).
The above analysis is suggestive both of the importance of discourse and biopolitics 
in understanding hegemonic discourse communication, and the negative implications 
of their marginalisation from the mainstream approaches to IR/IPE. In particular the 
attempt by the mainstream IR/IPE to confer pariah status on post-structural 
approaches (see Campbell, 1998: 210), led discourse theory for a long period to the 
margins of international studies theorising. Indeed there was, and still is in many 
scholars and researchers, a negative prejudice towards whatever has to do with 
discourse; the main charges being that discourse and post-structural theory are ‘self- 
referential’, ‘self-righteous’, ‘unscientific’ and ‘bad IR’ (see the review of the 
opinions of Rosenberg, Keohane, Ruggie and Mearsheimer in Campbell, 1998: 210- 
212); or that discourse theorists are no more than methodological anarchists,
6 All quotations are from Castoriadis, 1998.
7 Here, Castoriadis refers to capitalism.
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relativists and armchair theorizers (see Howarth, 2000: 6). This has created a clear 
dividing line between researchers employing discourse theory and those who do not. 
This situation does not serve the study of world politics and economics. Ideas and 
institutions alone are able to tell only half of the story about the politics of hegemony 
and discourse at an international level. Following traditional approaches to politics, 
these bodies of literature focus on powerful states, and interests. They inquire who 
has the power to determine the structures and the rules of the game of world politics 
and economics. By focusing on who gets what, when and how they locate the core of 
hegemony in powerful states and dominant interests, thus uncovering underlying 
power relations at act in the international.
On the other hand biopolitical approaches to politics emphasise that, to focus on how 
power structures the ‘game’ (e.g. the social universe, world politics, life itself, etc.), is 
to externalise power from the ‘game’. Thus, before and beyond the structuring of the 
rules of the game, one has to consider the concept of the game itself, and the 
conditions of its existence; and power is one of those. In such an inquiry the subject 
(human being) comes to the forefront. The subject acquires its existence through, and 
can only be self-identified against, the ‘game’. Furthermore the game does not exist 
beyond the subject; and change in the game and its terms can only be conceptualised 
as part of the process of subject’s reproduction, part of the process of everyday life
o
reproduction. Therefore this tradition of thought, which is based on the writings of 
thinkers such as Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, Antonio Negri, Giorgio Agamben, 
locates ‘hegemony’ at the level of the (re)production of life itself; locates hegemony 
at the level of the subject. Furthermore, this approach suggests that a new form of 
sovereignty has been emerging, which -  in contrast to the traditional understanding of 
sovereignty that was grounded on the concept of nation-state -  is grounded on a 
global network of power ‘composed of a series of national and supranational 
organisms [that are] united under a single logic of rule’ (Hardt and Negri, 2000: xii). 
Thus, in contrast to the traditional form of sovereignty, the new form ‘does not rely 
on fixed boundaries or barriers. It is a decentered and deterritorializing apparatus of 
rule that progressively incorporates the entire global realm’ (ibid.; emphasis in the
8 Indicative recent applications in IR include, Dillon, 1995; Dillon and Reid, 2000, 2001; Edkins, 2000; 
Edkins, Jenny, Pin-Fat, Veronique and Shapiro, Michael, 2004.
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original). It is the contention of this thesis that in order to study hegemonic 
discourses one has to consider and build upon both of these approaches to politics and 
sovereignty. The question of ‘who gets what when and how’ must open itself to the 
question of what are the conditions of existence, reproduction and change of this 
who-gets-what system. Put more abstractly, the question who gets what hegemonic 
discourse, when and how, must open itself to the question who is what part of a 
hegemonic discourse, when and how; and for this target to be met comparative 
institutionalism and discourse theory have to speak to each other.
The next sections aim at elaborating further on the characteristics of hegemonic 
discourses and proposing a framework for conceptualising and studying their 
communication/materialisation.
Conceptualising Hegemonic Discourse Communication: the Bio-Politics of the 
‘Public’
Hegemonic Discourses: from Origins to Function and Communication
One should start here with the question what makes a discourse hegemonic? Is it the 
scale of its dissemination, or are there structural elements, specific properties of the 
discourse itself? Put differently, does a discourse become global because it is 
hegemonic, or it is hegemonic because it becomes global? Which condition comes 
first? That is, what is the essence of the epithet ‘hegemonic’?
The thesis contends that what makes a discourse hegemonic is not its scope of 
dissemination but its structural relationship with particular interests and modes of 
social organisation and production, dominant at a certain historical moment. Thus, a 
discourse acquires a ‘hegemonic status’ on the basis of its relationship with dominant 
‘material’ forces, and therefore the emergence of hegemonic discourses is part of the 
‘story’ of wealth and knowledge production in world politics and economics (see 
below). In this regard, for instance, the emergence of globalisation discourse cannot 
be separated from the internationalisation of production by multinational enterprises 
and the integration of financial markets since the early 1980s. Moreover the
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integration of financial markets at an international level would hardly become 
possible without new technological breakthroughs, such as the Internet. Yet, two 
important caveats are in order here.
First, is that a hegemonic discourse and its effects cannot be reduced to any particular 
conditions or category (for instance the MNCs, the USA, the financial capital or the 
‘economic’ in the above example). A hegemonic discourse meets a condition of 
universality9. But precisely because it meets this condition of universality, it can only 
be through the non-universal, it can only be through the particularistic, the national, 
the ‘public’. To paraphrase, or rather to use, Deleuze (1988), the ‘hegemonic’ neither 
sees nor speaks. But precisely because it does not itself speak and see, it makes the 
public/’us’ do so. It comes from below. Thus, although the formation of hegemonic 
discourses can be traced to particular interests and conditions, during their 
communication hegemonic discourses acquire an independent dynamic, which not 
only cannot be reduced to, but in fact transforms the initial interests and material 
conditions which gave birth to them in the first place. This independent effect of the 
hegemonic discourse is central to the conceptualisation proposed here of hegemonic 
discourse communication. This process may create new subjectivities and cleavages, 
give rise to new dynamics, define new zones of contestation, new political projects 
and new possibilities for domination and resistance. In this way, ‘politics’ and ‘life’ 
are equal components of the communication process of hegemonic discourses.
The second caveat refers to the ‘materialistic’ point of departure of hegemonic 
discourses. Interests and power relationships are to be found at the point of origin. 
Are then hegemonic discourses superstructures? It is here that the dichotomy 
between the ‘material’ and the ‘discursive’ cannot but be problematised. Considering 
that the level of analysis is the reproduction of social life, at no point in time, is any 
‘material’, in terms of interests and power, extra-discursive, that is outside, beyond or 
independent from a hegemonic discourse. For, as already argued, hegemonic 
discourses are not understood as ‘ideological systems of meaning that obfuscate and
9 Here I borrow from the debate among J. Butler, E. Laclau and S. Zizek (2000:3). ‘All three of us, 
however, maintain that universality is not a static presumption, not an a priori given, and that it ought 
instead to be understood as a process or condition irreducible to any of its determinate modes of 
appearance’. For a Gramscian analysis on the issue of universality, see Laclau, 2000.
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naturalize uneven distributions of power and resources’ as the classical Marxist 
tradition would have it (see Howarth, 2000: 4 fc), but as social orders concerning the 
production and reproduction of social life itself10. Thus the interests and power 
relationships that are found at the point of origin of hegemonic discourses are not 
externally formed but are both a part and a product of the process through which 
social life reproduces itself. To use Foucault (1972: 45), the hegemonic11 ‘does not 
pre-exist itself...but it exists under the positive conditions of a complex group of 
relations... These relations are established between institutions, economic and social 
processes, behavioural patterns, systems of norms, techniques, types of classification, 
modes of characterization; and these relations...do not define its [i.e. hegemonic 
discourse’s] internal constitution, but what enables it to appear’. In this regard, and 
for the second half of the twentieth century, Hardt and Negri (2000) note: ‘Capital 
has indeed always been organised with a view towards the entire global sphere, but 
only in the second half of the twentieth century did multinational and transnational 
industries and financial corporations really begin to structure global territories 
biopolitically’ (ibid.: 31). Hence, ‘along with the global market and global circuits of 
production has emerged a global order, a new logic and structure of rule’ (ibid.: xi). 
Hence it can be argued that the relationship of a hegemonic discourse with dominant 
interests cannot explain the nature and function of a hegemonic discourse.
In order to understand the concept of hegemonic discourse one has to move from the 
question of the origins, to the question of the function of this discourse. Hence, a 
discourse is hegemonic when the practices and meanings on which it is based, and 
which it constructs/produces, start to restructure our everyday understanding of social 
relations and the world, the life-in-the-intemational, as a whole. This is what the 
epithet hegemonic really signifies: the fact that the discourse enforces its terms on the 
reproduction of social life, both in an individual and a universal sense. In this manner, 
a hegemonic discourse does not form objects and processes from a ‘zero point’, but 
rather (re-)orders dispersed phenomena towards a dynamic new totality which 
empowers her own identity as a totality, and (trans)forms the social reality in its own 
terms.
10 Increasingly not only the ‘social’, but also the ‘biological’ human life is at stake (if such a distinction 
makes any sense). See Rose, 2001.
11 Foucault refers to the ‘object of the discourse’.
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This analysis may give the impression that the establishment of hegemonic discourses 
is a linear process with clearly distinguished stages: firstly we have interests and 
‘material’ factors, secondly we have a set of favourable conditions, thirdly the 
hegemonic discourse, and fourthly its dissemination. Yet, as we have argued above, 
technological, material and cognitive changes are taking place in tandem, and can 
only be conceptualised as an integral part of the process of the reproduction of social 
life. In this framework, change is only possible through repetition and reproduction12. 
Therefore the above ‘stages’ should not be understood as different historical moments. 
In real terms each stage encompass and cannot be detached from the others, and in 
this regard all stages are present in each single stage. On this basis it is also claimed 
that a hegemonic discourse is materialised through its communication, and therefore 
communication and materialisation should be conceptualised as a single process in 
the case of hegemonic discourses.
Along the above lines it is clear that the establishment of a hegemonic discourse is 
not a process that is external to the subject; but a process that is implicated and takes 
place at the level of the subject, influencing its self-understanding and defining the 
social technology of its production, reproduction and change. The use of the term 
communication, rather than diffusion or dissemination, was preferred in regard to 
hegemonic discourses in order to stress this constitutive relationship between the 
hegemonic and the subject. Yet a study of the subject and its reproduction cannot but 
take place through the study of its sociality, i.e. through a study of the social 
interactions that dominate in its production/reproduction; and although the 
organisation of social life is characterised by various organisational and institutional 
layers, it can be argued that the single most important layer for the organisation and 
reproduction of social life since the dawn of modernity is the nation-state. It is at this 
point where the issue of the role of domestic structures and national institutional 
arrangements emerges. It is also at this point that the domestic, the social context, 
enters the picture of hegemonic discourse communication as a ‘black box’, in much
12 As Butler (2000: 41) notes, an ‘established discourse remains established only by being perpetually 
re-established’ thus risking ‘itself in the very repetition it requires’.
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of the respective IR/IPE literature. What happens at this level, and how is this level 
to be related with that of the hegemonic?
In order to address these questions this thesis suggests that we must open the 
‘domestic’ and emphasise the terms of its communication with the ‘hegemonic’. 
Indeed each ‘domestic’ delineates a discursive, particularistic reality on its own, 
which is characterised by different structures of signification, different historical 
institutional arrangements and mechanisms of ideology production, different ways of 
relating with the ‘hegemonic’. This domestic social sphere is referred to here as 
public discourse13, and is defined as a social sphere which is produced and 
reproduced through social interactions within a specific space/territory (the nation­
state in this case), and at the same time gives meaning to, orients and structures these 
interactions, i.e. it evolves through a structuration process (Giddens, 1984; see also 
Cemy, 2000)14. Along these lines it can be argued that the public discourse is what 
makes the diverse and disparate elements of a polity hang together, by creating a 
distinctive level of institutionalisation. Thus the concept of public discourse in this 
thesis includes both organisations and institutions (e.g. political parties, interest 
groups, electoral systems, and systems of democratic governance, such as presidential 
and parliamentary ones), and what makes these institutions hang together, delineating 
a distinctive social sphere (the historical co-evolution of these institutions, a common 
and society-specific symbolic universe, a common and society-specific regime of 
truth). Thus, the concept of public discourse, which will be used interchangeably 
here with the term public, aims at capturing the social interactions’ game through 
which a society constitutes and reproduces itself as a distinctive social sphere15,16.
13 The use o f the term discourse aims at underlining the dynamic and inherently inconclusive nature of 
the institutional arrangements and social processes which define the ‘public’.
14 It needs to be stressed here that in this structuration process not all the actors have the same role, 
position or power. For this point see, Mouzelis, 1991: chapter 4.
15 One can find in the literature several ways of conceptualising die social sphere that is defined by the 
‘domestic/inside’. Relevant to our project examples include the following: Deutsch (1966) has tried to 
develop a theory of peoples/nations as communities of social communication. He argues that 
peoples/nations ‘are held together ‘from within’ by what he defines as communicative efficiency (a 
concept which includes complementary habits, vocabularies and facilities, approximating an 
anthropological definition of culture) (Ibid: chapter 4). Berger and Luckmann (1967) in their classical 
book The Social Construction o f Reality refer to the concept of ‘symbolic universes’ defined as the 
matrix of all socially objectivated and subjectively real meanings. Thus these symbolic universes serve 
to integrate the meanings already attached to disparate institutional processes. Finally Foucault uses 
the concept o f ‘regimes of truth’. He argues that ‘[ejach society has its regime of truth, its ‘general 
politics’ of truth: that is the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the 
mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by
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Based on the above, it is claimed that that the key for the understanding and the 
analysis of hegemonic discourse communication is a thorough analysis of the 
interplay between the hegemonic and the publics, i.e. the public discourses of the 
different countries. In the Introduction it was argued that the ‘public’ and the 
‘hegemonic’ are parts of the same discursive ensemble, and exist in a relationship of 
mutual presupposition. Here we would like to push this position further by arguing 
that it is not only the case that the ‘public’ does not exist independently from the 
‘hegemonic’ but also that the ‘hegemonic’ cannot exist but through the ‘public’. The 
hegemonic is the condition of the production, reproduction and change of the ‘public’. 
Thus it is suggested that the ‘hegemonic’ is, and should be conceptualised as, the bio­
politics of the ‘public’, i.e. the technology of the publics’ reproduction and change. 
Therefore, the focus of the hegemonic-discourse-communication model proposed 
here is on the reproduction of the public discourses. Whether this will prove to be a 
valid model, or how useful such an approach is to study change and continuity in 
world politics and economics, remain to be seen in our analysis of the globalisation 
discourse in Greece and Ireland.
Conceptualising the interplay between the hegemonic and the public in the above 
terms puts our traditional understanding of the inside/outside relationship under stress. 
Although the hegemonic lies within the publics (i.e. it speaks and is materialised 
through the social agents), it also forms a concrete ‘outside’ for them. This ‘outside’ 
should be conceptualised both in cognitive and non-cognitive terms. In the case of 
globalisation discourse for instance, the experience of this ‘outside’ included both the 
experience of the actual internationalisation of production by multinational 
enterprises, and the creation of a new ‘cognitive map’ about how one should function 
in this ‘new era’.
which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the 
status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true’ (Foucault, 1980: 131).
16 Within this framework it can also be said that the public discourse offers the social space and 
institutional underlying framework for the emergence of ‘public sphere’, as conceptualised by 
Habermas (1991). The latter argues (1991: 398): ‘By ‘public sphere’ we mean first o f all a domain of 
our social life in which such a thing as public opinion can be formed...When the public is large, this 
kind of communication requires certain means of dissemination and influence...newspapers...radio 
and television are the media of the public sphere’. In a similar manner, Bennett and Entman (2001: 2- 
3) argue that ‘public sphere is comprised of any and all locations, physical or virtual, where ideas and 
feelings relevant to politics are transmitted or exchanged openly’.
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In the above process of hegemonic discourse communication the role of international 
institutions/regimes and global media must separately be underlined. A complete 
reference to these powerful communication mechanisms/channels is beyond the 
purposes of this project, not least because, as has already been argued, the analysis of 
these channels does not contribute decisively to our understanding of what really
1 *7
happens at the domestic level . As Friedman (2000) for instance argues with regard 
to the global media ‘[o]ne needs to be more specific about the actual social processes 
involved...The fact that the media are concentrated among certain...firms...does not 
suffice to generate the transformation described. One has to explain their resonance, 
the conditions under which ideas can be consumed and appropriated by the rest of the 
world if this is indeed the case’ (see also Butler, 2000).
Furthermore the model of knowledge production -  what Strange (1994) has termed 
knowledge structure -  is also an important and integral element in the process of 
hegemonic discourse communication. Two issues are really important here, with 
reference to the contemporary world. On the one hand the trend towards the 
‘privatisation of knowledge’ (see Mitelka, 2000) and the transfer of knowledge- 
authority from states to non-state, in general, and private, in particular, actors, and on 
the other hand the changing role of intellectuals. With regard to the latter it has been 
noted that ‘the new hegemonic representations are produced by the university 
academics and cultural elites themselves and thus [are] immediately perceived as 
critical and progressive according to the self-definition of these elites’ (Friedman, 
2000, based on Bourdieu and Wacquants, 1995). Along these lines of argumentation 
Cox (1996: 24), for instance, with regard to globalisation and globalism notes that 
‘[t]hey emerged first in the advanced capitalist societies and with the knowledge, 
prestige, and resources present in these societies they were disseminated as objective 
truth among these societies’ subordinate classes and to peoples in the rest of the 
world’. This thesis suggests that these changes in knowledge production and
17 Harindranath (2000), in an interesting literature review on global media and cultural imperialism, 
distinguishes between two main theses. On the one side Hamelink who argues that the ‘out there’ 
influence the ‘in here’, on the basis of Wallerstein’s centre/periphery analysis; and on the other side 
Liebes, Katz and Gillespie who argue that it is wrong to assume uncritical acceptance of dominant 
ideologies.
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knowledge authority constitute instances of the new conditions for the reproduction 
of social life, generated by the emergence of the hegemonic discourse of globalisation.
The above analysis and conceptualisation of hegemonic discourses could trigger the 
criticism of ‘discourse reification’ and ‘circularity’ (i.e. impossibility of change). 
This would indeed be the case if the level of analysis of the suggested theoretical 
framework would be the states, social classes, international organisations or other 
static categories that would not allow for their transcendence. Yet, the choice of the 
thesis to give primacy to the level of social-life-reproduction makes the above 
criticism rather irrelevant. If one focuses on the level of social life and how this is 
reproduced at the everyday, one faces a grand continuity, the continuity of social life 
itself. Hegemonic discourses indeed mark changes in the ways/modes of this 
reproduction. Yet it is through the ‘reification’ of a hegemonic discourse (i.e. when it 
succeeds in forcing its own terms in the reproduction of social life) that its change 
and transcendence become possible. The redefinition of interests, preferences and 
identities that a hegemonic discourses carries with it creates new dynamics and new 
relationships which set the conditions for a new hegemonic discourse. Thus, in a 
Bergsonian way being-in-the-international should be understood as an ever evolving 
becoming, for, the ‘social’ itself is a condition of perpetual becoming. Therefore the 
moment of discourse reification cannot but be a moment of social change (or the end 
of social life), i.e. the stage of reification for a hegemonic discourse cannot but be the 
moment of its transcendence, cannot but signify the initiation of its end/change (or the 
end of social time). Thus, by focusing on the reproduction of everyday life, the 
‘problem’ of reification turns out to be an integral part and a condition of change in 
the longue duree of the reproduction of social life. Finally, it needs to be stressed that 
such an approach does not neutralise the politics of the hegemonic, in terms of who 
gets, what, when and how, i.e. in terms of winners and losers. It rather makes this 
politics inevitable, as new political projects and new opportunities for domination or 
resistance are inherent in the reproduction of social life.
To recapitulate, it was claimed that in order to understand and study hegemonic 
discourse communication, we need to (a) open the public to the hegemonic, and study 
the terms of their communication, and (b) focus on the changes in the production and
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reproduction of social life at the level of the public, for it is through the latter that the 
hegemonic is materialised.
But how can one examine the public? How one can capture those discursive instances 
(including changes in the language, the social practices, the institutions, the self- 
understandings and the understanding of structural constraints/opportunities, the 
balances of power), which signify a change in the production and reproduction of the 
public and the social life within it? It is at this point where comparative 
institutionalism is introduced to the analysis of hegemonic discourses. The following 
section offers thoughts on how hegemonic discourse communication can be 
operationalised.
Operationalising the Communication Process
Comparative institutionalism focuses on the analysis of domestic structures and 
national institutional arrangements (see Katzenstein, 1977; Risse-Kappen, 1991: 486, 
1994: 187; see also Evangelista, 1995: 9; Krasner, 1995: 258). Thus, it allows us to 
disaggregate the public, and examine its organisational structure and institutional 
composition; and by doing so it allows us to examine the rules of the game of its 
reproduction and change. Through, comparative institutionalism, therefore, we can 
map who has a voice within a public, how these voices are articulated, what are their 
power relationships, and how they lie on each other? That is why comparative 
institutionalism is important for this thesis. For, if public discourses are social 
spheres which are produced and reproduced through social interactions, then in order 
to study the change of these social spheres, one has to study the rules of these social 
interactions and the power relations existed therein.
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The proposed investigation needs to take into account a number of existing studies on 
domestic structures, such as those by Katzenstein (1977)18, Risse-Kappen (1991,1994)19, 
Evangelista (1995)20, Tsebelis (1995)21, Garrett and Lange (1996)22, Schmidt (2000, 2001, 
2003)23. But it also needs to transcend these studies in terms of discursive formation and 
ideology production at the national level. It needs to take on board the importance that 
these studies place on domestic structures and institutions as independent and/or 
intervening variables. But it needs to go beyond a static approach to domestic structures 
and institutions, and underline their discursive nature; their inherent dynamism and
18 Katzenstein (1977) has argued that the domestic structures of the nation-state are a critical 
intervening variable, without which the interrelation between international interdependence and the 
diversified national strategies cannot be understood. In particular he claims that the centralisation of 
state and society and the differentiation between them determine the nature of domestic structures and 
thus constitute the underling factor for understanding different states’ responses to common external 
incentives. Finally, he argues that four different categories of states, with regard to their domestic 
structures, exist: (a) countries which are highly centralised in both their society and state (e.g. Japan),
(b) countries with low centralised state, but highly centralised society (e.g. former W. Germany, Italy),
(c) countries with a highly centralised state, but low centralised society (e.g. France, Britain) and (d) 
countries with low centralisation in both their society and state (e.g. USA).
19 Risse-Kappen (1994) has argued that the ability o f transnational alliances or knowledge communities 
to promote ideas to states is conditioned by the domestic structures o f the target states. In particular 
domestic structures determine both the channels into the political system and the domestic partners that 
the transnational alliances have at their disposal. Finally he distinguishes among three models of 
domestic structures: (a) the state-controlled (e.g. USSR), (b) the society-dominated (e.g. USA) and (c) 
the democratic-corporatist model (e.g. Germany. See, also Risse-Kappen, 1991: 486).
20 In a similar manner to Risse-Kappen, Evangelista (1995) has argued that centralised, hierarchical, 
bureaucratic states may effectively resist access to new ideas at first, but are able to implement the 
respective policies effectively once these ideas have been adopted. On the other hand, ideas can easily 
gain access to decentralised, fragmented states, but these states have difficulties in achieving the 
implementation of new policies
21 Tsebelis (1995) has used the concept of veto player in order to study the capacity of policy change in 
different political systems. He suggests that this capacity depends upon: (a) the number of veto players 
in the system (b) the congruence of veto players, defined as the difference in their political positions, 
and (c) the cohesion of veto players, defined as the similarity of policy positions which exist within 
each veto player. Based on this analysis he distinguishes between systems with one veto player (for 
instance Westminster systems and dominant party systems) and systems with multiple veto players 
(such as presidential or federal systems, or parliamentary systems with coalition governments). He 
finally concludes that the capacity for policy change decreases when the number of veto-players, the 
lack of congruence among them and the lack of cohesion within each of them increase.
22 Garrett and Lange (1996) have analysed how formal political institutions intervene in the 
relationship between societal preferences and political outcomes. Borrowing from Tsebelis, they argue 
that the responsiveness of a government to changes in the domestic preference depends on the regime- 
type of the political system. In particular two issues are underlined as important: (a) the number of 
veto points in the political system and (b) the degree of bureaucratic autonomy. They argue that both 
are inversely correlated to the responsiveness of government to given changes in societal preferences.
23 Schmidt (2000, 2001) in a similar manner to Tsebelis, Garrett and Lange, has distinguished between 
single-actor systems, (such as Britain and France), and multi-actor systems (such as Germany and 
Sweden). Based on this distinction she argues that the process of ideas communication in the single­
actor systems focuses on the attempt of key policy groups to persuade directly the public about the 
necessity and appropriateness of their ideas. On the other hand, in multi-actor systems the focus is on 
the attempt of policy groups to agree among themselves. Thus, Schmidt argues that in multi-actor 
systems the policy groups/social partners act as a filter between ideas and the public, whereas no such 
mechanism exists in the case of single-actor systems.
57
incompleteness. It needs not only to take into account the veto points in the political 
system, but also to study this system in structural power terms; in terms of how 
preferences and political agendas are formed and how societal consensus or dissent are 
produced, broken and change (see Strange, 1994: 24-25; Lukes, 1974: 21-25). In order to 
study the communication of hegemonic discourses one needs to examine the mechanisms 
of ideology production at the national level; the ways in which actors and institutions 
produce and enforce discourses and agendas. Furthermore, one needs to focus on the 
discourses of the institutional players which participate at the ideology production, and 
examine how these discourses are ‘locked’ at the national level and what is the system 
that governs their formation and co-existence. As Foucault (1972: 32) suggested for the 
study of discourse ‘[w]hat one must characterise and individualise is the co-existence of 
these dispersed and heterogeneous statements; the system that governs their division, the 
degree to which they depend upon one another, the way in which they interlock or 
exclude one another, the transformation that they undergo, and the play of their location, 
arrangement and replacement’ (ibid.: 34).
Hence the research strategy proposed here is based on the one hand on the 
identification of the key-institutional actors and the study of the evolution of their 
discourses, and on the other hand on the study of the evolution of the terms of 
coexistence and interaction of these institutional discourses at a national level (see 
also Introducing the Thesis). In this regard comparative institutionalism is introduced 
to the study of hegemonic discourses, as a way of disaggregating and studying the 
public.
In such a research project language and its study is of great importance; and in this 
regard the proposed project has a lot in common with the linguistic approaches to 
discourse analysis in IR (e.g. Larsen, 1997; see also the contributions in Wodak and 
Meyer, 2001). Yet, the focal point of the project proposed here is not language, but 
the mechanisms of ideology and life production at the national level; the focus is on 
the ideological/power institutional basis of public discourses24.
24 In this manner, this thesis is closer to the theory of hegemony articulated by Ernesto Laclau. But 
still this project focuses more on continuity, the system that governs social antagonisms, and life 
production, rather than on social antagonisms themselves, Gramscian hegemony, and universality as an 
empty space beyond subjects. See for instance Laclau, 1985, 2000, 2001.
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Recapitulation
In this chapter an effort has been made to demonstrate the limits of the ‘ideational 
turn’ in IR/IPE, through a problematisation of the assumption that ‘ideas do not flow 
freely’. In particular it was argued that although the ideas literature has manage to 
produce a sophisticated body of studies which deals with how ideas and discourses 
are disseminated across boundaries, it does not have the analytical capacity/ 
instruments to account for the communication of a certain type of discourses, defined 
by the thesis as hegemonic. It was then argued that in order to understand what the 
hegemonic discourses are and what they do, one must escape from the metaphor of 
‘ideas floating’, and adopt a more social constructivist approach based on the 
discursive formation of social life and reality.
Along these lines, hegemonic discourses have been conceptualised as social 
technologies that concern the production and reproduction of social life, and it was 
argued that the appropriate level of analysis for studying these discourses is that of 
the reproduction of everyday life. The concept of the ‘public’ was then introduced as 
a key organisational layer of everyday life, and the relations of mutual presupposition 
between the ‘public’ and the ‘hegemonic’ were elaborated. Finally, it was 
emphasised that everyday life is about life, and not about forces externally given or 
created; i.e. everyday life is about the ‘subject’. It is here, in the ultimate inside, 
where one should look for the rise and fall of the ‘hegemonic’. It is here where the 
power for emancipation, subjugation or resistance lies. Through this analysis the 
thesis aspired to suggest a theoretical framework for thinking about and studying 
hegemonic discourse communication.
Up to this point, we have discussed the concept of hegemonic discourses mostly in a 
‘generic’ sense. The next section turns to globalisation. The main questions here are: 
Why did this project focus on globalisation? How is globalisation conceptualised in 
the IR/IPE literature? What does it mean to think of globalisation as a discourse, and 
what is a Foucaultian reading of globalisation? What is the stance taken by this thesis 
towards globalisation?
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Why Globalisation? The Need to Understand & the Need for an All- 
Encompassing Discourse
Globalisation has been selected as an object of analysis by this thesis on the basis of 
its impact on the academic, social and policy realms, at both a national and an 
international level, since the mid 1980s. It is indeed striking, as has been observed, 
that the concept of globalisation ‘came out of nowhere’ and dominated during the 
1990s most of the international and national contexts and discourses. As Giddens 
(1999: 7) has put it, ‘[t]he global spread of the term is evidence of the very 
developments to which it refers.. .Yet even in the late 1980s the term was hardly used, 
either in the academic literature or in everyday language. It has come from nowhere 
to be almost everywhere’; and along the same lines Beck (2001) has argued that ‘the 
most important victory of globalisation may be the globalisation of the globalisation 
discourse’.
Indeed saying that globalisation, for good or ill, is the state we are in would not be an 
exaggeration or a rhetorical scheme. Important political and economic decisions have 
been taken and justified in the name of globalisation, and a huge transnational social 
movement has been developed and activated against economic globalisation and the 
policies associated with it. The academic literature has not been immune to this trend. 
On the contrary, globalisation has become the single most popular concept and theme 
of the last decade . One can indeed observe that globalisation, with agency or not; as 
a process, a structure or a project; new or old; even through the negation of its 
existence has become a ‘world for itself (Robertson, 1992), which is all-present in 
our everyday lives. How did the state we are in come into being? How has it been 
communicated and materialised in different national institutional contexts? What are
25 The works that have been produced and are still produced about globalisation, are too numerous to 
be mentioned in any comprehensive way here (or indeed elsewhere). The Global Transformation 
Reader edited by D. Held and A. McGrew (2000), including forty-three articles, manages to 
encapsulate the various debates surrounding globalisation. Often-quoted edited volumes include that 
of: J. Mittelman (1996); E. Kofman and G. Youngs (1996); R. Germain (1999). Moreover, often 
quoted texts include: J. Scholte (2000); U. Beck (1999); D. Held, A. McGrew, D. Goldblatt, J. Perraton 
(1999). Finally, often-quoted critics include: R. Falk (1999); P. Hirst and G. Thompson (1999); J. 
Mittelman (2000); J. Rosenberg (2000); G. Mander and E. Goldsmith (2001). It is also interesting to 
note the engagement in the debate of mainstream authors such as R. Keohane and J. Nye (2000a, 
2000b) and K. Waltz (1999).
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the forces that are governing and conditioning its rules of formation and 
transformation? Where did globalisation come from and where is it going? The aim 
of these questions is to signify that the main reason for choosing globalisation as our 
object of analysis is a normative one. There is a need to unfold and understand the 
state we are in, and through this analysis there is a need to understand how this state 
is (re)produced and changes.
Beyond this normative criterion, globalisation discourse has the merit of being a 
general/all-encompassing discourse, as opposed to a knowledge-based, or otherwise 
specialised, one. The discourses of Keynesianism or disarmament for instance, 
although concerning society as a whole, were initially introduced/communicated 
through specialised social groups. In the first case through the community of 
economists (Hall, 1989a), and in the second through the liberal internationalist 
community (Risse-Kappen, 1994: 196-200). Hence, in the communication of these 
discourses there has been a critical channel, which shaped the communication process. 
Therefore, the analysis of the two aforementioned discourses would need to be 
focused on specific groups. This condition does not exist in the case of globalisation 
discourse, where there is no authoritative source of definition. In this regard, 
globalisation constitutes a critical case study for the project undertaken by the thesis. 
It offers a most important case to study the nature and function of hegemonic 
discourses and the interplay between the ‘hegemonic’ and the ‘public’ discourses.
Globalisation in the Literature I
The problem of capturing, and therefore studying globalisation, is that it 
simultaneously refers to and forms objects and processes ‘that are in fact highly 
dispersed’ (Foucault, 1972: 44). It ‘gives birth simultaneously or successively to 
mutually exclusive objects’ and processes ‘without having to modify itself (ibid.). 
This seems to be a common point in the globalisation literature. Giddens (1999) 
argues that globalisation is not an ‘out there’ phenomenon but an ‘in here’ one, which 
restructures the ways in which we live. It constitutes ‘a complex set of processes 
which operate in a contradictory or oppositional fashion’. Held, McGrew, Goldblatt 
and Perraton (1999) propose that globalisation should be thought of as ‘a process (or
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set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organisation of social 
relations -  assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and impact’. They 
underline, however, that globalisation should not be conceived in opposition to more 
spatially delimited processes (such as localisation and regionalisation), but as 
standing in a complex and dynamic relationship with them. Cemy in a similar 
‘dispersed’ logic (2000, see also 1995) argues that globalisation ‘is a multilayered, 
asymmetric admixture of international, transnational, domestic and local processes 
the interaction of which increasingly generate multiple equilibria’. In his ‘critical 
introduction’ to globalisation, Scholte (2000) argues that globalisation is 
simultaneously an effect and a cause; an ‘outcome’, which turned to be a causal force. 
He further suggests supraterritoriality/deterritorialisation as the defining feature of 
globalisation, underlining that the global and territorial spaces co-exist and interrelate 
in complex fashions. Finally, Robertson (1992: 102), in an often quoted phrase, 
suggests that globalisation is a ‘form of institutionalisation of the two-fold process 
involving the universalisation of particularism and the particularisation of 
universalism’, and Rosow (1994) in a similar manner argues that in a dialectical 
ongoing process ‘selves’ and ‘identities’ become more globally diffused and at the 
same time more homogeneous (see also Beck, 2000; Appandurai, 1995; Rosenau, 
1995).
It is this dispersed logic, and the different and -  more often than not -  antithetical 
nature of the various manifestation of globalisation that led us to conceptualise 
globalisation as a hegemonic discourse. Such manifestations stretch from the 
interconnectedness of financial markets, to the organisation of the anti-globalisation 
movement; and from the global media, as hegemonic channels of homogenisation, to 
the internet as a self-liberating and anarchic place.
Globalisation in the Literature II: Globalisation as Discourse
There is now a relatively developed body of literature dealing with globalisation as a 
discourse. Gill (1995: 405) argues that globalisation ‘in its present mythic and 
ideological representations’ serves to ‘reify a global economic system dominated by 
large institutional investors and transnational firms’. He argues, furthermore, that the
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discourse of globalisation leads to the ‘global incorporation of the market’ at the 
micro-level of the individual (ibid.: 410). McNamara (1997, 2001: 3), argues that 
international economic integration is proceeding in tandem with the spread of the 
global cultural norms of neoliberalism. These norms influence actors’ decisions, 
which in turn reformulate the world through their effects. Along the same lines Hay 
and Rosamond (2000: 9) use the concept of globalisation discourse to refer to the way 
in which globalisation has come to provide a cognitive filter, frame, conceptual lens 
or paradigm through which social, political and economic developments might be 
ordered, narrated and rendered intelligible. Moreover they suggest that policy makers 
acting on the basis of assumptions consistent with the hyperglobalisation thesis may 
well serve to bring about outcomes consistent with that thesis, irrespective of its 
veracity (ibid.: 5; see also Rosamond, 1999; Hay and Watson, 1999; Hay and Marsh, 
2000).
Rosamond (1999: 10-15) elaborating on the literature on globalisation as a discourse, 
distinguishes two ways of approaching the discursive dimensions of globalisation. 
The first is globalisation as a discursive device to render the world manageable (for 
instance Hay and Rosamond, 2000). Such an approach treats globalisation as a (new) 
cognitive map which enables actors to make sense of the world in which they live 
(see also Mittelman, 2004). The second approach treats globalisation as a discourse 
of power associated with particular interests. This approach treats globalisation as a 
hegemonic project aiming at the establishment of a particular world order (for 
instance Gill, 1995; Hay and Watson, 1999). To do justice to the above works we 
need to underline here that the boundaries between these two approaches are more 
than blurred in most of the analyses of the above authors. This thesis stresses the 
interconnection of these two approaches by following a power/knowledge analysis. 
Through such a prism globalisation as a discourse of power and globalisation as a 
‘cognitive map’ reflect the interaction between power and knowledge, which takes 
place at all the levels of human action, cognition and organisation. This interaction as 
mentioned above acquires its own dynamic and cannot be reduced to particular 
conditions and interests. That is, globalisation as a discourse of power is in fact the 
project of making globalisation the dominant cognitive map of thinking about, and 
understanding the contemporary world. Nevertheless, through its communication this 
project detaches itself from the particular interests that gave birth to it in the first
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place. It generates a series of processes and signs, which acquire their own dynamic, 
leading to the redefinition of interests, argumentations, narratives and identities, even 
though there is no single conceptualisation or understanding of globalisation. The 
next section elaborates further on this Foucaultian approach to globalisation.
Globalisation Discourse: a Foucaultian Reading
The globalisation discourse in a Foucaultian approach signifies a set of practices and 
meanings that systematically and reflexively form the objects and processes of which 
they speak (see Foucault, 1992: 49) . Hence, globalisation discourse is not defined 
in terms of a privileged object, for instance neoliberal norms (ibid.: 32-37). The aim 
is not to reduce the phenomenon of globalisation to a single aspect of it. On the 
contrary the aim is to study the dispersed logic and antithetical aspects of 
globalisation; to study the globalisation discourse as such. This means that the unity 
of the globalisation discourse is not, and should not be expected to be found in a 
single ‘object’. Such an approach would be appropriate, if for example one studied 
the neoliberal economic discourse. The unity of the discourse of globalisation -  in a 
Foucaultian approach -  is the common space in which the various objects and 
processes of globalisation discourse ‘emerge and are continuously transformed’ 
(ibid.: 32). Therefore, in order to study the globalisation discourse one must focus on 
the condition of co-existence of these dispersed and heterogeneous objects and 
processes; one must focus on ‘the system that governs their division, the degree to 
which they depend upon one another, the way in which they interlock or exclude one 
another, the transformation that they undergo, and the play of their location, 
arrangement and replacement’ (ibid.: 34); one must focus then on what Foucault 
defines as the rules offormation of the discourse (ibid.: 38).
Such an approach constitutes part of the project of studying the discursive and 
subjective aspects of globalisation. Indeed, a number of scholars seem to agree on the
26 This paragraph applies Foucault’s approach to discourse, as developed in The Archaeology o f  
Knowledge, to the study o f globalisation discourse. In The Archaeology o f Knowledge Foucault 
focused on the discursive formation of medicine, economics and grammar in the course of the 19th 
century.
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conclusion that ‘globalisation is what we make of it’ (see for instance McNamara, 
1997; Scholte, 2000: 7). A Foucaultian approach extends this project by focusing on 
the how we make of it; how we make what globalisation is.
Globalisation in the Thesis
This thesis, based on the analysis of this Chapter, conceptualises globalisation as a 
hegemonic discourse, i.e. as a historical-specific social technology concerning the 
production and reproduction of everyday life. Thus here globalisation consists of the 
practices and meanings that have dominated in world politics and economics at least 
since the mid-1980s. Such practices include: capital account liberalisations, 
internationalisation of production, integration of financial markets, deregulation, 
flexibility policies in labour markets, tax-incentives to corporations, internet 
communication etc.; whereas meanings include: globalisation itself as a mental map 
and a way of conceptualising the international, as well as the concepts of borderless 
world, information society, knowledge economy, risk society, Americanisation, 
imperialism, individualisation, cultural annihilation and so forth.
The proposed approach allows us to study globalisation in its complexity and 
multiplicity, without demanding its reduction to a single process or object. It allows 
us to avoid developing a research project designed to fit in a narrow, a priori and 
externally enforced definition of globalisation. Approaching globalisation as a 
hegemonic discourse allows us to account for the diverse understandings that the 
various social actors hold about it. It lets the actors speak for themselves, and set on 
their own the limits and the rules of globalisation’s definition; thus allowing us to 
study globalisation in dynamic and reflexive terms (see for instance Rupert, 2000: 42). 
Approaching globalisation as a hegemonic discourse enables us to scrutinize the 
aforementioned common space of globalisation discourse, and illustrate its rules of 
formation at the national level. To return to Foucault’s terminology it enables us to 
study the ‘conditions of existence (but also of coexistence, maintenance, modification 
and disappearance)’, of the various understandings, statements, practices and policies 
that constitute globalisation (Foucault, 1972: 38).
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This chapter has discussed the theoretical framework of the thesis, and, within this 
framework, introduced globalisation as our object of analysis. Chapter 2 turns to the 
choice of the two test-cases in which the communication of globalisation discourse 
will be studied, i.e. Greece and Ireland. The purpose is to offer a concise analysis on 
the nature of the two national contexts and the rationale of their choice. Chapters 3 
and 4 then move on to the examination of the communication of globalisation 
discourse in these two countries.
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CHAPTER 2 
WHY GREECE AND IRELAND1? THE CASE- 
STUDIES AND THE RATIONALE OF THEIR 
CHOICE
Introduction: Focused Comparisons and the Thesis
Let us begin this section by elaborating on how the proposed comparison serves the 
purpose of the thesis. The thesis aims to examine how countries, which belong to 
different politico-economic systems, vary in the way in which they communicate 
global hegemonic discourses. In order to do so the method of ‘focused’, and in 
particular, ‘paired’ comparison has been chosen. This method as its name implies is 
based on an intensive comparison of two (‘paired’), or three (‘triangular’), 
cases/countries, and the emphasis of the analysis is at least as much on the 
comparison per se, as on each of the different cases (Hague and Harrop, 2001: 73). 
As Hague and Harrop (ibid.) observe focused comparisons ‘work particularly well 
when a few countries are compared over time, examining how they vary in their 
response’ to common problems and incentives.
Beyond the appropriateness of ‘focused comparison’ for this thesis, the method has 
also an important function in the production of knowledge in general and in 
comparative studies in particular. It helps us continually to test and reconsider 
established assumptions, generalisations and categorisations, which exist in social and 
comparative studies. Paired and triangular comparisons, by being focused and 
intensive, attempt to offer explanations with reference to social interactions (i.e. ‘from 
within’), rather than with reference to pre-existing constructed models and 
categorisations (i.e. ‘from without’). Hence, although their starting point may be
1 Ireland includes both ‘Northern Ireland’, which is part of the UK, and the ‘Republic of Ireland’, 
which became independent from the UK in 1922. The use of the name ‘Ireland’ in this thesis is made 
for convenience and refers only to the Republic of Ireland.
based on existing assumptions and models, the dynamic of focused comparisons 
allow them to test and if needed to problematise these assumptions and models.
Of What Are Greece and Ireland Cases?
Keeping the chosen method in mind let us proceed to the justification of the choice of
Greece and Ireland as case studies. The first issue to be addressed is the question of
what Greece and Ireland are cases of. This is a rather static question, as its main
point of reference is the established politico-economic models found in European
comparative politics literature, i.e. the Anglo-Saxon, the Continental, the
Scandinavian, and the Mediterranean. In this regard Greece is classified in the
2 •  •  •Southern European or Mediterranean model of polity and political economy -  a 
model which is usually treated as a sub-category of the Continental Model3 -  and 
Ireland is classified in the Anglo-Saxon model of polity and political economy (even 
if it is not the most representative case of it4). Yet it should be noted here that these 
two models (i.e. the Anglo-Saxon and the Southern European) signify different things 
to the different disciplines of political science, and thus it is hard to draw clear and 
definite division lines concerning the countries included in each model. The United 
Kingdom and Ireland, however, represent the Anglo-Saxon tradition at the European 
level, whereas Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain constitute the core of Southern 
European model.
Two influential research projects, that have adopted a similar approach towards 
Greece and Ireland are as follows: First, Rhodes and Meny (1998), who classify 
European states in three categories/groups according to the nature of their 
institutional arrangements and welfare states5: the ‘Scandinavian’ (Sweden, Finland, 
Denmark, Norway), the ‘Germanic-continental’ (Germany, France, BENELUX, 
Austria, Switzerland) and the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ (UK, Ireland). Moreover they refer to
2 This model is also referred to as ‘Latin’. See for instance Ferrera, 1998, and Therbom, 1995.
3 Referred to also as ‘Germanic’ model. See for instance Rhodes and Meny, 1998.
4 Indeed, the use of the term Anglo-Saxon for Ireland sounds rather bizarre, considering its history, 
culture and relationship with the UK. This issue is addressed below in this Chapter.
5 See also Esping-Andersen’s book The Three Worlds o f Welfare Capitalism (1990), on which Rhodes 
and Meny’s approach is based.
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Southern Europe (Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece) as a separate variant of the 
‘continental’ group (see also Ferrera, 1998). Second, Hall and Soskice (2001a) who 
based on a well-developed literature in comparative political economy, have argued 
that the industrially advanced OECD countries can be classified into three categories: 
(a) Organised market economies (e.g. Germany, Japan), where there is an extensive 
institutional support for the coordination of politico-economic agents, (b) liberal 
market economies (e.g. USA, UK, Ireland), where there is less institutional support 
available for non-market forms of coordination, and (c) a more ambiguous category 
often associated with Mediterranean capitalism (e.g. Italy, France, Greece).
The following paragraphs aim to present briefly the characteristics with which the 
Anglo-Saxon and Southern European models are associated6. It is important to stress 
from the outset that these models do not serve explanatory purposes in this thesis, and 
their accuracy in describing Greek and Irish societies is not taken for granted. They 
are rather used as points of departure. The ‘pair comparison’ undertaken here will 
test their accuracy and their limits both in descriptive and analytical terms. Therefore 
it is important to keep in mind that the contrast of the two models that follows aims at 
constructing an ideal-type axis of analysis, which can be questioned and 
problematised by the particular case studies employed by the thesis. Finally, it should 
be emphasised that the various characteristics of each model are not independent from 
each other, but interact in complex and changing cause-and-effect relationships.
6 In the comparative studies literature the most frequently employed strategy is the juxtaposition of 
countries belonging to the Continental and the Anglo-Saxon model. By contrast countries from the 
Southern European model are less often used in comparisons with Anglo-Saxon or ‘orthodox’ 
Continental cases. Arguably, this is so mainly for two reasons: (a) the different developmental 
trajectory of the southern model, which makes it hard to compare countries belonging in this model 
with countries from the other two models, and (b) the ‘ambiguous’ (see for instance, Hall and Soskice, 
2001a), or the ‘hard to classify’ character of the countries in this model.
Yet the different developmental trajectory of the South European countries is an asset for 
research projects which seek ‘to show the robustness of a relationship by demonstrating its validity in a 
range of contrasting settings’ (the ‘most different research design’ according to Przeworski and Teune, 
1970), or which seek to explore how does domestic context matter, in the way in which different states 
react to common incentives. Moreover, it can be argued that the hard to classify character of Southern 
European countries is rather an advantage, which increases the richness of comparative studies and 
verify the diversity and pluralism of European tradition in general. Hence the hard-to-classify 
character of the Southern model is a problem/threat only for established categorisations and 
dichotomies, which cannot account for these ‘ambiguous’ cases, and thus need to reduce difference to 
particularism.
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The Anglo-Saxon model is usually associated with early democratisation. Thus, 
Britain and USA are the classical examples of the ‘first wave’ of democratisation, 
whereas Greece, Portugal and Spain are examples of the ‘third wave’ (Huntington, 
1991). In such a classification Ireland would be placed in-between the first (1828- 
1926) and the second (1943-1962) wave of democratisation.
The Anglo-Saxon model is also associated with pluralism in the organisation o f 
societal interests and state-society relations:; whereas the Continental model is 
associated with ‘neo-corporatism’ (or ‘societal’ and ‘liberal’ corporatism), and the 
Southern European model with ‘state corporatism’ (or statism)7. Let us confine 
ourselves to the following characteristics of each category. On the one hand pluralist 
systems are typically associated with an individualistic social culture, and a clear 
separation between state and society (Cawson, 1978). Furthermore, the role of the 
state in these systems is confined to the arbitration of competition among the various 
societal groups and interests (ibid.). On the other hand, neo-corporatist systems are 
typically associated with a consociational social culture. State and society in these 
systems are in an ‘institutionalised’ and ‘collaborationist’ relationship (Schmitter, 
1979), and thus the state, rather than being an arbiter, is a partner which, along with 
employers and employees, shapes the trajectory of socio-economic development 
(Lehmbrunch, 1979). Lastly, state corporatism signifies the ‘from above’ compulsory 
intervention of the state, which aims at the restriction and/or the control of the voice 
of societal interests, and not the creation of a ‘genuine collaboration’ between these 
interests and the state, as in the case of neo-corporatism (Schmitter, 1979). State
7 For a classical comparison between pluralism and corporatism see Schmitter, 1979. In particular 
according to Schmitter ‘pluralism can be defined as a system of interest representation in which the 
constituent units are organised into an unspecified number of multiple, voluntary, competitive, non- 
hierarchically ordered and self-determined (as to type or scope of interest) categories which are not 
specially licensed, recognised, subsidised, created or otherwise controlled in leadership selection or 
interest articulation by the state and which do not exercise a monopoly of representational activity 
within their respective categories’ (ibid: 15); corporatist is defined as ‘a system of interest 
representation in which the constituent units are organised into a limited number of singular, 
compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, 
recognised or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly 
within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on the selection of leaders 
and articulation of demands and supports’ (ibid.: 13). Finally, Schmitter (based on Manoilesco, 1936) 
distinguishes societal corporatism from state-corporatism on the basis that in the latter organised 
interests ‘were created by and kept as auxiliary and dependent organs o f the state which founded its 
legitimacy and effective functioning on other bases’ (ibid.: 20).
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corporatism is usually associated with conditions of late-development and late- 
industrialisation, such as in Southern Europe, the Balkans and Latin America8.
Hence the nature and the function o f the state and its relationship with society, are 
very different in the Anglo-Saxon and the Southern European models. In the former 
the state is -  or is assumed to be -  a ‘Weberian’ type state; it is small and functional, 
with a well-developed independent bureaucracy, where formal and transparent rules 
and practices are dominating, and where meritocracy prevails over patronage and 
clientelistic relationships. It is a state which is clearly separated from society, and 
able to resist particularistic organised interests. Finally, it is a state which exists and 
functions in interaction with a well developed civil society. In a stereotypical sense 
the Southern European state is considered to be the exact opposite. The state can 
hardly be described as ‘Weberian’, and it is usually (very) big and dysfunctional. In 
particular, in most of the states in this model there is a tradition of a patrimonial 
structure of state organisation, close to what Max Weber (1978) called ‘sultanism’. 
The bureaucracy is characterised by ‘extended politicisation of the top administrative 
ranks, enduring patronage patterns in recruitment for the public sector, uneven 
distribution of human resources, and formalism and legalism’ (Sotiropoulos, 2004; 
see also Dashwood, 1983). As a result, informal practices usually prevail over formal 
rules and procedures (for the Greek case see Spanou, 1996), and clientelistic practices 
and patronage infuse society into the state, and undermine ‘both the technical 
capacity... and legitimacy of public administration’ (ibid.: 474; Ferrera, 1998: 87). As 
Ferrera (ibid.) argues, the ‘Southern’ state ‘is largely infiltrated and easily 
manipulated by organised interests (and in particular political parties)’, and it is 
exactly this ‘low degree of ‘stateness’ of the Latin Systems... that isolates this family 
of nations from the others in Europe’ (see also Ferrera, 1996). Therefore, society and 
state were traditionally fused in the Southern model, and civil society -  in its Anglo- 
Saxon and Continental expression -  has remained underdeveloped.
Taking into consideration this brief contrast between the Anglo-Saxon and the 
Southern European models it would not be an exaggeration to argue that the two
8 For a comparison of the developmental trajectories of the Balkans and Latin America see Mouzelis, 
1986. In addition, for a Marxist analysis of the ‘dependent development’ and ‘externally centred’ 
industrialisation in Portugal, Greece and Spain, see, Poulantzas, 1976.
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models occupy the two extremes of a hypothetical axis concerning the role and nature 
of state in the political system and its relationship with society. These differences in 
historical experience and institutional arrangements have been the first incentive for 
choosing countries from these two models, despite the fact that Ireland is certainly not 
a classical case of the Anglo-Saxon model (see below). The following section 
focuses on why this specific pair of countries, i.e. Greece and Ireland, has been 
chosen.
Why Greece and Ireland?
Limitations posed by the nature o f the thesis
There are two main constraints imposed by the very nature of the concern with the 
communication of the hegemonic discourse of globalisation. First, the project aims at 
exploring the interplay between hegemonic discourses and domestic social spheres. 
Yet, within the ‘international’ not all the domestic social spheres have the same place 
and influence. Following this rationale one could assume that the communication 
process of a hegemonic discourse would be more easily analysed in the case of small 
domestic spheres that had not played a crucial role in the generation of this discourse, 
rather than in the case of larger countries, where the moment in which the hegemonic 
discourse acquires an independent dynamic would be more difficult to be captured 
and studied. It was this rationale that led us to the choice of small countries.
Second, the choice of two small states within the same ‘regional block’ reduces the 
independent variables which are involved in the communication of a hegemonic 
discourse. Regional integration processes, such as the EU, NAFTA and ASEAN, 
constitute an important factor in the way in which countries are exposed to, and 
affected by global trends and incentives. They thus constitute an important 
intervening variable for any project on national responses to global processes. The 
choice of Greece and Ireland, that is of two member states of the EU, reduces the 
variables involved in the communication process by keeping the regional dimension 
‘constant’. If the two countries were members of different regional blocks then one 
more independent/intervening variable would be added to the research project, and it
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would be difficult to assess whether the observed differences in the communication of 
globalisation discourse were due to different institutional contexts or to different 
regional influences. The fact that the regional dimension is kept constant does not, 
however, mean that its effect is identical on all the member states. Moreover, the 
dynamic and multi-dimensional changes in the political opportunity structures within 
the EU member states, as well as the interplay among the local, national and regional 
levels and authority structures are crucial for the communication of, and reactions to, 
global trends and discourses. In this regard, EU regionalism constitutes a unique case, 
which poses high challenges for any research project focusing on the 
domestic/societal level, of its member states. Finally the study of the EU factor in the 
communication of globalisation discourse creates challenging puzzles, for the EU is 
both a part of, and a response to globalisation. It will indeed be interesting to see how 
these interwoven and intersecting realities are realised and experienced at the societal 
level of our case studies.
On the other hand, the choice of two EU member states places certain limitations on 
the theoretical implications of the findings of this project. The domestic structures of 
Greece and Ireland, despite their differences, both belong to a western, democratic 
model of polity. Different models of socio-political organisation or non-democratic 
regimes are not examined. Therefore the research project limits itself to the 
examination of discourse communication in western democratic polities. Obviously, 
further research needs to be done in the communication of discourses in different 
regimes, but such a purpose remains beyond the aspirations of this project.
Greece and Ireland as 'Extreme Stories ’ in the EU
The third reason for choosing Greece and Ireland is not so much related to the 
specific needs of the proposed research project, as to their inherent interest within the 
context of the European Union. Thus one could argue that on the one hand Ireland 
represents the most ‘successful story’ in the European Union. A country of the 
‘Regional Development Fund’, with significant economic and social problems up to 
the mid/late 1980s, became the ‘European tiger’, succeeding in having a steadily
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impressive rate of growth after 1987. The following Table demonstrates this growth 
in comparison to Greece, the Euro area, and the OECD average in the 1990s.
Table 1. Growth in Real GDP in Ireland and Greece: a Comparative Perspective
(Percentage change from previous year)
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Indeed, from the ‘poorest of the rich’ in 1988 (Economist’s Survey, 1988), Ireland 
became the ‘Celtic tiger’9 (inter alia Gardiner, 1994: 9-21; Sweeney, 1998; O’Heam, 
1998, 2000; and for a critique Allen, 2000) and ‘Europe’s shining light’ (Economist’s 
Survey, 1997) in the 1990s10. Furthermore the dynamic of Irish development was not 
limited in the EU-borders. It is suggestive that in the ‘Globalisation Index’ used by 
the US journal Foreign Policy (published by the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace), Ireland was found to be the most globalised country in the world 
throughout the period 2000-2002 (Foreign Policy, 2002, 2003, 2004; see also, Table 
6 below)11’12.
9 The term was coined by Kevin Gardner (1994) in a Morgan Stanley Euroletter in 1994.
10 This contrast between the two surveys o f The Economist, i.e. from the ‘poorest of the rich’ (1988) to 
the ‘Europe’s shining light’ (1997), is well cited in the literature about Ireland. See for instance 
Murphy, 2000 and Walsh, 2000.
11 The A. T. Kearney/Foreign Policy ‘Globalisation Index’ (GI) was used for the first time in 2001. The 
GI does not include all the countries of the world. However, the 62 countries ranked, account 
approximately for 95% of the world’s GDP and 84% of the world’s population (see, Foreign Policy, 
2004: 58). In terms of research methodology the Index uses 14 variables grouped in four baskets, in 
order to measure the degree o f openness/globalisation. These are as follows: (a) Economic Integration: 
trade, FDI, portfolio capital flows, investment income; (b) Personal Income: international travel and 
tourism, international telephone traffic, remittances and personal transfers; (c) Technological 
Connectivity: Internet users, internet hosts, secure servers; (d) Political Engagement: memberships in 
international organizations, personnel and financial contributions to UN Security Council missions,
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The striking integration of Ireland in the structures of international economy in the 
1990s, is also evident from the following economic indicators (Tables 2 - 4).
Table 2. Foreign Balance Contributions to Changes in Real GDP: 
Greece and Ireland in a Comparative Perspective
(As a per cent o f real GDP in the previous period, seasonally adjusted at annual rates)
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international treaties ratified, governmental transfers (ibid.). Notwithstanding its potential flaws, the 
variety o f variables used in the Index makes it a good general indicator o f state openness and global 
engagement. For criticisms that have been made o f the A. T. Kearney/Foreign Policy ‘Globalisation 
Index’, see Kudrle, 2004 and Lockwood, 2004.
12 Another ‘Globalisation Index’ with a growing impact in the literature of globalisation is this o f the 
‘Centre for the Study o f Globalisation and Regionalisation (CSGR)’ o f the University o f Warwick (see 
its webpage ‘The CSGR Globalisation Index’ at: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/csgr/index). For 
this Index, Ireland was the most globalised country in economic terms (economic ranking), and the 
second most globalised country in economic, social and political terms (overall marking), throughout 
the period 1998-2001 (see Lockwood and Redoano, 2005).
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Table 3. Foreign Direct Investment Intensity:
Greece and Ireland in a Comparative Perspective
(Average value o f inward and outward FDI flows divided by GDP, multiplied by 100)
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Source: Eurostat.
NOTE: No data were available for Greece during 1992-1998, and for Ireland during 1992-1996.
Table 4. Trade Integration of Services: Greece and Ireland in a Comparative 
Perspective
(Average value o f imports and exports of services divided by GDP, multiplied by 100)
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On the other hand it can be said that Greece in general represents the least ‘successful 
story’ in the European Union. A country of the ‘Regional Development Fund’ as 
well, and a country which entered the EU in a rather better economic condition than 
Portugal and Spain, its Southern European counterparts, it was the only EU member 
state which, although it did not opt-out, did not manage to fulfil the criteria and 
participate in the first wave of countries that entered into the third and final stage of 
the Economic and Monetary Union (i.e. Euro-zone) on January 1, 199913. Moreover, 
according to the Eurostat, at least up to 2001 it remained the country with the poorest 
living standards in the EU. The following Table is suggestive o f Greece’s 
performance in the EU in comparison with Portugal, Spain and Ireland.
Table 5. Per Capita GDP of Selected European Countries as % of the EU 
average
40
1981 1986 1990 1995
Portugal
Ireland
Source: European Commission, European Economy, No. 60,1995. Note: EU refers to EU15 (in 1995).
It is also suggestive that in terms of the above-mentioned Foreign Policy 
‘Globalisation Index’, Greece was at the bottom of the EU countries ranked, 
throughout the period 1999-2002 (Table 6).
13 Greece managed to join the euro-zone two years later, on January 1, 2001.
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Table 6: The Foreign Policy ‘Globalisation Index’ -  Selected EU Member States
Ranking rate: Absolute numbers, from 1 (the most globalised country o f the Index) to 
62 (the least globalised country o f the Index).
1999 2000 2001 2002
Ireland
Spain
Finland
Italy
AustriaGreece
EU-GI averagePortugal
Source: The table is based on data from various ‘Foreign Policy -  Globalisation Indexes’ (see 
Foreign Policy, 2002, 2003, 2004).
NOTE: EU-GI average includes Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the UK.
It would also be interesting to use the ‘Globalisation Index’ in order to compare three 
indicators of economic globalisation in Greece and Ireland, in the year 2001 (Table 7).
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Table 7: Measuring Economic Globalisation in Greece and Ireland in 2001
The numbers indicate the position of the countries in the various 
categories of the ‘Globalisation Index’. The rankings are from 1 to 62, 
whereas 1 indicates the most globalised country and 62 the least 
globalised.
Trade Foreign
Direct
Investments
Portfolio
Capital
Flows
Ireland 3 3 1
Finland 30 11 8
Austria 12 29 7
Portugal 29 16 11
Spain 39 14 13
Italy 47 40 21
Greece 45 48 16
Source: The Table is based on the Foreign Policy 
Globalisation Index’ (see Foreign Policy, 2003).
From the above Table we see that from the 62 countries that were ranked in the 
Foreign Policy Globalisation Index, for the year 2001, Ireland was in the third best 
position in terms of trade and FDIs, and in the first position in terms of portfolio 
investments, whereas Greece along with Italy were significantly low in the ranking, 
especially with regard to trade and FDIs.
This poor economic performance combined with an ‘idiosyncratic’ foreign policy 
during the 1980s generated a negative image of Greece in the European press. As a 
result, during the late 1980s and early 1990s, Greece was widely considered to be ‘an 
awkward partner or indeed a black sheep in the European Union’ (Tsoukalis, 1999).
To sum up, considering the above, one can indeed refer to Greece and Ireland as two 
‘extreme stories’ within the EU, i.e. ‘Europe’s shining light’ on the one hand, and the 
‘last to join the euro’ on the other. Yet, this is not the only way to approach the 
developmental trajectories of the two countries. In the following sections another 
approach is offered, which constitutes the fourth reason for choosing Greece and 
Ireland as our case studies.
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Greece and Ireland in the 1990s: From ‘Extreme Stories  ’  to ‘Parallel Lives ’ ?
The argument put forward here is as follows. One of the characteristics of Greece 
and Ireland -  at least up to the mid/end 1980s -  has been the strongly ‘traditional* 
character of their societies (for Ireland see, Coacley, 1999b; for Greece see 
Diamandouros, 1994; Tsoukalas, 1993a). The term ‘traditional’ is used here as 
opposite to the term ‘reflexive’. Put crudely a traditional society is one that does not 
deeply question and/or re-examine its beliefs and practices. Identities, national 
interests and the boundaries of the community are clearly defined, and the way to 
pursue or protect them is beyond discussion and reflection. It can be argued that 
since the late 1980s both Greece and Ireland have entered a stage in their history 
characterised by intensive self-reflection and the re-examination of traditionally well- 
rooted social beliefs and practices. Put sociologically and abstractly, they have 
entered into a period in which the eternal struggle and balance between social 
structures and agency has become weighted in favour of agency. Such a reading of 
the modem social change in Greece and Ireland is compatible with Anthony 
Giddens’s conceptualisation of reflexive modernisation14. It is also a reading which 
focuses not only on the level of individuals but also on that of society as a whole. It 
refers to a re-examination and re-evaluation of beliefs and practices at the level of 
collective intentionality. It refers to a re-examination of the boundaries and nature of 
the political community and to a reshuffle of the societal forces that struggle to 
structure the content of collective intentionality15. I would argue that two broad 
developments played a crucial role in this process of self-reflection in Greece and 
Ireland.
First, is the accession to the European Community. The ‘project EC/EU’ has had a 
cmcial role in enhancing the aforementioned dynamics in the two societies. Indeed
14 Giddens (1990: 38, 1991, 1995) argues that in late-modern societies ‘social practices are constantly 
examined in the light of incoming information about those very practices, thus constitutively altering 
their character’.
15 For the concept of ‘collective intentionality’ see Searle, 1995: 24-26. In particular Searle argues: 
‘The cmcial element in collective intentionality is a sense of doing (wanting, believing, etc.) something 
together, and the individual intentionality that each person has is derived from the collective 
intentionality that they share. Thus, to go back to the earlier example of the football game, I do indeed 
have a singular intention to block the defensive end, but I have that intention only as part of our 
collective intention to execute a pass play’ (ibid.: 24-25).
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change in modem Greek and Irish polities -  along with all the other EU member 
states -  can hardly be studied and understood if the impact of European integration 
and Europeanisation, as an explanatory factor for change in these polities, is 
neglected16. Along these lines it can be argued that in the case of Ireland, the 
European Community constituted and incarnated an alternative to the dependency on 
the UK (see also Coakley, 1999b: 47; Garvin, 2000, O’ Donnell, 2000: 162-166); and 
Ireland seized the opportunity and found itself in a position to confront its own (new 
European) future. In the case of Greece, the European community incarnated a much 
needed deux ex machina for the ‘reformist social forces’ (Diamandouros, 1994), and 
a much needed injection of confidence which led Greece to face its well-rooted
1 7national insecurities (mainly on the side of Greek-Turkish relations) . The Greek- 
Turkish rapprochement since the late 1990s should rather be interpreted through such 
a framework.
The second factor behind the reflexive turn of the two societies refers to a significant 
-  both in real and symbolic terms -  dismption between, on the one hand the socio­
economic past, and the perceptions that accompanied it, and on the other the socio­
economic present and the experiences and images it generates. In the case of Ireland, 
the ‘country of the famine’18 and the ‘poorest of the rich’19, experienced an economic 
miracle. Professor Walsh (2000) chose the title ‘From Rags to Riches’ to describe 
this development. In any case it is hardly disputable that this economic boom has
16 For this point, see the contributions in Goetz and Hix, 2001. In their introduction the editors note: 
‘In the main theories of integration, domestic politics is a central explanatory factor of the integration 
process...Much less effort has gone into thinking about the reverse effect: European integration as an 
explanatory factor in domestic political continuity or change’ (Goetz and Hix, 2001a: 1).
17 In this context Professor Tsoukalis makes a comparison between the Finnish and Greek experiences 
of EU membership. ‘For Finland, membership of the EU has opened a window to the rest of the world 
while also providing some kind of a security umbrella for the country in an awkward 
neighbourhood....there is no doubt that EU membership is perceived by many Greeks as a means of 
strengthening their national security’ (Tsoukalis, 2001: 125). For a discussion o f the effect of 
Europeanisation on Greece see Ioakimidis, 1996, 2001; Featherstone, 1998, 1998a; Lavdas, 1997; 
Kazakos, 1999; Mitsos and Mossialos, 2000: parts HI and IV, and Pagoulatos, 2001, 2003. More 
general studies on the Greece-EU relationship include: Kazakos and Ioakimidis, 1994; 
Dimitrakopoulos and Passas, 2003.
18 The 19th century famine in Ireland has been one o f the most formative experiences in the 
development of the modem Irish identity. The failure of the potato crop for successive years, in a 
population almost dependent for its diet on the potato, led to a major famine which lasted from 1845 to 
1851. According to estimations, in a total population of six to eight millions, one million people died 
of starvation and one and a half million emigrated abroad, mainly to Britain and the USA. Irish 
considered Britain as partly responsible for the famine (Collins and Cradden, 2001: 2-3; Finnegan and 
McCarron, 2000: 31-41).
19 For the historically poor Irish economic performance see also, Barry, 1999, 2003.
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been changing the way in which Irish people think o f their selves. Moreover the 
‘miracle’ in conjunction with other characteristics o f Ireland, such as the EU 
membership and the use o f English language, turned the country into an attractive 
location for foreign direct investments (FDI)20. This FDI trend was epitomised by the 
announcement of the agreement reached between the Irish government and the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), that the European Headquarters o f the 
MIT Media Lab research centre would be located in Dublin (see MITnews, Dec. 3, 
1999). Lastly and maybe more importantly for the aforementioned reflexive change 
of Irish self-conceptualisation, was the shift of Irish society from a traditional 
emigration profile to that o f immigration in the 1990s. Thus Ireland for the first time 
in its modem history experienced the growth of sizeable immigrant communities (see, 
Mac Einri, 2001)21. One cannot downgrade the impact of this changing economic 
and social geography of Ireland on the self-perception o f its population. Furthermore, 
it would not be an exaggeration to argue that such a development put Irish society in a 
position to mirror and redefine itself, through the ‘new foreigners’22.
On the other hand, one can observe a similar disruption between the socio-economic 
past and present in the Greek case. Greece did not experience an economic miracle as 
Ireland has done. Nevertheless, the economic policies that took place during the
20 See O’ Connor, 2001. Of course FDIs are both a cause and an effect o f the economic boom. For 
this relationship see Walsh, 2000: 118-120. For the argument that the economic boom was merely due 
to a huge flow of US investments see Allen, 2000: 21-29.
21 The following table is indeed indicate of the change in migration that took place in Ireland, in the
1990s:
M igration in Ireland
(in thousands)  Emigrants
 Immigrants
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Source: Central Statistics Office, 2002
22 For the reflexive re-articulation o f Irish identity see also Tonra, 2000. Tonra links changes in Irish 
foreign policy to changing conceptions o f Irish identity.
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1990s have managed to correct many of the chronic structural imbalances of the 
Greek economy, and to bring both high growth rates and stability; developments that 
generated positive reports in foreign media and international economic institutions23. 
This U-turn in macroeconomic figures and policies was epitomised by the entrance of 
Greece into the euro-zone in January 2001. These developments enhanced the 
confidence of Greek society, and problematised many traditional negative self-images. 
Moreover the new economic and political geography of the Balkan region and the 
significant role of Greece within it, constituted an important factor in the reflexive 
redefinition of Greek self-understanding. In particular Greece emerged as (i) a point 
of entrance to Balkan markets for foreign FDI, (ii) a significant FDI home-country 
itself, and (iii) a stabilisation force in the region24. Finally and again most 
interestingly, Greek society has also shifted during the 1990s from a traditionally 
emigration society, to one of immigration, experiencing for the first time in its post­
war history sizeable immigrant and economic refugee communities (Clogg, 2003). 
This phenomenon, as has been argued for the Irish case, led Greek society to look
n r
into the mirror and to reflect on its past and future (see also, Diamandouros, 2001) .
The above discussion demonstrates that the drive towards the reinvention and 
redefinition of the boundaries of community and the content of national identity, that 
has been taking place in Greek and Irish societies during the last decades, was not -  
and could not be -  independent from changes in the ‘material context’ (brought 
mainly by the EU support). Indeed, these two sets of factors (i.e. the ‘material 
context’ and the ‘psychological realm’) need to be addressed and studied together in 
order to understand the dynamics of the reflexive societal change in the two countries.
The next section aims to contextualise further the parallel politico-economic 
trajectories of Greece and Ireland. It focuses on key developments that exemplify 
why the early 1990s should be considered a turning point for the two countries.
23 See for instance, IMF, 1999.
24 See inter alia, Petrakos and Totev, 2000; Wallden, 2000; Kamaras, 2001.
25 In the same context Diamandouros (2001: 72) notes: ‘Greek society has until very recently thought 
of itself as a country of emigrants. It is a society and a country whose literature, whose poetry, whose 
folklore resonates with the notion of nostalgia, of emigration, of the desire to return. Objectively 
speaking, all of these things are, in fact, things of the past’.
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The U-Turn o f the early 1990s
There are at least two reasons why the early 1990s should be considered as a U-turn 
in the history of Greece and Ireland. One already mentioned refers to a positive 
disruption in their socio-economic development. The second has to do with a change 
in the nature of their political systems.
Until the 1990s both countries had experienced a long period of unfortunate economic 
experimentation and mismanagement. In the case of Ireland one can observe ‘the 
continuation of protectionism into the late 1950s’ and an ‘irresponsible fiscal 
experimentation in the late 1970s’ (Walsh, 2000: 121); policies that resulted in a deep 
economic crisis in 1980s. It is also worth mentioning that according to surveys, 
during the period 1979-1983 the Greeks and the Irish were prominent among the 
peoples of the EU in their support for ‘classic economic policies of the left’ 
(Coackley, 1999b: 60).
The turning point for Ireland may be put in the second half of 1980s, when the 
tripartite approach to national socio-economic development was revived -  in a much 
wider basis and agenda -  through the National Economic and Social Council (NESC). 
As Gary Murphy notes the NESC’s Strategy for Development agreed in 1986 formed 
the basis upon which the new Programme for National Recovery was negotiated by 
the social partners in 1987 (see Murphy, 1999: 274-277). From this point onwards an 
impressively successful model of consociational socio-economic governance has been
Ofkfunctioning in Ireland .
In Greece on the other hand, protectionism with irresponsibly expansionist fiscal 
policies, was followed up to the end of 1980s, with a small stabilisation parenthesis in 
1985-87. (see, Katseli, 1990; Kazakos 1992; Alogoskoufis, 1995). The last years of 
the 1980s were indeed very formative for the modem Greek politico-economic 
system. From an economic point of view, a series of events brought the country to 
the brink of economic disaster. The government of PASOK (elected in 1984)
26 Some analysts put the turning point in 1994. See Murphy, 1999.
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abandoned its 1985-87 economic stabilisation programme and, in a pre-electoral 
climate, adopted an expansionary economic policy. The two coalition governments 
that followed (see below), not only failed to reverse the rapid deterioration of 
macroeconomic indicators but also contributed to the increase of government deficits. 
When the centre-right party New Democracy came into power in April 1990 the 
Greek economy was undergoing its most severe economic crisis since 1974, the date 
of birth of the fourth Greek Republic. Nevertheless the governmental change of the 
1990 can be considered a turning point in the modem Greek politico-economic 
history. It signified, a shift from statist to deregulation/liberalisation oriented 
policies and discourses (i.e. privatisation, competition, integration into the European 
and global market); thus signifying a shift in the dominant economic paradigm 
(Kazakos, 1992a) . It was a moment of transition in which an expansionist and 
purely clientelistic state, started to be transformed into a stabilisation (Pagoulatos, 
2001) and a modernisation state.
The beginning of the 1990s can also be considered a turning point for the nature and 
function of the Greek and Irish political systems. In the case of Greece the turn from 
the 1980s to the 1990s was marked by the formation of two -  if short-lived -  
unprecedented coalition governments. After eight years in government, the socialist 
party PASOK was replaced in power in 1989 by a previously unthinkable coalition 
government, consisting of the centre-right New Democracy (ND) party and 
Synaspismos, a coalition of the Communist and other left parties. After five months 
in office (June-October, 1989), this coalition government was replaced by another, 
consisting of all three major Greek parties (ND, PASOK and Synaspismos). This all­
party government was headed by a widely respected Professor of Economics, 
Xenophon Zolotas, and also lasted only five months. It was finally replaced by a 
weak ND government in April 199028. These successive coalition governments 
marked a historical departure from well-established political cleavages in the Greek
27 Kazakos (1992a) argues that elements of the new paradigm were already in place after the second 
half of the 1980s. On the same issue Ioakimidis (1996: 41) notes: ‘Only in the years 1992-93, under 
the ND government, did privatisation (apokratikopiisi) policy appear to be pursued as a clear political 
preference’.
For these coalition governments see Pridham and Vemey, 1991. The new ND government was 
based on a coalition of ND with an independently elected MP.
85
political scene29; thus constituting the epitome of Greece’s democratic consolidation 
(Pridham and Vemey, 1991). Moreover, these coalitions played a significant role in 
the decline of the traditionally intensive polarisation of Greek politics (Pridham and 
Vemey, 1991; Pappas, 2001) ; a development that led to an enhancement of the base 
and role of civil society in the Greek political life.
During the same period, Ireland experienced an equivalent transition in its political
system. The turn from the 1980s to the 1990s signified the end of a long standing,
polarised pattern in Irish politics (that lasted from 1948 to 1989): the ‘Fianna Fail
versus the rest’ system (Mair, 1999). During this period Fianna Fail was the only
party which was in a position to form, and did form, single-party majority
governments; whereas Fine Gael and the Labour Party often had to choose between
forming a coalition in order to come to power, or stay in opposition. This system
came to an end in 1989, when Fianna Fail, in order to form a government, entered a
 ^1
coalition with the Progressive Democrats . The years that followed 1989 were 
indeed formative for Irish political life. In the elections of 1992 a traditionally 
unthinkable coalition government was formed from Fianna Fail and the Labour Party. 
In 1994, however, the Labour Party left the government and returned to its ‘historical 
ally’, Fine Gael. Thus a new government was formed by Fine Gael and the Labour 
Party, without general elections being held. Taking into consideration the above, 
1989 was indeed a landmark in Irish politics. It gave birth to a ‘new politics of 
coalition-making’, initiating a new, compromising style of party politics (Mair, 1999: 
148).
29 The period after the collapse of the colonels’ regime in Greece and up to the PASOK’s rise to power, 
that is 1974-1981, is characterised by an intensive and remarkably successful democratisation and 
modernisation process. Nevertheless this process had also its ‘darker side’, the main characteristics of 
which were the ‘anticommunist’ and socially exclusive state strategies, which had created deep 
cleavages in the Greek political scene (Diamandouros, 1997). It was to these ideological cleavages and 
hatreds that the coalition governments of 1989/90 put at rest.
30 Pappas (2001) argues that the reason for the decline of the polarisation in Greek politics is to be 
found in the ‘new party system’ which emerged after the 1981 elections.
31 Progressive Democrats ‘had initially resulted from a division within Fianna Fail over its policies in 
relation to Northern Ireland, but quickly won support from elements in both major parties [Fianna Fail 
and Fine Gael] on the basis of its essentially conservative economic policies and liberal stance on 
‘moral’ issues’ (Mair, 1999: 141).
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As the elections of 1997 and 2002 demonstrated32, the era of single-party
governments (and voting behaviour) in Ireland may be over .
Here, one should also mention the different electoral systems of the two countries. 
The electoral system used in Ireland is proportional representation by means of the 
single transferable vote (PR-STV) (see Sinnott, 1999), whereas the Greek electoral 
system is one of reinforced proportional representation. It can be argued that the 
main difference between the two systems is that the PR-STV in Ireland facilitates 
proportional representation in the Dail, and therefore creates a greater potential for 
coalition governments, whereas the Greek electoral system encourages and enhances 
the formation of single-party majority governments. However, a comprehensive 
examination of the political consequences of the two systems (in terms of political 
stability, party discipline, proliferation of parties’ formation, elections of independent 
candidates etc.) is beyond our purposes here; and in any case generalisations on the 
effects of the two systems are very difficult to make without consideration of the 
different socio-political histories, contexts and cultures34.
To sum up, the above analysis suggests a ‘parallel lives’ conceptualisation of the
modem Greek and Irish politico-economic systems, and constitutes a further reason 
why this particular pair of countries makes an interesting comparison.
The next section focuses on the last factor that determined the selection of case 
studies; the fact that Greece and Ireland have similar political systems but 
significantly different political economies. The term political system is narrowly 
used here to refer to the ‘triangle’ of presidency-govemment-parliament. The term 
political economy, on the other hand, is also narrowly used to refer to the level of 
formal or informal institutionalisation of the interactions between the government, the 
employers and the employees, including other organised interests that belong to civil 
society. Both the nature of the political system and the political economy are crucial
32 Both elections led to a coalition government between Fianna Fail and Progressive Democrats. 
Furthermore, one of the characteristics of the 2002 elections was the considerable increase of the 
power of small parties (Green Party and Sinn Fein).
3 Marsh and O’Malley (1999: 425) referring to the 1997 elections note: ‘In fact, Fianna Fail lost one 
seat to the Labour party. It did not manage to convince the electorate that there would be advantage in 
making government less dependent on independents for parliamentary majority’.
34 With regard to the PR-STV see the analysis of Sinnott, 1999.
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for the purposes of this thesis, because they add important information about the 
power basis of the national public discourses, i.e. about the institutional structures 
which determine the formation of Greek and Irish public discourses. Finally, a 
number of similarities between the Greek and Irish (civil) societies are also examined.
Political System, Political Economy, Society
By way of introduction it is worth noticing that both the Greek and Irish republics are 
based on and function according to their written constitutions. ‘The Constitution of 
Greece’ (‘To Luvxaypa tyjq EXka&aq’) was enacted in 1975 and was last revised in 
2001, whereas the ‘Constitution of Ireland’ (‘Bunreacht na hEireann’) was enacted in 
1937 and its last amendment took place in 1999. The form of government in both 
Greece and Ireland is that of a parliamentary republic , and the Constitutions of both 
countries recognise popular sovereignty as the basis and the source of all powers . 
In the following paragraphs we attempt a brief outline of the balance of power among 
the institutions of presidency, government and parliament in the two countries.
Political System: The Triangle of President -  Government and Prime Minister -  
Parliament
Democratic regimes are usually classified according to the constitutionally prescribed 
balance of power between the presidency, the government/prime minister and the 
Parliament. In this regard both the Greek and Irish political systems are highly 
centralised, and are characterised by a critical concentration o f power in the hands of
'xnthe prime-minister . The Presidency in both systems performs a rather symbolic
35 Article 1.1 in the Greek constitution. The Irish constitution lacks an explicit statement about the 
‘form of government’.
36 For the Greek case: Article 1 para. 2 & 3; for the Irish: Article 6. The two constitutions differ 
considerably in the way in which they can be revised. In the Irish case, in order any provision of the 
constitution to be amended, a referendum has to be held (Articles 46 and 47.1). In the Greek case on 
the other hand, a special two-stage amendment procedure is prescribed (Article 110), in which 
amendments can be made by a special parliamentary majority (of three-fifths).
37 For the Irish case see Elgie, 1999; Connolly and O’Halpin, 1999; Ward, 1994; O’ Leary, 1991. For 
the Greek case see Alivizatos, 1993. Moreover, King (1994) classifies Greece and Ireland in the six 
western European states with the most ‘influential’ heads o f government.
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function, and the Parliament is too government-dependent to act as counter-balancer. 
Let us consider these issues in some depth.
The Greek ‘President of the Republic’38 and the ‘President of Ireland’ (‘Uachtaran na
-3Q
hEireann’) are constitutionally the supreme figures in their polities, but their role 
and powers are more symbolic than real. In the Greek case the President of the 
Republic is elected with a special majority by the parliament (Article 32), and is 
constitutionally responsible for the ‘function of the institutions of the Republic’ 
(Article 30.1). The powers of the Greek President were curtailed by the constitutional 
amendment of 1986, when all the actual powers of the President were transferred to 
the parliamentary majority, and in real terms to the prime minister (Alivizatos, 1993: 
68). Yet, it should be mentioned that depending on the person in office, the influence 
of the institution to the public discourse vary. The case of the President of Ireland is 
similar. The latter, even though s/he is elected by a direct vote (Article 12.2.1) and 
according to the constitution takes precedence over all other persons in Ireland 
(Article 12.1), has no decisive power in the Irish political system (Elgie, 1999). As in 
the Greek case, the person in office may make a difference in the influence that the 
institution of presidency exercises on the public discourse, but again this function 
is/can be confined and/or controlled by the government (see Article 13.7). Hence the 
Presidency in both Greece and Ireland lacks the constitutional means to act as a 
counterbalance to the powers of prime minister. The same applies to the Greek and 
Irish Parliaments, on which the following paragraph focuses.
Ireland’s parliament (‘Oireachtas’) is bicameral40. It consists of a directly elected 
House of Representatives, called the Dail, and an indirectly elected Senate, called the 
Seanad (Article 15.2). The Greek parliament on the contrary is a unicameral one and 
is called the Vouli41. This difference in the two systems, however, should rather be 
treated as a difference in form and not in substance42, in so far as both parliaments are 
characterised by their inability to exercise any independent or significant control on
38 See Articles 30-50 of the Greek constitution.
39 See Articles 12-14 of the Irish constitution.
40 See Articles 15-27 of the Irish constitution.
41 See Articles 51-80 of the Greek constitution.
42 Considering the limited role and power of Seanad in Irish politics, the focus of our analysis is on 
Dail (see, Gallagher, 1999).
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their governments. There are two main reasons for this. First, is the fact that both the 
Dail and Vouli are party-dominated (Gallagher, 1999: 178-179; Alivizatos, 1993: 70). 
This, along with the high degree of party discipline that is found in both Greek and 
Irish political systems43, reduces significantly any possibilities for an independent 
role by the parliaments. Second, is the fact that government and parliament cannot in 
real terms be considered as separate bodies, in a ‘check and balance’ relationship. As 
Gallagher (1999: 178) notes for the Irish case, ‘it is more realistic to see parliament as 
wielding power through the government that it has elected than to see it as seeking to 
check a government that has come into being independently of it’. This also 
describes the Greek case. Moreover, in the latter the existence of majoritarian single­
party governments reduces even further the possibilities of an independent role by the 
Vouli44. Therefore even if the parliaments under examination are not only forums of 
party confrontation (i.e. talking parliaments) (Alivizatos, 1993), or even if they are 
not limited to legitimising legislation rather than making it (Gallagher, 1999), they 
certainly lack the power effectively to counter-balance the role and powers of their 
governments. As a result, the power in the political systems of both countries is 
concentrated in the government and in particular in the person of the prime minister.
It can be argued that the all-powerful role of the prime minister45 constitutes the 
single most important common characteristic of the Greek and Irish political 
systems46. In both cases the prime minister is solely responsible for the formation 
and composition of the government and the cabinet, and for the policymaking process. 
S/he is the one who set the agenda for the government and thus for the parliament too, 
and who supervises and evaluates the policy implementation, and the performance of 
the various ministries47. It can be argued that the only real constraints on the powers 
of the prime minister in both systems come from internal party politics48 (see, ibid.: 
238-245). Nevertheless, the latter do not cancel out the high and constitutionally
43 For the Greek case see Alivizatos, 1993: 70. For the Irish case see, Gallagher, 1999: 179; Sinnott, 
1999: 116-117.
44 It should however be mentioned here that the decline in the ability of parliaments to control 
executive is a common characteristic of most EC/EU states since 1950s (see Raunio and Hix, 2001).
45 In Ireland the prime minister is called Taoiseach (Article, 28.5).
46 It must also be noted here that the prime ministers in both systems are both head of governments and 
head of their parties.
47 It is also in her/his responsibilities to appoint the Attorney General who, in the Irish case, has also a 
seat at the cabinet (Elgie, 1999: 238).
48 In the Irish case one could also register the increasing importance of ‘coalition politics’.
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prescribed centralisation of Greek and Irish political systems. These characteristics 
have justified the term ‘prime ministerial government’ for the Irish political system 
(Elgie, 1999), which surely also describes the Greek case. Finally, it can be noted 
that this centralisation of power in the person of the prime minister produces highly 
personalised electoral campaigns49.
Up to this point the similarity of the political systems in Greece and Ireland have been 
outlined. The next section juxtaposes this similarity, with the difference in the 
political economies of the two countries. If the study of the formal political 
institutions gives us an idea about the nature of the state (narrowly defined), the study 
of political economy gives us an idea about the nature of state-society relationships.
Political Economy
The contemporary Irish political economy and the related structure of interest 
representation are characterised by a high degree of institutionalization. The latter is 
expressed through: (i) the institution of social partnership, i.e. the institutionalised co­
operation among the government, the employers and the employees, and (ii) the role 
and function of the National Economic and Social Council (NESC), i.e. the tripartite 
consultative body, which set the strategic goals and delineates the parameters for the 
negotiations among the social partners. Since the revival of the social partnership in 
1987 ‘five three-year pacts have been agreed50, each building on the success of the 
previous and attempting more ambitious targets for economic growth; investment in 
education and health care; social inclusion and action to promote enterprise and 
employment...’, as one reads on the Irish Congress of Trade Unions’ official 
website51. Thus, the social partnership has evolved as the most distinctive
49 For the Irish case see Elgie, 1999.
50 These pacts are:_______________
Programme Period
Programme for National Recovery (PNR) 1987-1990
Programme for Economic and Social Progress (PESP) 1990-1993
Programme for Competitiveness and Work (PCW) 1994-1996
Partnership 2000 1997-2000
Programme for Prosperity and Fairness (PPF) 2000-2003
51 http://www.ictu.ie/ (28/05/2002).
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characteristic of Irish political economy during the last approximately fifteen years, 
and many analysts contend that it is the successful functioning of this partnership that 
has led to and sustains the Irish economic miracle (see O’Donnell and O’Reardon, 
2000). In this context the social partnership and NESC can be seen as the central 
institutions of politico-economic governance, in which state and society meet, discuss, 
co-programme and co-decide. The range of civil society organisations that participate 
in the meetings of social partnership is indeed impressive and best demonstrates the 
highly consociational nature of the Irish political economy. For instance in the 
Partnership 2000 (the agreement reached by social partners in 1997) these 
organisations included: The Irish National Organisation of the Unemployed, the 
Conference of Religious in Ireland, the National Women’s Council, The National 
Youth Council of Ireland, the Society of St. Vincent de Paul, Protestant Aid and the 
Community Platform (see, Murphy, 1999: 276-277). In the next agreement of the 
partnership, the Programme for Prosperity and Fairness, the number of these 
organisations reached approximately 35 (Hardiman, 2000: 302). It is also important 
to underline that many of these organisations of the voluntary and community sector 
not only participate in the negotiations of the social partnership but also (since 1998) 
in the meetings of the NESC (ibid.: 303). In this regard Ireland is a striking 
exception from the Anglo-Saxon model in which such centralised and consensual 
mechanisms are unthinkable (see also below).
On the other hand, the Greek political economy is characterised by a considerably 
low degree of institutionalisation and centralisation. The fusion of state and society, a 
defining characteristic of the Mediterranean model, is also explicit in the Greek case. 
For instance, the Greek employee unions are not fully independent from the state, and 
until recently at least, could hardly be considered as organisations belonging to civil 
society. Yet, this dependency did not lead, as one might expect, to the control of 
organised interests by the state. It rather led to a fragmented bargaining system 
characterised by the antagonistic action of political factions, which had as a result the 
generation of ‘particularistic demands’, based on a strong ‘guild mentality’
52 This view is also held by Peter Cassells (personal interview, 27-06-2002). Peter Cassells is Chairman 
of Forfas (National Policy and Advisory Board for Enterprise, Trade, Science, Technology & 
Innovation), Executive Chairperson of the National Centre for Partnership and Performance, and 
former General Secretary of ICTU (1987-1999). He was personally involved in all the negotiations for 
partnership agreements, since 1987.
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(Mavrogordatos, 1993: 61-63; see also Lavdas, 199753). As analysed below, this has 
also been a dominant characteristic of the Irish political economy; at least up to the 
end of the 1980s, when the revival of the institution of social partnership acquired an 
unprecedented dynamism. In the Greek case various attempts have been made since 
1990 to develop an independent and viable social partnership on the basis of the neo- 
corporatist model (see, Ioannou, 1999; Kioukias, 1997). Most importantly, in 1994 
an ‘Economic and Social Council’ was created by law (2232/1994) in order to 
provide the institutional framework for the development of a social partnership. 
Nevertheless the PASOK government that created the Council in 1994 decided to 
follow the ad hoc model of a ‘National Social Dialogue’ in 1997 (Ioannou, 1999). 
Furthermore, a provision in the constitutional amendment of 2001, describing the 
Council as an instrument of social dialogue, aimed to enhance its institutional role. 
Yet its impact has not been -  at least yet -  significant. Therefore in contrast to the 
well-institutionalised social partnership in Ireland, the Greek political economy is 
characterised by under-institutionalisation and increased -  even if diminishing -  party 
domination in the representation of organised interests.
This contrast between the Greek and Irish political economies increases the interest of 
their comparison in terms of discourse communication. Although both countries have 
highly centralised political systems (that are characterised by the concentration of 
power in the person of prime minister), they differ considerably in the organisation of 
their political economies. Ireland has a highly institutionalised and consensual social 
partnership, in which ‘actors’ energies are focused on agreeing amongst themselves 
and on then persuading their own constituencies that the agreement is acceptable’, as 
Schmidt (2001; see also 2000) would characterise it. On the contrary, the Greek 
political economy is highly fragmented, with the result that global trends and 
discourses are not mediated by any thick consociational interest structure.
53 Mavrogordatos (1988, 1993) and Lavdas (1997) adopt different approaches in the definition o f the 
Greek interest intermediation system. Mavrogordatos argues that the Greek system is a characteristic 
case of ‘state corporatism’. Lavdas, adopting a more qualified approach, argues that although state 
corporatist elements have historically been present at various sectoral levels of the economy, the 
institutional character of the Greek interest intermediation system as a whole, is closer to what could be 
termed ‘disjointed corporatism’.
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From Political Economy to Civil Society and Society
The preceding discussion of political economies of Ireland and Greece may be an 
interesting point of entry to a discussion about the limits of a ‘models approach’ (i.e. 
Anglo-Saxon vs. South-European) to capturing the societal reality of the two 
countries.
Let us start by contextualising the consociational base of the Irish political economy. 
The emergence of this base, which is unknown to the Anglo-Saxon model, is 
relatively new. For instance, before the late 1980s, although ICTU may have been 
able to veto industrial relations reforms, its ability to propose and bring about policy 
changes was limited (Hardiman, 1988: 207). It can be argued that the consociational 
base of Irish political economy was bom out of the severe economic crisis that Ireland 
was facing at the time. Indeed, according to Peter Cassells, a key person in the 
transformation process54, the institution of social partnership as it functions today, 
and the economic miracle, would never have emerged if economic disaster had not 
been so close.55
Yet, the divergence of Irish political economy from the ideal type of the Anglo-Saxon 
model is not a phenomenon of the 1980s. Ireland had never had, contrary to the 
Anglo-Saxon model, a non-party dominated public policy-making process, and an 
independent civil service (Hardiman, 1988: 205-206). Moreover, Irish political life 
has traditionally been characterised by ‘pervasive localism’ and clientelistic relations 
and, as Hardiman says, rather than mediating, governments were trying to 
accommodate all these diverse societal interests (Hardiman, 1988: 198-203). Hence, 
it can be argued that the Irish political economy up (at least) to the beginning of the 
1990s was characterised by fragmentation, and was dominated by particularistic
54 As mentioned above, Peter Cassels was involved as Secretary General o f ICTU in the negotiations of 
all the national agreements for the period 1987-1999.
55 Personal interview with Peter Cassells, 27-06-2002. In this regard O’Clery’s (1986: 215-6, quoted 
in Hardiman, 2000: footnote 4) writes: ‘Gay Byrne, in an interview in 1986 with Hot Press magazine, 
as Ireland’s most popular broadcaster, said ‘[Ireland] is banjaxed and washed out.. .a man.. .stood up in 
the audience at the Late Late Show three or four years ago and said that if  we had any manners we’d 
hand the entire island back to the Queen of England at 9 o ’clock the following morning and apologise 
for its condition.. .As every week passes, I think that guy has something’.
94
interests -  characteristics usually associated with the Southern European model. 
Moreover, it can also be argued that Ireland shares many historical characteristics of 
the ‘externally-centred industrialisation’ experienced by Portugal, Spain, and Greece 
(Jacobsen, 1994:23)56.
In conclusion it can be said that Ireland’s divergence from the Anglo-Saxon model is 
remarkable both before and after the 1990s U-tum. Nevertheless, at least in terms of 
political economy, Ireland still belongs to the Anglo-Saxon model. It does have a 
flexible labour market, and an Anglo-Saxon corporate governance culture, which to a 
great extent are enforced by the high degree of foreign direct investments coming 
from the USA57 (see also the comparative indicators in Appendix B). But these 
Anglo-Saxon elements coexist with a (newly bom) consociational politico-economic 
structure, and a (very old) community -  rather than individualist -  oriented social 
culture. All these elements produce an interesting hybrid model. Furthermore, they 
add important and interesting information for the comparison with Greece attempted 
here.
Hence, it is interesting to note that clientelistic relations, a community rather than an 
individualistic oriented society, and an ‘underdog culture’ are all elements to be 
found traditionally in both the Greek and Irish societies. An extended analysis of 
these elements is beyond the purposes of this chapter. Let us, however, briefly 
underline some points with reference to the socio-political culture. First, the 
community-oriented culture -  as opposed to the ‘individualist orientation’ that 
characterises the Anglo-Saxon model -  can be said to be still dominant in both Greek 
and Irish societies (or at least at the self-perceptions of their people). This defining 
characteristic has posed a number of challenges for the way in which we understand 
and analyse the clientelistic networks in the two countries, as well as concepts such as
56 For a study of socio-political change in modem Ireland through a Dependency theoretical prism, see 
Jacobsen, 1994.
57 It is interesting that, when studying the ‘collaborative production’ in Ireland, many scholars 
distinguish between ‘unionised’ and ‘non-unionised workplaces’ (see for instance, Roche and Geary 
2000). For the issue of flexibility in the Irish labour market see Gunnigle and Brosnan, 2001. 
Moreover, for the effect and practices of US firms in the Irish workplace see: Gunnigle, Morley and 
Heraty, 1997; Geary, 1999; Gunnigle and McGuire, 2001. Gunnigle and McGuire (ibid: 59) have two 
very interesting extracts from interviews conducted with two Vice Presidents of US Multinationals: 
‘Any country that requires union recognition is immediately stricken off our list of possible locations’, 
and ‘We don’t deal with unions. We don’t have a union in the US. It does not fit with our culture’.
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civil society or the public/private sphere . Tovey (2001: 81) in a strong critique of 
the methods that are used to study different societies, writes: ‘For example, Giddens’ 
Sociology appears to be extensively and uncritically read in Ireland as an account of 
Irish Society. This is a text that does not refer anywhere to community as either a 
social or a sociological problematic’. With regard to this community culture it can 
also be argued that it creates an invisible social net which is based on rather personal 
relationships and traditional social bonds. The important function and role that the 
institution of the family still plays in these two societies is not unrelated to this 
community culture. Moreover, with regard to the issue of public/private division, one 
must not forget the separate developmental trajectories of the ‘semi-peripheral’ 
countries of the EU. Hence in the UK and France for instance, the rise of a ‘private 
sphere’, which supplied the ‘vital space’ for the development of a ‘private/civil 
society’, has been the result of long standing social struggles. These struggles 
delineated a space in which private (economic) interests came together and developed 
a separate social sphere of (economic) transactions, in opposition to the State. Hence, 
‘private/civil society’ and ‘State’ emerged in these societies as two separate and -  to a 
high degree -  oppositional spheres (Tsoukalas, 1993)59. On the contrary, in many 
cases in (semi-) peripheral societies, the emergence of these spheres was not the 
product of a particular historical development coming out of social struggles, but the 
result of ‘models and institutions transferring’ from the ‘European core’ (ibid.); a fact 
which created new hybrid models and trajectories. This ‘transplantation process’, 
dominant in colonial and late-development conditions, has to be kept in mind when 
we think of categories such as public/private in Greece and Ireland. This is one more 
fact that brings Ireland closer to the South-European model60.
58 For the case of Greece see Tsoukalas, 1993; for the case of Ireland see Tovey, 2001.
59 This point relates also to the discussion of how autonomous the state is from particular dominant 
societal interests and forces. In this context Tsoukalas (1993: 334), studying the case of Greece, makes 
an important point: ‘. . .before even the issue of the ‘degree’ of State autonomy to be raised, one should 
investigate to what extent the development of social and economic forces, and the building of State 
machinery are processes ‘external’ to each other’. For the issue of ‘state autonomy’ see the 
contributions in Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol, 1985, and for a marxist critique on this issue see 
the review article of Cammack, 1989.
60 See also the interesting discussion on the emergence and stabilisation of Irish democracy in Kissane, 
1995. Kissane argues that in order to understand the emergence of modem Irish polity, traditional post­
colonial explanatory frameworks should be combined with modernisation approaches.
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A second point with regard to the socio-political culture of the two countries is the 
existence of a traditionally strong ‘underdog culture’, which is still (in a lesser degree 
though) informing and influencing their political culture. Elements of such a culture 
can be said to include feelings and attitudes of introvertedness, exceptionalism and 
cultural insecurity61. Furthermore, the historical experiences of both societies have 
given to this underdog culture a distinctive moral gravity and significance. The 
saying that: ‘O my son/We may be a small country/We may be a poor one/But we 
have our pride’62 [or, ‘/But we can hold our head high’63], captures one of the 
traditionally commonest notions to be found in the Irish and Greek societies. This 
notion has many times been accompanied by a tendency to introversion. If cultural 
heritage and national identity were to be protected, foreign influences and the 
‘opening’ of the society had to be prevented or minimised. Yet, as noted above, these 
feelings of insecurity and introvertedness have been challenged in both countries 
since the 1990s. For economic growth, along with the confidence generated by the 
EC/EU membership problematised these traditionally negative/defensive self-
64images.
Moreover, in both the Irish and Greek cases, the balance of ‘knowledge transfer’ 
ceased to be unidirectional in the 1990s. Ireland started to export the experience of its 
own successful model of growth and social partnership, as well as its experiences 
with EU membership; and Greece did the same with its own experiences of EU 
membership and public sector reform, especially towards its northern neighbours in 
the Balkans. These developments increased the pressures on traditional negative self- 
images and syndromes of inferiority. Reflecting on these trends in the case of Ireland,
61 For an analysis of this culture in the Greek case see Diamandouros, 1994.
62 As many Irish grandparents keep saying.
63 The most common Greek version.
64 A caveat should be inserted here. I do not mean to make a value judgment about the aforementioned 
underdog culture, nor does the thesis subscribe to (simplistic) analyses which equate ‘tradition’ with 
‘backwardness’. Indeed, part of the discourse of the ‘modernising camps’ in both countries has often 
been based on a simplistic ‘binary logic’ in which ‘[t]radition, suitably packaged, homogenised and 
essentialised, becomes a mere caricature’ which is reconstructed and scapegoated as the ‘enemy of 
progress’ (see, Doak 1998: 26). What this thesis does argue is that the changed material and 
psychological landscape, as analysed above, led to the problematisation of historically well-rooted 
notions of dependency and insecurity (of which the historical origins and reasons are undisputable); 
and furthermore that this changed landscape led to a reflexive and self-confident attitude about the 
capacity of the two countries to decide for and formulate their own future, and therefore take 
responsibility for it.
97
it can be argued that a big chapter of its history has been closing. A chapter which 
could be titled by the well-known reply of Samuel Beckett.
~Vous etes Anglais?
-Non, au contraire.
In this context Professor O’Donnell, the Director of NESC, closing an edited volume 
on the Irish Experience, writes: ‘[Ireland] is free to walk and run in the century that 
lies ahead...It leaves the century free of the two masters that dominated and 
constrained it -  London and Rome. It is now free to reinvent itself (O’ Donnell, 
2000: 212). Of course, as is also argued below, this does not mean that the impact of 
the British legacy on Ireland’s socio-political life is -  or indeed can be -  over. A 
good example for this is the centrality of the issue of neutrality in the negative 
referendum on ‘Nice Treaty’ in 200165.
Let us close this chapter with a short reference to the role of the church in the two 
countries66. By way of introduction one should note that both societies are 
characterised by a high degree of homogenisation with regard to the religion of their 
population. In the Republic of Ireland the overwhelming majority of the population is 
Roman Catholic (91.6%), whereas in Greece the majority of the people is attached to 
the Greek Orthodox Church (98%)67. It is also important to note that religion in both 
countries is considered by the majority of the population to be an integral part of 
national identity; and within this majority a (large) part would consider that 
‘Greekness’ and ‘Irishness’ as forms of national identity cannot exist without 
Orthodoxy and Catholicism respectively. Yet the attitudes of the population towards 
religion either as an esoteric belief or as a part of the national identity should not be 
equated with the role of the institution of the church in the society. This becomes 
clearer when one studies the attitudes of the population not towards the religion but
65 Irish neutrality has traditionally been more about not being allied to Britain than about unilateralism 
per se. In the case of the Nice referendum, it is interesting how the concept o f neutrality has moved 
beyond an ‘instrumental definition’, and has acquired a central position in the Irish public discourse ‘as 
a synonym for national identity and core political value’ (Gillespie, 2002). For the issue of Irish 
neutrality see also FitzGerald, 1998.
66 Two recent accounts o f the State-Church relations are: Kissane, 2003 (for the Irish case) and 
Konidaris, 2003 (for the Greek case).
67 In particular, according to the 1991 census, the religious composition in the Republic is:
Roman Catholic: 91.6%; Church of Ireland (Anglican): 2.5%; Presbyterians: 0.4%; other, or no 
information or specific religious beliefs: 5.6%. The respective composition in Greece is: Greek 
Orthodox: 98%, Muslim 1.3%, other 0.7%.
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towards the church, or when the focus of the analysis is on the relationship of state 
and church.
With regard to the role of church68 in the two countries at least two points should be 
mentioned. First, the church is considered to have played historically an important 
role in the preservation of the national identity and in the fight for national 
independence69. Second, personalities do make a difference in the way in which the 
church intervenes in political life. This was made clear with the election of 
Archbishop Christodoulos in Greece, and Cardinal Desmond Connell in Ireland, who 
both adopted an ‘interventionist’ stance in public affairs70. But the nature and role of 
the church in the two countries are also considerably different. These differences are 
not only limited to historico-institutional aspects, such as the fact that the Greek 
Church is a ‘national church’ 71, whereas the Irish Church is a ‘global’ (and 
hierarchically structured) one, but also extend to more functional social-specific 
aspects. Thus it can be argued that traditionally the Greek Church depended on and 
was ‘used’ by the Greek state for its own purposes, rather than vice versa, which was 
the case in Ireland. Furthermore, it can be argued that church influence on the public 
discourse is more centralised in Greece than in Ireland. In the latter one finds a 
number of powerful interest groups, which although they advance the church’s 
positions, do not have any formal affiliation to it. Such interest groups include the 
Pro-Life Amendment Campaign (PLAC), the Society for the Protection of the Unborn 
Child (SPUC), the Family Solidarity and the Anti-Divorce Campaign (Inglis, 2000: 
54-55). In Greece on the other hand, the church’s intervention in public discourse 
remains relatively centralised, and is mainly expressed through the church hierarchy 
itself72.
68 In the case of Ireland, the term ‘church’ is used for convenience to refer to the Catholic Church. The 
‘Church of Ireland’ is the official name for the Anglican Church.
69 Even though the official Orthodox Church took a conservative stance towards the Greek fight of 
independence in the 19th century.
70 For the Greek case see, Stavrakakis, 2002.
71 The ‘national church’ is a common characteristic of the Christian Orthodox religion. Thus, national 
Orthodox churches were founded by Bulgarians (1872), Serbians (1879), Romanians (1885), Finish 
and Estonians (1923), Polish (1924), Albanians (1937) and Czechs and Slovaks (1998).
72 Here it is interesting to note that in Ireland, mass-attendance has dropped from 87% in 1984 (Breslin 
& Weafer Survey), to 64% in 1995 (IMS Survey) and 57% in 1999 (IMS Survey) (source: The Irish 
Council of Churches). For the case of Ireland, Inglis (2000, 1998) argues that in the latter half o f the 
20th century, the media began to take over from the Church in providing a new ‘habitus’, (in terms o f a 
‘collective orthodoxy’) in the Irish society. Thus the media have instituted a new form of civil society, 
which is not dominated any more by the Church. On the other hand in the case of Greece an
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Conclusion
This chapter has elaborated on the reasons why Greece and Ireland were chosen as 
case studies. These reasons include: First, the fact that the two countries are usually 
classified as different models of polities and political economies (the Anglo-Saxon 
and the South-European model respectively). Second, the fact that they are both 
members of the European Union, and therefore the regional/regionalisation factor 
remains constant. Third, the fact that they are both small countries; a fact that makes 
it easier to capture and analyse the communication process of the globalisation 
discourse. Fourth, the fact that the two countries represent two extreme stories within 
the EU, while at the same time they have been undergoing a similar modernisation 
process since 1990s. Fifth, the fact that their political systems and culture are similar, 
whereas their political economies differ (in the level of institutionalisation and 
centralization). This mix of similarities and differences will allow us to examine in- 
depth how the nature of political economy affects the communication of hegemonic 
discourses. Lastly, it should be pointed out that although there are many works in the 
literature of comparative institutionalism dealing with the large EU states, especially 
Germany, France and the UK, the case is not true of the research on small states. 
Therefore the choice of Greece and Ireland aims at contributing to the rather 
developing small EU states literature.
One further question, central in every comparison, should be raised here. Were 
Greece and Ireland the only or the best cases to be chosen for addressing the question 
about the communication of globalisation discourse? What were the alternatives and 
how they would affect the result of the research? It is true that the 1990s has been a 
decade of profound societal changes in many EU countries (including Austria, Italy,
interesting philosophical debate emerged in the mid-1990s on the relationship (and compatibility) of 
the Orthodox culture with modernity and post-modernity (see Giannaras, 1994, and Mouzelis, 1995). 
Yet based on various ‘Eurobarometer’ surveys throughout the period 1990-2001, it can be argued that 
Greeks and Irish remain among the most religious people in the European Union. For instance, in 
1994, in the question: ‘Whether you do or you don’t follow religious practices, would you say that you 
are: Religious/Not Religious/Agnostic/Atheist/Don’t know...’, 93% of the Greeks who participated in 
the survey -  the highest percentage in comparison to the other eleven EU member states -  replied 
‘religious’, whereas Irish came fourth with 82% (Portuguese were second with 89%, and Italians were 
third with 82%). The EU12 average for this answer was 59% (Eurobarometer 42, 1995).
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Finland, Portugal, Spain). Yet, the fact that Greece and Ireland are at the opposite 
ends of the EU spectrum, combined with a models-of-political-economy 
consideration, gave us a ready-made and exciting research puzzle to investigate the 
nature of hegemonic discourse communication. The attractiveness of this puzzle was 
then increased by one more factor. Both Greece and Ireland can be considered 
‘deviant cases’ in the group of political economies to which they belong (i.e. the 
Mediterranean vs. AngloSaxon groups). The problem with comparing deviant cases 
is that the research conclusions may not be easily comparable with already existing 
hypotheses and academic assumptions. Studies of ‘deviant cases’, however, have the 
potential to push the limits and widen the horizons of comparative research, and 
increase the possibility for unexpected research findings (see also Lijphart, 1971: 65). 
All these factors led us to the cases of Greece and Ireland. To return to the above 
question about the ‘uniqueness of the pair’, it can be argued that alternatives did exist, 
but the ‘extreme cases’ factor added an interesting and distinctive aspect to the 
proposed project73.
Finally, the thesis starts from an observation, i.e. the ‘globalisation of the 
globalisation discourse’, and seeks to test the role of different national institutional 
arrangements in this process. In a first research wave the importance of institutional 
arrangements in political science and international political economy was established. 
This research project falls within a second wave of research which focuses more on 
‘how institutions matter’ rather than on whether they matter. The findings of this 
second wave of research remain to be crystallised, through, as always, an incremental 
process of academic dialogue based on theses and counter-theses, observations and 
counter-observations. This thesis aims to contribute to this incremental, knowledge 
advancing process; a process which takes both ‘understanding’ and ‘explaining’ to 
progress.
73 There is one important difference between Greece and Ireland which should be mentioned: the fact 
that in Ireland the spoken language is English. This factor is indeed important, considering the ‘global 
status’ of English language, but arguably this does not affect the substance of the research project 
proposed here. For the issue under examination in this thesis is the actual communication process in 
each country. The factor of the English language does not influence the domestic institutional 
arrangements in Ireland, which are the critical variable of this project. Language can indeed influence 
die timing o f communication but not the means. Thus, language would be a critical factor in the case 
that foreign direct investments would be under investigation, but it is not at the case o f the 
communication of hegemonic discourses, as conceptualised in this project.
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Having developed the theoretical framework of the thesis (Chapter 1), and presented 
its case studies (Chapter 2), Part II turns to the examination of the communication of 
the globalisation discourse in Greece and Ireland.
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Part Two
The Communication of Globalisation Discourse 
in Greece and Ireland: Politics and Biopolitics
Introduction
Part II examines the communication of the globalisation discourse in Greece and 
Ireland. The focus is on the discourses o f the domestic institutional actors. How is 
globalisation implicated in their discourses? What are the main objects/themes of 
their discourses irrespectively of globalisation discourse? Haw do the various 
institutional discourses on globalisation ‘speak’ to and Tie’ on each other, and how 
they are locked in, and evolve, at a national level? In so doing, the aim is to study the 
power conditions which underlie the way in which the hegemonic is communicated at 
a national level. Moreover (and more importantly) we also aim to examine how the 
hegemonic is internalised and biopolitically transforms public discourses and their 
agents.
Following the above research strategy the aim is to bring the two aspects o f a 
hegemonic discourse under a single analytical framework. At a first order level it is 
exemplified that the practices that are generated by the globalisation discourse 
produce clear ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. Indeed, these practices both benefit and damage, 
empower and weaken social actors in the same social settings. Therefore the analysis 
of the ‘politics’ of globalisation discourse, in terms of its impact on the organised, 
vested and mediated interests and interest-structures, is put forward with a double 
purpose: first to examine how the hegemonic discourse influences the existing 
institutional configuration at the national level (i.e. which actors are empowered and 
which are weakened or marginalized); second to examine how the existing 
institutional configuration influences the way in which the ‘politics’ of the hegemonic 
discourse is mediated and negotiated at the national level, and what is the role o f the 
different mediation structures.
On a second order level, however, the proposed research aims to illustrate that while 
the politics of a hegemonic discourse is negotiated, this discourse has a deeper 
biopolitical effect on the subjects of the public discourses and through them on the 
public discourses themselves. Thus, while social actors are negotiating how the new 
conditions (e.g. ‘globalisation’) should be faced, in fact they materialise these new 
conditions, and thus also experience their consequences.
We start our investigation with the case of Greece, and we turn to Ireland in Chapter 
4. We then summarise and compare our findings in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 3 
THE GLOBALISATION DISCOURSE IN 
GREECE: 1995 -  2001
Introduction
The study of the communication of globalisation discourse in Greece aims to examine 
the effect that this discourse had in the reproduction of the Greek public discourse. 
Some broader contextualisation might be helpful here. In Chapter 2 we argued that 
1990 could be considered a turning point for Greek politics. In the same framework 
of analysis it can also be argued that 1996 signified both the consolidation of this 
turning point and a new significant shift in the Greek public discourse. In particular 
in 1996 Andreas Papandreou, the historical leader of PAS OK, who had come back in 
power with the elections of 1993, died. This event symbolically brought to an end the 
period of charismatic leaders in Greek politics. The other side of this development 
was that Costas Simitis, against all odds, replaced Papandreou as the leader of the 
PASOK government, and within a few months was also elected president of PASOK. 
Simitis was part of the ‘modernisation wing’ of PASOK. This wing was always a 
small minority within the party and was defined in opposition to Papandreou’s 
populist content and style of governance. In addition, its members were occasionally 
accused as ‘traitors’, and it had only little influence, if any, in the bureaucratic party 
machine. It is indicative that Simitis had resigned from the position of minister of 
National Economy in 1987, during a Papandreou government, almost explicitly 
accusing Papandreou of violating the agreed governmental programme of economic 
stabilisation. It should also be mentioned here that this political stance of Simitis and 
PASOK’s modernisers, made them, if not popular, sympathetic to many voters of 
both New Democracy (on the right-to-the-centre) and Synaspismos (on the left).
These developments constituted the epitome of the shift that had taken place in 1989- 
1990. The Greek political system had seemed to leave behind the increased 
polarisation and the ‘Koskotas scandal’, and an old political project, that of
‘modernisation’, seemed to form a new and dynamic historical block, creating a new 
public discourse which challenged the traditional party division lines. Based on these 
trends we can argue that 1996 signified the emergence of a new public discourse. 
The purpose here is to study how this changing public discourse in Greece interacted 
with the emerging, in the same period, globalisation discourse; how the hegemonic 
discourse was implicated in the public discourse formation, and how, conversely, the 
emerging public discourse was created and expressed in the terms of the globalisation 
discourse.
Institutional Actors and the Discourse o f Globalisation
The list of institutional actors on which the research focuses is as follows:
■ The Main Political Parties and their Leaders
- Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) & Constantinos Simitis.
- New Democracy (ND) & Kostas Karamanlis.
- Communist Party of Greece (KKE) & Aleka Papariga.
- Coalition of Left and Progress (Synaspismos) & Nicos Constandopoulos.
■ The Main Social Partners
- The Greek General Confederation of Labour (GSEE).
- The Federation of Greek Industries (SEV).
- The Economic and Social Council of Greece (OKE).
■ The Greek Church
■ A Press Sample (the Sunday Edition of the newspaper To V1MA), which also 
captures aspects of the book-production and the discourses of politicians, think- 
tanks and anti-globalisation groups.
The general criterion for the construction of the above list of actors was that of 
‘inclusion’. Therefore the purpose was to include as many actors as possible, and at 
least all these actors with an important institutional role in the (re)production of 
public discourse. A detailed justification of the various actors selected is offered in 
the sections that follow. It is also important to point out here that there may be slight 
differences in the period of examination of each institutional actor. Thus although the
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overall span of our research is from 1995 to 2001, in the case of political parties for 
instance, we take as a point of departure the electoral year 1996. Whenever such 
variations in the examination period do apply, a detailed reasoning is offered.
The analysis of the actors’ discourses takes place as follows: First, where necessary, 
the identity of the actors/institutions is presented. Second, the rationale of the 
analysed documents is discussed. Finally, the nature of engagement with the 
globalisation discourse is analysed. All translations of the official documents in this 
Chapter are mine, unless otherwise stated.
The Main Political Parties and their Leaders (PASOK, ND, KKE, Synaspismos)
The criterion for the selection of the political parties to be studied was a double one: 
first, their ‘representativeness’, as expressed by votes in the national elections; and 
second their continuity in the political scene. In this regard the following parties have 
been studied: (a) The ‘IlaveAXfivio EofftaXicmKd Kopjia/Panhellenic Socialist 
Movement’ (PASOK), which during the 1990s won the 1993, 1996 and 2000 
elections. PASOK is a centre/lefl-to-centre party, (b) The ‘Nea AripoKpaxla/New 
Democracy’ (ND), which during the same period won the 1991 elections. ND is a 
right-to-centre party, (c) The ‘KoppouviaxiKO Koppa EAMSac^Communist Party of 
Greece’ (KKE), which is the third biggest party in Greek politics, and is steadily 
represented in parliament since its foundation in 1974. KKE is a traditional 
communist party, (d) The ‘Euvacmajxoi; rrjg Apiaxepac; kco, rrjg IlpooSou/Coalition 
of Left and Progress’ (Synaspismos), which was the fourth biggest Greek party in the 
1990s. Synaspismos is a ‘progressive’ left party. It was founded in 1989, and with 
the exception of the 1993 elections, it was the only small party which had a constant 
presence in the Greek parliament during the period 1990-2001.
In order to study the discourse of the above parties, their electoral manifestos and the 
speeches and interviews of their leaders were scrutinised for the period 1996-2000. 
Moreover, in the case of the two biggest parties (i.e. PASOK and ND) the activities of 
their think-tanks were examined. We first turn to the party electoral manifestos.
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a. Electoral Manifestos: 1996 and 2000
The study of electoral manifestos is important for at least two reasons. First, the 
manifestos are a primary material of research, in the sense that they are published by 
the parties themselves, and usually express the outcome of an in-party conversation. 
Therefore they are an authoritative source for tracing and studying the positions of the 
parties in the past. Moreover, their publication constitutes a ‘media event’ and their 
content is used by the media for criticism or praise, independently of whether the 
manifestos themselves are read or not by the majority of the electoral population. In 
essence they are important because they incarnate the way in which parties choose to 
communicate with the electorate. This latter point brings us to the second reason of 
why the study of manifestos is important (at least for this project). Electoral 
manifestos are not academic texts, or texts aiming to a particular target group. Their 
target group is the electoral body as a whole (at least for the big parties) and that is 
why they are free of jargon or complex analyses which would not be accessible to the 
majority of people. In this regard electoral manifestos offer important insights and 
inroads for studying public discourses. They are texts that have been made in order to 
resonate to a great part of the population; or put differently, they include positions 
and arguments that (the parties hope) can resonate with the wider public. Therefore 
they constitute important means for studying the public discourse of a particular 
period1.
It has to be mentioned here that not all the Greek parties had an electoral manifesto, 
in terms of a single publication which summarises the proposed party policies in each 
and every policy area, during the period of examination. In particular, the idea of an 
electoral manifesto was fully embraced by the parties, with the exception of KKE, 
only in the 2000 elections. The lack of electoral manifestos was covered with the use 
of the various leaflets that the parties used in those election periods.
The methodology used for the study of the manifestos is as follows. First, references 
to the concept of globalisation were traced, and their content and context was studied.
1 For a short history of the study of electoral manifestos through content analysis see: Budge and Bara, 
2001. For a review of manifesto-based research see Budge and Bara, 2001a.
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Next it was examined how the different references within each manifesto related to 
each other. The purpose here was to find and analyse underlining notions and 
tendencies within each single manifesto. Finally, for each party separately, the 
manifesto of 1996 was compared with that of 2000 in order to trace changes and 
continuities of notions and tendencies. Concepts such as internationalization, 
neoliberalism and imperialism, were also examined and linked with the globalisation 
discourse where considered necessary, i.e. when they were the focal points of 
reference in the documents under examination. The next sections proceed with the 
analysis of the manifestos. We order the parties according to the power they had in 
the parliament.
Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK)
PASOK published electoral manifestos for both the 1996 and 2000 elections. The 
manifesto of 1996 was entitled Strong and Modern Greece: The Programme o f 
PASOK for the Road to the 21st Century2, it was 143 pages long, and it reflected the 
tensions which existed in PASOK at that period. It made five explicit references to 
(the term) globalisation in four different sections; the general-introductory statement, 
the section on foreign policy and defence, the section on export strategy and that on 
education.
In general it can be argued that although the 1996 manifesto adopted a critical-to- 
negative stance towards globalisation, in the sectoral sections, in many instances it 
referred to and replicated many aspects of the discourse of economic globalisation as 
a new international economic reality. The following paragraphs follow up these 
references.
The conceptualisation of globalisation in the introductory section of the manifesto is 
of particular importance, because it is the section in which the ideological platform of
2 The reference for this manifesto throughout the thesis will be, PASOK, 1996. The title in Greek is: 
Taxbpfj Kai Euyxpovr) EAM6a: To ITpbypajijxa t o o  IIAEOK yia xrjv Ilopeia rcpoq xov 21° Aubm’.
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the party was set out. The section was entitled ‘Before The New Era: Programme for 
the Way to the 21st Century’ (pp. 5-8)3 and its first paragraph read as follows:
In the dawn of the 21st century radical changes transform the world as we 
knew it until today. A new world takes over, which knows no boundaries for 
people, money, work, civilisations and values (p. 6).
This is the way in which PASOK conceptualised the historical environment within 
which its ideological platform was formed. The third paragraph of the same 
introductory section is on economic globalisation.
The globalisation of the economy and the domination of free market 
competition are accompanied by the domination of a narrow economic logic 
which has profit as its absolute criterion....’ (p. 6, emphasis in the original).
And further on one reads:
Social injustice and exploitation accompany the modern societies of the third 
industrial revolution.. .At the same time new.. .hopes emerge for a better life, 
more free, more socially just’. ‘What will dominate? The positive prospect or 
a new barbarism? This will be decided by the struggles and the efforts of us 
all (p. 6, emphasis in the original).
The next reference to globalisation in the manifesto was in the section on ‘foreign 
policy - defence’. In particular the term ‘globalisation of the economy’ was used 
twice in the definition of the new ‘international system’ and the conceptualization of 
the ‘new international economic environment’ (p. 10). Furthermore, the same 
concept (i.e. globalisation of the economy) was used in section 4, on ‘education’, for 
the definition of the ‘new social environment’ (p. 74). Finally in section 3 of the 
manifesto on ‘export strategy’, where the first heading was ‘A Dynamic Response to 
the Forces of Globalisation’ (p. 67), globalisation was again conceptualised as the 
‘new international economic scene’.
3 ‘M7ipoGT& g i t ] N£a E7ioxTj: IIp6ypa|j.|i.a yia xrjv Ilopeia Ttpoq xov 21° Aubva’.
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Beyond these explicit references to globalisation, one also finds scattered references 
throughout the manifesto to the need for adjustment to the new international 
environment, and other issues related to the globalisation debate, such as flexibility. 
Three instances follow:
We live in a period of unrelenting competition among countries, in which the 
main stake is who will succeed in adjusting more, faster and more effectively 
in the new models of production and competition that have emerged. It’s not 
enough to keep going. We must go faster than the others (p. 35)...
Our target is, a more flexible and effective state.
Our target is, a state which will function with less cost but with social 
criteria...
Our target is a Strategic State ’ (pp. 40-41, emphasis in the original)...
Third target of our [employment] policy is the enhancement of the mobility of 
employees and firms. In a period in which extensive changes take place in a 
global scale...employees and firms must move with flexibility among 
different sites of production, working methods and geographical locations of 
employment (p. 44, emphasis in the original).
Hence, overall it can be argued that PASOK’s 1996 manifesto was characterised by 
an internal tension. At the level of its ideological platform, references to the danger 
of a ‘new barbarism’4, as well as to ‘economism’, ‘social injustice’ and ‘exploitation’ 
were dominant. Therefore a rather negative stance to globalisation was adopted. Yet, 
at the various sectoral, policy specific sections of the manifesto (e.g. on the economy 
and education), globalisation and economic globalisation were recognised as a given 
historical condition, as a/the new international structure. Consequently, the urgent 
need for adjustment to the new conditions was repeatedly underlined. Thus while the 
manifesto criticised the conservative party’s policies of ‘less state and privatisations’ 
(p. 37), it itself propagated the need for a more flexible state, and flexibility in the 
industrial relations. In conclusion it can be argued that when the new reality and its
4 The term ‘barbarism’ made an explicit reference to the political philosophy of Comelious Castoriadis. 
Castoriadis formed the ‘Socialism or Barbarism’ group in 1948, and he was also the founding editor of 
the Socialism or Barbarism journal.
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requirements were under discussion in the various sectoral sections of the manifesto, 
the ideological stance of the party was neutralised or just ignored.
The manifesto for the 2000 elections was entitled The Governmental Programme o f 
PASOK: Our Proposals, Our Commitments (165 pages long), and the use of the 
concept of globalisation for the definition of the international state of affairs was 
widespread. In particular the term globalisation appeared eleven times in the 
document, and the references were spread among most of the sectoral/policy sections.
As in the 1996 manifesto, that of 2000 gave primacy to globalisation by including it 
in its introductory statement. In particular globalisation was mentioned as one of the 
‘critical developments’ that Greece had to face before and after the elections5 (p. 8). 
Thus in the opening statement of the manifesto globalisation was conceptualised as a 
phenomenon which created ‘new relations, new problems, new political questions and 
challenges which need to be met’ (p. 8; see also p. 9). This introductory section had 
also a subsection, entitled ‘the security of our society in conditions of globalisation’ 
(p. 10), where interestingly globalisation was referred to as the driving force of 
development.
We consider that market liberalisation, globalisation, the restructuring of the 
production and technological change constitute the driving forces for 
development. At the same time they create dangers and instability in social 
relations (p. 10).
A similar approach was adopted in the section ‘a new model of development: towards 
a modem and competitive economy’. This started with the subtitle ‘new reality, new 
policies’ (p. 16) and argued that ‘[technology and globalisation change the nature of 
international competition’ (p. 16).
The effort of the manifesto to combine a traditional left narrative with the need for 
adjustment was perhaps best exemplified in the following extract:
5 Along with (a) the choice of the values on which the future development of Greece would be based 
and (b) the accession to the Eurozone.
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The empowerment of the institutions of welfare state and their adjustment to 
the new facts of the post-industrialist society and the globalisation of the 
economy constitute the great challenges of the coming decade (p. 90, 
emphasis added).
It is interesting to note that the references to globalisation as a ‘new reality’, a new set 
of conditions which required particular actions at the domestic level, were usually 
found in the introduction of the various sections where either the general ideological 
platform of the party was laid out, or the ‘new challenges’ of the contemporary 
international state of affairs were discussed6. Furthermore, the manifesto was full of 
references to a ‘new economy’ (for instance pp. 16, 58, 59), a ‘new age’ (pp. 1, 58, 59, 
130,131) or as already mentioned to a ‘new reality’ (p. 16).
Beyond the electoral manifestos it is important here to analyse the activities of 
PASOK’s think-tank, ‘Institute for Strategic and Development Studies, Andreas 
Papandreou’ (ISTAME) which was founded in 19957. ISTAME has had a well- 
developed nation-wide framework of members and people engaging in research 
groups, and since its foundation it has organised numerous activities both in Athens 
and in smaller cities all around Greece. These activities had a variety of topics and 
the respective talks were delivered not only by academics but also by local politicians 
and local public figures. With regard to globalisation ISTAME organised two high 
profile events in Athens as early as in 1997. The first was organised in co-operation
Q #
with two other civil society organisations and was entitled ‘International Market 
Economy and Contemporary Left’ (May 12, 1997), and the second was an 
international conference on ‘The Left in the Europe of the 21st Century: Globalisation, 
Nation-State, Social Solidarity, Technology and Culture’. The latter was opened by 
Simitis himself and included speeches on globalisation by Leo Panich, Nicos 
Mouzelis and Robert Cabanes. These two events show that the globalisation
6 Overall 13 references to globalisation were made in the manifesto (including two references to the 
‘globalised society of knowledge’ in page 76). Beyond the above mentioned extracts, see also p. 120 
(section on constitutional reform), pp. 130-131 (section on public administration), and p. 156 (section 
on the European and international position of Greece).
7 ISTAME (2001: 2) is legally a ‘civic non-profit making corporation’, and ‘has been officially 
recognised as a Non-Governmental Organisation by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’. See the official 
web page of the institute at: http://www.istame-apapandreou.gr.
8 The ‘'Ojj.OiOg npoP^TniaTicpou yia tov EKouyxpoviopd Trig Koivcovicu;’ (Reflection Group for 
Societal Modernisation), and ‘IIoA.iT£ia’ (Politeia).
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discourse was becoming increasingly central in the Greek public discourse, at least at 
the level of political and academic elites. It is even more important that in 1999 
ISTAME attempted to popularise and widely communicate the globalisation 
problematique by organising a number of local conferences on globalisation in 
various cities around Greece. Thus, two conferences were organised in January, one 
in Athens, on ‘the globalisation of news’, and one in Agrinio, on ‘globalisation and 
the welfare state’. Two conferences were also organised in March, one on ‘woman 
and globalisation’ in Arta, and one on ‘youth and globalisation’ in Herakleion. 
Furthermore, a conference on the effects of globalisation on the periphery was 
organised in Patra, in May. ISTAME kept up the globalisation conferences 
momentum in 2000. Thus, a conference on globalisation and agriculture took place in 
Nemea, on February 21, and one more on globalisation, knowledge and the future of 
labour in Korinthos, on November 11.
This prominence of globalisation in both PASOK’s manifestos and ISTAME’s 
activities should be related to the emergent European debate among social democratic 
parties and leaders on the issue of ‘the future of Social Democracy’, the ‘third way’ 
and ‘progressive governance’. ISTAME for instance participated in the following 
relevant events: an international conference in Stockholm on ‘where is power? A 
conference on democracy and influence in the age of globalisation’, organised by the 
‘Olaf Palme Institute’ (July 1998); an international conference in Berlin on ‘shaping 
globalisation’, organised by ‘Friedrich Ebert Stiftung’; and the annual NGOs’ 
conference of United Nations in New York on ‘challenges of a globalised world’ 
(September 1999). To sum up we can say that there was an explicit effort by 
ISTAME to bring the issue of globalisation and its effect on society, to the forefront 
of political debate all over Greece (that is beyond Athens and Thessalonika).
New Democracy (ND)
The New Democracy Party did not publish a single electoral manifesto for the 1996 
elections. It issued, however, a detailed programme on economic policy (60 pages 
long). Along with the sectoral sections on banking, trade, securities, and maritime 
affairs, this covered broader issues, such as the role of the state, the social and
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political cohesion, and the definition of the new international environment. It is this 
economic manifesto, entitled The Governmental Programme o f New Democracy for 
the Economy9 that was used here as a substitute for a general electoral manifesto10.
This economic manifesto made no explicit reference to the term globalisation11. It 
seems however that instead of this term, the concepts of ‘internationalisation’ and 
‘internationalisation of the world economy’ were used to signify the same phenomena 
and developments. In particular, there were four references to the concept of 
internationalisation. The first one was in the section on ‘the role of the state’ (pp. 9- 
11) and, as in the case of PASOK’s 1996 manifesto, was urgent about the new 
conditions that ‘we are in’. It was as follows:
The internationalisation of the world economy and in particular the European 
integration, the technological advancement and the change of the 
developmental strategy of some countries have unleashed forces that demand 
more freedom in transactions. Greece cannot be an exception in the new 
international environment. These developments necessitate the revision of 
the role of the state and of the institutional framework that defines the 
function of our economic system (p. 9, emphasis in the original).
The need for adjustment to the new economic reality of the internationalisation of the 
world economy was repeated at least twice more in the manifesto. In the section on 
the ‘New Economic Conditions’ (pp. 18-20) one reads:
Our adjustment to the new international environment demands many 
changes...The internationalisation of the world economy is the most 
important change. It is now a chimera to believe that any country, and 
certainly Greece can isolate itself from the international conjuncture (p.
19)...The internationalisation of economic activities creates the need and 
imposes the modernisation and the adjustment of the Greek credit system 
in the international tendencies and developments (p. 35).
9 The reference for this manifesto throughout the thesis will be, ND, 1995. The title in Greek is: ‘To 
KuPepvr|TiK6 npdypajipa rr\q N£a<; ArnioKpaxicu; yia xr|v Oncovopia’, and was published in February 
1995.
10 This was also the suggestion of the ‘Electoral Manifestos Section’ of the ND party.
11 This, as such, is an interesting finding. Potential explanations are offered later in this Chapter.
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Therefore in the ND’s 1995 economic manifesto, the concept of internationalisation 
of the world economy was put forward as the new international structure, due to 
which a wide range of policy and structural changes needed to be made in the Greek 
politico-economic system. Furthermore, this internationalisation of the world 
economy was not judged (criticised or applauded) by the manifesto, but was 
presented as the new international economic order.
For the 2000 elections, ND adopted the idea of a single manifesto, and published in
1 0March 2000, The Governmental Programme o f New Democracy , a 98 pages long
1 o
document. The manifesto made few explicit references to globalisation as such , but 
the arguments/assumptions about a ‘new era’ and a ‘new reality’ that were found in 
PASOK (2000), were clearly put forward here too. The first reference was made in 
the introduction of the section on the future of Greek economy:
It is a common belief that the whole world is at the end of one era and the 
beginning of an other. We are already in the first stage of the post-industrial 
era. The stage of the era of globality, of technology and of knowledge (p. 32, 
emphasis in the original).
And further below:
For the country to meet the challenges of the 21st century, we must mobilise 
all the social agents and factors, public and private, of the Greek society, in 
an attempt to reach a social transformation tuned with the today’s global 
reality and capable of meeting the needs of the new era (p. 84).
The manifesto also turned to globalisation in the section on culture. The reference, 
however, did not negatively relate the two concepts. It argued that the ‘challenges of 
globalisation necessitate today more than ever before, to face Culture as the basic 
bond of our national existence’ (p. 96). In a similar manner the manifesto referred
12 The reference for this manifesto throughout the thesis will be, ND, 2000. The title in Greek is: ‘To 
Ku(tepvT)TiK6 npdypappa rr|q N6cu; Ar|poKpaTlcu;\
13 Overall three references, including one on ‘globality’ (p. 32) and one on ‘globalised economy’ (p. 
53).
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positively to the phenomenon of the ‘globalised economy’, as one of ‘the new big 
challenges’ for the development of Greece (p. 53).
To sum up, it seems that ND’s manifestos did not develop a discourse on 
globalisation per se. Instead, they put forward the notion of an emerging new global 
reality that presented a developmental challenge, to which Greece should adjust in 
order to prosper. Reasons for this no use of the term globalisation are discussed when 
the discourse of party’s leader Karamanlis is examined. We conclude this section on 
New Democracy’s discourse with a brief reference to the activities of its think-tank.
New Democracy created its own think-tank, the ‘Constantine Karamanlis Institute for 
Democracy’ (CKID), in 199814. Globalisation, however, did not feature high in the 
activities and interests of CKID, at least until 2001, when it organised a conference on 
‘Globalisation and Orthodoxy’, and published its proceedings (CKID, 2001). It is 
indeed interesting that CKID chose this subject as a point of entrance in the debate on 
globalisation. But it is also true that this issue had emerged at the time (with the help 
of Archbishop Christodoulos) as one of the most central issues in the public discourse. 
Beyond this intervention, CKID did not seem to change in any way the engagement 
of ND with the globalisation discourse, as this was manifested through the party’s 
electoral manifestos.
Communist Party o f Greece (KKE)
For the 1996 elections, KKE published a 10 page long document entitled Electoral 
Manifesto o f the Communist Party o f Greece: People Counterattack with a Strong 
KKE15. This document made no reference to globalisation, but this was because the 
processes and conditions that in the manifestos of PASOK and ND were associated
14 The institute is a ‘nonprofit organization...for the purpose of examining and analyzing social, 
political and economic issues’. See, http://www.idkaramanlis.gr/html/_en-version/profile/index- 
en.html (30/10/02). Compared to ISTAME, CKID is in organisational terms more centralised, i.e. it 
does not have local branches around Greece.
15 The reference for this manifesto throughout the thesis will be, KKE, 1996. The title in Greek is: 
‘EicXoyiKfi AiaKfjpn^ T] ton KoppouviaiiKon K6ppaTO<; EAM5aq: Avi£7u0£an Aa6 pe Ia^upd KKE’. 
The extracts from the manifesto are not accompanied by page numbers because the document was not 
paginated.
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with globalisation and internationalisation, in the case of KKE, were conceptualised 
as imperialism.
Thus the KKE manifesto conceptualised the new world order as a ‘new imperialist 
order’ that posed an immediate threat to Greece. It furthermore accused PASOK and 
Simitis, for serving the plutocracy. For instance with regard to the elections it argued 
that, ‘the powerful circles of plutocracy and the imperialist centres’, had called early 
elections in order ‘to promote a new storm of anti-worker and anti-farmer measures, 
according to the demands of the industrialists, the imperialist organisations and the 
European Union’. Finally the KKE called for the creation of a ‘front against the 
imperialist new order’, and for confrontation and clash with ‘the monopolies and the 
choices of imperialist organisations’.
Hence the discourse of KKE remained grounded in a conceptualisation of the 
international politico-economic order as an imperialist terrain that served particular 
economic interests. Along these lines the increased levels of internationalisation or 
globalisation signified, for KKE, the advancement of the old plutocratic and 
imperialist order.
In the 2000 elections instead of an electoral manifesto, KKE published twelve leaflets, 
with a sectoral (e.g. for farmers and self-employed) or thematic (e.g. on education and 
on the pension system) orientation. Some of these leaflets did make reference to 
globalisation, the main thesis being that globalisation was used by PASOK and ND as 
a means for justifying policy reforms that served the interests of multinational 
corporations and ‘plutocracy’ in Greece. For instance, the leaflets for education16 and 
for self-employed workers claimed:
Both PASOK and ND focus on the no-altemative of EMU and 
‘globalisation’, struggling over which of the two will win the trust of the 
plutocracy (leaflet on education). Their policy serves the big monopolies 
and the multinationals.. ..(leaflet on self-employed workers).
16 The title of this leaflet is ‘Strengthening the Fight for Education and Life’. The reference for this 
leaflet throughout the thesis will be, KKE, 2000.
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Finally, the leaflet for farmers added:
The way forward for the KKE.. .is the struggle for the development of an 
agriculture, against the quotas and common responsibility fines that aim 
at shrinking the Greek farming, making it supplementary to the EU, and 
adjusting it in the so called globalised market, from which are excluded 
more than 1.5 billion people who starve or are undernourished.
Thus, KKE remained constant in both electoral campaigns in its conceptualisation of 
the ‘new world order’ as an imperialist and plutocratic order. It furthermore accused 
the two big parties of using globalisation (and the EU) as an excuse to advance the 
changes demanded by plutocracy and its forces (mainly the MNEs).
Coalition o f the Left and Progress (Synaspismos)
Considering the width of the gap between KKE on the one side, and PASOK and ND 
on the other, it is indeed interesting to see how Synaspismos was positioned towards 
the changing international environment, of the time. Synaspismos’ 13 page Electoral
17 •Manifesto 1996 , did not engage, at least directly, with the concept of globalisation. 
It propagated the need for a ‘modernisation with a human face’, and argued that 
‘[t]he proposals of Synaspismos constitute and promote a modernisation which is not 
neutral, which is not a boring technocratic process’. In this regard it can be argued 
that Synaspismos was reading the need for modernisation of the Greek politico- 
economic system, not as something that was externally required, but as something 
that was a domestic, societal need. Thus the manifesto attempted to relate the 
‘modernisation proposals’ of PASOK and ND to bureaucratisation, and argued for a 
‘progressive’ and ‘people-driven’ modernisation. Yet, since the manifesto was 
mainly domestically-focused with no explicit reference to the ‘new international 
conditions’, no conclusions can be drawn on its stance toward globalisation.
17 The reference for this manifesto throughout the thesis will be, Synaspismos, 1996. The title in 
Greek is: ‘EkXoyikti Aiaicijpu r^i 1996: Epeli; Mrcopoupe va aaq Koixdpe axa Mdxia’.
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The manifesto for the 2000 elections was much more internationally oriented. It was
1 o
entitled Decide Left -  Vote Synaspismos: Elections 2000 and it was 56 pages long . 
It paid particular attention to the ‘post-EMU’ era in Greece, it attacked the ‘neo­
liberal orthodoxy’ and ‘warnfed] the Greek people that PASOK and ND 
prepare[d]...a new round of deregulations and blood-sacking of the weaker social 
classes, in the name of the adjustment of the Greek economy in the post-euro reality’.
The manifesto referred also to the ‘problems and demands that emerged from the new 
reality, defined by the revolution in science and technologies, and the globalisation of 
markets... the model o f uncontrolled markets, and o f the domination o f market over 
society, cannot be the future o f the country in the new century’ (emphasis in the 
original). Furthermore, the section on ‘sustainable development’ placed globalisation 
among the factors that damaged the quality of human life.
Overall, it can be argued that the focal point of criticism in the manifesto was neo­
liberalism and the process of the domination of economy over society that was 
associated with the phenomenon of globalisation.
Synopsis
From the above reading of party manifestos for the period 1995-2000 some 
elementary conclusions can be drawn. The party in power, PASOK, changed its 
stance significantly towards globalisation. From warnings against the danger of a 
‘new barbarism’ in 1996, it moved to a relatively positive treatment of the concept of 
globalisation, as a ‘new reality’ that demanded domestic changes, and which was the 
driving force for international development. On the other hand ND had a more 
neutral approach from the outset. For this party, the internationalisation and 
globalisation processes signified a ‘new global reality’; the ordering principle of a 
new era to which the country had to adjust. On the left of the equation, the positions 
seem to converge during the period under investigation. The communist party (KKE)
18 The reference for this manifesto throughout the thesis will be, Synaspismos, 2000. The title in 
Greek is: ‘Arcocp&crias Apiarepd -  'FriqHce 2i)vacmo|!6: EKXoy£<; 2000’. The document is not 
paginated.
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started in 1996 by defining the ‘new world order’ as another plutocratic and 
imperialistic order, whereas Synaspismos argued for a modernisation with a human 
face, as an internal, societal necessity. Yet by 2000, both parties accused the 
government of PASOK of using globalisation as an excuse, in order to promote 
particular neo-liberal policies that were against the interests of the weakest social 
classes.
From this, it can be said that globalisation emerged gradually as a new zone of 
contestation in Greek politics. It defined a new political axis with globalisation as an 
opportunity for development and a ‘new reality’ on the one side, and as a ‘new means 
for imperialist expansion’ on the other. Hence, either through its acceptance as a new 
structural environment, or through its negation, as an excuse for neoliberal policies, 
the globalisation debate in Greece during 1995-2000 was all about the definition of 
what ‘reality’ and ‘adjustment’ were, and what they implied in policy terms.
The next section moves the examination on to the discourses of political leaders. 
Such an examination enriches our investigation of Greek public discourse in both 
qualitative and quantitative terms. It allows us to monitor the political actors’ 
attempts to deliberately explain the phenomenon of globalisation to a variety of social 
groups and on different occasions, expanding from ad hoc electoral speeches to local 
farmers, to more institutionalised events such as the annual assembly of Greek 
employers.
b. Party Leaders: 1997 -  2000
Introduction
The methodology that was followed for the collection and the study of the research 
material is as follows. All the four parties have well-developed on-line archives, 
containing the public pronouncements of their leaders since approximately the
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beginning of 199719. These pronouncements include, (i) speeches delivered in the 
parliament and in events organised by a wide variety of social organisations and 
associations, (ii) short statements made in a variety of occasions (e.g. new year 
messages, comments on the air strikes on Kosovo, comments on industrial actions, 
etc.), and (iii) interviews in the press or on TV. In this regard, the on-line party 
archives constitute a great source for the study of party leaders’ discourses. The 
rationale was that even if this material did not include all the public interventions of 
the political leaders during 1997-2000, it included a critical mass, able to give us an 
accurate picture of the discourses of political leaders. With regard to methodology, a 
‘key-word-in-context’ and a ‘word-count’ methodology were combined . The ‘key 
word’ given was ‘globalisation’ (7iayKocj|j,i07roir|ar|).
Costas Simitis, Prime Minister and President o f PASOK throughout the period 
1996 -  2000
Costas Simitis’s intervention in the public discourse is very important given that the 
prime minister is a powerful figure in the formation and evolution of Greek public 
discourse. In order to study this intervention 347 speeches, interviews and other 
various statements, searched for references to globalisation during the period 1997- 
2000. From these 347 documents, 68 were found to include an explicit reference to 
globalisation; that is approximately 20% of the total. The exact evolution of these 
references is presented in Table 1 below.
19 The KKE’s archive contains documents published after 1998.
20 See, Denzin and Lincoln, 2000: 775-777.
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Table 1: References to Globalisation in Speeches, Statements and Interviews by C. Simitis
Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. Oct Nov. Dec. Totals %
1997 4:0 8:2 6:1 3:1 7:1 9:3 2:1 - 4:0 13:1 16:6 4:2 76:18 23.6
1998 - 3:2 3:0 6:2 7:1 7:2 9:3 1:1 8:1 9:2 7:4 4:1 64:19 29
1999 3:0 3:0 8:2 3:0 17:1 16:0 4:1 3:0 5:0 11:0 4:1 12:1 89:06 6.7
2000 12:5 12:1 33:4 16:2 5:0 9:4 4:1 - 7:3 7:2 6:2 7:1 118:25 21.1
NOTE: The first number in the Table’s cells indicates the absolute number of examined documents, 
and the second number indicates the absolute number of documents in which a reference to 
globalisation was made. The last column indicates the per annum percentage of documents referring to 
globalisation.
We thus observe that 2 out of 10 public interventions (i.e. speeches, statements, 
interviews) of Simitis in 1997 included a reference to globalisation, and this figure 
rose to 3 out of 10 in 1998. Interestingly the references were reduced to 1 out of 15 
interventions in 1999, to pick up again to 2 out of 10 in 2000. Therefore, the first 
general observation to be made is that globalisation constituted a constant theme, an 
integral part, of prime-minister’s discourse. Furthermore considering the dynamics of 
references during the years 1997 and 1998, it can be argued that globalisation was 
also implicated in the ‘modernisation project’ discourse of PASOK, and through it, it 
became an integral feature of the Greek public discourse. Nevertheless, the 
significantly low number of references to globalisation in 1999 remains hard to 
explain. It might be the case that by 1999 globalisation had started to be perceived 
and experienced in Greece as a process with concrete benefits and costs for the 
different groups of the population. Such an explanation would also be consistent with 
the negative connotations that globalisation had acquired at an international level by
1999. These factors, combined with the fact that 1999 was a pre-electoral year, may 
have led Simitis to put temporarily to the side his effort to defend globalisation within 
the public discourse.
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Yet it is important to underline here that the above numbers and percentages should 
be treated as indicators of tendencies and not as absolute figures. Many of the 
examined speeches and statements were delivered on occasions when a reference to 
globalisation would be rather ‘out of context’ (e.g. a short public statement on the 
crisis in Kosovo, or a short statement on the re-election of C. Stefanopoulos to the 
Presidency). In this regard, the fact that the percentage of public interventions that 
made a reference to globalisation remained on average 20% is indeed striking.
In Table 2 we classify the sixty-eight references to globalisation made by Simitis, in 
different categories, according to their context.
Table 2: The Context of C. Simitis’s References to Globalisation
Globalisation 
of the market/ 
economy/ 
production/ 
competition 
(usually along 
with 
references to 
technology & 
technological 
advancement)
The Challenge 
of
Globalisation 
(in general)
The era of 
globalisation
The EU as a 
response to 
globalisation
Political 
globalisation 
(including 
‘globalised 
system’ and 
‘globalised 
relations’ 
mainly in an 
IR context)
Globali­
sation
and
culture
Definition
of
globalisation
Various
(incl.
Crime
and
Olympic
Games)
1997 16 4 2 1 1 - -
1998 12 11 4 1 2 1 -
1999 3 5 - - 1 - -
2000 11 20 2 2 4 - 2
Totals 42 40 8 4 8 1 2
NOTE: The numbers in the Table’s cells signify the number of thematic annual references and not 
absolute numbers o f documents examined. For instance, if a document made a reference both to the 
EU and to culture, then both categories would be credited. For the annual totals of documents see 
Table 1.
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Table 2 indicates a shift in the discourse of the prime-minister from an emphasis on 
economic globalisation, to a broader depiction of globalisation as a new era and as a 
challenge that had to be faced and taken advantage of, i.e. a shift from a passive to a 
pro-active approach to the phenomenon of globalisation (see also below). There was 
also a constant amount of references to the European Union as a response to 
globalisation. Furthermore, as time passed by, globalisation was used with reference 
to an expanding list of issues such as international governance, culture and crime. 
This points to a deeper implication of the concept of globalisation in the Greek public 
discourse. What follows are some direct extracts from Simitis’s speeches on 
globalisation. Through these extracts we aim to elucidate further the substance of his 
discourse on globalisation, and the content and dynamics of the categories mentioned 
in Table 2.
During 1997 C. Simitis initiated a series of high profile events aimed at discussing the 
position of the ‘socialist movement’ within the contemporary world. These series 
were part of the broader European debates on the future of ‘social democracy’, the 
‘third way’ and international ‘progressive governance’ and the speakers included 
Massimo D’Alema, Jacques Delors and Lionel Jospin. In the first event, with 
D’Alema present, Simitis in his speech argued:
The first and more powerful dynamic is that of the globalisation of the 
economy. Its characteristics include: The ever greater liberalisation of the 
movement of capitals, goods, services and economic actors. The ever- 
increasing demand for the stabilisation, synchronization and convergence of 
the economies. It is a new reality with ever diminishing economic borders21.
During 1998 this ‘new reality’ approach to globalisation was augmented to 
accommodate the dimension of ‘challenge’. Thus, Simitis tried to present 
globalisation in Greek public discourse as a challenge, (which remained, however, an 
inevitable reality). At the same time, an integral part of his discourse on globalisation 
was also the need for Greece to be an EU member state in this new era.
21 The speech took place in March 14, 1997.
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Today we have passed from the bipolar age to the age of globalisation22.
The globalisation is not only a challenge for the country but also a field that 
we are well-positioned to take advantage of23.
European integration is the means to respond to the great challenges that 
characterise our era. The first development is the globalisation of the 
economy.. .More and more it’s becoming obvious that this trend is not 
reversible, that there are no ways to cancel it24.
In a similar manner in 1999 Simitis was noting:
The globalisation of the economy and the development of technology create 
opportunities and capacities to those able to adjust and those who have the 
will and the creativity to take advantage of them.. .Technology and 
globalisation integrate the national economies and change the nature of 
global competition. They give to smaller countries like Greece the ability to 
participate further and more dynamically in the international markets25.
The above extract is indeed indicative of Simitis’ strenuous effort to present 
globalisation as an opportunity within the Greek public discourse. It also signifies the 
shift of his discourse from a rather passive to a proactive stance towards globalisation. 
The message that Simitis wanted to communicate was that the opportunities ‘were 
there’; it was up to Greece to take advantage of them and prosper -  adjustment was a 
crucial step to this end.
A decisive factor for the development of Simitis’ discourse on globalisation was his 
confrontation on exactly this issue with Archbishop Christodoulos. As we 
demonstrate below, by 1999 the Greek Church had developed through the Archbishop 
an explicitly hostile discourse towards globalisation. Simitis was asked on several
22 Speech in the parliament, June 23, 1998.
23 Speech in Lamia, July 4, 1998
24 Speech in an international seminar, November 14, 1998.
25 Speech in the event ‘youth and democracy’, in Pnyka, July 22, 1999.
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occasions to comment on these negative positions of the Archbishop. In a high 
profile TV interview in ‘Mega Channel’, he said:
You mentioned the issue of globalisation; I believe that one should face 
globalisation as a reality, and should not fight it. What one should fight for 
is to adjust the country to globalisation.. .26.
In a similar context responding to a question about the danger of global cultural 
homogenisation he replied:
[the response to the negative consequences of globalisation] comes from our 
intellectual production.. .we must develop dynamics that confront this 
annihilating logic27.
To sum up, Simitis was engaged in a tireless effort to present and defend 
globalisation in Greek public discourse as a ‘new reality’, and as a ‘challenge’ for the 
development and prosperity of Greece. Thus he tried to stress the potentials for 
taking control and advantage of globalisation. The decisive factors in the formation 
of his stance towards globalisation were: (i) his effort to counterbalance the negative 
and defensive discourse on globalisation of Archbishop Christodoulos (see below), 
and (ii) his participation in the European debates on the future of social democracy 
and on progressive governance. It seems, however, that Simitis had a genuine 
personal belief in globalisation as an opportunity for the development of Greece.
Kostas Karamanlis, President o f New Democracy (ND), 1997 -  present
After its defeat in the 1993 elections, the New Democracy party underwent an 
identity crisis, trying to delineate its political and ideological space. In this process, 
prominent neo-liberal as well as extreme-right members of the party were 
marginalized or expelled. Kostas Karamanlis, who took over the presidency of ND
26 Interview with Stavro Theodoraki, in Mega Channel, April 2, 2000.
27 Press conference during the ‘International Conference on Progressive Governance’ in Berlin, June 2,
2000.
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from Miltiadis Evert in March 22, 1997, attempted to promote the concept of ‘middle 
space’ (peaaloq %d>po<;) as both the political space of belonging and an ideological 
orientation for the party.
Table 3 examines the frequency of the use of the concept of globalisation by K. 
Karamanlis.
Table 3: References to Globalisation in Speeches, Statements and Interviews by 
K. Karamanlis
Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Totals %
1997 - - 2:0 2:0 6:0 2:0 0:0 0:0 3:0 6:1 15:1 8:1 44:3 6.8
1998 6:0 9:0 4:0 10:0 17:0 11:0 4:0 1:0 12:0 12:0 10:0 9:1 105:1 1
1999 10:0 38:0 32:1 9:0 27:0 20:2 4:0 0:0 7:0 14:1 32:0 34:1 227:5 2.2
2000 22:6 17:2 39:5 16:2 10:2 16:4 9:1 5:2 6:1 11:1 17:2 12:5 180:33 18.3
It is clear that Karamanlis avoided the use of the term globalisation. From the 556 
documents that were searched only 42 made a reference to globalisation (or globality), 
which corresponds to approximately 8% of the documents. It is revealing that even 
the increase in the use of the term in 2000 does not strictly refer to the term 
globalisation but to the term globality (wcryKOO(iioTrpa), which Karamanlis used most 
of the time, after 1999, instead of the term globalisation. Table 4 offers a more 
concrete picture of the context and content of Karamanlis’ (limited) discourse on 
globalisation.
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Table 4: The Context of K. Karamanlis’s References to Globalisation
Globalisation 
of the 
market/ 
economy/ 
production/ 
competition 
(usually along 
with 
references to 
technology 
and 
technological 
advancements)
The 
Challenge of 
globalisation
The era of 
globalisation
The EU as a 
response to 
globalisation
EU and 
Globalisation
Political 
globalisation 
(including 
‘globalised 
system’ and 
‘globalised 
relations’ 
mainly in an 
ER context)
Globalisation
and
culture
The 
definition of 
the concept 
of
globalisation
The Era 
of
globality
1997 3 - - - - 1 -
1998 1 1 - - - - -
1999 2 4 1 - 1 1 -
2000 9 28 9 3 1 - - 17
Totals 15 14 4 1 1 2 17
For most of the period up to 2000 Karamanlis used the concept of globalisation in a 
narrow manner to refer to the international economic environment. The more, 
however, the concept of globalisation was charged ideologically -  both domestically 
and internationally -  the more Karamanlis adopted a more critical stance towards it or 
avoided references to it. This should also explain the lack of references to 
globalisation in the electoral manifestos of New Democracy. In this framework the 
conceptualisation of the European Union as a response to globalisation became an 
integral part of Karamanlis discourse29. From the last months of 1999, however, the 
leader of the Opposition started to make use of the more neutral concept of globality 
(7rayKoapioxriTa). Karamanlis used globality along with technology and knowledge
28 Two of which refer to ‘globality’ rather than globalisation.
29 See for instance his reference to the importance of the project of European Integration in the age of 
globalisation in his message on the occasion of the 28th of October (a national day for Greece), 1999.
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to define the nature of our age. The context of his references to globality was 
repetitive and served an introductory purpose in his speeches. The following extract 
is characteristic of these references, and was also found in the 2000 electoral 
manifesto:
It is a common belief that the world is in the end of an era and the beginning 
of an other. We are already in the first stage of the post-industrial era. The 
first stage of the era of globality, technology and knowledge. The 
developments in all the sectors of human activity have acquired an 
unprecedented speed30.
The concept of globality gave to Karamanlis an ideological-free alternative to 
globalisation. Its use can itself be considered as a critique of the concept of 
globalisation as a challenge for development that was advanced by Simitis. In this 
way, Karamanlis tried to send the message that globalisation was a rather negative 
development, as opposed to globality which signified the arrival of the post-industrial 
era. Thus he was implicitly taking the Archbishop’s side in the ‘war’ between the 
latter and the government, on the concept and consequences of globalisation; a stance 
which no matter how genuine it was, was an easy way to increase his party’s 
popularity.
Aleka Papariga, Leader o f the Communist Party o f Greece, 1991 - present31
Aleka Papariga adopted from the very beginning a highly critical approach both to the 
phenomenon of globalisation as such and to the way in which globalisation was used 
by the government. The focal point of Papariga’s discourse on globalisation was that 
globalisation constituted a development which was inexorably related to the evolution
30 Speech at the Annual Assembly of the Federation of Greek Industries, January 20, 2000.
31 It has to be noted here that the available on-line party archive cannot be used as a source for the 
majority of the speeches and interviews of the party leader. Although it has a number of Paparigas’s 
speeches it mainly includes decisions and reports of the Central Committee of the party as well as 
speeches and interviews by other party members. For the purposes of our research we did not only 
examine the available on-line Papariga’s speeches and interviews, but also the available decisions and 
press reports of the party’s Central Committee (for the period 1998-2000). Therefore the examination 
of Papariga’s discourse remains thinner compared to the analysis offered for the other party leaders.
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and expansion of the capitalist system, and in this regard it was the modem face of
39imperialism . In this discourse the European Union was considered to be part of the 
‘imperialist problem’ (rather than a response to it), and both PASOK and ND, were 
accused of using the excuse of globalisation to serve the interests of the plutocracy in 
Greece.
The one-way of ‘globalisation’ and the ‘new order of things’ that the 
government tries to impose, is fake33.
The workers can choose between two paths. Either they will be subjugated 
in the inhuman globalisation of EMU...or they will follow the path of class 
struggle, adopting as their vision the overturning of the domination and 
power of the monopolies.. .34.
Following this logic the KKE adopted an explicitly supportive stance towards the 
anti-globalisation movement (including its radical expressions). For instance, after 
the protests in Gotebor, in 2001, the Central Committee of KKE criticised Simitis for 
supporting with his statements ‘state violence’ that had led to ‘hundreds of 
prosecutions and...one clinically dead protester’35. Moreover, according to the 
Central Committee, these developments demanded ‘an equally strong response to be 
given to the imperialist barbarism’. The announcement concluded that ‘[t]he struggle 
against NATO and EU is of vital importance’36.
Thus it can be argued that Papariga and KKE remained faithful to their traditional 
negative approach to the European Union, as a ‘neoliberal project’ that serves the 
interests of the global and local plutocracies. Along the same lines KKE approached 
globalisation as a new form of imperialism that had to be resisted through class 
struggle.
32 See Aleka Papariga, ‘For the Capitalist Globalisation’, Rizospastis, May 20, 2001, page 6.
33 Announcement of the Press Office of the Central Committee of the KKE regarding the entrance of 
Greece in EMU, June 20, 2000.
34 Declaration of the Central Committee of the KKE on May 1, 2000. See also the speech of Papariga 
in the meeting of the ‘European United Left’ in Rizospastis, April 12, 1998.
35 Announcement of the Press Office of the Central Committee of KKE on the protests in Goteborg, 
19-06-2001. Available at: http://www.kke.gr (06-11-2002).
36 Announcement of the Press Office of the Central Committee, 19-06-2001.
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Nicos Constantopoulos, President o f Synaspismos 1993 -  200437
Nicos Constandopoulos articulated a clear, coherent and critical discourse on 
globalisation. Some quantitative and qualitative aspects of his discourse are as 
follows.
Table 5: References to Globalisation in Speeches, Statements and Interviews by 
N. Constandopoulos
Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Totals %
1997 - - “ “ “ “ " “ 1:0 " “ 1:0 2:0 "
1998 “ - 1:1 2:1 2:0 2:0 2:0 1:0 6:1 2:0 2:0 2:0 22:3 14
1999 5:0 1:0 3:1 1:0 2:1 2:1 1:0 1:0 2:1 5:0 2:0 3:1 28:5 18
2000 1:0 7:0 4:0 4:0 3:0 0:0 2:1 0:0 1:0 3:0 1:1 3:1 29:3 10
Table 6: The Context of N. Constandopoulos’s References to Globalisation
Globalisation 
of the market/ 
economy/ production/ 
competition (usually 
along with references 
to technology and 
technological 
advancements)
Globalisation 
(the phenomenon of)
Political 
Globalisation 
(with relation to a 
hegemonic power)
Globalisation of 
networks of 
news and technology
1998 3 2 - -
1999 2 3 1 2
2000 - 3 3 -
Totals 5 8 4 2
37 Speeches and Interviews were available at Synaspismos on-line archive only after 1998 (excluding 
two speeches delivered in 1997). Thus the investigation was limited to the period 1998-2000.
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From the 81 speeches that were examined only 11 made an explicit reference to 
globalisation, a number (14% of the documents) that fails to capture both the dynamic 
and the coherence of Constandopoulos’s discourse on globalisation. The focal point 
of the latter was that globalisation is a hegemonic ideology aiming at the subjugation 
of politics and society by the market. Constantopoulos’s discourse was also decisive 
in the institutionalisation in the Greek public discourse of the critique of globalisation 
as an excuse used by the government to promote particular (neoliberal) policies and 
laws. The following extracts are indicative of his discourse:
The sacrifice of society and politics on the altar of the market must be 
prevented. The deification of globalisation is idolatry38. The government 
constantly uses the gospel of globalisation of market and the commandments 
of uncontrolled free competition, calling on the citizens to accept.. .their 
subjugation in the economic, social, cultural and regional inequalities that are 
generated and getting deeper by the governmental policy itself39.
In the same manner, in his last speech before the 2000 elections he called for 
resistance at the European level in order ‘not to surrender democracy and society to 
the uncontrolled globalisation’40. Yet Constantopoulos carefully differentiated 
himself and his criticism from the stance taken by the Archbishop Christodoulos. 
Therefore he strongly criticised references to ‘forces of darkness, that aim to take the 
soul of our faith and destroy our national identity’41.
In conclusion it can be argued that Costandopoulos developed a critique of 
globalisation and its effects on human societies and the environment, similar to the 
one that was adopted by the majority of the European left at the time.
38 Speech in the Fest o f Synaspismos in Athens, in September 13, 1998.
39 Speech in the Parliament, on April 28, 1998.
40 June 7, 1999.
41 An explicit reference to the Archbishop’s approach to globalisation. Speech at the 3rd Annual 
Conference of Synaspismos, in July 2, 2000.
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Party Discourses: A First Reflection on the Findings
Up to this point we have focused on the main political parties and their leaders. This 
analysis is important because as has been argued, the political parties in Greece 
constitute all-powerful social institutions which penetrate and dominate most aspects 
of the Greek polity and society. In this regard, by studying the discourse of political 
parties and their leaders, we have examined one of the most fundamental nexuses of 
ideology production in Greece.
The question to be raised here is what the above data tell us about the communication 
of the globalisation discourse in Greece. It can be argued that the examination of 
party discourses revealed a gradual but critical restructuring of the Greek public 
discourse in the terms of the hegemonic/globalisation. Thus the discourse of 
globalisation seems to emerge as a new zone of contestation, a means through which 
social interests and conflicts were reordered and expressed anew. Moreover 
globalisation did not emerge, and was not communicated, as a thematic, issue-specific 
discourse. It was about the economy and the opportunities for future development, as 
it was about culture and the danger of homogenisation; it was about the environment 
and social inequalities, as it was about the role of the state and capitalism. It can thus 
be argued that the emergence of globalisation discourse in Greece was about the 
conceptualisation and definition of the conditions and environment the country was in. 
Put differently, globalisation was all about everyday life, its constraints, its 
opportunities, its conditions of production and reproduction. At this point the 
boundaries between inside and outside become highly problematic. Globalisation, 
being about the reproduction of people’s everyday life, was also about the 
conceptualisation of the dynamics and the substance of the ‘out there’; it was about 
the understanding, ultimately at the level of the subjects, of what the current world 
state of affairs was and what was becoming.
This process of everyday life reconceptualisation and restructuring is about politics, 
because it carries with it the politics o f the hegemonic discourse, in terms of power 
relationships and ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. But it is not only about politics, at least 
when the latter are narrowly defined. It is also about biopolitics, i.e. about the (re-)
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production of subjects, their self-understanding and their social space of existence. 
Much of the material used for tracing this latter biopolitical process constituted part 
of the ordinary, the obvious, the commonsensical, the everyday. It is through the 
incremental changes at this obvious, everyday level that a hegemonic discourse 
operates.
Yet the Greek public discourse cannot be boiled down to the discourses of the 
political parties and their leaders. Broader social institutions that underlie or/and 
interact with the world of political parties, such as the church, the organised interests, 
the media and the intelligentsia have to be taken into consideration. The following 
section turns to the analysis of the Church.
The Archbishop of Athens and All of Greece, Christodoulos, and the Greek 
Church
The purpose of this section is to study the Greek Church’s discourse on globalisation. 
It should also be noted that the Church can exert significant influence in the formation 
of the Greek public discourse, and has the power to mobilise people when it feels that 
its interests are at stake42. In order to study the Greek Church the speeches and public 
interventions of Archbishop Christodoulos were examined. Such a narrowing down 
of the research cannot be fully representative of the various and diverse positions that 
existed within the Greek Church in the second half of the 1990s. Yet, the Archbishop 
is the leader of the Church and, in terms of public influence, is the single most 
important personality in it.
The thesis examined the 62 speeches, letters and interviews of the Archbishop that 
were available in the on-line archive of the Church of Greece. Of these documents 54 
were in Greek and 8 in English. From the 54 documents in Greek (covering the 
period 1995-2001) 12 made a reference to globalisation (i.e. 22%), and most of these 
references were rather extensive. Furthermore most of these documents were
42 This became clear during the confrontation between the Church and the government of PASOK on 
whether religious affiliation should be mentioned on identity cards.
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gathered together in a thematic subdirectory of the archive under the name 
‘globalisation’ (the main directory was ‘Europe’). On the other hand, in the English 
section of the web-site, the percentage of the speeches that made a reference to 
globalisation was as high as 40% (3 out of the 8 speeches). Nevertheless, these 
figures cannot capture the influence that Archbishop Christodoulos exerted on Greek 
public discourse, regarding the concept and conceptualisation of globalisation, no 
matter whether this was channelled through his after Mass talks every Sunday, 
through books and other publications, or through interviews in Greek mass media.
In the Archbishop’s discourse, globalisation represented a great and multilevel threat 
to the European societies in general. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the 
Archbishop personified and declared a war on globalisation. Sometimes, the object 
of this war was concrete, for instance the protection of the European socio-political 
model. Yet, most of the time more abstract and transcendental categories were 
employed to describe the ‘enemy’, such as the ‘forces of evil’.
In 1998, talking about the future of the European Union, the Archbishop noted: ‘A 
real development is only that which promotes social cohesion, in other words, 
solidarity’; and in this context he was calling for resistance against the 
‘thailandisation of Europe’ for ‘development is the opposite trend, namely the 
elevation of the Thai and other poor populations to the standards of the Europeans’43. 
In the same context a year later he argued:
In the first place, I am asking myself whether the term globalisation is correct.
Is it, indeed, about globalisation?... Instead, we have the exportation of a 
model, which belongs to only one country and the imposition of that model 
on other countries. Hence, whoever does not wish to play with words and the 
reality these words signify would speak of world Americanisation rather than 
globalisation -  even if he does not a priori oppose to Americanisation.
David Rothkopf, the managing director of Kissinger Associates, 
participated in a debate...which had been organized by ‘Foreign Policy’, a 
magazine of indisputable authority, published by the Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace. There David Rothkopf emphatically declared that
43 Opening Greeting at the ‘Athens Meeting 1998: Peace and Development’ (original text in English).
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globalisation is nothing more but ‘the dominion of the American model’ 
which as a phenomenon is not something new, but the old and notorious 
model of colonialisation. He straightforwardly pointed out, that ‘it is in the 
general interest of the United States’ that ‘exclusionary aspects of religion, 
language, and political/ideological beliefs’ to be abolished... That’s exactly 
why the director of Kissinger Associates evaded the use of the term 
‘globalisation’ and chose instead the term ‘cultural imperialism’...
Under these conditions, whoever resists the dissolution of national 
identities, and languages, he does not simply resist American imperialism but 
the suzerainty of international crime.
It’s typical that the most powerful argument on behalf of 
globalisation is that it’s about an inescapable situation; however, there 
are many catastrophes which are inescapable, but this does not mean we 
are obliged to applaud them; on the contrary, we are obliged to find out 
ways, which can secure the survival of Man and civilization.
Another argument is that globalisation would facilitate the economic 
development, and the domination of free market... However, the European 
civilization has been the product of a parallel action of two elements: of free 
economy and social solidarity. And we all Europeans paid very dearly 
whenever we hazarded to abolish that parallel action.. .44.
Most of these points were being replicated in the everyday speeches and interviews of 
the Archbishop. For instance in one of his speeches after a Sunday Mass he stressed:
Today the Church tries to protect the people from their entrapment in the new 
forms of the demonic. Today the implementation of globalisation is dramatic, 
and appears with the mask of global economic development.. .globalisation is 
the means mid not the end; it is the means which leads to the imposition of 
syncretism. Syncretism is promoted by the same forces which promote 
globalisation ...A second step in the promotion of syncretism is the cold 
planned effort for the destruction of Christianity45.
44 All three references from the Opening Greeting at the ‘Athens Meeting 1999’ (original text in 
English).
45 Synodic Mass in the Church of St. Dionysios in Athens, March 19, 2000.
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Furthermore, during his confrontation with the PASOK government on the issue of 
identity cards, he urged: ‘The Church knows well that its compromise with the 
secularisation.. .[and] globalisation... is a criminal mistake’46.
Hence, Archbishop Christodoulos conceptualised globalisation as a manipulated 
process, which was driven by particular interests that aimed at the ‘annihilation’ of 
the cultural diversity around the world in general, and the ‘Christian discolouring of 
Europe’ and thus of Greece in particular47. The main reference points of this 
discourse were Americanisation, American cultural imperialism, the danger of 
cultural homogenisation, social estrangement and individualism/egocentrism.
Concluding, it can be argued that the Archbishop was very effective in articulating a 
discourse of globalisation as a real and immediate threat to the Greek national identity 
and way of life, in a period when the confidence of the Greek people about their 
position in Europe and the World was increasing. This anti-globalisation stance of 
the Archbishop created a wide popular trend against globalisation. His critics have 
argued that the demonisation of globalisation by the Archbishop, was one way of 
securing and justifying the active role of the Church in the Greek socio-political 
system.
The success of Archbishop Christodoulos in constructing globalisation as an 
immediate threat in the public discourse adds an important piece to the ideology 
production puzzle of the Greek polity. Moreover, it supports the thesis about the 
effect of the hegemonic discourse in the (re)production of the national, social spheres. 
Yet in order to get a more complete understanding of the dynamics at work in Greek 
public discourse, other important institutional actors should also be brought in the 
picture. The following two sections focus on the employers and workers.
46 October 11,2000.
47 See also his speech ‘The society of People in the Time of Post-Neoterism, of Holisticity and of 
Globalisation’, available at: http://www.ecclesia.gr/English/EnArchbishop/EnSpeeches/ 
the_society_of_people.html (06/11/2002).
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Federation of Greek Industries (SEV)
The Federation of Greek Industries was founded in 1907 and is the main national 
association that ‘represents and speaks for industry, and for the economy’s private 
sector in general, vis-a-vis state authorities and other societal institutions’48. SEV’s 
‘members are individual enterprises or employer organisations, both sectoral and 
regional’. ‘More than 85% of its members are manufacturing enterprises and the 
corresponding sectoral or regional employer organisations’49.
Considering the widespread penetration of political parties in the structure of interests 
representation in Greece, it can be argued that the Federation of Greek Industries is 
the most enduring and ‘party-independent’ group of organised interests that has ever 
existed in the Greek industrial relations system.
Studying the role of SEV in the communication of globalisation discourse, one has to 
keep in mind the impact of the intervening European level, and in particular the 
relationship and interaction of SEV with the Union of Industrial and Employer’s 
Confederations of Europe (UNICE), i.e. the respective European association. The 
impact of UNICE on SEV becomes clear from the UNICE’s documents and positions 
that SEV used in Greece for the promotion of its ideas and policies. We return to this 
issue when the conclusions of the comparison between Greece and Ireland are drawn.
In order to capture SEV’s discourse, the following documents were scrutinised: (a) 
the annual activity reports (‘A7to^oyia(j,6<;’, henceforth ‘annual report’ or ‘Report’) of 
the Federation for the period 1995-2001, and (b) the speeches of the Chairman of 
SEV, during the meetings of the annual General Assembly of the Federation for the 
period 1998-2001. A personal interview with Iason Stratos, the Chairman of SEV for 
the period 1992-2000, was also conducted on April 30, 2002. On the one hand, the 
annual reports allowed us to trace and monitor all the activities of SEV during the
48 ‘The Institutional Role of FGF, at the official website of SEV, at: http://www.fgi.org.gr 
(07/11/2002).
49 ‘FGI and Its Members’, at: http://www.fgi.org.gr (07/11/2002).
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period into question. On the other hand, the annual General Assembly is a ‘media 
event’ and can be considered as the activity of SEV with the single most important 
influence in the Greek public discourse.
Annual Reports
The general conclusion from the study of the annual reports is that SEV and its 
leadership did not develop, or attempt to develop, a discourse on globalisation as such. 
Yet particular ‘dominant objects’ of the economic globalisation discourse, mostly 
‘flexibility’ and ‘privatisation’, were at the heart of SEV’s discourse. Iason Stratos, 
the Chairman of SEV had a clear idea on whether globalisation was something new 
for SEV: ‘Globalisation and the need for adjustment to market forces was not 
something new for SEV; it was what SEV was fighting for since the late 1980s’50. It 
is also interesting that all the Reports made reference to the conscious effort of SEV 
to promote its positions in media and the broader public, and ensure that these 
positions would be commented on in the ‘appropriate way’ (i.e. positively)51.
In order to understand the dynamics at work in SEV’s discourse, we should bring the 
European level back into the picture. In this regard the ‘Essen strategy’ (i.e. the ‘five 
action points’ agreed in the European Council in Essen in December 1994) 
constituted an important point of reference, as it became a focal point in SEV’s 
discourse . In particular, the second ‘action point’ of the Essen Strategy referred to 
flexibility, suggesting an ‘increase in the employment intensity of economic growth 
through a flexible organisation of work and working time, moderate wage settlements 
and new areas of employment’ . In this context, one more important development at 
a European level was the publication of the ‘Concluding Report’ of the ‘Molitor
50 Personal interview, 30/04/02.
51 The same reference existed in all the Reviews. See SEV, 1996: 75-76, SEV, 1998: 25, 114, SEV, 
2000: 36. The latter noted that the creation of the ‘right [public] image for the Industry...and 
particular its contribution to the creation o f wealth and social prosperity, was...of central concern 
to...SEV’ (p. 36).
52 This was clear in the annual report of 1996 (that covers the period May 1995 to April 1996).
53 See SEV, 1996: 42-43. The quotation is from: http://www.eu-employment-observatory.net/ 
ersep/imi53_uk/00030001.asp (11/11/2002) and was party reproduced in SEV, 1996: 42-43. These 
trend is also exemplified at the agreement signed by the social partners at the EU level on the issue of 
part-time jobs, facilitating the use of flexible modes of employment (see SEV, 1998: 15, 89).
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group’54, on the simplification and deregulation of European and national legal 
frameworks; a report which also triggered an UNICE report, published in October 
199555. It is also worth mentioning here that with the treaty of Amsterdam, 
competition became a basic target for the European Union (see respective reference in 
SEV, 1998: 122).
These European level developments are instrumental in demonstrating that the need 
for deregulation, flexibility and adjustment to the ‘new conditions’ were not only 
defining features of SEV’s discourse but were also in the spotlight in the European 
Union in general and UNICE in particular (of which SEV was a member). Thus, 
throughout 1995-2001 SEV promoted positions reached at UNICE’s level, stressing 
both the need for the transformation of the labour market in more flexible terms56, 
and the important role of the social partnership, in this regard57.
Thus the discourse of SEV (at least initially) was built on the trio of flexibility, 
privatisations and the danger of a ‘regression to statism’.
Clearly the scheduled privatisations are being delayed, whilst the closing of 
some enterprises, has in some circles revived the logic of statism. There is a 
danger these developments could be used as an excuse for undermining the 
privatisation policy. If the trust of the investors in Greece and abroad is to be 
restored, then this danger should be faced with determination (SEV, 1996:
64; repeated also in SEV, 1998: 101)58.
The same stance toward the role of the state and the need for privatisations and 
flexibility was also taken in all the subsequent Reports. For instance the 2001 Report 
stressed:
54 A group of independent experts on legislative and administrative simplification and deregulation, 
which had been founded by the European Commission.
55 SEV, 1996: 100-101.
56 SEV’s approach to flexibility was a broader one and referred to the restructuring of the whole socio­
economic system. With regard to education see SEV, 2001: 48-50.
57 In November 1996, SEV and GSEE created the ‘National Observatory for Industrial Relations’. For 
the SEV’s stance towards the role of social partners, see SEV, 2001: 46.
58 On this issue see also SEV, 1996: 104-105.
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Today, the transformation of the State is the absolute priority; it needs to 
be radically modernised, and adjusted to the new conditions (SEV, 2001:
29) ... SEV has ... expressed its opinion on the general need for the 
modernisation of the regulatory framework of the country either 
[through] simplification.. .or deregulation.. .or...self-regulation...[T]he 
above modernisation is imposed by the processes of globalisation, the 
new technologies and the development of the new economy, which 
demands less barriers in world competition (ibid.: 33-34)...[t]hese 
positions are now meeting a wider acceptance in large parts of Greek 
society and are faced with greater realism by the workers (ibid.: 47; see 
also the foreword in SEV, 1998).
In this context, it is also interesting that SEV translated the EU ‘race to the bottom’ 
debate59 as a proof of the need for immediate and ‘brave’ economic reforms. In this 
regard SEV criticised PASOK’s ‘tax reform’ (promoted with the law 2753/99) as a 
very limited one which had completely ignored SEV’s suggestions (see SEV, 2000: 
33-35).
To account fully for the above dynamics, we also need to consider the impact of the 
EU pressures on its member states for the institutionalisation of tripartite consultation 
mechanisms. These pressures were generated by the intensification of the social 
dialogue between employers’ associations (UNICE and CEEP60) and workers’ unions 
(European Trade Union Confederation-ETUC) at the EU level61, especially since 
1997, when the role of the social partners in European integration was 
institutionalised by the Treaty of Amsterdam. Thus the member states were forced to 
create (if they did not already have in place) policy mechanisms that institutionalised 
the participation of social partners in various aspects of their public policy making. 
In the Greek case and regarding the employers, this pressure was translated into the 
enhancement of the institutional role of SEV, through the participation of its 
representatives in an ever-longer list of public committees and working groups (SEV,
59 To face this ‘negative’ race ECOFIN adopted a code of conduct in December 1, 1997 (SEV, 1998: 
98).
60 The European Centre of Enterprises with Public Participation and of Enterprises of General 
Economic Interest (CEEP) is recognised as a Social Partner by the European Commission. See 
http://www.ceep.org.
61 See SEV, 1998: 14-15.
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1998: 22, 92). The following instance is characteristic of these institutional pressures 
and changes. In the European Council in Luxembourg (November 1997), the 
member states agreed to submit each year a ‘national action plan’ for employment. 
Yet the first plan which was submitted by the Greek government in 1998 had not 
been prepared in consultation with the social partners, a fact which triggered criticism 
from the European Commission towards the Greek Ministry of Labour. As a result, 
the Ministry of Labour was forced to change its policy process in order to 
accommodate consultation with the social partners, in the preparation of the next 
plans (SEV, 2000: 22).
Within this context PASOK initiated a ‘Social Dialogue’ (i.e. round table 
discussions/negotiations between the government and the social partners), in May 
1997, and an agreement was reached by the social partners in November of the same 
year (ibid.: 16) . SEV saw the promotion of the ad hoc framework of Social 
Dialogue by the government not in opposition but as complementary to the Economic 
and Social Council that the government itself had created in 1995 (SEV, 2001: 16-17). 
Yet it severely criticised the government for organising a ‘fake’ Social Dialogue in 
2000, that resulted ‘in the creation of rigidities in the organisation of labour as well as 
in the rise of labour cost’ (SEV, 2001: 60-61).
The Chairman
The study of the speeches of the Chairman of SEV at the Annual General Assembly 
of the federation since 1998 does not add much more to the above picture. The need 
for the acceleration of privatisation, and in general for the redefinition of the role of 
state in the economy, along with the need for greater flexibility in the labour market 
and for deregulation remained the focal points of reference. In terms of vocabulary, 
Iason Stratos seemed to have avoided the use of the term globalisation, preferring the 
concept of ‘globalised markets’ (see Stratos, 1999), which also appeared in the annual
62 The agreement was titled ‘Development, Competitiveness, Employment’.
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report of 2001 (see SEV, 2001: 54)63. Leuteris Antonacopoulos replaced Stratos in 
the leadership of SEV in May 2000. In his speech to the annual assembly 
Antonacopoulos (2000) referred to the ‘challenge of globalisation’ that the modem 
enterprises confront, but in substance his approach was similar to Stratos and the 
focus of his speech remained on the need for ‘structural changes, which...have been 
delayed’ (ibid.). Thus, SEV’s chairmen not only did not join the public debate on 
globalisation but rather avoided the use of the term altogether.
This attitude may have a simple explanation. On the one hand the ‘economic side’ of 
globalisation discourse did not offer something new in the discourse of SEV. The 
arguments in favour of privatisation, deregulation and competitiveness had always 
been central to SEV’s interventions in the public discourse. On the other hand, after 
1995, globalisation was increasingly charged with a heavy ideological content, and 
arguably the SEV leadership wanted to avoid associating its policy prescriptions with 
a concept towards which a large number of Greek people were negatively predisposed.
Synopsis
It can be argued that the Federation of Greek Industries was very active in promoting 
the ‘politics of globalisation’ (in terms of the needed structural adjustments) and 
generating a discourse that was based on the ‘dominant objects’ of economic 
globalisation, such as ‘anti-statism’, ‘privatisations’, ‘deregulation’ and ‘flexibility’. 
Overall, SEV’s strategy and discourse was characterised by a ‘new reality’ approach 
to globalisation, even if the term globalisation itself was generally avoided.
The next section turns to the other half of the story of industrial relations in Greece, 
the discourse of the Greek General Confederation of Labour.
63 Moreover, on the question of how he conceptualised the phenomenon of globalisation, Mr Stratos 
started his answer by saying: ‘We live in a globalised market, a globalised society’. Personal interview, 
30/04/02.
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Greek General Confederation of Labour (GSEE)
The Greek General Confederation of Labour (GSEE) is the main national association 
which represents workers and employees in the private sector. Traditionally, GSEE 
was dominated by political parties, and thus the potential for the articulation of an 
independent stance and discourse was extremely limited, to the point of zero. It is 
revealing that 87.9% of the trade unions’ leaders belong to a political party64.
Since the beginning of the 1990s, however, GSEE has been acquiring a more 
independent stance. Two factors seem to have plaied a significant role in this change. 
First, was the integration of GSEE in the structures of social partnership at a 
European level. These structures, as has been argued, demanded and necessitated an 
institutionally independent stance from GSEE in public policy making, helping it at 
the same time to develop such a role (see also the respective SEV section). The 
crucial factors in this process were the intensification of the interaction of GSEE with 
other workers’ unions around Europe, as well as the fact that the Chairmen of SEV 
and GSEE had on many occasions to represent together the ‘Greek side’ at the 
European level65. A product of these processes was the creation by GSEE of the 
‘Institute of Labour’ (INE), in December 1990 66 ; a think-tank aiming to 
‘scientifically’ support the Greek ‘trade union movement’67. The Institute of Labour 
is chaired by the Chairman of GSEE, and has contributed immensely to the 
articulation and promotion of an independent and effective role and discourse by 
GSEE. In particular it invested GSEE and its intervention in public discourse with an 
epistemic capacity that significantly enhanced its public credibility. Thus INE broke 
the tradition that wanted ‘scientific’ research and arguments to come only from the 
government’s or SEV’s sides (leaving GSEE to manifesto-like interventions). 
Moreover the creation of an independent unit of analysis and a pool of experts 
reduced GSEE’s dependence on political parties and their experts.
64 According to a research conducted by GSEE in 1995. See Enimerosi, no 3, May 1995, p. 7.
65 Iason Stratos, personal interview, 30/04/02.
66 ADEDI, the union for the public sector employees, also participates in INE.
67Quotations are from the official webpage of the Institute of Labour. See at, http://www.inegsee.gr/ 
INE-profile.htm (14/11/02).
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In order to study the role of the General Confederation in the communication of the 
globalisation discourse in Greece, we examined the monthly publication of the 
‘Institute of Labour-INE’, Enimerosi for the period 1995-200068. Enimerosi allows 
one to trace and monitor all the (main) activities of INE and GSEE, including the 
activities of their Chairman, who is also the editor of Enimerosi. This material was 
complemented by a personal interview with Professor Savvas Robolis, the ‘Scientific 
Director’ of INE, held in Athens, in April 29, 2002.
Enimerosi: Tracing GSEE’s Discourse on Globalisation
During the first years of the period under investigation, i.e. 1995-96, the concept of 
globalisation did not seem to figure significantly in the argumentation and public 
interventions of GSEE. Instead, the focal point of its discourse were the concept of 
‘neoliberalism’, as well as the ‘dominant subjects’ of the economic globalisation 
discourse, mainly ‘flexibility’ and ‘deregulation’ (which were also in the front line of 
SEV’s public interventions).
In 1995, at the top of GSEE’s agenda was the issue of a 35-hour working week. 
GSEE succeeded in bringing the issue onto the public agenda, forcing both the 
government and the employers’ associations to take a position on the subject69. A 
demand for a 35-hour week was also adopted by the 8th Congress of ETUC, in 199570. 
In terms of public discourse it can be argued that the issue of a 35-hour working week 
was developed against the pressures for flexibility in the labour market, exercised by 
the Federation of Greek Industries and the government. Thus, in 1995 the pressure 
for ‘structural adjustments’ translated in Greece into the flexibility of labour market 
vs. reduction of working hours debate.
68 The first 32 issues of Enimerosi (March 1995 -  January 1998) are available only in hard copies. I 
am grateful to Mr Dimitris Katsoridas (economic analyst and responsible for the archive in INE) for 
his crucial help in acquiring a copy of them.
69 Enimerosi, no 3, May 1995, p. 2.
70 See Enimerosi, no 3, May 1995, p. 3, 5.
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This confrontation was carried forward in 1996, and in general remained central 
throughout the period 1995-2000. Thus, the first issue of Enimerosi in 199671 was 
almost exclusively devoted to the issue of 3 5-hour week. GSEE criticised the 
government for not consulting the social partners in its decisions on the subject, and 
for not following the ‘wider European trends’, as these were exemplified, according
79to GSEE, in the case of France . In March of the same year, GSEE publicised its 
positions on the matter, rejecting ‘the unrestrained ‘flexibility’ that deregulates the 
social life of employees and increases their insecurity and exploitation’73. Yet it 
remained within the ‘game’, asking ‘for ... the establishment of minimum 
requirements for the implementation of part time and other flexible practices’, rather 
than rejecting flexibility policies altogether74. This modest strategy bore fruits. In a 
survey on the issue of the 35-hour week, contacted by DIMEL, on a significant 
sample of Greek companies, the results were as follows: 40% replied that the unions’ 
demand was right, 25% that it was premature, 29% that it would create problems in 
the function of companies and 6% did not answer.
During the same period the concepts of internationalisation and globalisation were 
also mobilised. Internationalisation along with ‘new technologies’ were 
conceptualised as the new defining parameters of the industrial relations and social 
security systems 75 , whilst references to the ‘globalisation of markets and 
economies’76 started to appear. Neoliberalism, however, remained the main point of 
reference. In this context, Professor Pierre Bourdieu was invited and gave a lecture to 
GSEE on October 16, 1996. He argued for the need to create an ‘anti-trend, against 
the trend of neoliberalism’, and criticised the ‘fatalisme neoliberale’, i.e. the tendency
77to approach neoliberalism as a historically inevitable process . Christos 
Polizogopoulos, the Chairman of GSEE, made similar comments in his welcoming
71 Enimerosi, no 10, January 1996.
72 Enimerosi, no 10, January 1996, p. 15.
73 Enimerosi, no 12, March 1996, p. 6.
74 In particular GSEE’s demands included: (a) the specification o f a maximum percentage o f part-time 
workers per company, (b) the specification of a minimum time of employment per day, (c) payment of 
the part-time workers on the basis of their working hours (with an increased ratio) (ibid.). Moreover,
in 1996 INE published two studies on flexibility and its affects. See Enimerosi, no 22, February 1996.
75 See for instance the intervention of S. Laimos, the Vice-General Secretary of GSEE and Secretary of 
Social Policy, in Enimerosi, no. 17, September 1996, pp. 15-16.
76 See for instance ibid., p. 16.
11 Enimerosi, no 18, October 1996.
147
remarks, referring to ‘neoliberal policies that diminish the welfare state and workers’ 
rights’78.
It was not until 1997 that the concept of ‘globalisation’ came into the spotlight at 
GSEE, along with the distinction between different models of capitalism. With 
regard to the latter, GSEE, in its written response to the government’s proposal for a 
‘Social Dialogue’, argued:
The demand for adjustment to the new laws of global competition leads to 
the transfer of practices and experiences related with attitudes that dominate 
at the ‘Atlantic side’. These practices demolish the European social 
model... and deregulate the system of labour relations... developments which 
do not fit in the traditions and vested rights of the European people79.
On the other hand, globalisation was being introduced and conceptualised as a form 
of market domination. Thus, the new conditions for labour relations and social 
protection were set by ‘the market forces that.. .controlled the globalisation of the 
economy’80. The way in which Enimerosi reacted to an IMF report published in 1997 
is also indicative of the position that globalisation had acquired in GSEE’s discourse. 
The report (World Economic Outlook, May 1997) had as its main subject the effects 
of globalisation, and one of its conclusions was that globalisation in the form of 
competition by low-wage countries ‘does not seem to constitute the main factor for 
the negative developments in employment and income distribution which are 
observed in many advanced economies’ (ibid.). EnimerosVs editorial comment, was 
that ‘what of course the IMF report does not mention is how many rushed and wrong 
decisions have been taken in the EU during the last five years due to exactly this 
erroneous dominant belief with regard to globalisation’81.
In 1997 the discourse of globalisation was becoming central also in the international 
labour movement. Most importantly, at the 85th Conference of the International
78 Ibid. GSEE tried to maintain its relationship with P. Bourdieu, and a common research project was 
included in its annual activity plan of 1997. See Enimerosi, no 22, February 1997, p. 2.
79 Enimerosi, no 24, April 1997, p. 5.
80 Enimerosi, no 27, July-August 1997, p. 13.
81 Enimerosi, no 29, October 1997, p. 17.
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Labour Organisation the newly elected President Mrs. Olga Keltosova brought the 
issue of globalisation to the heart of her presidential speech and thus to the heart of 
the international labour movement. Keltosova argued that ‘globalization and the 
realization of ILO goals are interconnected.. .Globalisation should be accompanied by 
respective progress in the social field...every state, company, multinational enterprise
O'}
and individual should receive its share from the benefits of globalisation’ .
After 1997 globalisation remained central to GSEE’s discourse. Moreover, it was 
treated more and more as an excuse used by SEV and government to promote their 
(neoliberal) policies. During this period, Dimitris Katsoridas, an economic analyst in 
INE, published widely on globalisation in Enimerosi. One of his first articles was 
‘The Globalisation of the Economy: Myth or Reality?’, where he argued:
The phenomenon of ‘globalisation’ has emerged as a pivotal economic and 
political issue. Yet the concept of ‘globalisation’ is often used with 
ideological purposes, to bend workers’ resistance in the attempted capitalist 
restructuring, by supporting the ‘inevitable’ and the ‘omnipotence’ of the 
market-without-frontiers ’.
Furthermore using statistical data he went on to argue:
the debate which goes on with regard to the ‘globalisation’ of the economy is 
without any basis, because even today most companies are based on nation­
states83.
This conceptualisation of globalisation as an excuse, as a means for policy 
justification dominated INE’s discourse. For instance, an article published in 2000 
and signed by three of the main economic analysts of INE, N. Grammatikos, D. 
Katsoridas, G. Kollias, argued:
82 Ibid. p. 20. See also http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inf/pr/97-15.htm.
83 Enimerosi, no 44, 1999. See also D. Katsoridas, “ Globalisation’ or Internationalisation of the 
Economies’, Enimerosi, no 45, 1999.
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In most cases the term ‘globalisation’ is used as an inaccessible -  enforced from the 
outside -  force, to which states have no choice but to adjust. Moreover, it is used as 
an excuse for the introduction of changes in labour market84.
At the same time other aspects of the international anti-globalisation discourse were 
also acquiring a prominent position in the public interventions of GSEE. For instance, 
in the 9th Convention of ETUC, in Finland, in June 26, 1999, GSEE submitted a 
proposal ‘for the implementation of the TOBIN-Tax’85.
Finally, the General Council of GSEE, in its decision taken on December 10, 1999 
(after the events in Seattle) argued for ‘flexibility within socially accepted limits’ and 
stated that: ‘The General Council supports the need for international solidarity 
among workers, in order to put a limit to the omnipotence and arrogance of the 
globalised economic power’86 (emphasis in the original).
Synopsis
To sum up, it can be argued that globalisation acquired a prominent position in the 
discourse of GSEE, after 1997. This development supports the argument about the 
gradual restructuring of Greek public discourse in the terms of the hegemonic 
discourse of globalisation. Instrumental in this process was the participation and 
further integration of GSEE in the European and international labour movements. 
One more point should be stressed here. GSEE, maybe for the first time in its history, 
was not the social partner which followed a policy of slogans, but the partner which 
accused the government and SEV of doing so, trying at the same time to value the 
discourse of globalisation concrete by using ‘scientific’ arguments and data (see also 
below).
84 Enimerosi, no 61-62, July/August 2000.
85 Enimerosi, no 54, December 1999.
86 Enimerosi, no 54, December 1999.
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General Observations
Some more general observations can be derived from the study of the issues of 
Enimerosi. These observations reveal the dynamics that were at work in Greece, in 
the second half of the 1990s.
First, is the normalisation of the relationship between the trade unions and the 
employers, and the intensification of the process for the construction of a ‘social 
partnership’. It is indicative of traditional industrial relations in Greece that a joint 
research publication between INE and the Federation of Industries of North Greece 
(published in 1995) was characterised by C. Protopapas, the chairman of GSEE in 
1995, as an innovation for Greece87.
Second, we see clearly the first instances of a more proactive and epistemic stage of 
the labour movement in Greece. For instance, GSEE managed to put onto the public
QQ
agenda the issue of the 35-hour working week . In order to support this demand, a 
number of ‘scientific’ articles were published by the research team of INE from 1995
O Q
onwards . The publication for the first time of an ‘Annual Review of the Greek 
Economy’ by GSEE, in 1999 (along with the traditionally published annual reviews 
of the Bank of Greece and SEV) is to be placed in this context. Such a scientific 
approach was gradually adopted in many issues that were raised in public agenda and 
were of interest to GSEE. At the same time, as in the case of SEV, the EU integration 
process necessitated and enhanced an independent voice from GSEE, and 
representatives of GSEE were increasingly invited to sit in committees and working 
groups at various ministries90. This rapid trend towards an ‘epistemisation’ of GSEE 
(i.e. a more ‘scientifically-centred’ public intervention) triggered some internal 
reactions and accusations over the ‘bureaucratisation’ of the Greek labour movement. 
In this context, when GSEE said a conditional ‘yes’ to the ‘Social Dialogue’ proposed 
by the government in 1997, it also made it explicit that this Dialogue ‘does not
87 Enimerosi, no 1, March 1995, p. 6.
88 Enimerosi, no 3, May 1995, p. 2.
89 For instance, see Enimerosi, nos 2, 3, 7 (the special sections by H. Ioakimoglou and D. Katsoridas), 10, 
16.
90 See Enimerosi, no 34, 1998.
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replace the action of trade unions’91. Furthermore, the decisions of the Annual 
Convention of INE/GSEE in 1997 included the following caveat: ‘The transformation 
of INE in either a public relations mechanism or a tool for the bureaucratisation of the 
syndicalist movement... must be avoided’92.
Third, we can observe an impressive level of interaction and transnational knowledge 
transfer among the trade unions of the EU countries. In this regard numerous 
common projects through the FORCE-NEPTURE, the Association for European 
Training of Workers on the Impact of New Technology (AFETT), and the 
LEONARDO DA VINCI programme (on vocational training) were mentioned in 
Enimerosi’s pages. Furthermore, the interaction and knowledge transfer between 
Greece and the rest of the Balkan countries increased rapidly after 1995 (the PHARE 
programme was essential in this regard93). For instance in 1996 INE/GSEE: worked 
with its counter-part FRATIA in Romania for the development of the Romanian 
Institute of Labour, co-organised a seminar in Bulgaria on electronic communications 
and labour unions, and co-organised a training programme on ‘collective bargaining 
and social pacts’ in Albania94. It is worth mentioning that such an interaction was 
not only centralised, but was also taking place through the various peripheral or 
sectoral channels and institutes of which INE is constituted. For instance, the sectoral 
institute of INE which specialises in banking and securities (INE/OTOE) was very 
active in developing various joined projects with Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, FYR 
Macedonia, Serbia and Cyprus through the LEONARDO and PHARE programmes 
and the AFETT95.
Our analysis of the social partners’ discourse will be concluded with a short reference 
to the Economic and Social Council of Greece (OKE).
91 Enimerosi, no 25, May 1997, p. 17.
92 Enimerosi, no 27, July-August 1997, p. 13.
93 The PHARE programme has aimed to assist the applicant countries of Central and Eastern Europe in 
their preparations for joining the European Union. Originally created in 1989, it covered the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania. 
Until 2000, when the CARDS programme was created, the countries of the Western Balkans (Albania, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and the FYR Macedonia) were also beneficiaries of the PHARE. See the official 
webpage of the Programme at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/pas/phare.
94 See Enimerosi, no 11, February 1996, p. 11.
95 See Enimerosi, no 23, March 1997, p. 19.
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The Economic and Social Council (OKE)
The Economic and Social Council was founded in 1997 as a tripartite, consultative 
organ. It includes representatives from the government, the employers, the 
employees, and other civil society organisations. OKE is also a member of the 
European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), which is the forum ‘where the 
various socio-economic organisations in the Member States of the European Union 
are represented’96. This European level should be stressed because, as already shown, 
it played a crucial role both in terms of institutional reconfiguration and in terms of 
agents’ discourse formation at the level of the member states.
Yet it needs to be pointed out here that OKE’s influence in the Greek public discourse 
has been minimal, if not negligible. The decision to include it in our analysis was 
based mainly on two reasons: (i) for comparative purposes, as its Irish counterpart 
had an important role in the Irish public discourse, and thus it had to be studied, and 
(ii) because the study of OKE adds some interesting information on the interaction of 
social partners in Greece, on the issue of globalisation.
In July 2000 the EESC discussed in a plenary session a working paper on the issue of 
globalisation of trade in the framework of WTO. As a follow up of this session and 
in order to participate and contribute to the discussion on Globalisation in Greece 
OKE published an ‘Opinion’, on 17 October, 2000, entitled, ‘The Globalisation of 
Trade in the Framework of WTO’. This document, albeit close to the end of the 
period under investigation, is important because it was the only single document 
which was explicitly on globalisation, and was prepared by all the social partners (i.e. 
government, workers, employers). The second section of this document was entitled 
‘the positions of OKE’ and started as follows:
96 See EESC’s official website at: http://www.ces.eu.int/pages/en/home.htm.
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Greece is a country which has been integrated in the phenomenon of 
globalisation, thus facing both the prospects and the consequences that are 
generated by it. Yet the dialogue on this issue in our country has not 
acquired the publicity that it should, whereas whenever the issue is raised, it 
is raised in such an ideological and philosophical manner that the substance 
of the matter is put at risk. OKE considers that globalisation is a 
development that creates serious threats, but also important potentials for the 
economic and social conditions of the countries which participate in it (OKE,
2000).
The above paragraph signifies the tensions which existed at the time in the Greek 
public discourse with regard to globalisation. First, is the view of the critics, mainly 
labour unions and left parties, that globalisation carried with it many threats. Second, 
is the view of the government and the employers that no matter what globalisation 
was or did, Greece was part of it, and in any case globalisation created many 
opportunities. It is also interesting that the text acknowledged and criticised the fact 
that the debate on globalisation in Greece was so ideologically-laden that it tended to 
miss the point. In this regard the equilibrium reached in OKE can be said to be closer 
to the PASOK government’s and employers’ approach. Maybe this is why a caveat 
was put in the introduction of the document, stating that the ‘Opinion’ referred to the 
respective document which was to be discussed by EESC ‘and it does not constitute a 
general statement on the phenomenon of globalisation’ (OKE, 2000).
Up to this point, we have examined the discourses of political parties and social 
partners in Greece. Yet any study of public discourse formation and transformation 
would be incomplete if the media were not included in the analysis. The media are an 
institutional actor who has the power to give voice or to impose silence, to create 
events or to sentence events into oblivion. In this regard the media are both an 
institutional actor, with their own -  diverse and conflicting -  agenda, and a mirror of 
a society. Indeed, media coverage in a dialectical process both reflects and creates 
the public agenda. Thus, media coverage allows us at least to study what was 
considered to be ‘news’ and what was at the forefront of public consideration and 
public agenda at a certain period of time.
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Media Coverage
Introduction
In this research project the study of media coverage serves mostly an instrumental/ 
quantitative purpose. In this regard, this project does not employ discourse analysis, 
as the latter is known in media studies, in order to study in depth specific texts. The 
aim is to study in a consistent manner a representative source of media coverage in 
Greece, throughout the period 1996-2001, in order to examine: (a) the volume and the 
evolution of the use of the term ‘globalisation’, (b) the context of its use, and (c) the 
composition of the people using this term. Through the above information we also 
aim to capture the discourses and activities of groups that have not been studied 
above, such as think-tanks, academics and anti-globalisation protesters.
In the case of Greece, it was decided that such a representative and functional source 
of coverage is the Sunday edition of daily newspapers. It is representative because 
the Sunday editions of the Greek newspapers summarise all the important weekly 
events and include several special sections on topical issues, published books and 
journals, cultural events etc. It is also functional because it would be practically 
impossible, due to time limits, to search all the daily editions of a newspaper, or 
indeed of any other source, for a period of six years; whereas the use of the Sunday 
editions offer a credible alternative. It is also important to note that in Greece the 
circulation of the Sunday editions of newspapers are much higher than the daily ones. 
Moreover, when it comes to Sunday editions party-preference as a criterion for 
choosing newspaper is, even if only in some respects, relaxed. Therefore many 
readers will buy the newspaper of their political preference along with one of the 
newspapers that have been (at least for the period 1995-2001) in the first ranks of
• • * • » Q 7circulation among the Sunday editions i.e. To Vima, Kathimerini and Eleftherotypia . 
In this regard it can be argued that the latter three editions have a considerable effect 
on the formation and reproduction of the Greek public discourse. The thesis chose as 
a ‘sample source’ the newspaper To Vima (henceforth ‘VIMA’), because its Sunday 
edition had the highest circulation for most of the period under investigation98.
97 The ranking of the daily editions is different.
98 VIMA was first in circulation throughout the period 1995-1999. Eleftherotypia surpassed VIMA in 
2000-2001, but their distance remained within approximately 1% (source: Athens Daily Newspaper 
Publishers Association).
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CHART 1: Share of Total Sales of Greek Newspapers— Sunday Editions (1995-2001)"
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Source: Athens Daily Newspaper Publishers Association (EIHEA)
The methodology followed in the study of VIMA is as follows. VIMA has a free 
access, on-line archive for all its Sunday editions, since 14 July 1996. This on-line 
availability of the newspaper made possible the collection of all the VIMA 
articles/texts that made a reference to globalisation during the period July 1996 -  
December 2001. This work was based on a ‘key-word’ and a ‘key-word-in-context’ 
research methodology100; the ‘key-word’ being ‘globalisation’ (‘7107x0 0 ^107101^ 071’)• 
Thus, for the references which were found, a paragraph before and a paragraph after 
the reference were copied and kept for further reading and analysis. In the cases of 
articles that had as their main subject globalisation itself, the whole references/articles 
were kept. The results of this research appear in Table 7 and in Chart 2.
Here, we must also mention that the references to globalisation found in VIMA can 
be classified into three broad categories: (a) references in texts in which globalisation 
itself was a ‘news item’ (e.g. the anti-globalisation protests, or a conference or a book 
on globalisation); (b) references in texts in which the term globalisation was used in 
the commentary of everyday social, political and economic news; (c) references 
found in statements, remarks, announcements, press releases etc. o f specific 
institutional actors (e.g. political parties, workers, the church).
99 The circulation per year of the two best
1995 1999 2001
VIMA 177,996 194,748 181,785
Eleftherotypia 163,059 193,254 186,864
selling Sunday papers was as follows:
Source: Athens Daily Newspaper Publishers Association
100 See Denzin and Lincoln, 2000: 775-777.
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TABLE 7: The Emergence of the Discourse of Globalisation in VIMA (Sunday Edition): 1996-2001 
Months
Year______ January February March April May June July August September October November December
1996 14: 0 04: 1 01:0 06: 1 03:0 01:0
- 21:0 11:0 08: 1 13:2 10: 1 08: 0
28:4 18:0 15: 1 20:0 17:2 15:0
25:0 22:0 27:2 24: 0 22: 0
29: 1 29: 0
SUB-TOTALS: 4 1 3 5 3 0
TOTAL for 1996 (6 m onths only): 16
1997 05: 1 02:0 02: 1 06:4 04: 1 01: 1 06: 1 03: 1 07:3 05:0 02:4 07:4
12: 0 09:2 09: 0 13:2 11:3 08: 1 13:0 10:0 14:0 12: 1 09:4 14:2
19: 0 16: 1 16:2 20:0 18: 2 15: 1 20: 1 17: 1 21: 1 19: 1 16: 1 21:3
26: 2 23:2 23:2 27:0 25:3 22: 1 27: 2 24:3 28:0 26: 3 23:2 28:2
30:2 29:2 31: 1 30: 3
SUB-TOTALS 3 5 7 6 9 6 5 6 4 5 14 11
TOTAL for 1997: 80
1998 04:8 01: 3 01: 2 05: 1 03: 6 07: 1 05:3 02:4 06: 8 04:4 01:3 06:4
11:2 08: 1 08:2 12:3 10:0 14: 3 12:2 09: 1 13: 2 11:3 08: 6 13: 1
18:2 15: 1 15:0 19: 1 17:5 21: 1 19:3 16:3 20:5 18:8 15:3 20: 7
25: 1 22: 1 22:2 26: 2 24: 5 28:4 26: 2 23:0 27: 3 25: 1 22: 3 25: 5
29: 0 31: 3 30:4 29:8
SUB-TOTALS 13 6 6 7 19 9 10 12 18 16 23 17
TOTAL for 1998: 156
1999 03: 1 07: 1 07: 2 04:5 02:4 06:0 04: 1 01:2 05:0 03:6 07:2 05: 7
10: 1 14: 1 14:3 10: 1 09: 5 13:2 11:4 08: 1 12: 1 10:3 14: 0 12:4
17:0 21:3 21: 2 18: 1 16:2 20: 5 18:4 14: 1 19: 2 17:3 21: 5 19: 14
24: 6 28: 1 28: 2 25:3 23:0 27:2 25:2 22:2 26: 7 24: 8 28:4 25: 4
31:3 30:2 29: 1 31:3
SUB-TOTALS 11 6 9 10 13 9 11 7 10 23 11 29
TOTAL for 1999: 149
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2000 01: 4 06: 3 05:9 02: 3 07: 1 04: 8 02:2 06: 3 03: 2 01: 8 05: 7 03:5
09: 5 13: 10 12:8 09:4 14: 1 11:2 09: 11 13:3 10: 7 08: 2 12: 1 10:3
16: 5 20: 8 19: 5 16:4 21:2 18:4 16: 3 20: 5 17:5 15:4 19:5 17: 0
23:3 27:4 25: 2 23: 7 28:7 25:4 23: 5 27:3 24: 5 22:5 26: 5 24: 6
30:0 29:4 30: 1 29:2 31: 5
SUB-TOTALS 17 25 24 22 11 18 22 14 19 21 18 19
TOTAL for 2000: 230
2001 07: 5 04: 5 04:3 01:5 06: 1 03:8 01:1 05:3 02: 7 07:4 04: 1 02: 6
14:4 11:3 11: 1 08: 2 13:2 10:3 08:1 12:6 09:7 14:4 11:4 09:2
21: 7 18: 1 18: 6 14: 3 20:2 17: 5 15: 8 19: 1 16: 6 21: 8 18: 3 16: 1
28:4 25:5 24: 2 22: 1 
29:3
27: 3 24: 6 22: 10 
29:8
26: 2 23:8
30:7
28: 5 25: 1 23:4
30:2
SUB-TOTALS 20 14 12 14 8 22 28 12 35 21 9 15
TOTAL for 2001: 210
TOTAL SUM for the period 1996-2001: 841_____________
NOTE: In the cells o f the Table, the first number indicates the date of the Edition and the second the number of articles found (see also page 159).
CHART 2: References to the term  Globalisation per year, in the Sunday Edition of the Newspaper VIMA (1997-2001)
(% of the total sum of references for the period 1997-2001)
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28% 18%
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The Discourse o f Globalisation in the Newspaper VIMA, 1996-2001
Table 7 indicates the evolution of the use of the term ‘globalisation’ in the Sunday 
edition of the newspaper ‘VIMA’ during the period 1996-2001. Under each month- 
heading a series of a pair of numbers appears; for instance, the first reference in July 
1996 is ‘14:0’. The first o f these numbers indicates the date of the publication of 
each edition. For instance in July 1996, three editions were available and examined, 
that were published respectively on the 14th, the 21st and the 28th of July. The second 
number of the pair indicates the absolute number of articles which made a reference 
to the term ‘globalisation’ in each edition. For instance, in the publication of 28 July
1996, the term globalisation was mentioned in four articles (the reference being 28:4).
Based on the above data some important observations can be made. First, contrary to 
our expectations a significant number o f references to globalisation are traced, since
1997, i.e. well before the anti-globalisation protests in Seattle. In a more specific 
manner, the comparison of the second semesters (July-December) o f 1996 and 1997 
demonstrates a threefold increase in the use o f the term globalisation (from 16 in 
1996 to 45 references in 1997). Then again the number o f references on an annual 
basis is doubled in 1998 (from 80 in 1997 to 156 in 1998) and remains at the same 
level up to the end of 1999 (149 references). Finally, the Seattle events in December 
1999, led to an approximately 50% increase in the references to globalisation in 2000 
(230 references) in comparison with 1999, and approximately the same levels were 
maintained in 2001 (210 references). Figure 1 offers a schematic depiction o f the 
evolution of the volume of references to globalisation in the Sunday Edition of 
‘VIMA’.
Figure 1: Articles with a Reference to Globalisation in VIMA (Sunday Edition)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
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It is important to note here that the absolute number of references made to 
globalisation does not speak for itself. But the comparison of the references per year 
does demonstrate the dynamics under play during the respective period. In this 
regard, it can be noted that the emergence of globalisation discourse took place 
gradually, in a process that was initiated at least in 1997. Moreover, considering the 
year 2000 as the ‘peak-point’ of the globalisation discourse it can also be noted that 
globalisation was implicated in the discourse generated by ‘VIMA * at least after 
1998; and this implication, and its wider effect in the Greek public discourse, is 
independent -  even if not irrelevant -  from the source of the references (i.e. who 
where the authors of the respective articles). For, if the references to globalisation in 
2000 (i.e. the peak-year) are 230, then 156 and 149 references in 1998 and 1999 
respectively, can be considered significant numbers even if we do not have data 
available to compare these numbers with other issues discussed during the same 
period in VIMA. On this basis, the (approximately) 50% increase that took place 
after the Seattle events does not really seem to suggest an ‘out of the blue’ change in 
the references to globalisation, even though the content of these references and the 
composition of the authors remain open.
Thus, in order to grasp better the dynamics that the above data signify, one should 
study the composition of the authors who were using the term globalisation, and the 
evolution of this composition, as well as the distribution of the references among the 
various sections of the newspaper and how this distribution changed during 1996- 
2001. The following paragraphs focus on these questions. I start with the distribution 
of references in the various sections of VIMA, and then move on to the composition 
of the authors.
Chart 3 offers aggregate data for the distribution of references in the various sections 
of VIMA for the period 1996-2001, whilst Table 8 monitors the evolution of this 
distribution within the respective period.
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CHART 3: Thematical Distribution of References to Globalisation in the
Sunday Edition of the Newspaper VIMA (1996-2001)
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TABLE 8 : Evolution of the References to Globalisation in VIMA (Sunday edition),
According to the Newspaper’s Section of Appearance
Sections
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
A (main/political) 8 31 57 37 64 67
B (academic) 3 11 24 30 48 63
D (economic) 2 20 26 31 36 23
E (Europe/monetary) 2 7 8 4 13 14
S (books) 0 8 26 26 42 31
V (miscellaneous) 0 3 15 14 36 11
NOTE
Section A: TO VIMA (the main/political section of the newspaper)
Section B: Nees Epoxes (mostly academic contributions on topical issues, and adverts for seminars, conferences, 
books, journals, talks, concerts etc.)
Section D: Anaptyxi (the economic section)
Section E: To Vima tis Europis (special section on Europe; ‘E’ was also used for Sections on Drachma and Euro. 
Section S: Vivlia (special section on books, that includes book adverts and news on journals and magazines) 
Section V includes the following sections:
Section C: To Alio Vima (the cultural section: news, reports, interviews etc.)
Section T: Taxidia (special section on travels and vacations)
Section U: Akinita (special section on Property)
Section Y & I: various special publications (etc. on stock market, on personalities etc.)
Section Z: TV (up to the 16/11/1997), Art and Artists (23/11/1997-30/12/2001)
The dynamics of the above data are diagrammatically depicted in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Evolution of the References to Globalisation in VIMA (Sunday
Edition) According to the Newspaper’s Section of Appearance
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1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Years
A (main/political section) 
D (economic section)
S (books)______________
B (academic section)
E (Europe/monetary section) 
V (miscellaneous)
Based on the above data we can infer the following. First, the references to the main, 
political section of the newspaper (i.e. section A) remained dominant throughout the 
period under investigation, even though the evolution of these references was not 
linear. After a ‘peak-point’ in 1998 these references started to decline; a trend that 
was drastically reversed after the anti-globalisation protests in Seattle in the end of
1999. The same event seems to have had an opposite effect for the references in the 
economic section (section D). In this section the references increased gradually but 
steadily up to 2000, when a significant decrease of their number took place. This 
decrease could possibly be explained by the fact that the concept o f globalisation, as 
we saw in the discourses of the political parties, the workers and the church, had 
acquired an ideologically charged, negative connotation in the Greek public discourse 
and therefore its use was avoided in relation to economic policies and related 
economic issues. The most linear pattern is found in the ‘academic’ section (i.e. 
section B), in which the references steadily increased throughout the period 1996- 
2001, surpassing the references of the economic section in 2000, and approaching the 
references of the political section in 2001. A similar dynamic appears also in the 
book section (i.e. section S), despite the decrease in 2001. With regard to the 
references in the rest sections of the newspaper it can be observed that after a 
tremendous increase in 2000, they returned to their pre-Seattle levels in 2001.
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It is also interesting that even before the protests in Seattle in December 1999, 
references to globalisation in the main/political section o f VIMA outnumbered those 
in the economic section. Moreover up to 1998 (inclusive) the references in the 
political section outnumbered also these in the academic (section: B) and book 
(section: S) sections, if the latter two are counted together (Table 9).
Table 9. Globalisation Discourse in VIMA: ‘Political’ vs. ‘Academic’ pages
100
<*.o
L.OA
E
3
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Years
A (main/political section) —• — B (academic section) + S (books)
If, however, in the above diagram to the references o f the political section one adds 
the references o f the economic section in order to juxtapose the references made in 
the ‘politico-economic pages’ (sections: A+D) with those made in the, broadly 
speaking, ‘academic pages’ (sections: B+S) then the references to the ‘non-academic 
pages’ remain higher throughout the period 1996-2000 (Table 10).
Table 10. Globalisation Discourse in VIMA: ‘Politico-Economic’ vs. ‘Academic’ 
Pages
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Years
A (main/political section) + D (economic section) —■— B (academic section) + S (books)
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Based on the above data it can be argued that the academic discourse on globalisation, 
generated through the pages o f VIMA, did not outnumber or precede the globalisation 
discourse that was generated through the everyday politico-economic pages and 
commentary o f the same newspaper; rather the opposite is the case. Thus, the 
implications and the effects o f globalisation discourse in Greek public discourse seem 
to be much deeper and wider than those of an elite based discourse, limited to 
academic circles. The above findings can be further sharpened if  combined with 
information about the identity of the people who wrote the respective articles. In this 
regard, Chart 4 presents the overall picture for the period 1996-2001, and Table 11 
monitors the evolution of the authors’ identity within this period.
CHART 4: References to Globalisation in the Sunday Edition of the Newspaper 
VIMA, according to the Authors’ Identity (1996-2001)
Unsigned
20%
Miscellaneous
3%
Journalists
38%Civil Servants 
1%
Politicians
5%
Academics
33%
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Table 11: Evolution of the References to Globalisation in VIMA (Sunday
Edition) According to the Authors’ Identity
\ Journalists Academics1 Politicians Miscellaneous2 CivilServants3 Unsigned
1996 08:08 01:01 - - - 07
1997 13:33 19:24 05:05 - - 17
1998 39:61 32:49 07:11 01:01 02:02 30
1999 43:62 32:43 08:08 01:02 01:01 30
2000 51:86 44:79 06:07 12:16 01:01 38
2001 46:67 48:76 03:10 07:10 - 46
1 Including all articles in the books' section.
2 Including managers, consultants, artists. The reference in 1998 is an interview with the Archbishop 
Christodoulos.
3 This category refers to the highest ranks of the public services and institutions such as the Chairman of the 
Bank of Greece and the Vice-Chairman of the public employment organisation OAED.
In Table 11 the first number of each pair refers to the number of the authors, whereas 
the second number of the pair refers to the number of the written articles. For 
instance in the column ‘Journalists’ in the year 1999, 62 articles were written by 43 
journalists. In this manner we take into consideration both the volume of the 
references and the diversification of their source.
If one focuses on the number of authors independently from the volume of the written 
articles then the following picture is derived:
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Figure 3: Evolution of the Different Categories of Authors 
Making References to Globalisation in VIMA (Sunday edition)
■Journalists
• Academics
■ Politicians
■ Miscellaneous
■ Civil Servants
• Unsigned
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Years
The above picture does not change significantly even if the focus is placed on the 
number of articles per category of authors.
Figure 4: Evolution of the References to Globalisation in VIMA (Sunday edition) 
According to the Authors’ Identity
• Journalists
■ Academics
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■ Miscellaneous 
■Civil Servants
• Unsigned
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Based on the above data it can be observed that during 1998-2000 the number of 
journalists who used the concept of globalisation in their articles outnumbered that of 
academics who did so. If the number of articles rather than the number o f authors is 
taken into account, then the journalistic references were more than the academic ones
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throughout the period 1997-2000101. This finding enhances the conclusion we 
reached in the analysis of references according to the newspaper’s section of 
appearance. Thus the intensity of the implication of the globalisation discourse in the 
politico-economic pages remained higher than in any other section of VIMA up to
2000. Furthermore to the extent that VIMA reflected Greek public discourse, it can 
be argued that globalisation had a significant position in this public discourse after 
1998. An other indicator of this ‘quotidianisation’ of the globalisation discourse at the 
national level is the high number of the unsigned references, as well as the increase of 
the engagement with the concept of globalisation of the categories of ‘miscellaneous’, 
‘politicians’ and ‘civil servants’. The latter seem to constitute an additional finding in 
favour of the argument about the gradual biopolitical transformation of the Greek 
public discourse, in terms of the then newly emerging hegemonic discourse of 
globalisation. It is also important to point out that the ‘journalistic engagement’ with 
globalisation discourse in the newspaper VIMA was led by journalists who were 
widely read and had a significant influence in the public discourse. Therefore the list 
of the journalists who had the highest per year references102 includes: D. Mitropoulos 
(in the years 1997, 1998), R. Someritis (1997, 1998, 2001), N. Nikolaou (1997, 1999,
2001), J. Pretenderis (2000,2001), all leading figures of the newspaper.
This analysis of the ‘press sample’ will be completed with a short reference to the 
issue of book production. The aim here is double: first, to capture one more channel 
of discourse communication and dissemination, and second to double-check the role 
of academics/intelligentsia in the communication of globalisation discourse.
There is no single and secure way to trace all the books published on a specific 
subject during a certain period in Greece. The data used below have been collected 
after having consulted the following resources: The ‘National Book Centre of
Greece’, the main on-line catalogue of the ‘Panteion University’, the on-line 
catalogue of ‘Protoporeia’ bookstore, and the ordering catalogue of ‘Politeia’ 
bookstore103. The ‘National Book Centre’ holds a list with all the books that the
101 It is important to keep in mind that the above analysis is independent from the sections in which 
these articles were published. Thus many academics have permanent columns and/or occasionally 
write in the main political section of the newspaper, and not in the academic one.
102 That is more than three articles per year.
103 ‘Protoporeia’ and ‘Politeia’ are two of the biggest bookstores in Greece.
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publishers have sent to the Centre but this list is by no means an exhaustive one. The 
research was limited in books that had the term ‘globalisation’ in their title or subtitle. 
The time-span of the research was 1990-2001. Chart 5 and Table 12 summarise the 
findings:
CHART 5: Books having the Term ‘Globalisation’ in their Title or Subtitle 
published in Greece during 1990-2001
Translations
OtherReligion
Economics
Social Sciences
Not Classified
Political Science
NOTE: The ‘subject categories’ were taken either by the ‘National Book Centre’ or by 
the respective bookstores.
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Table 12: Books with the term ‘Globalisation’ in their Title or Subtitle, published in Greece during 1990-2001
1990-
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
No date given -  
but before 2001
Number 
of Books 
Published
0 1 2 5 15 17 32 3
Subiect Area1 Subiect Area Subiect Area Subiect Area Subiect Area Subiect Area Subiect Area
Political Science: 1 
Social Sciences: - 
Economics: - 
Religion: -
Stance towards
Political Science: - 
Social Sciences: - 
Economics: 1 
Religion: -
Stance towards
Political Science: 2 
Social Sciences: 2 
Economics: - 
Religion: -
Stance towards
Political Science: 4 
Social Sciences: 3 
Economics: 5 
Religion: 1
Stance towards
Political Science: 3 
Social Sciences: 2 
Economics: 8 
Religion: 1 
Law: 1
Stance towards
Political Science: 6 
Social Sciences: 7 
Economics: 3 
Religion: 4 
Other: 2 
Not Classified: 8
Stance towards 
Globalisation
Positive: 1 
Critical: 6 
Unidentifiable: 20 
Not applicable: 3
Translations: 
-Noam Chomsky, 
Latin America: 
From Imperialism 
to Globalization 
-Thomas Friedman, 
The Lexus and the 
Olive Tree
Political Science: 1 
Social Sciences: 2 
Economics: 
Religion:
Stance towards
Globalisation2 Globalisation Globalisation Globalisation Globalisation
Positive: - 
Critical: - 
Unidentifiable2: 1 
Not applicable2: -
Translations:
Positive: 1 
Critical: - 
Unidentifiable: - 
Not applicable: -
Translations:
Positive: - 
Critical: 3 
Unidentifiable: - 
Not applicable: 1
Translations:
Positive: 2 
Critical: 3 
Unidentifiable: 8 
Not applicable: -
Translations:
Globalisation
Positive:
Critical: 3 
Unidentifiable: 10 
Not applicable: 2
Translations:
-Hirst & Thomson, 
Globalisation in 
Question 
-Chris Harman, 
Globalisation & 
Resistance
Positive:
Critical: 2 
Unidentifiable: 1 
Not applicable: -
Translations:
Alan Mink, Happy 
Globalisation
Barber Benjamin, 
Jihad vs MacWorld
-Oscar Lafontaine & 
Christa Muller, 
Don't be Afraid 
o f Globalisation 
-UlrickBeck, What 
is Globalization?
NOTES
1 As ‘subject area’ was used the one given either by the ‘National Book Centre’ or by the respective bookstores.
2 The ‘stance towards globalisation’ was judged by the provided book abstracts. ‘Unidentifiable’ was used when no abstract was available or when the stance was 
not absolutely clear by the provided abstract. ‘Not applicable’ was used for edited volumes, with no clear or single ‘stance’.
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It is clear from Table 12 that significant numbers of books started to be published 
only after 1998. This can easily be explained considering the slow nature of the book 
publication process, and the fact that it always takes more time for books to catch up 
with current developments and events. Moreover, it is also not surprising that the 
books that adopted an explicitly critical or negative approach to globalisation 
outnumbered the ones that adopted an explicitly positive approach (seventeen vs. 
four). At least for the period in question this seems also to be the case at the 
international level. Yet the data of Table 12 should be treated with caution, for books 
central to the globalisation debate, such as The Third Way published by Anthony 
Giddens in 1998 (and translated in Greece the same year), were not included in the 
Table as long as they did not have the term globalisation in their title or subtitle. Let 
this short reference to the book-production close here. The next section offers a 
summary of the findings of the analysed ‘media sample’.
Synopsis
After 1997 globalisation was implicated in the discourse generated by the newspaper 
VIMA and it was to be found more than anywhere else in the construction/production 
of news in the political columns of this newspaper. To the extent that VIMA 
reflected the Greek public discourse, the same can be said to be true about the latter 
and globalisation discourse. In this regard, it can also be argued that the boom of 
globalisation discourse observed in VIMA, and consequently in Greek public 
discourse, in 2000 was rather a part of a longer and gradual process.
The purpose of this section was to use a representative ‘press sample’ in order to 
uncover the dynamics that were at work in the Greek public discourse during the 
period in question. By definition such an analysis and its conclusion can only be an 
indication of the broader dynamics at work in the Greek public discourse. We trust 
however that we managed to offer a concrete and representative sample of how, when 
and to what extent the concept of globalisation became a significant point of 
reference in the production of Greek public discourse.
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Conclusion
This chapter has investigated the discourses of key institutional actors in Greece, in 
order to trace changes or continuities in the production of Greek public discourse 
during the period 1995-2001. Through this investigation we saw that globalisation 
gradually emerged as a new point of reference, through which the institutional actors 
rearticulated their interests and goals, renegotiated their identities, and redefined their 
strategies. Thus globalisation was defended as an opportunity for economic 
development (e.g. PASOK), accused as a new means of imperialist or neoliberal 
expansion (e.g. KKE, Synaspismos, GSEE), associated with the forces of evil (e.g. 
the Church), taken for granted as a new reality (e.g. SEV), or just avoided as a 
concept (e.g. ND, SEV). This analysis brought also to the forefront changes in the 
power of the different actors, as these were manifested in the evolution of their 
interaction; for instance, we saw how workers, after a period of resistance, accepted 
to discuss proposals for flexibility policies in the labour market -  a traditional 
employer position. This is also an example of how the (new) politics of globalisation, 
in terms of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’, was materialised at the national level104. The 
sample of press coverage that was examined supported the above analysis. 
Globalisation after 1998 occupied a significant position in the discourse of the 
Sunday newspaper that had the highest circulation during the period in question. This 
cannot but mirror the increased importance of the concept of globalisation in the 
discourses of key institutional actors. It also, however, manifests the increase of the 
importance of globalisation both as an independent news item, and as a way of 
reading events and changes in the domestic and international realms. In this manner, 
VIMA not only mirrored the restructuring of Greek public discourse in terms of the 
globalisation discourse, but it was also an actor in this restructuring process.
A detailed synopsis and conclusion for this chapter are offered in a comparative 
perspective with the Irish case in Chapter 5. Yet based on the above, it is clear that
104 Within this context, Giorgos Kirtsos, editor at that time of the Greek right-wing newspaper, 
Eleftheros Typos, suggested that, ‘this new politics of globalisation was also experienced in Greece 
through -  among other things -  the centralisation of Greek mass media and the new order of American 
hegemony in the Balkans’. G. Kirtsos, personal interview, 27/04/2002. For Eleftheros Typos' 
circulation rates see Chart 1.
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globalisation discourse did not ‘arrive’ in Greece with the Seattle protests. Rather 
the opposite was the case. The events in Seattle signified (in Greek public discourse) 
not the beginning but a ‘peak’ of a longer hegemonic restructuring process (to which 
these events were a reaction). The increased references to globalisation throughout 
the period 1998-99 in VIMA should be conceptualised in this context. Such an 
understanding does not aim to undermine the crucial impact of the ‘Seattle events’ on 
public discourses around the world, and the new dynamics they created. It rather 
aims to place these events in the broader social dynamics, material and conceptual, of 
which they constituted an integral part. These include the new production, 
technological and communication techniques and practices, (including the 
internationalisation of production through multinational corporations; the 
globalisation of financial markets, the increasing power of short-term capital and the 
financial crises of the 1990s; the spread of new communication and information 
technologies -  most importantly the internet) which started to bio-politically 
restructure world politics, economics and everyday life, at least since the late 1970s. 
Arguably, the hegemonic discourse of globalisation came out of the dynamics that 
were unleashed from these new developments, and Greek public discourse was 
produced and reproduced in interaction with these. This conclusion, however, needs 
to be double-checked. For this, Chapter 4 turns to the communication of the 
hegemonic discourse of globalisation in the case of Ireland.
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CHAPTER 4 
THE GLOBALISATION DISCOURSE IN 
IRELAND: 1995-2001
Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to study the communication of globalisation discourse in 
Ireland. In order to do so and to secure a comparative study with the Greek case, we 
replicated the structure and methodology followed in Chapter 3. Hence, we 
scrutinised the discourses of the key institutional actors, in order to examine the 
following questions. How was the globalisation discourse implicated in the discourses 
and identities of these actors? How was the communication of globalisation discourse 
affected by the existing national institutional configuration, and what impact did it 
have on this configuration? Finally, what did these changes mean for the Irish public 
discourse?
Before starting the analysis of the institutional actors’ discourses some 
contextualisation is necessary. As we argued in Chapter 2 the decade of the 1990s 
signified a turning point for the Irish political system. The well-established ‘Fianna 
Fail versus the rest’ political pattern -  which had dominated the Irish political life for 
approximately fifty years (1948-1989) -  ceased to define Irish politics and gave way 
to a ‘new politics of coalition-making’ (Mair, 1999). Moreover, the turn from the 
1980s to the 1990s witnessed the significant enhancement of the socio-economic role 
of the institution of ‘social partnership’. Within these conditions a new public 
discourse started to emerge, with new points of references and signifiers (e.g. Celtic 
tiger, Europe’s shining light). As in the case of Greece, the purpose is to examine the 
nature of the relationship between this emerging public discourse and the hegemonic 
discourse of globalisation.
Institutional Actors and the Discourse o f  Globalisation
In the case of Ireland the thesis focuses on the following institutional actors. As in 
the case of Greece the main criterion for the construction of the list was that of 
‘inclusion’, in an attempt to study all the actors with a significant role in the 
formation of the Irish public discourse.
■ The Main Political Parties1
- Fianna Fail (FF)
- Fine Gael (FG)
- Labour Party (LP)
- Progressive Democrats (PD)
■ The Main Social Partners
- Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU).
- Irish Business and Employers Confederation (IBEC).
- National Economic and Social Council (NESC).
■ The Catholic Church
■ A Press Sample (the newspaper The Irish Times), which also captures part of the 
discourses of various actors (e.g. academics, anti-globalisation groups, artists, 
entrepreneurs, civil servants etc.) not included above2.
The analysis of those actors’ discourses was conducted as follows. First, where 
necessary, the identity of the examined institution is presented, and the rationale of 
the analysed documents is discussed. Then the means and nature of the engagement 
with the globalisation discourse is elaborated.
1 In the case of Greece, the study of the discourse of political parties was complemented by the study 
of the discourse of party leaders. The latter was based on the well-organised on-line archives of the 
Greek parties. Unfortunately in the case o f Ireland it has proven impossible to collect in a consistent 
manner the speeches and interviews of all the party leaders. Thus such a separate section on the leaders 
discourses was omitted, and replaced with further analysis on the party discourses.
2 Again, in the Greek case there was a small separate section on ‘book production’. This was omitted 
in the case of Ireland because (due to the English language), the book industry market for Irish 
academics is internationalised; i.e. Irish academics prefer to publish in well-established international 
publishers.
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The Main Political Parties (FF, FG, LP, PD)
Two criteria were used for the selection of the political parties. First, their 
‘representativeness’, as expressed by votes in the national elections, and second their 
‘continuity’ in the political scene and/or participation in government. The inclusion 
of the ‘participation in government’ criterion was deemed necessary in the case of 
Ireland, due to the existence of coalition governments since the early 1990s.
Based on the above criteria we have studied the following parties: (a) Fianna Fail: 
The Republican Party (FF), which got the majority of votes in all the elections since 
1989 (i.e. in 1992, 1997, 2002), and formed coalition governments with the Labour 
Party in 1992 (lasted until 1994), and with Progressive Democrats in 1989, 1997 and 
2002. (b) The Fine Gael (FG), which came second in all the elections in the 1990s, 
and was in power, in a coalition government with the Labour Party during 1994-1997. 
(c) The Labour Party (LP), which is the third biggest party, and was in power as a 
partner of FF during 1992-1994 and as a partner of FG during 1994-1997. (d) The 
Progressive Democrats (PD), which is the youngest party (founded in 1985). It came 
fourth in the elections of 1989, 1992, 1997 and 2002, but participated in coalition 
governments with FF in 1989, 1997 and 2002.
The most decisive factor for the formation of the Irish party system has been the 
‘Anglo-Irish Treaty’ of 1921, that led to the division of Sinn Fein. Thus Fianna Fail 
emerged (in 1926), from the anti-Treaty tradition, while Fine Gael (which was 
founded in 1933) has its origins in the ‘Cumann na nGaedheal’, the party that 
supported the Treaty. The first, the anti-Treaty stance was mainly based on landless 
farmers, farm workers, small business and industrial workers. In contrast, the Treaty 
was mainly supported by large business owners, merchants and big farmers. Both 
Fianna Fail and Fine Gael evolved to catch-all parties, fact that makes their 
classification in a traditional left-to-right axis very difficult. Yet, both parties are 
generally considered to be conservative. It is indicative that in the European 
Parliament Fine Gael belongs, along with New Democracy and British Conservatives, 
to the ‘European People’s Party and European Democrats’ group, that includes 
‘Christian Democrats, Conservative and other mainstream centre and centre-right
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political forces’3. On the other hand Fianna Fail belongs to the ‘Union for Europe of 
the Nations’ group, a Euro-sceptic and rather nationalistic group. Regarding the 
smaller parties, it can be said that the Labour Party is a rather progressive left party. 
In terms of its European belonging, it is a member, along with PASOK and the 
British Labour Party, of the ‘Party of European Socialists’ group of the European 
Parliament (and is not for instance in the left group of ‘European United Left/Nordic 
Green Left’ where the Greek Communist Party belongs). Finally, the party of 
Progressive Democrats has its origins in Fianna Fail. In fact it was created by Fianna 
Fail members, as a reaction to the party’s populist character and conservative stance, 
under the leadership of Charles Haughey, during the 1980s. The Progressive 
Democrats are a right-wing party with a strong liberal character (both economically 
and politically)4.
As discussed above, the broader focus of the thesis is on the second half of the 1990s. 
Yet within this broader period the thesis looks for ‘moments’ that signify changes, 
discursive shifts within the societies under consideration. In this regard, in Greece it 
was the coming to power of the ‘modernisation block’, in 1996, that was taken as a 
point of departure. In the Irish case a parallel moment is the 1997 elections. The 
latter signified the end of a long period of short-lived coalition governments (1992- 
1997). Furthermore, it signified the consolidation of the post-‘FF versus the rest’ 
political scene, and the crystallisation of a new political dynamic, based on the FF-PD 
programmatic bargaining and governmental co-operation. The choice of 1997 as a 
point of departure, forced us to include in our research the year 2002, which is 
marginally outside the focus of the thesis, but is the year when the next election 
campaign took place.
3 See the official website of the group at: www.epp-ed.org.
4 For a short overview of the history of Irish parties, see Collins and Cradden, 2001: 16-31. For a well- 
documented research on Irish parties and elections, see Sinnott, 1995.
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Electoral Manifestos: 1997 and 2002s
Electoral manifestos were published and used by the Irish parties in both the 1997 and 
2002 elections. An analysis of their content with respect to the discourse of 
globalisation is as follows.
Fianna Fail (FF)
The 1997 manifesto of Fianna Fail was entitled People Before Politics6 (144 pages 
long), and was characterised by a populist tone. Thus, after a short introduction by 
the leader of the party Bertie Ahem, and a chapter on ‘sustainable growth’ (pp. 5-11), 
the three (out of five) main chapters of the manifesto bear the following titles: 
‘Winning the country back for the people’ (pp. 11-50), ‘Revitalising the fabric of our 
nation’ (pp. 51-80), and ‘Preserving and extending our heritance’ (pp. 112-139). The 
other two chapters of the manifesto focused on the economy (pp. 81-111) and on 
‘strengthening Ireland’s place in the world’ (pp. 130-139). Yet, even though the 
above titles seem very conducive to the various aspects of the globalisation debate, 
the term globalisation was totally absent from the manifesto, while the adjective 
‘global’ was only used three times, two with regard to the economy (i.e. ‘global 
marketplace’, p. 82; ‘global economy’, p. I l l )  and once with regard to international 
affairs in general (i.e. ‘global issues’, p. 135). But let us consider carefully if, where 
and how the globalisation discourse did appear in the manifesto.
It can be argued that the bottom line of the electoral strategy of Fianna Fail in 1997 
was the following:
[The Irish] now have the opportunity to build on the current wave of success,
laying solid foundations for a prosperous Ireland in the 21st century...Or we
5 For the methodology followed in the study of the manifestos, see the introduction of the respective 
section in the case of Greece, in Chapter 3.
6 The reference for this manifesto throughout the thesis will be, Fianna Fail, 1997.
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can watch helplessly while lawlessness takes over our country7, and the gap 
grows wider between the haves and the have-nots (‘Introduction’ by B.
Ahem, p. 2).
In the same manner, the Winning the Country Back for the People chapter declared:
Fianna Fail believe that disadvantage in our society can no longer be 
tolerated. Irish people want prosperity, but not at the expense of those who 
are genuinely in need or disadvantage. Neither do Irish people want a 
society that is at war with itself, because of growing gaps between the 
‘haves’ and ‘have nots’ (p. 21).
Therefore, Fianna Fail, although in opposition during 1994-1997, did not dispute -  
and it could not meaningfully do so -  the fact that economic growth, success and 
prosperity were there in 1997. Its focal point was how this prosperity should be 
managed and what strategies should be followed, from that point onwards, in order 
‘to build on the current wave of success’ (p. 2). This point needs to be stressed. 
What was at stake, in the way that Fianna Fail set the format of electoral struggle, was 
not how prosperity should be created, was not about the basic choices of economic 
policy, but rather how the existing success could work better for all the social strata in 
Ireland. Thus, the wealth-creating mechanisms (for instance tax cuts) of the Irish 
political economy, being the undeniable reason for the economic success, remained 
outside from party competition, at least as the latter was set in the manifesto of Fianna 
Fail. Furthermore even when these mechanisms entered in the electoral game, it was 
only to create a race for their expansion to an ever-wider range of areas, rather than to 
be problematised. Tax cuts are perhaps the most prominent example here. The 
second chapter of the manifesto, under the heading ‘Economy & Taxation’, 
substantiated Fianna Fail’s ‘prudent’ profile in sound economic management, on its 
past ‘ability to reduce the tax burden’ (p. 7), and developed the strategy through 
which Fianna Fail would reduced further the ‘tax burden’ (p. 7-10). It is indicative 
that ‘tax cuts’ was the fifth most popular concept in the manifesto.
7 It is worth mentioning here that the manifesto gave primacy to the issue o f crime. ‘Crime threatens 
us on our streets, in our homes, and in our business...it poses a major threat to the fabric of our 
society’ (p. 12-13). Accordingly FF was arguing for a ‘zero tolerance’ approach to crime (p. 13-14).
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This ‘apoliticisation’ of Irish economic policy can principally be attributed to the 
following reasons: (a) the positive effects that this policy had in terms of economic 
growth and living standards; an effect which was directly experienced by Irish people 
on an everyday basis, and (b) the social partnership, the new ‘anchor-institution’ of 
the Irish politico-economic system. Indeed the concept of partnership/social partners 
was the second single most popular term of the 1997 manifesto. Fianna Fail stressed 
that the ‘ground-breaking social partnership’ was its initiative in 1987 (p. 7), and 
included the participation of social partners in almost all the proposed new 
institutional bodies. The following extracts are only indicative:
We will set up a National Competitiveness Council.. .which will include 
representatives of the Social Partners (p. 88).
[W]e will...enter into full discussions with the Social Partners before any 
final decisions are taken on rationalisation [of state policies towards 
business] (p. 90).
FF will set up a new partnership between the Department of Agriculture,
Teagasc, farm organisations...(p. 101).
[In the state sector FF will work] in the spirit of social partnership and 
consensus (p. 109, see also p. 111).
[FF will] Involve the whole community in environment policy through a new 
National Environment Partnership Forum (p. 113).
These extracts illustrate how the concept of social partnership had been evolving as 
the new core of Irish politics -  the means through which politics were to be delivered. 
The content of the politics to be delivered seemed rather to be taken for granted, due 
to a ‘new state of affairs’. Thus, although the concept of globalisation was absent, the 
most popular concept of the manifesto was that of the ‘information age’, while the 
concept of ‘Ireland’s attraction’ (to foreign investments), and the concept of the 
‘world marketplace’ were the third and fourth most popular concepts respectively.
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In particular a whole section was devoted to the ‘information age’ which was 
conceptualised as a ‘massive opportunity’ (p. 82) but which nonetheless carried with 
it threats.
[The] Information Age offers Ireland a massive opportunity.. .The reason is 
that the new age offers us...a way around the disadvantages we have always 
suffered because of our remote position...In the Information Age, where we 
are will no longer matter. Ireland will be as well-placed as any country in a 
truly global market-place... However...the dividend from the Information 
Age will not come automatically. On the contrary: if we do not prepare 
properly, we will be left behind...(p. 82)...The key fact about the 
Information Age is that it is connected. Without the means to communicate 
instantly and cost-effectively, our human resources are powerless (p. 85).
In general, references to the ‘information age’ were scattered throughout the 
manifesto, and Ireland had to ‘catapult [itself] to the front rank’ of it (p. 2), ‘position 
itself aggressively in the forefront o f  it (p. 6), lead itself into it (p. 86), ‘reposition’ or 
‘upgrade’ itself for it (p. 89, 92), ‘accelerate access by schools to’ it (p. 84), etc. 
Furthermore these references to the information age were backed up by references to 
a ‘new world’ (p. 32), ‘new era’ (p. 69) and ‘new age’ (p. 69). Within this context 
Fianna Fail criticised the FG-LP coalition for lacking a ‘strong pro-enterprise 
attitude’ and for following a tax policy that put in danger ‘Ireland’s attraction as a 
location of inward investments’ (p. 6).
Finally, the section on the public sector declared: ‘[Fianna Fail will take] a practical 
rather than an ideological approach to State companies...rejecting ideology in favour 
of practicality’ (p. 109). Thus FF ‘will not engage in a wholesale dismantling or 
disposal o f State companies. We will not sell off State assets cheap to make quick 
profits for investors...' (emphasis in the original, p. 110), acknowledging at the same 
time that: ‘It is a time of change in the State Sector, change that is being driven by 
technology, by EU deregulation and competition’ (p. 110).
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In sum it can be argued that economic globalisation was ever-present in the manifesto, 
not to be contested or discussed but to be promoted, whereas the cultural aspects of 
globalisation discourse were completely absent.
The 2002 manifesto, entitled A Lot Done - More to Do (94 pages long), does not 
change much from the above picture8. Of course the context was not the same. In 
2002 Fianna Fail was not trying to defeat a government, but to stay in power. In this 
regard the issue of the growing gap between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have nots’, central in 
the 1997 manifesto, gave place to confident statements such as:
[W]e consolidated an economy that is still the envy of the world (p. 6).
[The] era of mass unemployment and emigration has been brought to an end (pp.
3,4).
Under Fianna Fail Ireland has been the world’s most dynamic economy (pp. 4,
25).
[We want to] ensure that Ireland continues to be a world leader in
Knowledge-based industries (p. 33).
It is indeed striking that, although we were in an electoral competition that took place 
in 2002, once again the manifesto of the biggest party did not make a single reference 
to the term globalisation, while the usage of the adjective global remained limited. In 
particular the term global was used twice, one of which was to refer to ‘global 
poverty’ (p. 21). The second use was more interesting. It was in the section on 
employment, and was as follows: ‘We will encourage the Irish operations of 
multinationals to engage in high value added activities that are likely to be retained 
during periods of global rationalisation. ..’ (emphasis added, p. 29). Indeed the term 
‘rationalisation’ is used here instead of terms such as crisis, downturn, recession etc. 
The appearance and use of the term globalised, is also interesting. The term was not 
used in order to describe the global economy, communication networks etc. It was
8 The reference for the 2002 manifesto throughout the thesis will be, Fianna Fail, 2002.
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borrowed by the A.T. Kearney/Foreign Policy Globalisation Index, to describe 
Ireland itself:
In 2002 Ireland ranked first in the world as the world’s top globalised 
economy (A.T. Kearney Consultants Survey)...As one of the most 
successfully globalised countries in the world, we will continue as labour 
market conditions require... (pp. 29-30, emphasis added).
Thus, in this context policies related to labour market flexibility and mobile capital 
investments were considered to be a proactive policy target and positive achievement:
Li order to progress as a society, we will be seeking a maximum proportion 
of skilled, well-paid and flexible forms of employment, both full and part- 
time, for the benefit of everyone seeking paid employment (p. 29).
We are committed to maintaining a favourable business environment, so that 
we can continue to attract mobile capital investments and technology (p. 26).
The above approach towards the concepts ‘globalised’, ‘flexibility’ and ‘mobile 
capital’ is instrumental in understanding where Fianna Fail’s discourse lay with 
regard to the globalisation discourse. Fianna Fail emphatically argued for, and tried 
to achieve what the anti-globalisation movement had as its focal points of criticism 
(principally flexibility and mobile capital investments). At the same time the 
(economic) policies suggested by Fianna Fail, far from being conceptualised as 
‘globalisation’ were considered as manifestations of a new approach to economic 
development: the ‘Irish economic model’.
Our policy is to further develop the Irish economic model, combining the 
most positive and distinctive features of our own experience, with the 
dynamism, investment and light regulation characteristic of the US economy 
and the social solidarity and inclusive participation characteristic of the 
European economy (p. 26).
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In the above context the concepts of ‘partnership’ and ‘social partners’ were the most 
popular (e.g. pp. 6,11-12, 31-32,45, 60, 72, 76, 90), while the issues of tax reduction, 
and the criticism of ‘ideological approaches’ to the economic policy remained central.
Two things need to be kept in mind before we turn to Fine Gael. First, the absolute 
absence of references to the term globalisation in both the 1997 and 2002 manifestos; 
and second, the fact that policies thoroughly associated with the phenomenon of 
economic globalisation, such as those related to flexibility, tax cuts and mobile capital, 
were conceptualised as non-ideological and were thus pursued not in the name of 
globalisation or external pressures, but in that of the guaranteed success of the Irish 
economic model.
Fine Gael (FG)
Fine Gael did not publish a single electoral manifesto for the 1997 elections. Instead, 
it published four documents under the title Securing your Future, each of which was 
focusing on a different issue (on economy/prosperity9, education and healthcare10, 
environment11 and crime12). When the term manifesto is used without further 
specification (e.g. economic, environmental) in the analysis below, then we refer to 
all the four documents. It is worth keeping in mind that in 1997 Fine Gael, and its 
leader John Bruton, were trying to stay in power by taking advantage of the fact that 
Ireland was in the midst of an unprecedented economic boom.
The economic manifesto, entitled Securing and Sharing our Prosperity, was the 
longest (18 pages long) and first to be published of the above four documents. It paid 
particular attention to the sharing of the prosperity that had been created. As was 
mentioned in its introduction, the broader FG electoral programme aimed to ‘secure 
our nation’s prosperity and share it fairly for the benefits of all our citizens’ (p. 2). In 
this regard Fine Gael was trying to counterbalance the Irish people’s worries and FF’s
9 The reference for this document throughout the thesis will be, Fine Gael, 1997a.
10 The reference for this document throughout the thesis will be, Fine Gael, 1997b.
11 The reference for this document throughout the thesis will be, Fine Gael, 1997c.
12 The reference for this document throughout the thesis will be, Fine Gael, 1997d.
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accusations about the growing gap between the ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’. And this was 
the stance taken in a document whose most popular concept was that of social 
partnership and social partners (see for instance the references in the pages 3, 8, 10, 
13,14,17, see also FG, 1997c: 2 ,1997d: 6, 7).
The economic manifesto was also the only document that made a reference to the 
1 ^term globalisation . In particular, in its first section, a ‘new World Trade 
Organisation agreement, further trade liberalisation and globalisation of the economy’ 
were included in the challenges that the new ‘millennium government’ would have to 
face (p. 3). Yet beyond this reference to the challenge of the globalisation of the 
economy, the Fine Gael’s manifesto (i.e. all the four documents) did not engage in a 
discussion on globalisation, while, as in the case of Fianna Fail (1997, 2002), a lot of 
policies associated with economic globalisation were supported, as an integral part of 
the Irish economic success, and Fine Gael promised to promote them further. Thus 
policies associated with economic globalisation were taken for granted between the 
two big parties in the electoral debate, and the issue was who would push these 
policies further.
In this context Fine Gael’s aim was ‘to see Ireland attain a permanent place in the top 
10 league of international competitiveness’ (FG, 1997a: 5), and the means to achieve 
this aim were flexibility, mobile investments and ‘corporatisation’. It is indicative 
that ‘tax reductions’ was, after social partnership, the most popular concept of the 
manifesto (see for instance page pp. 2-3, 9, 10, 15, 17). The following extracts are 
elucidating:
Building on Fine Gael-inspired initiatives to promote more flexible systems 
of wage and salary compensation (p. 4, see also p. 5).
[W]e continue to remain highly attractive to internationally mobile 
investments, which has been one of the foundation stones for the huge 
advances we’ve made in employment (p. 4).
13 The manifesto makes also one reference to the term ‘globally’. In particular it mentions that a 
workforce must be developed with ‘globally tradable skills’ (p. 4).
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This decisive measure [i.e. the reduction of enterprise taxes] underscores our 
attractiveness as a location for mobile international capital (p. 16; in the 
section: ‘reducing the burden of enterprise taxes’).
Fine Gael supports the continuation of the ‘corporatisation’ drive among all 
the Commercial State-Sponsored Bodies (CSSBs)...‘Corporatisation’ 
requires all the CSSBs to act ‘as if  they were corporates in the private sector, 
by requiring them.. .to generate dividends.. .and commercial returns.. .(p. 14).
Thus we see how key -  negatively charged -  concepts of the economic globalisation 
discourse were used in the 1997 electoral campaign. Fine Gael did not support 
flexibility as a necessary evil but on the contrary tried to persuade the electorate that 
flexibility policies were FG-inspired. The same applied to the case of mobile capital, 
which was not approached as the ‘curse’ of globalisation, but as the ‘magic touch’ of 
Irish economic success14. The choice of the term ‘corporatisation’ is also telling, if 
only on a semantic level, about the dynamics found in the Irish public discourse. 
Removed from the Irish context the term could only sound like an anti-globalisation 
slogan.
Some interesting insights with regard to the cultural/social aspects of the globalisation 
discourse are to be found in the manifesto Education and Healthcare -  The Future 
(FG, 1997b). In its introductory paragraph one reads: ‘For Fine Gael, family and 
community encapsulate a way of life which we value highly. Growing urbanisation 
and technological change place stress on the family’ (p. 2); and further below was 
declared (as an FG’s millennium pledge):
The Government must support the family. The family is the institution 
which best provides care, nurture and love for children, for elderly and for 
the incapacitated... Changes in society such as the growth of individualism 
and secularisation, urbanisation, technological change, changing work 
practices and changed gender roles are placing families under pressure...(p.
5).
14 A similar approach to mobile capital was also adopted by FF, 2002.
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The above reference could be conceived as a cultural critique of globalisation. In this 
regard it is indeed interesting that the FG 1997b identified as a problem, what the FG 
1997a promoted as a policy for wealth-generation, i.e. changing work practices.
Under the new leadership of Michael Noonan in the 2002 elections, Fine Gael chose 
to push this kind of identity-critique further. There are two key documents in this 
regard: the general 2002 electoral manifesto, under the indicative title Towards a 
Better Quality o f Life15 (38 pages long), and a separate economic manifesto, entitled 
‘Just Economics’16 (24 pages long).
The most striking observation derived from the study of the above documents is 
(again) the complete absence of any reference to globalisation. The sole relevant 
reference was found in the section on competitiveness of the economic manifesto, 
where it was mentioned that threats to Irish competitiveness would ‘become more 
pronounced in an increasingly globalised marketplace’ (FG, 2002b: 19).
Nevertheless, Fine Gael brought the issue of the quality of life, and the fading values 
of Irish society to the forefront of its manifesto. Indeed, the issue of ‘community 
spirit vs. selfishness’, the importance of family and traditional values, along with a 
critique of the nature of ‘Celtic Tiger’ created by FF and PD, were all central to the 
2002 manifesto. Noonan, developing his vision of Ireland in the introduction of the 
manifesto (FG, 2002a), noted:
[Fine Gael vision is an] Ireland built on a sense of community -  not one that 
has room only for individual selfishness (p. 2).
So the choice is stark: it is a choice between a philosophy that says money is 
all that counts, and one that puts money in the wider context of quality of life 
(p. 3)17.
15 The reference for this manifesto throughout the thesis will be, Fine Gael, 2002a.
16 The reference for this manifesto throughout the thesis will be, Fine Gael, 2002b.
17 A similar reference is made in the economic manifesto: ‘. . .our people are living to work rather than 
working to live’ (FG, 2002b: 9, emphasis in the original).
187
1
One of the greatest strengths in the Irish tradition has always been... family 
life. Under Fianna Fail and the PDs, the Celtic Tiger has put this tradition 
under serious stress (p. 10)
and in a similar manner on FF and PD economic policies:
It has been a policy of survival of the fittest. This policy.. .runs the boilers at 
full speed and never minds who gets caught in the backwash’ (p. 22).
Along with such references, which were scattered throughout the manifesto, there 
were also more issue-specific references such as to the negative effects of 
‘individualisation’ on single income families (p. 23), or the need for a ‘sustainable 
neighbourhood’ project (p. 29). Furthermore, Fine Gael’s 2002 manifesto stressed 
the widening ‘gap between the have and have nots’ (pp. 2, 22) (a critique which had 
also been used by FF in 1997).
Beyond the above criticism Fine Gael tried also to develop an outside-in critique. In 
this regard, in relation to the EU, it argued that ‘Irish policy positions have become 
narrow and selfish’ and that ‘[ujnder Fianna Fail and the PDs, Ireland became ‘the 
bad boy’ of Europe’ (p. 34). Finally, the manifesto declared that under an FG 
government ‘Ireland’s new reputation as a selfish, greedy country...[would] 
decisively [be] put to rest -  forever’ (p. 35).
The 2002 Economic Manifesto Just Economics does not add much to the above 
picture. Both Jim Mitchell (Deputy Leader and Front Bench Spokesperson on 
Finance) and Michael Noonan in their introductions stressed that Fine Gael was 
‘proud of the part it has played in bridging about this economic miracle’ (p. 2). 
Mitchell in particular declared that ‘the end for which we are working is A JUST 
SOCIETY.. .However, to achieve this Ireland must always be at the cutting edge of 
competitiveness and flexibility’ (p. 2; capital in the original); a position that 
exemplifies the extent to which concepts such as flexibility were embedded in the 
Irish public discourse and politico-economic system. The economic manifesto 
declared also that the ‘era of unprecedented growth known as the Celtic Tiger came to
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an end in 2001’ (p. 9), and analysed how the ‘Irish Economic Model’ could be 
developed as ‘a third way between Boston and Berlin’ (pp. 12-14).
The above examples make it clear that the electoral strategy of Fine Gael wavered 
between two opposites: on the one hand, a critique of the FF’s and PD’s version of 
Celtic Tiger and its negative socio-cultural effects; on the other hand, an attempt to 
cash in on the role it had played in bringing about the economic miracle of (the same) 
Celtic Tiger, and to make clear that it would continue the relevant economic policies. 
Hence whereas one can find in the Fine Gael’s critique of the ‘Celtic Tiger model’ 
elements of the cultural aspect of globalisation discourse, the economic aspect of the 
latter seems to remain beyond any contestation in the policies and ideology promoted 
by both FG and FF (i.e. the two biggest Irish parties) throughout the period 1997- 
2002.
The following sections turn to the ‘partners in power’ of the Fine Gael and the Fianna 
Fail, i.e. the Labour Party and the Progressive Democrats.
Labour Party (LP)
The Labour Party published electoral manifestos for both the 1997 and 2002 elections.
During 1997 its purpose was to stay in government, while in 2002 its aim was to
come back as a partner in power. The 1997 manifesto was entitled Making the Vital 
1 8Difference (79 pages long), and despite the fact that the term globalisation was used 
only once, one can find in it a discussion about globalisation and its nature. Let us 
however begin the analysis of the manifesto by pointing out how the Labour Party 
identified itself and the policies needed, in 1997:
Building hope and confidence for the future...requires a mix -  a mix of 
values, of vision, and of practical policies (p. l)...On the one hand, a rapidly 
changing economy demands economic flexibility. On the other, people have
18 The reference for this manifesto throughout the thesis will be, Labour Party, 1997.
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a right to a reasonable level of income security.. .Achieving both will be the 
key measure of.. .success (p. 49).
Labour is the party of work and the party of enterprise. Without enterprise in 
the public or private sector, there is no wealth and no basis for social 
progress. Labour is committed to a strong market economy based on 
competition (p. 11).
Our object is [t]he prioritisation of enterprise and innovation as a key
elements in the creation of wealth (p. 6).
It would be hard to guess that the above extracts were found in the electoral manifesto 
of a Labour Party (at least in the continental Europe). Indeed the ‘commitment’ to a 
‘strong market economy’, and the self-identification of the Labour Party as the ‘party 
of enterprise’ elucidates conceptually where the ‘parliamentary left’ of the Irish 
political scene was drawing the line of ideological and policy confrontation; the line 
of what could be considered to be ‘practical policy’, and what should be considered 
as ‘ideological policy’. This is an important point because it indicates the area of 
economics and politics that was not contested by the Irish political parties. It 
signifies, in other words, what was conceptualised and treated as non-ideological by 
the Irish party ideology production mechanisms. Along the same lines, the new 
anchor of Irish politico-economic life, i.e. the social partners/partnership, was also 
dominant in the Labour Party’s discourse, being the most frequently used 
term/concept within the manifesto [see for instance pp. 5-6, 8-10, Chapter 3: 16-25, 
35, 68].
In contrast however to the two big parties, the LP’s 1997 manifesto did engage with 
the globalisation debate which was evolving both at academic and political circles at 
a European level after the mid-1990s. The following extracts illustrate the Labour 
Party’s attempt to make sense of and define the ‘new’ international environment:
As we approach the 21st century, the world is in the early stages of a 
revolution as profound and all-pervasive as the industrial revolution of the 
last century.. .it is within our abilities to ensure that this time, the information 
revolution does not leave us behind. The new age promises the ability to
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liberate people...However there are also real dangers...with consequent 
marginalisation for some (p. 49).
[The suggested economic goals] must be achieved against a background of 
free trade, of rapid technological change and communication advances.. .The 
global dimension is intruding ever more strongly into national and local 
economies. The ‘Information Society’ is upon us. These are the realities.
They are challenges to be met with enthusiasm...(p. 4, see also p. 11, where 
EMU and globalisation are defined as the context of economic policies).
Therefore a ‘new reality’ approach to globalisation was clear in the Labour Party’s 
rhetoric. Furthermore, this new reality, i.e. the coming information revolution, and the 
‘global dimension’ were defined as challenges that were to be met with enthusiasm. 
Within this context the effort of the Labour Party to put forward a left rhetoric in the 
Irish public discourse was characterised by serious inherent contradictions. The 
following extracts are indicative:
Labour is opposed to individualism as a social philosophy. Thatcherites and 
their Irish clones follow an alien creed19 (p. 4). [Yet, in] the Information Age 
citizens will find it necessary to think even more for themselves (p. 50).
In accepting the market system with private enterprise and private property 
we recognise that we also have to seek to humanise it where necessary, but 
without undermining its capacity to perform (p. 4).
Thus the opposition to individualism gelled with the diagnosis of the Labour Party on 
the nature of the ‘information age’. Furthermore, in the need to ‘humanise’ aspects of 
the market system, one condition was set: such attempts should not undermine its 
functionality. This statement is one more important indication of the ‘ideological 
consensus’ found among the Irish parties, on what was acceptable/unacceptable in the 
realm of public policy. Finally the 1997 manifesto included some discussion on the 
cultural aspects of globalisation and the Irish Gaelic identity and language; yet its
19 Along these lines the Labour Party promoted the idea o f a ‘Social Guarantee’ for disadvantaged and 
disabled people. SeeLP, 1997: 16-20.
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approach to the future of Gaelic tradition ‘in a multifaceted culture’ was more 
positive and confident than negative or defensive (pp. 46-47).
The 2002 manifesto entitled Our Values, Our Pledges (36 pages long) , signified a 
shift in the Labour Party’s discourse, towards the endorsement of a classical left 
critique of globalisation. Thus the manifesto articulated a discourse on globalisation 
through repetitive references to ‘global capitalism’ (p. 1), ‘global capital’ (p. 2, 32), 
‘global economic justice’ (p. 10), ‘global economic development’ (p. 16), ‘globalising 
economy (p. 32), ‘global militarisation’ (p. 33), ‘global community’ (p. 34), and the 
need for ‘the introduction of the Tobin tax’ (p. 35). Thus although the manifesto 
made only one reference to the term globalisation, the term ‘global’ was its most 
popular term, while the mobilisation of the concept of social partnership was very low 
in comparison to the 1997 manifesto. Moreover, in the self-identification of the party, 
the emphasis shifted from ‘enterprise’ to the identity of the party as a ‘part of the 
European Social Democratic and Socialist Parties’ (p. 32, see also p. 2). In this 
manner the Labour Party was adopting a ‘social democratic vision of society’ (p. 13, 
see also p. 32).
In general, in 2002 the Labour Party attempted to bring the question of ‘values’ to the 
heart of its electoral campaign. The introduction of the manifesto declared:
This election is about values...This Government has been guided by a 
combination of crude Thatcherite ideology...and the populist complacency 
of the larger Government Party...Labour believe that the State has a vital 
role to play in Irish Society...As globalisation has driven a new way of 
economic change and opportunity, it has brought with it uncertainty, and in 
some cases gross injustice...Unchecked by democratic control, global 
capitalism has the potential to do severe damage to the social and economic 
rights of the individual (p. 1).
In this context it was claimed that a ‘deadening cynicism has taken hold in Irish 
politics’ (p. 2), that was the result of the ‘simplistic economic individualism’ (p. 2) 
and the ‘simplistic right-wing’ agenda (indicatively pp. 2, 7) followed by the
20 The reference for this manifesto throughout the thesis will be, Labour Party, 2002.
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governmental coalition. What about the principle of flexibility, the cornerstone of 
Irish economic success? The Labour Party did not go so far as to dispute its necessity. 
Thus, ‘[redundancy payments legislation’ had to be upgraded so as employers may 
‘deliver the flexibility required to remain competitive in the new economy’ (p. 9, 
emphasis added). Considering the Labour Party’s approach to flexibility, as 
something required by the new economy, it can be argued that the Labour Party did 
not really dispute the heart of governmental economic policies, but rather the 
‘compensation mechanisms’ that accompanied these policies. Again, this is very 
telling about the ideological consensus found in the Irish public discourse about what 
was not considered to be ideological or disputable in the realm of Irish economic 
policy; and this ideological consensus was not affected by the assertions of the 
Labour Party that it ‘believefd] in the European Social Model’ (p. 32). The framing 
of the following passage is suggestive in this regard.
With increasing economic uncertainty, and new forms of work as well as an 
anti-union ethos prevailing in a number of enterprises both domestic and 
multinational, there is as great a need as ever for the protection and 
enhancement of the statutory rights of workers (pp. 8-9).
Again, although a critical stance was adopted towards for instance the ‘anti-union 
ethos’, the suggestion was closer to a compensation-logic, than addressing the roots 
of the problem (no matter what these might be considered to be).
The next section moves on to the other end of the Irish political spectrum, to study the 
discourse of the Progressive Democrats.
Progressive Democrats (PD)
It would not be an exaggeration to say that the Progressive Democrats, although the 
youngest party, had the greatest impact on the Irish politics in the 1990s. As 
described in Chapter 2 it was through the Progressive Democrats that the traditional 
format of Irish politics, the ‘FF vs. the rest’ system, was brought to an end. It is also 
worth-mentioning that the Progressive Democrats was the only right-wing party with
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a clear ideological stance in Irish politics and economics, i.e. an open neo-liberal 
agenda.
The Progressive Democrats’ electoral strategy for the 1997 elections was not in 
substance very different from that adopted by Fianna Fail in the same campaign. The 
core of this strategy was clearly delineated by Mary Harney, the leader of the party, in 
the introduction of the party’s manifesto Real Answers, Not Idle Promises (49 pages 
long)21:
We are in the midst of an unprecedented economic boom. But it has not 
impacted on the lives of thousands of our people. The more we grow, it 
seems, the greater of isolation of those on the fringes (p. 1).
Therefore the issue of a ‘two-tier’, ‘divided’, society (p. 1) was pushed to the 
forefront of the electoral strategy. The reasons however for this ‘unequal’ 
development were not clearly elaborated in the manifesto. Instead the emphasis was 
put on how a ‘strong economic growth’ (p. 4) and a good ‘business environment’ 
could be maintained and promoted further. The core strategies suggested to this end 
were: ‘Rewarding Work’ (section 1), ‘Promoting Enterprise’ (section 2), ‘Controlling 
Public Spending’ (section 3), and enhancing the competitiveness of the Public Sector, 
through privatisations and other competition policies (sections 5, 6). Although, 
broadly speaking, these policies defined an economic globalisation agenda, any 
references to globalisation, or indeed to an ‘information society’, a ‘new age’ etc. 
were absent from the manifesto. The only relevant reference was found in the section 
on public spending, that referred to the ‘reality of rationalisation and restructuring’ (p. 
4).
In general, ‘tax reform’ and ‘tax reductions’ were the flagship prescriptions of the 
Progressive Democrats (indicatively pp. 2, 4, 29, 41, 44), along with ‘non ideological 
privatisations’ (p. 7) and ‘less regulation’:
21 The reference for this manifesto throughout the thesis will be, Progressive Democrats, 1997.
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It is clear that employers are responding to more and more labour-market 
regulations by turning full-time posts into casual ones. If we want less 
casualisation, then we must have less regulation.. We want to see an opt-out 
clause so that workers themselves are free to decide how many hours a week  
they want to work (p. 3).
The Progressive Democrats were also attacking the unemployment benefits system 
which they defined as the ‘dole system’ (see section 8, p. 13); ‘The genuine
unemployed want more jobs, not more dole’ (p. 16). Along these lines the
Progressive Democrats were radical enough to dispute the primacy of the
consociational base of the Irish politico-economic system:
Consensus is no bad thing in some regard -  but i f  it props up the status quo, 
it cannot be productive (p. 1).
Nevertheless the concept of social partnership was often mobilised and retained a 
significant position in the manifesto.
The 2002 manifesto pushed the ideological platform of the Progressive Democrats 
further, adopting the indicative title, Manifesto 2002: Value for Your Vote (92 pages 
long). In a consistent ideological manner the core concept of the manifesto was that 
of ‘enterprise’, with abundant references made to an ‘enterprise economy’ (for 
instance pp. 14, 44, 46), an ‘enterprise approach’ (for instance with regard to 
education and curriculum development pp. 70-71, see also p. 44), and an ‘enterprise 
society’ (for instance p. 70). In particular a whole chapter of the manifesto was 
devoted to, ‘A Pro-Enterprise and Pro-Consumer Society’ (pp. 44-47). Its 
introduction claimed:
Enterprise is at the heart o f  a vibrant, developing society. An enterprising 
approach is about taking initiative to make change for the better happen. 
Enterprise creates wealth, delivers jobs and improves people’s lives...no  
more so than at local community level where initiative and enterprise bind 
strong communities together (p. 44).
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The Progressive Democrats kept high in their 2002 agenda the need for an ‘inclusive 
society’ (pp. 14-19) and in the chapter on agriculture acknowledged that ‘some have 
gained more than others’ and thus that the existing ‘pattern of growth has been 
uneven’ (p. 55).
It is again striking that the term globalisation is only used twice, in the sections on 
‘Europe’ (p. 84) and ‘International Affairs’ (p. 86), in a rather neutral manner. For 
instance in the chapter on ‘Irish International Affairs’ it was noted that the ‘world is 
becoming increasingly globalised, politically as much as economically’ (p. 86), and 
that Ireland needed to work ‘to build an institutional and policy framework that 
promotes human rights and economic opportunity in globalisation’ (p. 87).
To sum up, it is important to stress that the Progressive Democrats’ calls for a pro­
enterprise society and for liberalisation, deregulation and tax cuts were not justified in 
the name of external pressures, but rather were promoted as a mode of both being and 
remaining prosperous. In this regard globalisation was not constructed or approached 
as something external. But nor was a new reality approach elaborated; even though 
many references were made to the need for modernisation in various sectors, such as 
in education and the economy (see PD, 2002: 6, 22, 48, 61, 79). Rather, enterprise 
and deregulation policies were put forward as preconditions for the development of a 
wealthy and inclusive society. In this regard the most suggestive reference was that 
relating enterprise to the reproduction of the local communities, by arguing that 
‘enterprises bind strong communities together’ (p. 44). To conclude, it would not be 
an exaggeration to say that enterprise was suggested by Progressive Democrats as the 
new ‘core’ through which (traditional) social life should be organised and reproduced. 
This point gains additional importance if one considers that the other end of the Irish 
political spectrum, i.e. the Labour Party, also put enterprise at the top of its agenda (at 
least in 1997).
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Synopsis
The study of Irish party discourses has revealed an interesting paradox. The concept 
of globalisation is virtually absent from all the parties’ manifestos (with the exception 
of LP, 2002), in the most globalised country of the world, in two electoral campaigns 
that took place at the high period of globalisation discourse, and specifically in 1997 
and 2002. Thus considering that political parties define one of the most fundamental 
ideology production nexuses of Irish polity, it can be assumed that the concept/term 
of globalisation had not become a central point of reference in the production and 
reproduction of Irish public discourse and life.
But let us return to the basic research question: What do the discourses of the Irish 
parties tell us about the emergence and communication of the hegemonic discourse of 
globalisation in Ireland? An easy answer is that the globalisation discourse, contrary 
to what happened in Greece, had not become a new zone of contestation through 
which Irish politics were reordered and redefined. Yet the above findings suggest 
more than this. It is not only that globalisation did not become a focal point of 
reference, it is that the concept of globalisation was completely absent in the majority 
of the texts through which parties (re)defined their identity, explicated their 
programmatic statements, communicated with their public and asked for its vote.
Thus, based on the above analysis, it can be argued that our research revealed also a 
non-ideological, i.e. not contestable, space in Irish politics and economics. This 
space consisted of policies and concepts which have been widely associated with 
extreme aspects of economic globalisation. Thus economic policies, which had been 
widely contested in many European states, which constituted the main target of the 
anti-globalisation movement, and which were promoted by most European 
governments as a necessary evil due to globalisation and external pressures, in Ireland 
constituted the given, the uncontested, what was to be taken for granted, what needed
99to be protected and promoted . They thus constituted a policy and cognitive space
22 In their investigation of the discourse of globalisation in Ireland Hay and Smith (2005) seem to 
arrive at a similar conclusion: ‘...globalisation [rather than to be presented] as a set of external 
challenges (still) to be accommodated, it is introduced more as a means of reflecting positively on the 
distance already travelled by the Irish economy in its rise to ‘tigerdom’.’ (ibid.: 136).
197
against which Irish parties competed only in the name of safeguarding or expanding it.
This is a challenging phenomenon to conceptualise. It can be said that Irish political 
and economic life reproduced itself through this non-ideological space, which, 
however, was nothing else than the core of the hegemonic discourse of globalisation. 
The thesis comes back to this argument in Chapter 5. What needs to be stressed here 
is that as long as the consensus on the non-ideological space was maintained by the 
parties, the hegemonic discourse seemed to be equated -  if this is meaningful -  with 
the Irish model of development (see also Hay and Smith, 2005: 136). Thus it was 
becoming an integral part of Irish identity production, and was read as the reason for 
Irish success.
It is now necessary to examine whether the above conclusion about the non- 
ideological space applies beyond the party discourses. In this way we will get a more 
accurate picture of the dynamics under way in the production and reproduction of 
Irish public discourse. This is the purpose of the following sections.
Irish Business and Employers Confederation (IBEC)
The Irish Business and Employers Confederation is the national and international 
‘voice of Irish business and employers’ and has approximately ‘7000 member 
businesses and organisations from all sectors and of all sizes’ of the Irish economy23. 
Being an integral part of the institution of social partnership, IBEC has had a decisive 
and independent role in the formation and change of Irish political economy. It is 
worth mentioning here that the increase of its influence that followed the revival of 
the social partnership in the late 1980s, was accompanied by a decline in its 
membership, mainly due to the ‘arrival of increasing numbers of multinationals and
23 As a national association IBEC came into being in 1993, as a result o f the merger between the 
Confederation of Irish Industry (founded in 1934) and the Federation of Irish Employers (founded in 
1942). See IBEC’s official website, at: http://www.ibec.ie (02/07/2003).
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other companies refusing to bargain with trade unions... [and]...join...employers’ 
association’24.
A crucial factor in IBEC’s discourse has been UNICE and the general developments 
that had been taking place at the European level. Yet as we have referred to these 
developments in the case of Greece, here we proceed directly to the examination of 
IBEC’s discourse for the period 1996-2001. In order to do so we consulted the 
following sources: (a) The ‘Annual Reviews’ of the Confederation for the period 
1996-2002. The Reviews cover all the activities of the Confederation, including its 
publications, (b) The newspapers The Irish Times and Irish Independent for the 
period 1996-2001. This research was conducted through the electronic data-base 
‘Lexis-Nexis Executive’ and its aim was to counterbalance the lack of an on-line 
archive with the speeches and interviews of IBEC’s executives (i.e. the Chairpersons 
and the Directors General).
Annual Reviews
The main conclusion from the study of IBEC’s Annual Reviews for the period 1996- 
2001, is the same as that reached from the study of SEV’s Reviews: IBEC did not 
develop a discourse on globalisation, as such. It is indeed suggestive that the term 
globalisation was only mentioned once, in the annual review of 2001-2002, to 
describe the ‘growing globalisation of business’ (IBEC, 2002: 15). As in the Greek 
case the lack of references to globalisation should not be interpreted as an absence of 
globalisation discourse, as particular ‘objects’ and ‘themes’ of the economic 
globalisation discourse were reiterated and brought to the heart of IBEC’s discourse 
and communication efforts. The list of these objects and themes is predictable: tax 
cuts, with particular emphasis on the reduction of corporate taxes, competitiveness, 
flexibility, liberalisations and privatisations, social partnership and enterprise culture. 
Below I briefly explore the way in which these objects were ‘mobilised’.
24 See the official webpage of the ‘European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working 
Conditions’, a ‘tripartite European Union body, at: http://www.eurofound.eu.int/emire/IRELAND/ 
EMPLOYERSASSOCIATION-IR.html (02/07/2003).
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One could start by distinguishing between the tone and the stance of the Annual 
Reviews before and after the year 2000. The former were characterised by a strong 
optimism based on the assumption that the economy and the social partnership were 
moving on the right track for Ireland’s international competitiveness. In the 1997 
Review (covering the year 1996), the section on the economy was entitled 1996: 
Strong Growth and a New Agreement (IBEC, 1997: 4). The respective title in the 
1998 Review was 1997: A Year o f High Growth and Low Inflation (IBEC, 1998: 2); 
whereas the notion that the ‘economic performance of Ireland...has been...the envy 
of...[its]...fellow European members’ (IBEC, 2000: 3) was widespread in all the 
Reviews for the period 1996-1999 (for instance see IBEC, 1997: 6). This strongly 
positive and optimistic rhetoric was qualified to an extent in the analysis of the 
economic year 2000, which still remained a year in which Growth Exceeds Forecasts 
(IBEC, 2001: 4). The optimistic stance changed with regard to 2001. The 2002 
Review mentioned that, as ‘we predicted in last year’s Annual Review the Irish 
economy slowed down dramatically in 2001’ (IBEC, 2002: 4; emphasis added). 
Regarding this latter phase of IBEC’s discourse it can be said that even though the 
slowdown of the Irish economy was undisputable, the growth rates of the Irish 
economy remained among the highest within the OECD, and hardly justified the use 
of dramatic tones by IBEC. Thus the repetitive use of the term dramatic in IBEC’s 
2002 Review must have been serving a different purpose. Let us develop this point 
further.
In the 1997 Review IBEC defined as ‘reasons for Ireland’s very positive economic 
performance’, the successful ‘overall macroeconomic management’, the ‘continued 
consensus approach’ and the success ‘in attracting high quality’ FDIs (IBEC, 1997: 4). 
At the same time Anthony Barry, the president of IBEC, was congratulating the 
government for following an employment policy
which largely reflected the policy objectives fo r  which...IBEC...had
campaigned over the years  (ibid. 3, emphasis added; see also p. 7),
and which was characterised by flexibility (ibid.). Building on this approach, in the 
1998 Review Barry was arguing: ‘we now have to look forward to even more radical 
changes...to meet the greater changes of an expended marketplace’; and in his call
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for the reduction of ‘corporation tax and...capital gains tax’ he referred to the 
‘principle that wealth must be generated before it can be redistributed, and business is 
the wealth creator in the economy’ (IBEC, 1998: 1, emphasis in the original). The 
1997 and 1998 Reviews were also stressing the difference between the ‘industrial 
unrest in the public sector’ versus the ‘stable’ and ‘relatively peaceful’ industrial 
relations of the private sector (see for instance IBEC, 1997: 6, 1998: 4, 1999: 4-5). 
At the same period a burning issue in the agenda of Irish industrial relations was the 
issue of the recognition of trade unions. In this regard, in the ‘High Level Group on 
Trade Union Recognition’, established under the terms of the social pact Partnership 
2000, IBEC
argued strongly for important principles which the Confederation had 
articulated over the past number o f  years: that the voluntary system o f  
industrial relations must be underpinned and reinforced; and that no action 
be taken to impose mandatory trade union recognition on employers (IBEC,
1999: 4).
In defending its flexibility agenda IBEC did not hesitate to qualify its general pro- 
European stance. For instance it ‘repeatedly expressed grave concerns’ with regard to 
the 1999 EU ‘Working Time Directive’ (IBEC, 2000: 9,11). Furthermore, with 
regard to the Irish proposal for tax cuts it noted: ‘The EU Commission, however, had 
a different view and its very public disagreement with the government on the issue 
did nothing to improve the image of the EU among Irish citizens’ (IBEC, 2001: 5). In 
the same context IBEC stressed, as a way of self-advertisement, that it intensively and 
successfully lobbied the government, to force it to ‘to accept...[IBEC] policy 
recommendations with regard to Public/Private Partnerships’ (see IBEC, 1999: 9; 
2000: 3,10).
What can be inferred from the above extracts is that IBEC contended that the 
economic miracle was based on the fact that the government and the other social 
partners (mainly ICTU), had conceded, subscribed to and followed the ‘policy 
objectives...which...IBEC had campaigned over the years’ (IBEC, 1997: 3). 
Considering the economic policies that dominated in the Republic after the end of the 
1980s, IBEC’s claim seems to be a valid one, i.e. it is rather clear that it was IBEC
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that set the parameters within which the social partnership strategy was moving and 
changing. It must, however, be pointed out that even though these parameters 
triggered industrial action, mainly in the public sector (see for instance IBEC, 1998: 
4; 1999: 4-5), they generated such an unprecedented wealth that any trade union 
opposition to them became unsubstantiated if not irrelevant. This format of politico- 
economic development seems to be challenged in 2000. William Burgess, the 
president of IBEC, opened the Review for this year as following:
It is something o f  a paradox that, in a time o f  unprecedented prosperity and 
economic activity, the factors which contributed to our success are in danger 
o f  collapse. Government over-spending; industrial unrest...;...inflation  
...infrastructure...[In this regard] IBEC lobbied intensively during the year 
to ensure that a business-friendly climate was nurtured (IBEC, 2001: 1 ,10).
Above all it seemed that the parameters set by IBEC were no longer to be taken for 
granted even if they bore the partnership’s imprint. To face this situation IBEC tried 
to maximise the pressure on its partners through warnings such as the following:
the failure o f  trade unions to deliver their commitments under PPF [the 2000 
social pact Programme fo r  Prosperity and Fairness] was a major source o f  
unease, calling into question the very validity o f  such agreements in the 
future (IBEC, 2001: 15).
In addition in its message in the 2002 Review W. Burgess noted:
The Confederation has been seriously concerned for some time that business 
is the only social partner which remembers that the prosperity o f  the nation 
depends on our ability to sell our goods and services at the right price in the 
global market (IBEC, 2002: 1).
And the Review went on to underline:
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Throughout the year, major difficulties were experienced with PPF because 
o f  the failure by trade unions to comply with basic commitments under the 
agreement... [CJompanies experienced real problems in ensuring co­
operation with on-going change, with trade unions exploiting change 
initiatives by demanding payment in return (IBEC 2002: 2).
It was within the above context that the 2002 Review (on the year 2001) talked about 
a ‘dramatic slowdown’, ‘weakening confidence’ and ‘eroded’ competitiveness with 
regard to the Irish economy (ibid.: 4, 5).
To conclude, the lack of any discussion on globalisation in the Annual Reviews was 
compensated for by an omnipresent economic globalisation agenda, in the name of 
which IBEC did not hesitate to confront and criticise the European Commission, or 
even to dispute the validity of the social pacts, so central to the Irish economic 
miracle. Thus, it could be argued that the non-ideological space that was traced in the 
manifestos of the political parties, found its definition and generating-dynamics in the 
discourse of IBEC. To double check this conclusion, the thesis examined also the 
discourses of the various Presidents and Directors-General of IBEC, as captured by 
the two biggest in circulation Irish broadsheets; Irish Independent and The Irish 
Times.
IBEC Representatives
The examination of the discourses of IBEC representatives was based on the 
following methodology. The data-base ‘Lexis-Nexis Executive’ was used as an on­
line archive for the newspapers The Irish Times (TIT) and Irish Independent (II) 
published during 1996-2000. Having specified the two newspapers as our source, 
specific key-words were given to find articles referring to the IBEC executives under 
examination. These executives and the key-terms used, as well as the respective 
findings are presented in Table 1:
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TABLE 1: IBEC Chief Executives and the Use of the Concept of Globalisation
Position ‘Search Terms’ 
used
Articles 
found in TIT 
Sc Irish 
Independent 
during 
1996-2000
Articles attributing 
the use of the term 
‘globalisation’ to 
the IBEC Executive 
under consideration
Tony Barry 
(1996-1998) President Barry and EBEC 39 0
Richard
Burrows
(1998-2000)
President Burrows and IBEC 16 0
John Dunne 
(1992-2000)
Director
General Dunne and IBEC 171 0
It is important to keep in mind that the above numbers do not indicate how many 
times the term globalisation was used by IBEC’s top executives, but how many times 
a substantial part of the printed press brought together the name of an executive and 
the term globalisation. The result is indeed suggestive: none. This supports, if not 
confirms, the above analysis of IBEC’s discourse on globalisation. The 
representatives of Irish businesses did not engage in or develop a discourse on 
globalisation as such. At the same time, the issues of competitiveness, tax reductions 
and flexibility retained their predominance in the above articles, as they did in the 
Annual Reviews. For instance, referring to a speech by John Dunne , The Irish 
Times noted:
While accepting a need remained for achieving greater social cohesion, 
[John Dunne] told...this could not deflect the social partners from ‘the 
primacy of competitiveness’26.
25 The Director General of IBEC during 1992-2000.
26 Extract from a speech to the conference ‘Framework for a New Partnership’ in Dublin. The 
conference aimed to the negotiation of the basis for a new social pact among die social partners. 
‘Director of IBEC says 10% pay rises ‘out o f the question” , The Irish Times, October 24,1996, p. 10.
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It is also interesting to note how the institution of social partnership was used 
differently in different periods, with regard to the issue of flexibility in pay rises. 
Thus in 1996 during the negotiation of a new wage agreement John Dunne was 
opposing any local bargaining clause: ‘I’d have to be very blunt...The greatest 
attraction to employers of national agreement on the pay side is certainty. The more 
you introduce so called flexibility, the more you reduce certainty’27. Yet in 2000, 
when pay rises were at stake, Turlough O’ Sullivan, the successor of John Dunne, 
was arguing: ‘Any extra money made available must be on the basis that employers 
have the right to bargain at local level, as the provisions of the PPF [the social pact 
‘Programme for Prosperity and Fairness’] allow, to seek greater flexibilities, 
productivity and so on’28. This is a small example, but indicates the development of a 
clearly instrumental approach towards the social partnership by IBEC.
The lack of an IBEC discourse on globalisation as such, was also confirmed by a key- 
word-in-context research in The Irish Times and Irish Independent through Lexis- 
Nexis. The object of this research was to find articles that included both the terms 
‘globalisation’ and ‘IBEC’. Indeed, none of the 21 articles found for the period 1994- 
2001 offered any indication of an engagement of IBEC in the debate about 
globalisation29.
Finally, the above newspaper research demonstrated that IBEC’s economic 
globalisation discourse and agenda were not the most radical of their kind in the Irish 
politico-economic scene. In fact the biggest in circulation (but not in ‘status’) Irish 
newspaper, i.e. Irish Independent, was throughout the second half of the 1990s 
criticising IBEC (and the social partnership as a whole) as a ‘dinosaur’, ‘the voice of
O A
the big banks and the semi-states’, ‘the old economy’ , as opposed to ‘the tigers’, i.e. 
the multinational companies, and the ‘new economy’. Thus one of the two most 
important newspapers in the Irish public discourse, and that owned by the so called
27 Padraig Yeates, ‘Fear of Failure to aid case for a new PCW’, The Irish Times, September 26, 1996, p.
14. (P. Yeates was the industry and employment correspondent).
28 Padraig Yeates, ‘Fear of Failure to aid case for a new PCW’, The Irish Times, September 26, 1996, p. 14
29 The organisation of a conference on the impact of globalisation on the food and drink industry seems 
rather to be an exception. See ‘Dilger in call for big companies’, Irish Independent, November 21, 
1998.
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‘baron’ of the Irish media, Tony O’Reilly31, was strongly pushing and arguing 
throughout the 1990s for the extension of the non-ideological space of Irish politico- 
economic scene, accusing the official body of business representatives of being a 
‘dinosaur’, suffering from a ‘semi-state mindset’ , and not serving the needs and 
interests of the Irish economy. The criticism went so far as ironically to suggest that 
IBEC ‘should apply for membership of ICTU’33. In this regard it should be stressed 
that a major part of the mainstream press criticised IBEC’s economic discourse and 
agenda, not for demanding too much, too fast of economic globalisation but for not 
demanding enough.
Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU)
The Irish Congress of Trade Unions was formed in 1959 and ‘is the single umbrella 
organisation for trade unions in Ireland’ 34. As we saw in Chapter 2 the role of ICTU 
in Irish economy and society, changed fundamentally in the end of the 1980s. A key 
factor for this change was the agreement Programme for National Recovery, reached 
by the social partners in 1987. This agreement met its aims and led to a new one for 
the period 1990-1993, titled Programme for Economic and Social Progress. As Peter 
Cassells, the General Secretary of ICTU for the period 1987-1999, commented, this 
second agreement ‘worked better than expected thus creating a new and 
unprecedented dynamic in Irish politico-economic life; a dynamic which found at its 
core the institution of social partnership’35.
30 The quotation are from: ‘Tigers eat up the Dinosaurs’, The Sunday Independent, December 12, 1999. 
Among others see also: ‘Troops in: Bust AIB’s top Brass’, ‘Tigers Vs Dinosaurs’ and ‘Did the Unions 
dictate the budget?’ in The Sunday Independent, April 2, April 16 and December 10, 2000, respectively.
31 Tony O’ Reilly is the Chairman and major shareholder of the firm ‘Independent Newspapers’, which 
‘is the dominant actor in the Irish newspaper industry’. The degree of the concentration of the latter is 
exemplified ‘in that around 80 per cent of Irish newspapers sold in Ireland in 2001 were sold by 
companies which are fully or partially owned by Independent Newspapers’. See the Irish country 
report of the ‘European Journalism Centre’ available at: http://www.ejc.nl/jr/emland/ireland.html 
(07/07/2003).
32 ‘Troops in: Bust AIB’s top Brass’, op. cit.
33 ‘Top of the agenda the PPF is as dead as a dodo’, The Sunday Independent, December 3, 2000.
34 95% of Irish trade union members are in unions affiliated to the Congress. The Congress, is a 32- 
county body (including both the Republic and Northern Ireland). See the official website of ICTU at: 
http://www.ictu.ie. See also the information in the European Foundation’s web-page at: 
http://www.eurofound.eu.int/emire/IRELAND/IRISHCONGRESSOFTRADEUNIONS-IR.html.
35 Personal interview with Peter Cassells, 27-06-2002.
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We have analysed above how IBEC seemed to set the parameters of the 
aforementioned dynamic, and how it did not speak about globalisation. We have also 
tried to outline the emergence of a non-ideological space in Irish politico-economic 
life; a space which would be defined by most globalisation critics and anti­
globalisation protesters as globalisation par excellence. Within this context it is 
important to study the discourse of ICTU, and try to understand and illustrate how the 
workers were making sense of the world and were re-reading their identity, role, aims 
and strategy. The importance of the EU level in these developments should always 
be kept in the background of our analysis (see the relevant section in the Greek case).
In order to study the discourse of ICTU on globalisation we examined two official 
documents for the period 1995-2001: (a) The biennial ‘Report of the Executive 
Council’ (REC). The Reports of the Executive Council are approximately a hundred 
pages long each and cover in a comprehensive manner all the annual activities of 
ICTU. They are thus the main source for examining the ICTU discourse, (b) The 
‘Reports of Proceedings’ (RP) of the Biennial Delegate Conferences of ICTU; which 
are approximately a hundred and fifty pages each. The ‘Delegate Conferences’ were 
established in 1993 and bring together a big number of delegates from most, if not all, 
the Irish trade unions, along with other invited speakers. In these conferences 
approximately a hundred motions carried from the various delegates, are discussed 
and brought to a vote thus setting the ‘strategic orientation’ for the ICTU Executive 
Council. Finally this material was complemented with a personal interview with 
Peter Cassells, the General Secretary of ICTU for the period 1987-1999.
Unlike the IBEC, ICTU did develop a discourse on globalisation as such, and traces 
of this discourse were to be found as early as in 1995. For instance Peter Cassells 
used the term globalisation in his introduction for both the 1997 and 1999 Reports of 
the Executive Council. In particular, in the 1997 Report36 (for the years 1995-1997) 
he noted: ‘We also worked closely with the International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions in highlighting the implications of globalisation for workers in the developing 
world’ (p. 5), an issue which was then explored further in the section on the
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international activities of ICTU (see p. 61; overall the term globalisation appeared 
twice in the Report). In the 1999 Report37 the term and concept of globalisation was 
mobilised more frequently. Thus a reference to globalisation was made in nine 
different pages of the Report (including a reference in the contents). In his 
introduction, referring to the developments in the Irish politico-economic scene, 
Cassells observed that ‘all these changes are occurring in a world seeking to cope 
with the impact of globalisation’ (p. 4). Furthermore, the section on the Irish 
economic situation concluded that the ‘sustained pattern of growth reflects the 
resilience of the Irish economy to increasing globalisation’ (p. 12); and the section on 
the social partnership argued that there ‘is still the challenge of securing the European 
social model in the face of globalisation which seeks to build a competitive edge on 
low wages and low standards’ (p. 16). Lastly, in the section on international activities 
a sub-section was devoted to globalisation under the title, Responding to 
Globalisation. Here, one reads:
Globalisation can be described as the increased integration o f  national 
economies into the world economy which significantly reduces the scope for 
independent national economic policy-making and increases the inter­
dependence between nations and regions o f  the global economy. Ireland as a 
small open economy is one o f  the most global econom ies... Around 45% o f  
the workshop in manufacturing industry are employed in foreign owned 
companies. In the face o f  the challenges presented by globalisation 
Congress has consistently advocated the need to adopt a ‘high road’ strategy 
to economic development (p. 92).
According to Cassells such a ‘high road’ strategy should be based on investments in 
technology and on social partnership, in contrast to a Tow road’ strategy that would 
be based on ‘deregulation, unfettered competition, low wages’(ibid.).
Thus after 1998 the issue of globalisation seemed to acquire a more central position to 
the discourse and agenda of ICTU. This is also exemplified by the fact that in the
36 The reference for this Report throughout the thesis is: ICTU (1997), Unions in Action: Making 
Partnership Work. Dublin: ICTU.
37 The reference for this Report throughout the thesis is: ICTU (1999), Report o f  the Executive Council 
1997-1999. Dublin: ICTU.
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Biennial Delegate Conference, in 1999, the third motion carried (out of 77) was 
exclusively devoted on globalisation. The motion was put forward by Inez 
McCormack who was representing UNISON; it was entitled Globalisation: Social 
Ground Rules, and its first paragraph reads as follows:
Conference recognises that in order to tackle the effects o f  globalisation it is 
essential to lay social ground rules to enable all to claim their fair share o f  
wealth.. .and to ensure that social progress goes hand in hand with economic 
progress. Conference therefore commits itself to vigorously campaign for 
such a global ethic.. .(ICTU, 1999a: 11).
The ICTU attempts to conceptualise, contextualise and operationalise the concept of 
globalisation continued in the Activity Report for 1999-2001 (where references to 
globalisation were made in six pages). It is important to note that in this Report an 
analysis of globalisation appeared at the section on the Irish economy entitled, 
Modernising the Economy (IBEC, 2001a: 53-64). This included a special section on 
globalisation entitled Globalisation: the Need for International Standards (ibid.: pp. 
61-62). The approach to globalisation adopted was as follows:
Globalisation refers to major shifts towards the elimination o f  controls on 
markets both through the reduction o f  barriers to international trade and 
investment and the deregulation and privatisation o f national industries that 
has occurred during the past twenty years...Congress and the international 
labour movement are not against globalisation: indeed we would agree that 
globalisation can be a big part o f  the answer to the problems o f  the world’s 
poor. But it is also a big part o f  the problem.. .Unfortunately this move 
towards free trade has not been balanced by the development o f  a social 
dimension...(ibid.: 61).
381 do not mean to personify ICTU. But the views expressed in the pages o f these Reports can be 
taken as a ‘common denominator’ o f the unions represented in ICTU, or even as views which were 
consciously pushed forward in order to become a common denominator for the various trade unions. 
The 2001 Report was published in two parts. The reference for the first part is: ICTU (2001a), 
Working for a Fair Society -  a Sound Economy (Part I): Priorities and Strategy. Dublin: ICTU; and 
for the second: ICTU (2001b), Working for a Fair Society -  a Sound Economy (Part II). Organisation 
and Finance. Dublin: ICTU.
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Within this context it was argued that ICTU would keep working towards a more 
equitable sharing of ‘the profits of globalisation’ between companies and workers (p. 
62). The same was also argued in a motion carried in the Delegate Conference, in 
Bundoran, in 2001. The motion was entitled Economic Strategy: Nearer to Brussels 
than Boston, and declared ‘that globalisation should be underpinned by social ground 
rules and a commitment to the redistribution of wealth’ (ICTU, 2001: 9-10). The 
main objective of the motion was to express ICTU’s commitment to the ‘European 
model of development’ (ibid.).
Why was the discourse of ICTU untypical of the politico-economic consensus found 
among political parties and the IBEC? In order to understand the way in which ICTU 
approached the non-ideological space of Irish politics and economics and related it to 
globalisation, one needs to take into consideration three contextual factors, and their 
deep implications for the formation and evolution of the ICTU discourse.
The first of these factors had to do with the impact, in terms of wealth generation, of 
the ‘Irish miracle’ itself. This miracle had been based on economic globalisation 
policies, such as corporate tax reductions, non-mandatory recognition of trade unions 
and flexibility in the labour market in general. These were policies that brought to 
Ireland significant investments from big pharmaceutical and IT companies, and 
generated for more than a decade the highest growth rates within the OECD countries. 
They also reversed a historic trend to emigration, generating full employment. They 
thus elevated Irish society from deprivation and misery to economic success, 
delivering for the first time in Irish history the promise of a wealthy and prosperous 
society. This could not but lead to the emergence of a set of politics and policies that 
were beyond contestation -  what we have defined here as the non-ideological space 
of Irish politico-economic system. Within this context, at least for the first years of 
the second half of the 1990s, the discourse of ICTU on (economic) globalisation 
could not be negative or aggressive, as happened with many trade unions in many 
countries around the world. Yet ICTU was not insulated either from these foreign 
unions or from the debates within the left and the international labour movement. 
Arguably that is why in the beginning globalisation was conceptualised and presented 
as a phenomenon with implications for developing countries, disassociated from 
everyday life in Ireland. In short, it can be said that the problematisation by ICTU of
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the parameters of Irish economic development, was not a logical option at the time, 
because these parameters and the respective policies were delivering unprecedented 
wealth in the Irish society, including the trade union members.
The second factor that conditioned the worker’s discourse was the issue of social 
partnership. The view that IBEC set the broader parameters of policy agenda is not 
indeed sufficient to draw an accurate picture of the Irish politico-economic scene of 
the second half of the 1990s. It seems to be the case that a genuine social partnership 
was been developing between IBEC and ICTU (or, in any case, ICTU and the 
majority of the trade unions were thinking so). Thus, in the years up to 1997-1998, 
not only did ICTU not develop a ‘mainstream’ European trade union discourse on 
globalisation, but to a big extent it endorsed many aspects of the European employers 
associations’ discourse. Basic instances include: (i) The priority that was given to the 
concept of competitiveness, which was brought to the fore of the ICTU discourse 
(also through the ‘Partnership 2000’), in the name of the improvement of living 
standards (see for instance ICTU, 1997: 10). (ii) The adoption of the concept of 
flexibility which was often mobilised in a rather neutral way. For instance, the 1995 
Delegate Conference ‘calls on the Executive Council to campaign to ensure 
that...flexible working practices are jointly agreed by employers and trade unions’ 
(carried motion 33, see: ICTU, 1995: 70, see also ibid. p. 69; ICTU, 1997: 7, 25; 
1999: 51, 57). (iii) The soft stance that was adopted towards ‘the necessity for 
restructuring’, the need to increase the ‘atypical and part-time employment’, and the 
‘reform of the public sector’; which were conceptualised as rather natural and 
inevitable effects of the ‘changing economic and commercial environment’ (see for 
instance ICTU, 1997: 28-30). (iv) The emphasis that was paid on the ‘necessity for 
modernisation’. For instance, a motion on Economic Progress Through Partnership 
in the 1997 Conference acknowledged that ‘much more needs to be done to 
modernise our economy and our workplaces for the challenges of the new 
millennium’ (ICTU, 1997a: 41, see also relevant references in ICTU, 1999: 2, 12, 44, 
60, 67). The need for modernisation was also stressed in the first motion carried out 
in both the 1999 and 2001 Conferences (see respectively ICTU, 1999a: 9; 2001a: 10). 
(iv) The adoption of the concept of, and necessity for, efficiency (see for instance 
ICTU, 1999: 4, 12,45).
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The adoption, however, of employers’ views and their lexicon did not stop the 
Congress from bringing to the heart of its discourse the issue of the unfair and 
unequal distribution of the benefits from the economic miracle . But for ICTU a 
genuine partnership was the best place for addressing and solving this problem. Thus, 
within the above context, the strategic objective of ICTU was to avoid reducing the 
bargaining with IBEC to a plain ‘pay negotiation’ issue, as this would destroy the 
genuine character of their partnership. This strategy seemed to work well up to the 
end of the 1990s. Furthermore developments such as the ‘Profit Sharing’ and 
‘Employee Share Ownership Plans’ were reassuring the workers’ representatives for 
the genuine character of the partnership40. In this regard the ICTU’s approach to the 
economic globalisation discourse remained rather neutral, even if increasingly 
alarming.
The last factor that influenced and arguably moved the Congress’s discourse on 
globalisation closer to its European counterparts, had to do with what can be 
described as the identity crisis of the social partnership and of the labour movement. 
Three interwoven developments were instrumental here. First, was the growing 
dissatisfaction on the part of labour with social partnership’s failing promise of a 
more fair and equal society. Thus although all the strata of Irish society had moved 
upwards in terms of economic benefits, both the discourse and the reality of the gap 
between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have nots’ acquired a central place in the Irish polity 
after the end of the 1999. Second, this dissatisfaction was fed by the fact that some of 
the parameters of the social partnership which were pushed by the unions throughout 
the 1990s proved to be much less flexible than what a concept of a genuine 
partnership would imply. For instance the issue of the mandatory recognition of trade 
unions, central to the discourse and expectations of the Congress, had reached a 
stalemate in 1999. Thirdly, and maybe more importantly, a feeling started to be 
generated among labour unions that although ‘Partnership has...helped to produce a 
great number of jobs,...it has been less effective in ensuing that those jobs are 
rewarding, less stressful, more secure and compatible with rich family life’; thus the
39 See for instance the introduction of Peter Cassells in the 1997 and 1999 Reports (see, ICTU, 1997: 5 
and 1999: 4, respectively), the motion 63 carried in the 1997 Conference, and the motion 1 carried in 
the 1999 one (in ICTU, 1997a: 107 and 1999a: 9 respectively).
40 See for instance ICTU,1997: 27; 1999: 6,44, 69, 82; 2001a: 11, 31.
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‘Work-Life balance’ had been changed for the worse41. As a result the ICTU in 1999 
seemed to abandon the prioritisation of competitiveness as a condition for a better 
future. This was a period when the need for a ‘social dimension’ was placed at the 
core of Congress’s discourse; when the effects of globalisation were not to be 
discussed only with regard to the developing countries; and when the ‘European 
model of development’ was promoted by ICTU as a response to globalisation. As 
Cassells argued:
i f  this country’s vision does not reach beyond the goal o f  economic growth 
and competitiveness, we could slide into a shallow, selfish, highly divided 
society where poverty, exploitation and discrimination become permanent 
features (ICTU, 2001a: 45).
The above three factors delineate also three broad phases in ICTU’s discourse on 
globalisation. These should not be understood as insulated from each other. For 
instance in the last phase, when ICTU mobilised the concept of globalisation to 
conceptualise developments taking place both in Ireland and internationally, a chapter 
in the 2001 Report was devoted to the need for Modernising the Economy (ICTU, 
2001a: 53-62). Yet in this latter phase (i.e. 1999-2001) the discourse of globalisation 
as was articulated by the European Left, also acquired a central dimension in the 
strategies, vocabulary and identity-reproduction of the Irish labour unions.
National Economic and Social Council (NESC)
The National Economic and Social Council of Ireland was founded in 1973 with as its 
main task ‘to advise the Government on the development of the national economy 
and the achievement of social justice’42. For the purposes of this section two things 
need to be underlined. First, that the Council had played a crucial role in the revival 
of the social partnership in Ireland, since the late 1980s; and second the fact that the 
personality of Professor Rory O’Donnell, as Director of NESC, did make a great
41 The quotations are from the introduction o f Peter Cassells in the 2001 Report (see ICTU, 2001a: 3).
42 See N ESC’s official website at: http://www.nesc.ie.
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difference in the role and influence of the Council in Irish politico-economic scene. 
Indeed Rory O’Donnell is considered to be one of the main architects of the modem 
social partnership (i.e. post mid-1980s).
NESC had been a place where the social partners (including representatives from the 
government, employers, workers, farmers and the community and voluntary sector) 
met and exchanged ideas about a wide range of economic and social issues. The 
Council’s Secretariat (led by the Director) had a cmcial role in this process, for it is 
up to the Secretariat to synthesise and guide the various and often opposing opinions 
expressed. The published Reports and Recommendations that constituted the end 
products of these processes, aimed to delineate, or define, the common ground among 
the various participants and to offer (strategic) guidance for governmental policies.
After IBEC and ICTU, NESC remains the last piece of the puzzle of social partners’ 
discourse on globalisation. In order to study NESC’s discourse we examined: (a) The 
Press Releases of the Council for the period 1993-200143. Through the Press 
Releases one can monitor all the activities of NESC. They also included 
comprehensive summaries of all the publications of the Council, (b) The full text of 
the Reports of the Council for the period 1999-2001. Some of these Reports focus on 
general topics, such as the future opportunities and challenges for the Irish economy, 
while others had a more thematic focus, such as the issues of poverty or profit sharing.
The picture that emerges from the study of the press releases is rather a clear one. Up 
to 1997/1998 three issues constituted the core of NESC’s discourse: the necessity and 
priority of competitiveness, the level of unemployment (which for the first time since 
1990 decreased into a single figure in 1998), and the importance of social partnership 
as the ‘most effective mechanism for developing Irish competitiveness and social 
cohesion in the...global context’44. After 1998 the issues of social cohesion and 
inclusiveness seemed to replace the issue of unemployment in the core of NESC
43 They were available on line at: http://www.nesc.ie/Press.htm.
44 See for instance the press releases for the report A Strategy for Competitiveness, Growth and 
Employment (published on November 23, 1993), and for the ‘Conclusions and Recommendations’ of 
the report NESC Strategy into the 21st Century (published on October 8, 1996). Available on line at: 
http://www.nesc.ie/Press.htm (21/07/2003).
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discourse45. Globalisation came to the fore of the Council’s discourse with the Report 
Opportunities, Challenges and Capacities for Choice that was published, in 
December 1999 (NESC, 1999). There NESC developed its vision for Ireland for the 
first decade of the 21st Century and elaborated on the economic and social strategy 
that had to be followed in order Ireland to reach this vision. The Report had plenty of 
scattered references to globalisation, but notably also included an explicit section on 
Globalisation (NESC, 1999: 92-109). NESC saw globalisation as one of the three 
fundamental integration processes that posed a challenge in the development of Irish 
economy (along with the European and the Republic-Northern Ireland economic 
integrations). The section started with the acknowledgement that globalisation ‘is a 
term that has become part of everyday life in the 1990s’ (p. 92) and that it ‘is a term 
that connotes momentum, suggesting an almost unstoppable force over which people 
(national governments, firms, individuals) have no control’ (ibid.); an assumption that 
was disputed later in the Report. Three factors were defined as the ‘main driving 
forces of globalisation: technology, trade liberalisation and increased capital/financial 
flows’ (p. 95); and through their analysis, and the study of the respective literature, it 
was concluded that ‘it is increased use of technology and not increased trade that has 
reduced the demand for low-skilled workers in developed countries’ (p. 110).
Based on the above extracts and on a detailed reading of the Report, it can be argued 
that NESC attempted to free the concept of globalisation from its negative 
connotations, and to present globalisation as a given context that necessitated 
particular policies. In this regard NESC discourse was based on a new reality 
approach to globalisation. Finally it can be argued that the NESC discourse on 
globalisation was determined by the attempt of its leadership to define and protect the 
consensus among the social partners on what were, and what was demanded by, the 
prevailing economic conditions. Hence, the engagement of NESC’s Secretariat with 
the globalisation debate served also, intentionally or unintentionally, a strategic 
purpose; that is, pre-emptively to neutralise a potential politicisation of the non- 
ideological space of the Irish politico-economic life, that could take place through the 
mobilisation of the anti-globalisation discourse, by any of the social partners.
45 See the press releases for both the ‘Overview’ and the full text of the report Opportunities, 
Challenges and Capacities for Choice, published in November and December 1999, respectively.
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The Archbishop of Dublin and Primate of Ireland, Cardinal Desmond Connell, 
and the Church in Ireland46
The Church is an important actor in Irish society and therefore its impact cannot be 
excluded from the study of the Irish public discourse. It is also worth pointing out 
that the active stance adopted by Cardinal Connell in public affairs, did make a 
difference, while in some respects reviving the role of the Church in Irish public 
discourse. Of course within the Church in Ireland one can find different voices and 
views. Yet the focus of this section on Cardinal Connell is entirely legitimate as the 
latter is not only the head of the Catholic Church in the Republic, but also the person 
with the most active and influential, even controversial, stance in the Irish public 
discourse.
Our analysis of the Cardinal Connell’s discourse on globalisation was very much 
based on the press coverage of Cardinal’s speeches, interviews and public 
interventions in general. In particular the newspaper The Irish Times was selected as 
the most credible ‘source of references’ in the Irish press. The research was 
conducted through the electronic data-base Lexis-Nexis Executive, while the key-word 
used was ‘Desmond Connell’. For the period 1996-2001, 474 articles were found. 
We then used this material as an electronic pool of articles from which we kept all the 
articles that included one of the following key-words: global, globalisation, identity, 
flexibility and Celtic Tiger. In addition, articles that included the key-words 
‘modem’ or ‘Europe’ were also kept, when the context of the use of these terms was 
judged relevant to our investigation. This selection process left us with forty articles, 
the great majority of which had direct quotations from Cardinal Connell, and 
approximately one fourth of which were interviews and articles or speeches of his. 
This material was then supplemented with his speeches and statement, for the period 
1999-2001, which were available in the on-line archive of Dublin Diocese47.
46 Cardinal Desmond Connell was appointed as Archbishop of Dublin in 1988, and elevated to the 
Sacred College of Cardinals in 2001.
47 See http://www.dublindiocese.ie/Releases/releases.htm.
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It is striking, once again, that in none of the above articles, speeches or statements did 
Cardinal Connell use the term globalisation or its derivatives. Yet if one considers 
the fact that the concept of globalisation represented no stakes and served no 
significant function within the Irish public discourse, then at least some room for an 
explanation is made. The Cardinal’s discourse could not but exist in a dialectical 
relationship with the discourses of the other national institutional actors, and as long 
as the latter did not engage with the concept of globalisation, Cardinal did not do so 
either. Nevertheless, Cardinal Connell attacked, with the same ferocity and publicity 
that Archbishop Christodoulos fought globalisation in Greece, the most important 
expression and achievement of the Irish non-ideological space: the Celtic Tiger48. 
Furthermore, his critique, having as focal points the issues of secularism49, 
individualism, identity and tradition, had many things in common with Archbishop 
Christodoulos’ critique of globalisation. Thus in 1998 the Cardinal argued that the 
‘technological world...reduces...[the children] to the indignity of products and 
derives its meaning from power rather than from gift. This becomes all more acute 
when they find that the brave new world of prosperity leaves them without hope of 
participation’50.
In the same year, speaking in Accord (the Catholic Marriage Counselling Service) he 
characterised the dominant economic system as ‘unchecked capitalism’, and called 
for ‘a radical re-examination of the whole economic system under which we are 
living’. He also added that ‘we are so full of the Celtic tiger that anything else seems 
unthinkable’51. A year later, in 1999, he stressed:
48 In this regard, an editorial of The Irish Times , on April 2, 1999, argued that Dr Connell ‘has been 
among the most insightful critics of the Celtic Tiger’ (p. 17).
49 For this criticism see for instance his article ‘Church Cannot Accept the People Can Do no Wrong’, 
The Irish Times , October 14, 1997, p. 16, where he connected the Holocaust and the Nazi or 
communist regimes on the one hand, with the ideology of a secular modernity on the other. This 
article triggered a lot of criticism See for instance, Fintan O’Toole, ‘Time to Move away from Moral 
Monopoly’, The Irish Times, October 17, 1997, p. 12.
50 Extract from a speech to the Life Society, at St Patrick’s College. The full text of the speech was 
published in The Irish Times , March 8, 1999, p. 6. With a similar content see also his article ‘Risk in 
Judging Church with Hindsight’, The Irish Times , November 24, 1998, p. 16, and his speech ‘Science 
and Technology Bring Benefits but Risk of Depersonalisation’, delivered on April 10, 2001, and 
available at: http://www.dublindiocese.ie/Releases/releases.htm (17/07/2003).
51 The quotations are from Patsy McGarry, ‘House Prices put Family Life at Risk -  Dr Connell’, The 
Irish Times , February 14, 1998, p. 3. Patsy McGarry was the ‘Religious Affairs Correspondent’ of 
The Irish Times.
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Co-existing with the prosperity and gain o f the Celtic Tiger is the sad 
spectacle o f  poverty and exclusion...The forthcoming budget represents an 
ideal opportunity for the Government to build further on its commitment to 
tackling poverty...it must also take note o f  what is being referred to as the 
‘N ew  Poor’ in our contemporary society: those who, while gainfully 
employed, struggle to survive economically52.
Thus the Cardinal articulated a discourse that had as its focal points most of the 
dominant objects of the anti-globalisation critique, e.g. ‘unchecked capitalism’, 
‘poverty’, ‘exclusion’, ‘consumerism’53, ‘depersonalisation’54. The concept of 
globalisation, however, was not mobilised as a means of bringing together and 
conceptualising these diverse developments. Nor did the Cardinal engage with the 
all-dominant contemporary debate on globalisation. It seems that rather than using 
globalisation to attack the Celtic Tiger, he generated a critique of Celtic Tiger ‘from 
within’. In this regard Cardinal Connell’s discourse can be considered as the only 
domestic discourse that aimed from the outset to problematise the non-ideological 
space of Irish politics and economics.
Media Coverage
Introduction
The aim of this section, as in the Greek case, is to study in a consistent manner a 
representative source of media coverage throughout the period 1996-2001, in order to 
examine: (a) the volume and the evolution of the usage of the term globalisation, and 
(b) the composition of the people using this term. Through this study we also aim to 
capture the discourses and activities of groups that have not been studied above, such 
as think-tanks, academics, civil servants, artists and anti-globalisation protesters.
52 Desmond Connell ‘Human Face o f Poverty Reflected in Homeless Statistics’, speech delivered on 
September 24, 1999, at the launch o f the Crosscare’s Annual Report for 1998. Available at: 
http://www.dublindiocese.ie/Releases/releases.htm (17/07/2003).
53 Ibid.
54 Desmond Connell, ‘Science and Technology bring benefits but Risk o f  Depersonalisation’, op. cit.
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In the case of Irish press, the choice of the source to be studied was between the two 
(out o f four) morning newspapers big in circulation, i.e. The Irish Times and Irish 
Independent. From these two, the thesis focused on The Irish Times, even though The 
Irish Independent had been higher in circulation (see Chart 1 below), for the former, 
according to all the people interviewed in Ireland (see Appendix A), is more credible 
both as an ‘archive’ of social actors’ discourses, and as an indicator o f the political 
debates that dominate in Irish polity55.
CHART 1: Share of Total Sales of Irish Newspapers 1996-2002
The Star 
22%
Irish Times 
26%
Irish Examiner 
14%
Irish Independent
38%
Source: ABC
Finally, the research was conducted as follows. The Lexis-Nexis Executive data-base 
has had an on-line archive of The Irish Times since the early 1990s. Using the data­
base we made a key-word search in The Irish Times for the period 1996-2001, using 
as a key-word the term globalisation. The search machine retrieved 1045 articles, 
whose classification according to the time of their publication is recorded in Table 2 
and Chart 256.
55 The circulation per year of the two morning papers was as follows (numbers are in ’000):
1996 1999 2001
The Irish Times 102 113 120
Irish Independent (Daily ed.) 159 166 169
Source: National Newspapers of Ireland
56 The manual processing o f these 1045 articles proved that a sizeable number o f them were mis- 
downloaded. After the one-by-one processing only 816 of the 1045 actually had a reference to the 
term globalisation. The latter include: 30 references to the term ‘globalise(d)’, 13 references to the 
term ‘globalising’, and 2 references to ‘globalism’.
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TABLE 2: The Emergence of the Discourse of Globalisation in The Irish Times: 1996-2001
Months
Year January February March April May June July August September October November December
Total 
per year
1996 2 2 3 4 7 6 1 2 9 4 4 2 46
1997 3 2 8 7 11 14 3 3 2 5 8 11 77
1998 12 11 6 11 13 5 6 9 4 5 14 15 111
1999 11 5 16 5 4 7 11 7 14 4 13 21 118
2000 9 11 13 13 16 16 10 18 32 15 13 19 185
2001 18 6 20 27 30 22 41 30 21 21 22 21 279
TOTAL SUM for the period 1996-2001 816
CHART 2: References to the term Globalisation per year, 
in The Irish Times (1996-2001)
(% of the total sum of references for the period 1996-2001)
1998
14%
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The evolution of the number of articles found is depicted in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Articles with a Reference to Globalisation in The Irish Times
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The Discourse o f  Globalisation in The Irish Times, 1996-2001
The fist thing that needs to be stressed here is that the above numbers refer to the 
numbers of published articles in the daily edition of The Irish Times (TIT is not 
published on Sundays). Thus, whereas in the Greek case, the research was based on 
the Sunday edition of VIMA, in the Irish case the research was based on the daily 
Irish Times. Beyond its methodological importance57, this difference makes a strong 
statement about the quantitative nature o f the findings. Thus the number of articles 
found in VIMA exceed, some times by far, for most o f the period under consideration 
(except 2001) the articles found in The Irish Times, despite the fact that in 
quantitative terms the absolute number o f The Irish Times papers studied was six-fold 
(being a daily edition) those of VIMA (being the Sunday edition). The following 
Figure is suggestive.
57 I do not mean to downsize or disregard the potential methodological problems created by the 
comparison of a ‘Sunday’ with a ‘Daily’ edition. Yet our aim was to find a representative press sample 
within the two different national contexts; and the Sunday VIMA and the daily The Irish Times serve 
this purpose. Of course when the two sources are compared, their difference is taken into 
consideration.
A +
A
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
221
Figure 2: A Comparison of References to Globalisation between the daily Irish
Times and the Sunday Edition of the VIMA
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Note: The year 1996 was omitted due to incomplete data in the case of VIMA.
Thus, considering the absolute number of the articles found in The Irish Times, it can 
be argued that the first and most important observation from the study of The Irish 
Times is the very low number of articles making reference to the term globalisation, 
at least in comparison with VIMA. This represents an interesting paradox. Before 
conducting the research the main hypothesis was that the concept of globalisation 
would be marginal in the Greek press up to the end of 1999 (i.e. the Seattle protests), 
and popular in the Irish press which literally speaking, if  nothing else, ‘speaks’ the 
language of globalisation (i.e. English). The second obvious observation that can be 
made on the basis of Figure 1 is that the evolution of references in The Irish Times 
was a linear/upward one, throughout the period 1996-2001 (whereas in the Greek 
case, the year 2000 represented a peak point). Furthermore, the ‘Seattle effect’ does 
not seem to have had a significant impact on the evolution of references. The 57% 
increase in references from 1999 to 2000, is lower than that seen from 1996 to 1997 
(67%), and close to the change seen from 1997 to 1998 (44%) or from 2000 to 2001 
(50%). Beyond these general observations however, so as to elucidate The Irish 
Times globalisation discourse, we need to break down the numbers according to the 
sections of publication and authors’ identity. In this way we aim to find out the 
different aspects of the globalisation discourse (economic, political, cultural, etc.) and 
their relative gravity within The Irish Times; and even if such a target can hardly be
■  The Irish Times
■  VIMA
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accurately met in a quantitatively-oriented research as the one followed in this section, 
the basic dynamics under way can be demonstrated.
The following sections and Tables aim to classify thematically the articles found in 
The Irish Times, according to the newspaper’s section in which they were published. 
It must first be noted that the relevant articles were found under 31 different section- 
headings. Therefore, the first task was thematically to group these sections in more 
general ones, without completely losing the internal diversity of the new categories. 
Table 3 presents this thematic organization.
TABLE 3: Organisation of The Irish Times Sections in ‘Generic’ Categories
Main
Political
Section
(MPS)
includes:
Home News 
(HN)
Editorial 
Front Page
CFP)
News
Features
(NF)
Opinion 
Elections ’97 
Features
Main
Economic
Section
(MES)
includes:
Business & 
Finance 
(B&F) 
Budget 
2001
World News
(WN)
includes:
World News 
(WN)
World Review 
(WR)_______
European Parliament
News (EPN)_______
The Amsterdam
Treaty (TAT)______
Developing World 
(DW)____________
France___________
Attack on America
(AA)_____________
Scotland & Ireland 
(S&I)____________
Education, 
Art, Life 
and Sport 
(EALS) 
include:
Art_______
Media
Scope
(MS)
Education
& Living
(E&L)
Style
Culture
Sport
Miscellaneous
Include:
Sound & Vision 
(S&V)_________
Computimes 
Commercial 
Property (CP)
Obituaries (Obit.) 
Other
Having organized the 31 sections of The Irish Times into 5 generic categories, and 
before studying the dynamics between them, let us examine what happens within 
each generic category. These intra-category dynamics are presented in the Tables 4-8 
(the numbers in the vertical axis indicate absolute number of articles).
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Table 4: The Globalisation Discourse in the Main Political Section of The Irish Times
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Table 5: Main Economic Section Table 6: World News
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Table 7: Education-Art-Life-Sport (EALS) Table 8: Miscellaneous
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Finally, Table 9 puts all the above data into a single framework to allow a comparison 
between the different generic categories.
Table 9: Evolution of the References to Globalisation in The Irish Times 
According to the Section of Publication
M ain Political Section (M PS) —■— M ain Economic Section (M ES)
World News (WN) x -- Letters to the Editor
Business this Week •  -  EALS
Weekend — —  Other
NOTE: ‘Business this Week’ is Thursday’s supplement on Business. ‘Weekend’ is a 
supplement on TV, theatre, cinema, books etc.
Trying to draw some tentative conclusions from the above data we can observe: First, 
that the ‘political pages’ lead the Irish Times discourse on globalisation, with the 
‘world news’ being second and the ‘economic pages’ third . This is important to 
underline, especially as the great bulk o f the references found in the political pages 
were in the pages under the heading ‘home news’ (see Tables 3 and 4). Thus we can, 
if  tentatively, infer that beyond the globalisation discourse o f the ‘world news’ pages, 
there was also a strong ‘home news’ discourse on globalisation. In addition the latter 
seemed to be significantly stronger compared to the ‘world news’ discourse, in the
58 Particular attention should be paid here to the comparison with VIMA. VIMA has a daily economic 
supplement, which can be separated from the main body of the paper. Therefore when, in the case o f  
VIMA, a reference is made to ‘economic pages’ it implies the aforementioned economic supplement. 
The Irish Times has a separate economic supplement only every Thursday, called ‘Business this 
Week’, which is studied here as a separate section. The daily edition, however, does have particular 
pages under the heading ‘Business and Finance’. It is these pages of the main body o f the paper that 
are called here ‘economic pages’.
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year 2001. Furthermore if one adds the political (MPS) to the economic (MES) pages, 
and counter-poses them to the ‘world news’ -  to tentatively explore the inside/outside 
aspects o f the globalisation discourse in The Irish Times -  then it can be argued that 
the home/inside discourse on globalisation was significantly stronger than the world 
news one. It should be kept in mind however, that this comparison refers to the 
section o f publication, rather than to the content of the news themselves (see, Table 
10).
Table 10: The ‘Domestic vs. International’ Aspect of the Globalisation Discourse 
in The Irish Times59
140
120
100
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1999 2000 20011996 1997 1998
A second observation that can be made on the basis of Table 9 is that 1999 seems to 
constitute a turning point, at least for the dominant, in terms of references, sections -  
something which was not clear in the aggregate data of Figure 1. Thus after a short 
decline in the number of articles published in political (MPS), economic (MES) and 
World News pages in 1999 as compared to 1998, there was an intensification o f the 
references in 2000; a trend that was significantly enhanced in 2001. Moreover the 
intensification of the use of the concept of globalisation after 2000, at least in the 
political pages, seems to be on a much higher scale in The Irish Times than that found 
in VIMA. It is indicative that in VIMA the references in Section A (which is the 
main political section o f the newspaper) increased only by 4% between 2000 and 
2001, whereas the respective increase in the Main Political Section of The Irish Times 
was 130%. Therefore, even if  the events in Seattle were responsible for the reversal
59 A short note may be added here. In the domestic side of the equation one could consider adding the 
‘Letters to the Editor’ section. Yet, although the majority of these articles were about Ireland -  and 
many of them especially on Irish culture -  some of them discussed broader issues o f globalisation, 
world trade, international economy etc. That was the reason for excluding this section from the 
domestic side.
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of the trend in 1999, they do not seem capable of accounting for the increase in 
references between 2000 and 2001. Hence, another dynamic must have been driving 
the 2001 increase. In order to explore this issue, and study further the figures of 
Table 9, one needs to get a more complete picture of the globalisation discourse in 
The Irish Times, by considering not only the sections where articles were published, 
but also the identities of the authors of these articles. Table 11 offers a detailed 
classification of the evolution of references according to their source, and Chart 3 
offers a graphical representation of the universe of references according to authors’ 
identity.
TABLE 11. Evolution of References to Globalisation in The Irish Times according to 
Authors’ Identity60
Authors 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Academics 1* 3* 6* IQ**** 12*** 11*
Foreign Academics - - 1 - 2 1*
Politicians1 - 3 7 6* 6 11
Prime Minister - 1 1 1 2 -
Governmental Documents 3 - - - - -
Foreign Politicians - 2 5 2**** 1 g****
Civil Servants (Upper Echelons)2 - 1 1 - 2* 1
Church - - 1 - - 2
Entrepreneurs/Business3 1* 3 5* 7** 8******* 5*
Workers Unions Reps 1 3 1 - 1 5
Employers Reps. - - - - - 1
Foreign Employers’ Reps - - - 2 - -
NGOs 1 - - 1 1 2
Artists - - - 2 - 2
Others - - - 2 2 -
Books4 - 1 2 - 10 9
International Organisations5 1 1 - 1 - 1
Readers 2 1 7 9 7 18
The Irish Times Journalists 33 50 58 62 116 164
Unsigned Articles 3 5 16 10 15 34
1 Including references made by Mary Robinson.
2 Including references made by Peter Sutherland (former EU Commissioner and Attorney General).
3 Including both Chief Executives and Business Researchers/Specialists.
4 This section includes only book reviews written by journalists. Book reviews written by academics were 
included in the ‘academics’ category.
5 Including, ILO, UN, WTO.
60 Some of the references, although they explicitly attributed to certain politicians, businesspersons etc., 
were not articles written by them, but articles that were focusing on these persons’ actions or speeches. 
To indicate the number of this category of references, an asterisk (*) is used. For instance, 8****, in 
‘Foreign Politicians’, signifies that 8 articles were found of which 4 were signed by foreign politicians 
and 4 were focusing on foreign politicians’ statements on globalisation.
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CHART 3: References to Globalisation in The Irish Times according to Authors’ Identity (1996-2001)
U nsigned A rticles 
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Prime M inister &
i f  1 o n e
Foreign Politicians
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Civil Servants Entrepreneurs/Business 
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W orkers Unions 
l%
NGOs
l%  on.Others
3%
Readers
5%
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59%
NOTE: The category ‘others’ includes: governmental documents, international organisations, foreign academics, the Church, employers’ representatives and artists. ‘NGOs’ 
includes both Irish -based and overseas organisations. For a detailed picture of these categories, see Table 5.
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Based on the above data we can observe the following: First, the above mentioned 
boom of references in 2001 was led primarily by journalists, and strongly supported 
by the ‘readers’ (i.e. letter to the editor) and ‘unsigned articles’ categories. The 
significant increase of the references by ‘readers’ in 2001 (Table 11), indicates that 
globalisation had started to become a focal point in the Irish public discourse. This 
trend seems also to be confirmed by the significant increase (in absolute terms) of the 
‘unsigned articles’ in 2001. As has already been argued this category can be treated 
as an indicator of the degree of ‘quotidianisation’ of a hegemonic discourse, i.e. as an 
indicator of the transformation of globalisation from an event ‘out there’, to an 
integral part of the everyday and everyday news. This conclusion is enhanced also by 
the steadily increasing percentage of references by politicians and academics. Thus, 
contrary to our findings from the party discourses, politicians seem to have had an 
active role in the communication of globalisation discourse. Interestingly this role 
seems to have been from the outset as important as that of academics. Yet it must be 
kept in mind that the active stance of politicians and academics that comes out from 
Chart 3, is based on a very low absolute number of articles/references for the period 
1996-2001. Second, ‘business’ (mainly entrepreneurs and market specialists) seems 
also to have been very active in the communication of the globalisation discourse. 
Workers unions, on the other hand, seem to have developed a discourse on 
globalisation only in 2001, whereas the employers remained silent throughout the 
period 1996-2001. Nevertheless the aforementioned caveat on the low absolute 
number of references should also be placed here. Finally, the increase of references 
related to the book reviews section in 2000 and 2001 supports the claim for an 
intensification of the communication of globalisation discourse after 1999.
It is also interesting to break down the category with the highest number of references, 
i.e the ‘Irish Times Journalists’, trying thus to figure out how and by whom 
globalisation discourse was generated within the Irish Times community. Chart 4 
illustrates the relative engagement with the globalisation discourse of the various 
editorial/correspondence teams.
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CHART 4: Articles making reference to Globalisation, signed by Editors & 
Correspondents of The Irish Times (1996-2000)
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7% Europe & 
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NOTE: The chart excludes editorial or correspondence teams with reference lower than 2%. This includes: 
Andy Poliak (Education Correspondent, until 2000), Emmet Oliver (Education Correspondent, since 2000, 
Padraig Yeates (Industry and Employment Correspondent), Madeleine Lyons (Technology Reporter), Loma 
Siggins (Marine Correspondent), Eibhir Mulqueen (Midwest Correspondent) and Frank Millar (London Editor). 
In addition, the Chart does not include the columnist Fintan O’ Toole, who, with 10 articles, also contributed 
approximately 2% to the overall references to globalisation.
1 Paul Gillespie (Foreign Editor), Mark Brennock (Foreign Affairs Correspondent until 2001, and Political 
Correspondent since 2001), Deaglan de Breadun (Foreign Affairs Correspondent), Paul Cullen (Development 
Correspondent).
2 Jane Suiter (Economics Correspondent), Cliff Taylor (Finance Editor), Conor O’ Clery (International Business 
Editor), Siobhan Creaton (Finance Correspondent).
3 Michael Foley (Media Correspondent), Eddie Holt (Connect Column), Harry Browne (Media Scope Editor).
4 Frank Me Donald (Environment Correspondent and Editor), Kevin O’ Sullivan (Environment and Food 
Science Correspondent).5 Patrick Smyth (European and Washington Correspondent).6 Denis Staunton (Europe 
Correspondent). 7 Joe Carroll (Washington Correspondent). 8 Lara Marlowe (Paris Correspondent). 9 Paddy 
Agnew (Rome Correspondent)
The breaking down of the ‘Irish Times Journalists’ category into its constituent 
elements adds some more pieces to the discourse of the Irish newspaper on 
globalisation. Most importantly, the ‘other journalists’ category61 clearly dominates 
in terms of written articles. Thus the globalisation discourse o f The Irish Times, no 
matter how small, it seemed to be rather dispersed, i.e. not produced only by a few 
editors or correspondents. Second, it is interesting, although predictable, to observe 
the dominance of the European editors and correspondents within the signed articles. 
Thus, if  we count them all together (i.e. Europe, Paris, Rome and half o f the
61 This category includes signed articles by authors, who used the concept o f globalisation very few 
times, and were not part o f the established editorial/correspondence teams mentioned in the Note of 
Chart 4.
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references of ‘Europe and Washington’ correspondents), they amount approximately 
to 23% of the signed articles. A closer qualitative analysis of the articles of these 
editors/correspondents would be helpful here.
The Irish Times followed throughout the period 1996-2001 a consistent policy of 
covering the way in which globalisation was conceptualised in Ireland’s major 
European partners. The increased number of relevant references by European 
Correspondents such, as Ms Lara Marlowe (Paris Correspondent) and Patrick Smyth 
(European Correspondent), should be explained as a result of this policy. This 
coverage was very important for the Irish public discourse at least for the following 
reason. It consciously or unconsciously related Ireland to the globalisation discourses 
of its major European partners. Some examples should elucidate this point:
Covering the French general election in 1997, Lara Marlowe (Paris Correspondent) 
argued:
Without naming the evil monster that embodies French fears of the outside 
world, Mr Chirac briefly tried to do a public relations job for mondialisation 
(globalisation)...If globalisation is an almost mystical force, buffering 
France from afar, le liberalisme is the creed of those who collaborate with 
it62;
and in a similar manner:
France’s fitful mood seems rooted in misgivings over globalisation and 
economic liberalism. A subliminal fear of losing their identity and secure 
existence63.
Such an approach to the French reading of globalisation implies that the respective 
conceptualisation in Ireland was -  or should be -  rather different and certainly a non­
demonising one. Furthermore, considering that during that period globalisation was 
absent from the Irish public discourse, such an approach could be explained through
62 ‘Political Catchphrases that possess the Elan of a Moose’, The Irish Times, May 29,1997, p. 13.
63 ‘French Jobless Develop a Taste for Strike Action’, The Irish Times, December 31, 1998, p. 52.
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the confrontation of Ireland with most of its European partners on the issue of 
corporate taxation. As it was noted in an article by Partick Smyth (European 
Correspondent):
Socialist EU finance ministers are unlikely to be sympathetic to Charlie 
McCreevy’s [Minister for Finance] ideological case for maintaining our low 
corporate tax regime and may instead see it as more special pleading by 
Ireland...In truth, however the argument [against low corporate tax] is 
somewhat old-fashioned. It may have been a different matter 20 years ago, 
but we now live in the age of globalisation and extraordinary capital 
mobility64.
This debate was then evolved/diffused in 1998-1999 in the discourse on ‘progressive 
governance’ and the respective dynamic that had been created by the meetings of 
centre-left leaders, including Bill Clinton, Tony Blair, Gerhard Schroder and 
Massimo D’Alema. Within this discourse, globalisation was formulated (as we also 
saw in the Greek case) as a great challenge to be met, and these developments were 
monitored by the correspondents of The Irish Times65. It was within this framework 
that Paul Gillespie wrote the article The Answer to Globalisation is Europeanisation66, 
maybe the only intervention on globalisation that was debated both within and 
beyond the pages of The Irish Times. This discourse on the relationship between 
Europeanisation and globalisation came to dominate in the pro-European circles of 
Irish political life, and as we saw it also dominated in the discourses of the Labour 
Party and ICTU. This Europeanisation/globalisation discourse came also to the 
forefront of the debate on the referendum on EU Amsterdam Treaty. Patrick Smyth 
in this regard wrote:
64 ‘Corporation Tax Deal Could Lose Us EU Goodwill’, The Irish Times, November 30,1998, p. 16.
65 See for instance: P. Smyth, ‘Transatlantic Alliances Strengthened...’, The Irish Times, November 22, 
1999, p. 11; P. Smyth, ‘New Dawn for Socialism but What Does it Mean Anymore?’, The Irish Times, 
December 31, 1998, p. 51; P. Gillespie, ‘For Europe a Decisive Time’, The Irish Times, June 21, 2000, 
p. 60; D. Staunton, ‘Fischer Denies German Vision of a Federal Europe is a Form of Imperialism’, The 
Irish Times, June 22, 2000, p. 13; P. Gillespie, ‘Process of Equalisation Between Europe...’, The Irish 
Times, August 11, 2001, p. 11.
66 The Irish Times, December 30, 1997, p. 50.
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Fears whether rational or irrational, about loss of sovereignty or the erosion 
of neutrality will vie with those who desire to see the newly self-confident 
Ireland at the centre of Europe. It will be a contest between those who see 
the winds of globalisation as a challenge to be met by battening down the 
hatches and those who want to build a bigger boat and hoist more canvas67.
These debates on globalisation co-existed in The Irish Times with a more cautious or 
even sceptical approach to globalisation that was formulated by the Pope John Paul 
II68, and the UN, both traditionally very influential in the Irish public discourse69. 
The latter, however, did not seem to have had any broader impact on the Irish public 
discourse.
Synopsis
To sum up, it can be argued that there are two main findings from the study of The 
Irish Times' globalisation discourse. The first is that, in comparison to VIMA, this 
discourse seems to have been of very low ‘intensity’ until 2000, i.e. during most of 
the period under consideration here. Thus, to the extent that the Irish public discourse 
was reflected in the everyday pages of The Irish Times, it can be argued that up to the 
late 1999 -  mid 2000 period, the globalisation discourse was comparatively (to 
Greece) absent, from Ireland, i.e. the country that internationally was at the heart of 
globalisation debate. The second finding is closely related to the first one. From the 
second half of 2000 there was a boom in the use of the concept of globalisation. This 
boom cannot be unconnected to the ‘Seattle effect’ and the anti-globalisation protests 
that followed it. Yet the dynamics it had acquired in 2001, and the evolution of the 
references in terms both of section of publication and authors, suggest that there must 
have been a deeper, domestic reason for this development. It might be the case that it 
was only in 2001 that the rigidity of the social partnership’s parameters came to be 
felt and challenged; or in broader terms it might be the case that after a period of
67 The Irish Times, May 7, 1998, p. 11.
68 See for instance, P. Agnew, ‘Pope’s Choices Map out Path to his Successor’ The Irish Times, 
February 22, 2001, p. 16.
69 See for instance, P. Gillespie, ‘UN plan calls on Member-States to Agree Targets’, The Irish Times, 
April 4, 2000, p. 10.
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unprecedented growth and prosperity, it was only in 2000-2001 that notions of 
‘winners’ and ‘losers’ started to be felt in the population, and thus globalisation 
discourse, as the latter dominated in Europe, started to make sense and be mobilised 
by the population. It could also be the case that it was in this period that the Irish 
public discourse started to embrace the way Ireland was conceptualised by its EU 
partners. We return to this point in the next chapter. Here it is important to point out 
that the study of The Irish Times demonstrated that after 2000 the globalisation 
discourse started to be implicated and have a more central role in the reproduction of 
Irish public discourse. This finding supports also the findings from the study of the 
evolution of the discourses of the other institutional actors.
Conclusion
The analysis in this chapter revealed an interesting paradox. The concept of 
globalisation was relatively absent from Irish public discourse during the period 
1996-2001. Furthermore, this absence of the concept of globalisation was 
complemented by the existence of an economic globalisation agenda that was both 
taken for granted, and was celebrated as the reason for the Irish economic miracle by 
all the political forces, including the employers and -  for a long period of time -  the 
workers. Within this context the debate about the potential negative effects of 
economic globalisation that was developing in most European countries did not seem 
to resonate in Irish public discourse. This is also evident in the very low number of 
references to globalisation found in the press sample that was examined. What we 
did see to emerge during 1996-2001 was a Celtic Tiger discourse. The latter had a 
twofold character. On the one hand, it celebrated the economic success of Ireland. In 
this manner the economic policies that were linked to this success had been invested 
with a non-negotiable, non-disputable quality. On the other hand, however, it brought 
to the forefront of the Irish public discourse a critique of the cultural consequences 
generated by these economic policies (e.g. deregulation, flexibility, tax cuts). This 
cultural critique was led by the Church and was later adopted by Fine Gael. 
Furthermore, after 1998, a clear shift in the discourse and position of the workers took 
place, joined later on also by the Labour Party. Through this shift globalisation
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became an object of critique, as it was already the case in many other European left 
parties and workers’ unions.
In the next chapter we recapitulate and compare the findings from the Greek and Irish 
cases, and conclude what these cases tell us, and do not tell us, about hegemonic 
discourses and their communication.
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Part Three
From Puzzle Solving to Puzzle Generating in 
Hegemonic Discourse Communication
CHAPTER 5 
THE GREEK AND IRISH CASES 
JUXTAPOSED
This chapter has a dual purpose. It begins by offering a comparison of the 
communication of globalisation discourse in Greece and Ireland. Thus it summarises, 
juxtaposes and compares the findings of Part II. From there, it elaborates on what 
conclusions we can draw from this comparison with regard to the communication of 
the hegemonic discourse of globalisation in Greece and Ireland.
Introduction: Juxtaposing the Communication of Globalisation Discourse in 
Greece and Ireland
The thesis’s findings will be summarised and juxtaposed in four sections. The first 
will focus on political parties and their leaders, arguably one of the most, if not the 
most, important part of the ideology production nexuses of the two countries. The 
second will juxtapose the interaction among the social partners, focusing on the 
discourses of the national associations of workers and employers as well as the 
respective National Economic and Social Councils. A third section compares the 
discourses of the Catholic Church in Ireland and the Greek Orthodox Church. Finally, 
the study of the media sample in the two countries is considered.
It is worth recalling here that the study did not enforce or mobilise any specific 
definition of globalisation as part of its research design. It let the social actors speak 
for themselves, and took as ‘globalisation’ whatever was defined or referred to 
explicitly as such by them. Accordingly, the absence of references to globalisation 
was used as an important finding in its own right. Yet this key-term-driven reading of 
the primary material was qualified and backed up by a second independent-to-the- 
term-globalisation reading of the material (see below). This second reading had a 
double purpose. First, it allowed us to capture instances where terms and concepts 
alternative to globalisation were (consciously) used and promoted by the respective 
social actors (e.g. neoliberalism or imperialism). Second, it allowed us to identify 
core themes within the research material independently of any pre-specified referent 
or anchor-term. The thesis returns to these issues and their importance after the 
juxtaposition of the two cases.
The political parties
It would be helpful to begin our analysis with a recapitulation of the political parties’ 
positions towards globalisation.
Greek Parties
PASOK
PASOK is the party with the most significant change of position towards 
globalisation during the period 1994-2002. From a fundamentally negative approach 
to globalisation in 1994, it gradually moved to a proactively positive argumentation, 
portraying globalisation as a ‘significant opportunity’ for Greece’s development. 
This shift was based on the conscious effort of Simitis’ government to reverse a 
socially dominant, negative understanding of globalisation.
New Democracy
New Democracy maintained a neutral, ‘new reality’ approach to globalisation, 
throughout the period under examination.
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The Communist Party
The Communist Party adopted a fundamentally negative stance, conceptualising 
globalisation as anew ‘form of imperialism’.
Svnaspismos
Synaspismos followed the opposite trajectory from that of PASOK. From a rather 
positive to neutral position in the mid 1990s, it gradually adopted a highly negative 
position towards globalisation, accusing the government of using globalisation as an 
excuse in order to implement its (neoliberal) policies.
Thus in the Greek political scene, there had been four dominant discourses on 
globalisation. Globalisation as a significant opportunity (positive); globalisation as a 
‘new reality’ (neutral); globalisation as a ‘justification instrument’ for the 
implementation of neoliberal policies (negative); globalisation as a new form of 
imperialism (negative).
Irish Parties1 
Fianna Fail
The biggest party of the coalition government remained attached to a ‘new reality’ 
approach to globalisation, which, however, presented a ‘unique opportunity’ for 
Ireland’s development and prosperity.
Progressive Democrats
The Progressive Democrats were the most passionate advocates of globalisation and 
its unique benefits for Ireland, within the Irish political party terrain.
1 As was demonstrated in Chapter 4, three out of the four Irish parties (FF, PD, FG) do not develop a 
discourse on globalisation as such. Thus the analysis of the globalisation discourses of Irish parties is 
based on a broader consideration of their stance towards policies, practices and issues associated with 
the various aspects of globalisation debate (e.g. economic, cultural, etc.).
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Fine Gael
For most of the period under investigation Fine Gael’s attitude towards globalisation 
was similar to that of Fianna Fail. Yet since 1999 FG developed a critique of the 
phenomenon of the Celtic Tiger that can be broadly conceived of as a critique of 
globalisation’s negative impact on culture and tradition. Thus, FG started to move 
away from an understanding of globalisation as a ‘unique opportunity’.
Labour Party
Labour Party’s attitude followed a similar trajectory with that of Fine Gael. Yet LP’s 
distancing from a new positive reality approach to globalisation took place a little 
earlier than that of FG and it was more explicit.
Thus in the Irish political scene there appears to have been only one discourse on 
globalisation, at least for most of the period under investigation: globalisation as a 
new positive reality that represented a unique opportunity for Irish prosperity. It was 
only at the end of the 1990s that this discourse was challenged by a ‘traditional’ 
European Left critique of globalisation developed by the Labour Party, and a 
respective cultural critique developed by Fine Gael.
Reflecting on the Findings
One must not consider the party discourses in static terms or in isolation from each 
other. It is important to examine how each party discourse functioned within its 
broader national political party context, and how the latter differently communicated 
and thus materialised the globalisation discourse. The core findings of the thesis in 
this regard are as follows. In Greece the concept of globalisation (7iayKoapi07ioir|<Tr|) 
was ever-present in the discourses of the political parties and their leaders. In 
particular, the research suggested that globalisation emerged as a new zone of 
confrontation in Greek politics, as a new political axis. This axis had globalisation as 
a ‘new reality’ on one side, and as an ‘instrument of justification’ for policies serving 
particular interests, on the other. In any case, globalisation either as a ‘positive thing’ 
and an opportunity for Greece, or as a ‘great threat’ and a form of imperialism, by the 
end of the 20th century came to dominate the vocabulary and the conceptual arena of
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the Greek politico-economic life (at least as the latter was reflected in the political 
party discourses).
It was indeed unexpected that the case of Ireland (one of the most globalised 
economies in the world at the time) proved to be almost the exact opposite to the case 
of Greece. The research suggested that, not only did globalisation not become a focal 
point of reference in party discourses and party competition, but it actually remained 
marginal, almost non-existent, within the party discourses, for most of the period 
1995-2002. Indeed, one finds no reference to the term globalisation in the manifestos 
of Fianna Fail (the biggest party in the coalition government). It is also significant 
that with the exception of the Labour Party in the 2002 elections (when it adopted a 
globalisation rhetoric close to what was at the time a dominant European Left 
rhetoric) there was absolutely no debate on globalisation in the party manifestos 
during the last two elections (i.e. 1997, 2002).
Yet, two important findings must be added to this picture of the Irish politico- 
economic scene. First, although the term globalisation was absent from party 
electoral debates and discourses, many dominant objects of the economic 
globalisation discourse, such as deregulation and liberalisation were widely used in 
their discourses, and generally in the nexus of ideology defined by the Irish political 
parties. But, these dominant objects were not identified -  as in most other European 
cases and certainly in the case of Greece -  as a ‘necessary evil’ to be pursued due to 
‘external pressures’ or globalisation. They were there either to be celebrated as the 
‘magic touch’ that led to the Irish miracle, or to be taken for granted. Thus these 
dominant objects did not define a zone of contestation in Irish politico-economic 
scene, but rather a zone o f non-contestation; a zone beyond ideology and party 
antagonisms (unless it was to claim the respective policies’ parenthood). The second 
point refers to the discourse of the ‘Celtic Tiger’. It could be argued that this 
discourse substituted in the 2002 electoral strategy of Fine Gael (the second biggest 
party) a discourse on globalisation. The material, however, suggests that this critique 
of the Celtic Tiger (developed by the opposition parties) was mainly cultural, leaving 
untouched the non-ideological space of Irish political economy. To be precise the 
Celtic Tiger critique did have an economic aspect but this was about the
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redistribution of wealth rather than the redefinition or reconsideration of the core 
policies generated by the aforementioned non-ideological space.
To sum up, it can be argued that there was a significant difference in the 
communication of the hegemonic/globalisation -  in terms of understandings, policies, 
strategies, rhetoric -  within the political parties’ realms in Greece and Ireland. In 
both cases it has functioned as a new ordering principle. Yet, in the case of Greece 
this seems to be expressed as a zone of contestation, whereas in the case of Ireland it 
seems to be expressed as an invisible, underlying line of agreement.
Having explored the national ideology production nexus defined by the political 
parties, the following sections turn to the juxtaposition of the social partners’ 
discourses in the two countries. While studying the latter, it is important to keep the 
developments at the EU level as a backdrop. As has already been underlined, since 
the mid-1990s the social dialogue between the European employers’ associations 
(UNICE, CEEP) and workers’ unions (ETUC) had been enhanced, while with the 
Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 this dialogue was institutionalised. These 
developments increased the interactions both between and within the workers and the 
employers at a European level.
Employers
The examination of the discourses of the Federation of Greek Industries (SEV) and 
the Irish Business and Employers Confederation (IBEC) revealed a similar pattern in 
the way these actors engaged with the hegemonic discourse of globalisation. On the 
one hand, neither of these organisations mobilised the concept of globalisation or 
developed a discourse on globalisation as such. On the other hand, both organisations 
actively promoted a de facto economic globalisation agenda. Thus although the 
concept of globalisation was not mobilised by SEV and IBEC, one finds the dominant 
objects of economic globalisation (e.g. flexibility, liberalisation and privatisation) at 
the core of their public intervention and policy suggestions.
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It is also worth emphasising the closeness of the reading of the situation2 by the 
chairpersons of SEV and IBEC. In Greece, Iason Stratos argued that globalisation 
and the need for adjustment to market forces was not something new for SEV; it was 
what SEV had been fighting for since the late 1980s. In a similar manner, Anthony 
Barry in Ireland congratulated the government in 1997 for following policies that 
largely reflected the policy objectives for which IBEC had been arguing for years.
Undoubtedly, the developments at the EU level cannot be underestimated when the 
commonalities between IBEC and SEV are considered. Thus after the mid-1990s the 
need for adjustment to the ‘new conditions’ and the need for deregulation and 
flexibility had been at the top of the policy agenda of both the EU in general and 
UNICE in particular; and both IBEC and SEV were committed to and actively 
participated in the dissemination of the debates, statements, publications and 
benchmarking exercises produced by UNICE.
On the other hand, even though the discourses of IBEC and SEV had many things in 
common and were characterised by the same pattern, there were some interesting 
differences in the context of these discourses. First, in the case of Greece and mainly 
after 1997, the concept of globalisation was becoming more and more ideologically 
charged, acquiring a negative connotation. Thus the avoidance of the use of the term 
by SEV can also be attributed to its effort to avoid associating its policy prescriptions 
with an increasingly negatively charged concept. This was not the case in Ireland. 
On the contrary, considering the language factor (i.e. English) one would expect a 
wide dissemination of the concept of globalisation, as happened for instance in the 
United Kingdom. In addition, Ireland’s proximity to the latter and to the USA 
(through the Irish Diaspora and business) would also be reasons for one to expect an 
early dissemination of the concept of globalisation in the Irish domestic public 
discourse. Contrary, however, to these expectations, the concept of globalisation is 
more visible in the discourse of SEV rather than of IBEC.
2 The ‘situation’ being the changes that had been taking place at the national and international levels 
since the early/mid 1990s.
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The second difference concerns the place of IBEC’s and SEV’s discourses within 
their broader domestic public discourses. In the case of Greece, SEV and its policy 
prescriptions were leading the pro-economic globalisation agenda. In the case of 
Ireland the situation was different. IBEC was not the most active advocate of 
economic globalisation policies. On the contrary, it faced strong criticism and 
pressure for not being more active in this regard. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the 
highest in circulation Irish newspaper, the Irish Independent, was criticising IBEC 
throughout the 1990s as being part of the ‘old economy’, a ‘dinosaur’, the voice of 
Irish big banks and semi-state companies. Thus, in contrast to SEV in Greece, IBEC 
seemed to be far from leading the pro-economic globalisation agenda in Irish public 
discourse.
Workers
Contrary to the case of employers, the workers unions in Greece and Ireland engaged, 
if in slightly different time-frames, with the concept of globalisation. Indeed 
globalisation discourse came gradually to re-order and dominate the discourses of 
GSEE and ICTU. In the case of GSEE this process was intensified in 1997, whereas 
in the case of ICTU this happened a year later.
If 1997 and 1998 signify shifts for the workers’ discourses in Greece and Ireland, the 
first important question to be raised is what was there before these shifts. What was it 
that globalisation changed or continued in the discourses of GSEE and ICTU? This 
question brings into sharp relief the issue of continuities and changes wrought in the 
wake of the discursive transformation operated by the workers.
In the case of GSEE the central concept during the period 1995-1998 was 
‘neoliberalism’. The latter seemed to have offered to GSEE both a conceptual 
framework for decoding and understanding the politico-economic environment of the 
time (i.e. 1995-97), and a point of reference for defining its interests, policies and 
broadly speaking identity. Globalisation acquired a significant position in GSEE’s 
vocabulary during 1996, but it was only in 1997 that it became the new defining 
conceptual framework through which GSEE (re)produced itself and read its 
environment. At the same time (since mid/late 1997) globalisation came to be
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increasingly conceptualised as a ‘justification instrument’ used by the government 
and the employers to promote policies against the vested interests and living 
conditions o f the workers.
In the case o f ICTU globalisation did not seem to have replaced any other dominant 
concept or point of reference. What did seem to happen was that ICTU itself changed 
in the late 1990s the way it used the concept o f globalisation. Thus, globalisation was 
present in ICTU’s discourse since 1995, i.e. much earlier than in the case of GSEE. 
Yet as has been shown in Chapter 4, this early understanding and mobilisation of the 
concept was associated rather with developing countries and broader issues of 
international development. 1998 seems to signify a shift in this regard. From being a 
developmental issue, globalisation began to be associated more and more with Ireland 
and its model o f development. This shift was completed towards the end of the 1990s, 
when globalisation became indeed a central point of reference o f the ICTU’s 
discourse. Figure 1 aims at capturing some of the aforementioned dynamics.
Figure 1: Workers’ Engagement with the Globalisation Discourse in
Greece & Ireland
Engagement with the
Globalisation discourse
'GSEE
ICTU
98 1999 2000 2001
Non-Engagement with the 
Globalisation discourse
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Contrasting the above two ‘discursive trajectories’, it could be argued that although 
globalisation came to dominate GSEE’s discourse first, it represented in fact a more 
significant shift in the case of ICTU’s discourse. In the former case, the discourse on 
globalisation was built on -  rather than against -  the former central point of reference 
of workers’ discourse, i.e. neoliberalism. Moreover, if this development is placed in 
the broader politico-economic context of the late 1990s (as this was expressed in the 
party discourses), then it can be said that GSEE’s shift was an integral part of the 
Greek public discourse emerging at the time, which had globalisation as its new point 
of reference. On the other hand, in the case of ICTU, it seems that the employment of 
the concept of globalisation in the late 1990s signified a transformation of an ‘out 
there’ developmental issue to an ‘in here’, first order, domestic issue. Through this 
employment ICTU, in essence, was contesting the ‘untouchable’ of the Irish social 
partnership, and was questioning, if not the results, then the direction of the Celtic 
Tiger’s development.
Lastly it is worth mentioning one central point of reference around which the 
workers’ discourses in both countries were converging in the late 1990s: the existence 
of different models of capitalism, and the importance of the ‘social dimension’ of the 
European model. This emphasis on the European model was gradually developed as 
an integral characteristic of the globalisation discourse of both GSEE and ICTU. 
Finally, the European and international levels should be kept as a significant 
backdrop. Of particular importance in this regard was the 85th conference of the ILO, 
in 1997, when globalisation came to the forefront of the debates within the 
international labour movement (see Chapter 3).
National Economic and Social Councils (NESCs)
The comparison of the discourses of the National Economic and Social Councils in 
Greece and Ireland (OKE and NESC respectively) is rather problematic, as the weight 
of this institution within their respective national contexts was significantly different. 
In Greece the institution was relatively new and the governments of PASOK decided 
to ignore it in their ad hoc organised ‘social dialogues’, during the second half of the 
1990s. Thus in general the voice of OKE was hardly heard, or had any significant
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impact in the Greek public discourse. The opposite can be said to be the case for the 
NESC in Ireland. The latter had been strongly associated with the Irish economic 
miracle, and indeed it was considered to be the institution which had set the strategic 
parameters of Irish development, since the late 1980s. Its voice was clearly heard 
within the Irish public discourse, and its Director, Professor Rory O’ Donnell was a 
significant public figure. Nevertheless, it is useful to think of the documents 
produced by OKE and NESC not only as representing a lower common denominator 
of the social partners’ positions, but also as attempts by the Councils’ directors to 
create (potential) strategic frameworks for action in various policy fields.
In Greece, OKE published an ‘Opinion’ on globalisation (OKE, 2000), where it 
recognised that the globalisation debate in Greece had come to be too ideologically 
driven, and thus counter-productive. Based on this understanding it tried to redirect 
the debate in a more pragmatic direction, where not only the threats but also the 
opportunities stemming from globalisation, would be at the forefront of the public 
debate. A similar public intervention occurred in Ireland. In the latter case, it seems 
that in 1998 when ICTU started to question globalisation, NESC tried to channel the 
public discourse to a more neutral understanding of the phenomenon, as a positive 
challenge and a given context for the Irish economic development.
Hence, it can be argued that in both countries the purpose of the Councils’ 
intervention was to define and promote a rather technocratic or ‘new reality’ approach 
to globalisation. The goal and the context of these interventions, however, were 
different. In the case of Greece, OKE was attempting to redirect a heavily 
ideologically charged debate, whereas in the case of Ireland NESC was attempting to 
prevent the domestic debate from becoming ideologically charged. Furthermore, in 
the case of Greece, OKE’s intervention can be seen as part of the broader polarisation 
of the public discourse produced by the globalisation discourse. In the case of Ireland, 
NESC’s intervention can be seen as an attempt to protect the non-ideological space of 
Irish politico-economic life, from the challenges presented by a diffusion of (an 
‘ideologically’ charged) globalisation discourse.
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The Church
The Church is a very important actor in both countries both due to the undisputed 
influence it has and to the nature of its membership, which transcends the dividing 
lines of political parties and organised interests. Moreover, as we have shown, both 
Archbishop Christodoulos in Greece and Cardinal Connell in Ireland adopted a very 
interventionist stance in the socio-political life of their countries.
In the case of Greece, Archbishop Christodoulos launched a ferocious attack against 
globalisation. He portrayed it as a major and immediate threat for the European 
societies in general and Greece in particular, and as a development that was 
associated with the ‘forces of evil’. Globalisation came thus to dominate church’s 
discourse in Greece. The Irish case seems to be the opposite. Although a great 
number of Cardinal Connell’s speeches and remarks in the press were examined, no 
reference to globalisation was found. What was found, however, was a ferocious 
attack on the very concept and nature of the Celtic Tiger. Nonetheless, a striking 
similarity appears when observing the focal points of the critique of globalisation in 
the case of Greek Church, with this critique of the Celtic Tiger idea. In the case of 
Christodoulos, these were national identity, tradition, Americanisation, cultural 
homogenisation, secularism, social estrangement and individualism. In the case of 
Connell they were national identity, tradition, secularism, consumerism, 
depersonalisation, as well as unchecked capitalism, poverty and exclusion. Thus, in 
both cases we have two rather secular and highly politicised church discourses, which 
although their targets were different (i.e. globalisation and the Celtic Tiger 
respectively), addressed approximately the same issues , pomted to the same 
problems, and sensed similarly the nature and consequences of the changes underway.
There is, however, one important difference in the nature of the two discourses. The 
discourse of the Greek Church was based on an outside-in logic. External forces and
3 One difference between the two discourses was the references of Archbishop Christodoulos to 
Americanisation and American cultural imperialism, references that were missing from Cardinal’s 
critique of the Celtic Tiger.
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interests had penetrated and attempted culturally to annihilate European societies, and 
thus Greece. Thus no matter how it was promoted or expressed at the national level, 
the source of the threat for the Greek Church was both external and externally driven. 
In contrast the Church discourse in Ireland, albeit stressing the same ‘symptoms’ as 
its Greek counterpart, was an inside-out discourse, a fact which was also reflected in 
its name. Its principal object was the Celtic Tiger, the most impressive ‘product’ of 
the domestic, Irish non-ideological space, and not external forces driven by 
globalisation or otherwise. It is interesting that this remained the case despite the 
concern of Pope John Paul II with globalisation4, and the global structure of the 
Catholic Church, which could act as a transmission belt of the globalisation discourse. 
Thus to address the same problems the Church in Ireland focused on the concept of 
the Celtic Tiger, whereas the Church in Greece turned to globalisation. It can be 
argued that these two stances represented two different approaches to locating and 
understanding the hegemonic. For the Greek Church the core of the hegemonic was 
to be found ‘out-there’, in forces external to Greece. For the Church in Ireland, the 
(same) hegemonic was something that was produced within Ireland, ‘in-here’ rather 
than ‘out there’. This difference may be suggestive of the different nature of the 
interplay between the hegemonic discourse of globalisation and the two countries, a 
point developed in the Conclusion of this Chapter.
4 A clear substantiation of this point is beyond the purposes of this thesis. Yet two examples, one older 
and one more recent, may be helpful. Thus, Pope John Paul II, when addressing the Vatican 
Foundation ‘Centesimus Annus -  Pro Pontifice’, in 1998, said: ‘to prevent the globalization of the 
economy from producing the harmful results of an uncontrolled expansion of private or group interests, 
it is necessary that the progressive globalization of the economy be increasingly met with a ‘global’ 
culture of solidarity attentive to the needs of the weakest’ (available on line at: 
http://www. Vatican. va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/speeches/l 998/documents/hfJp-ii_spe_09051998_ 
fondazione-cent-annus_en.html) (May 5, 2003). Similarly, in a May Day speech in Rome, in 2000, he 
was warning: ‘New realities which are forcefully affecting the productive process, such as 
globalisation of finance, of the economy, of commerce and of work, should never be allowed to violate 
the dignity and centrality of the human person or the democracy o f peoples’, and he went on to say: 
‘Globalisation is a phenomenon present today in all aspects of life, but a phenomenon which needs to 
be wisely harnessed. It is necessary to globalise solidarity too’. (BBC News, May 1, 2000, 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/europe/ 732379.stm) (September 17, 2003). In the same way, the 
Pope brought the issue o f globalisation to the heart of his welcoming remarks, during the visit of the 
US president George Bush in Rome, in 2002 (see the White House transcript of the remarks available 
on line at: http://www.usembassy.it/file2001_07/alia/ al072220.htm) (March 24, 2003).
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The Press
Up to now we have juxtaposed the ways in which important institutional actors in 
Greece and Ireland engaged with the discourse of globalisation. We have focused on 
these actors based on the assumption that they had a strategic role in the production 
and reproduction of the public discourses of their countries. Yet a study of 
domestic/public discourses without a consideration of the media would be rather 
incomplete. It is in this regard that a media sample was studied along with the above 
actors. Through such an analysis the purpose was to get a sample of the role of media 
both as an autonomous agent and as a mirror of society, i.e. both as a major agent in 
terms of reality-construction/ideology-production, and as a mirror which reflected and 
represented the prevailing social concerns and relations of power. The focus of the 
thesis has been on the press and in particular on the Sunday edition of VTMA in 
Greece, and the daily edition of The Irish Times in Ireland.
The quantitative comparison of the aforementioned media sources, with regard to the 
concept of globalisation, came to enhance the picture that had already been formed 
through the analysis of the other institutional actors. Compared to the references to 
globalisation found in VIMA, the references found in The Irish Times were minimal. 
Specifically, the absolute number of references found in the daily Irish paper (6 
papers per week) was lower than those found in the Sunday edition of the Greek 
paper (i.e. 1 paper per week) each and every year, throughout the period 1997-2000. 
Considering that The Irish Times is in English (so, a new term did not have to be 
created, and/or the term globalisation did not have to be translated, or otherwise 
appropriated for domestic use) then indeed the extremely low number of references 
found in The Irish Times (in comparison to VIMA) was contrary to all expectations. 
This situation seemed to change after the mid-2000, and in 2001 the references to 
globalisation in The Irish Times exceeded those found in VIMA (always in the 
Sunday edition). Yet further research is required to establish whether this was a 
temporal or sustainable trend.
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It also needs to be stressed here that globalisation gradually dominated the press 
coverage in Greece -  at least to the extent that VIMA is representative of this 
coverage -  both as an object and as a prism of analysis; both as news and as a way of 
reading the news. Furthermore, this domination reflected the dominant position of 
globalisation in the discourses of the key institutional actors. The opposite 
conclusions can be drawn in the case of Ireland. Globalisation was not there (i.e. in 
the public discourse as this was reflected in the press) either as a news item, or as a 
means of reasoning. Moreover globalisation was not implicated in the discourses of 
institutional actors, as these discourses were reflected and reconstructed in the press. 
Thus, it can be said that the hegemonic/globalisation that seemed to speak stronger 
and stronger to and within the Greek public discourse after 1997, by contrast seemed 
to be virtually absent, or at least invisible, in the Irish public discourse, up to the year 
2000.
Synopsis & Conclusions
We have studied the communication of globalisation discourse in Greece and Ireland 
during the period 1995-2001 (including 2002 in the case of Ireland). Based on the 
above juxtaposition and the primary material presented in Chapters 3 and 4 we can 
summarise the findings of the thesis as follows. The discourse of globalisation, as 
manifested in the mobilisation of the concept of globalisation itself, dominated the 
Greek public discourse. It became an integral part of the vocabulary of the key- 
institutional actors, including the press’s everyday commentary. It became a new 
means/filter through which actors’ identities, interests, targets and strategies were 
understood, negotiated, expressed and reproduced. Either as an ‘external 
structure’/‘context’, or as an ‘opportunity’, ‘justification instrument’ or ‘threat’, it 
came to define the terms of what was politically, economically, socially and culturally 
at stake. The above picture includes an exception: the Federation of Greek Industries. 
Yet overall the study of Greek public discourse seems to verify and exemplify the 
model of hegemonic discourse communication presented in Chapter 1. For the Greek 
public discourse was restructured and redefined in the terms of the hegemonic 
discourse of globalisation. Put differently the ‘hegemonic’ (i.e. globalisation) came 
to provide the new conditions for the reproduction of the ‘public’ (i.e. the Greek
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polity); or, to be more precise, the hegemonic was these new conditions, this new 
social technology of the public’s reproduction. Is this model also confirmed by the 
Irish case?
The main finding from the study of the Irish case is that the object, or referent, 
globalisation left the Irish public discourse relatively untouched, especially up to the 
year 2000. Globalisation was not invoked in the vocabularies of the key institutional 
actors, did not appear to emerge as a new zone of contestation in the politico- 
economic life, and, based on the press sample, was not -  at least in any significant 
way -  implicated in the commentary of everyday news. Nor was it there as a 
significant news item. The only exception to this picture was the ICTU and later the 
Labour Party, but this exception cannot meaningfully be compared with the 
transformation observed in the Greek case, or with the transformation described at the 
proposed hegemonic discourse communication model. If one adds to this picture, the 
language factor (English), the fact that the Irish model of the economy (Anglo-Saxon) 
was conducive to economic globalisation, the status of the Irish economy (the most 
globalised in the world), the changes underway in the Irish society (reflexive 
modernisation), and the fact that the late 1990s were the high-days of globalisation 
discourse internationally, then the absence of a discourse on globalisation within the 
Irish public discourse is indeed surprising.
Yet as we have shown in Chapter 3, during the same period the Irish public discourse 
and politico-economic life were dominated by meanings and practices that were 
constitutive of the concept of economic globalisation. Thus although the concept of 
globalisation was absent from Irish public discourse, the main components of 
economic globalisation were dominating actors’ discourses and actions, and were 
defining the conditions for the reproduction of Irish public discourse. This set of 
meanings and practices, however, did not bring about a new zone of contestation in 
the Irish society as in the Greek case. Rather the opposite was the case. These 
meanings and practices emerged as if they were beyond the spheres of politics and 
ideology. They delineated not a zone of contestation, but a zone of fundamental 
consensus; the underlying givens of Irish politics and economics, upon which the 
whole political life seemed to be based. These givens did not seem to be directly 
contested at any time during the period under examination, but they did seem to
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produce a cultural critique. The discourse of the Celtic Tiger did seem to emerge as a 
new way of conceptualising and negotiating what was at stake in modem Irish society 
and culture.
Thus in the second half of the 1990s, the Irish public discourse seemed to be 
reproduced under a new ordering principle, based on the meanings and objects of the 
economic globalisation discourse. As in the case of Greece, this principle acted as a 
new means through which actors’ identities, interests, targets and strategies were 
understood, negotiated and reproduced. In addition, although in the Irish case these 
meanings and practices did not come to be unified under the rubric of globalisation, 
they were constituent elements of the hegemonic discourse of globalisation, and they 
did set the parameters of what was at stake in Irish politics, economics, society and 
culture.
Based on the above synopsis of the Greek and Irish cases we can draw the following 
conclusions.
First, that the reproduction of the Greek and Irish public discourses during the period 
under investigation was dominated to a significant extent by the same meanings, 
practices and points of reference. This does not mean that one finds the same 
practices (e.g. the flexibilisation of labour market) to have been implemented at the 
same extent in the two countries. It means that -  either as taken-for-granted 
assumptions or as highly politicised and contested policy concepts and strategies -  
these meanings and practices functioned as focal points that defined the terms of 
reproduction of their public discourses, and the stakes, identities, strategies and power 
relationships of the actors involved. The ever-increasing power of the employers to 
set the domestic agenda and define the rules of the game in both countries must be 
read as part of this broader rearrangement of the domestic discourses in the term of 
the new hegemonic. In this regard globalisation discourse, as a delineation either of 
the socially given, or of the socially contested, seems to have supplied the common 
ordering principle (based on a specific stock of objects, meanings, practices and 
policies) on the basis of which both the Greek and the Irish public discourses were 
being restructured. Finally, this ordering principle was generating within both the
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Greek and Irish public discourses a certain ‘globalised’ understanding of the 
international.
Yet how do we deal with the lack of linguistic expression in the same terms in Ireland 
and Greece? The term globalisation is important within this framework. Its spread 
cannot but be associated with the new mental map that was produced by the 
hegemonic discourse it referred to. The study of the hegemonic discourse, however, 
is something more than a study of a name. Names do matter in the study of 
hegemonic discourses, and indeed names and naming must themselves be 
conceptualised and studied as social practices. But a hegemonic discourse cannot be 
reduced to any of its elements (see Chapter 2), even if this is the very name of the 
discourse itself. Thus the term globalisation constitutes only a part of the broader set 
of ‘practices and meanings’ that the hegemonic discourse of globalisation consists of.
The second conclusion to be drawn is already apparent from the preceding analysis. 
Although the stock of meanings and practices that was present in the two countries 
was, with few exceptions (e.g. the term globalisation) the same, the way in which this 
stock was present in the two cases was fundamentally different. In Greece the 
hegemonic/globalisation was communicated, and thus materialised, as a multi-level 
struggle over a new political. Most social, political, economic and cultural stakes had 
to be thought through, redefined and fought for anew within the Greek society. In 
Ireland the hegemonic/globalisation was communicated, and thus materialised, as a 
set of practices and meanings that stood outside the political. From the very 
beginning it emerged and was experienced as a social technology that was succeeding 
in elevating Irish society above the traditional misery and poorness of the past. Thus 
the hegemonic/globalisation offered the basis on which new sociocultural and 
politico-economic stakes could be negotiated, but in itself the hegemonic remained 
beyond contestation or deliberation. Thus the hegemonic/globalisation materialised 
fundamentally differently in the cases of Greece and Ireland. In the first it was 
manifested as a new political, whereas in the second as a new apolitical. For 
convenience, the thesis henceforth refers to these two different manifestations as 
facets of the hegemonic.
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The last conclusion is a more tentative one and refers to the dynamics of the 
communication/materialisation of the globalisation discourse in the two countries. 
Thus, for most of the period under investigation the different facets of the hegemonic 
seemed to grow stronger and stronger; whilst everything regarding globalisation was 
becoming political in Greece, it was becoming apolitical in Ireland. The more 
economic globalisation practices were generated in Ireland, the more economic 
globalisation was politicised in Greece. During the latter part of the period under 
investigation, however, these opposing dynamics seemed to change, and divergence 
seemed to have given place to convergence between the political and the apolitical 
facets of the hegemonic. Thus, in Ireland since 2000 there has been gradually 
developed a trend towards the politicisation of the ‘apolitical’5. This dynamic had at 
least two sources: (a) There was a domestic dynamic towards politicisation that was 
led by the failure -  real or perceived -  of the ‘apolitical’ and its underlying 
institutional apparatus (mainly the social partnership) to fulfil certain promises (e.g. 
reduction of social disparities, recognition of unionism), (b) There was also a 
dynamic that was generated by the communication within Ireland of Ireland’s image 
abroad, and in particular within the European Union. This interaction led 
domestically to discussions on the purpose and desirability of the Celtic Tiger’s 
policies and practices. On the other hand, a similar but reverse trend can be traced in 
the case of Greece. Thus, some highly politicised issues, such as part-time 
employment, through their quotidianisation seemed to be treated as less and less 
political within the Greek public discourse. This quotidianisation should not 
necessarily be understood as a passive process. Thus for instance in the case of the 
labour movement in Greece, the struggle against the ‘neoliberal prescription’ of 
labour market flexibility during the early-to-mid 1990s, was transformed as time 
passed by into a new bargain on what the (‘inevitable’) promotion of flexibility 
should be exchanged with.
5 The adjective ‘gradual’ is very important here, as even after the 2000 the Fine Gael’s critique of 
Celtic Tiger did not focus on, or dispute, the policies that had produced this Tiger, but rather on the 
cultural consequences of these policies; thus leaving relatively intact the non-ideological space. A 
special reference needs to be made here to the discourse of the Church before 2000. Thus, the Catholic 
Church developed from the outset (i.e. at least since the mid-1990s) a strong critique of the cultural 
consequences of the policies produced by the non-ideological space; a critique that came by time to 
include a critique of the followed economic policies themselves. Thus elements of contestation of the 
‘apolitical space’ within the Irish public discourse can be found even before 2000, in the discourse of 
the Church.
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Hence, the convergence of the two communication/materialisation processes became 
possible only after the two hegemonic facets had reached a certain degree of 
reification, within the respective public discourses. It was this reification that started 
to make visible the givens of the Irish politico-economic system and their respective 
limits and limitations. In an opposite way, it was also through their use, denial or 
resistance at every possible instance within the Greek public discourse that aspects of 
the globalisation discourse were reified as a new reality in the Greek context and 
redefined agents’ conceptualisations and strategies. Finally, as we saw in the study of 
social partners’ discourses, the EU had a significant role in this convergence process, 
acting as a powerful generator of economic globalisation objects, policies and 
practices.
To conclude, a common set of practices and meanings, i.e. a common social 
technology, dominated in the reproduction of both the Greek and Irish public 
discourses in the second half of the 1990s. Yet, the way in which this social 
technology was communicated/materialised in the two countries was fundamentally 
different. In the case of Greece this new social technology emerged as a new field of 
struggle, a new zone of contestation, a new ‘political’ (the meanings and the practices 
of which were present and were contested at all the levels of the social, political, 
economic and cultural life). In the case of Ireland this same new technology emerged 
as a new ‘apolitical’, which was all-present at the Irish everyday life, but it was 
present as a social technology that was beyond ideology and contestation; it was 
socially taken as given, as granted. Finally, it seems that after a period of divergence, 
the distance between the two different ways of communication started to reduce. In 
Ireland aspects of the imperceptible, the apolitical started to enter into the sphere of 
the socially visible, the socially disputable, the sphere of the political, whereas in 
Greece, highly contested aspects of the globalisation discourse started to acquire an 
apolitical, taken for granted character.
This Chapter juxtaposed the communication of the hegemonic discourse of 
globalisation in Greece and Ireland, and offered conclusions on the nature of the 
interplay between this hegemonic discourse and the two countries. Chapter 6 
elaborates on how these conclusions inform our understanding of hegemonic 
discourses and their communication.
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS
This last Chapter focuses on the reasons for the different communication/ 
materialisation process of the hegemonic discourse of globalisation in Greece and 
Ireland. The issue at stake here is how the differences in the communication of the 
hegemonic discourse are to be explained. The Chapter concludes with an analysis of 
what we can learn and what we do not learn about the interaction between the 
‘hegemonic’ and the ‘public’ from the comparison of the Greek and Irish cases, and 
how these lessons shed new light on our understanding and analysis of hegemonic 
discourses.
Models of Political Economy, Domestic Institutional Arrangements and 
Hegemonic Discourses
The nature of the political economy of the two countries is a key factor in the 
explanation of the observed different aspects of the hegemonic. As was argued in 
Chapter 2, although the hegemonic itself cannot be reduced to any particularity, to 
any specific interests and conditions, the origins of a hegemonic discourse can be 
traced in particular interests and material/power conditions. Based on this framework, 
one could argue that there must be a certain degree of ‘genealogical compatibility’ 
between the conditions in which a hegemonic discourse originates, and the conditions 
that a hegemonic discourse in turn generates. Thus in our case, one could assume that 
the practices and meanings that were generated by the hegemonic discourse of 
globalisation (e.g. liberalisation, flexibility, deregulation, privatisation, tax-cuts) 
would be more or less taken for granted, or smoothly absorbed in political economies 
that were based on institutional arrangements that were conducive with the 
globalisation discourse (the Anglo-Saxon model in the case of Ireland), whereas they
would generate controversy, tension and clashes in political economies that were 
based on different, non-compatible arrangements (the continental/Mediterranean 
model in the case of Greece). For example, the reduction of state control over the 
economy and the deregulation of national economic frameworks have been defining 
characteristics of the hegemonic discourse of globalisation. Nevertheless, whereas 
the contemporary Irish political economy, as an Anglo-Saxon type, was characterised 
by low state control over the economy and a highly deregulated economic framework, 
the Greek political economy had the opposite characteristics, i.e. high state control of 
the economy and a strict regulatory framework (see Appendix B). Consequently, one 
could claim that whereas the hegemonic was ‘Irish-friendly’, it was, in contrast, 
dismantling of the practices that dominated in the Greek political economy.
The above argumentation and its rationale draw mainly from the findings and the 
conclusions that have been put forward from the ‘goodness of fit’ literature, mainly in 
European Studies. The main assumption of this literature is that, the degree and 
intensity of the adaptational pressures at the national level depend on the degree of 
the ‘fit’ or ‘misfit’ (i.e. the compatibility) of the national institutions and practices 
with those promoted by the European Union (among others see, Knill and Lehmkuhl, 
1999; Borzel and Risse, 2000; Caporaso et al, 2001).
Yet when considering the role of political economy in the study of hegemonic 
discourse communication one must be cautious to avoid a circular logic that turns a 
goodness of fit approach into a self-proof explanation. First and most significantly 
we have already argued that although a hegemonic discourse originates in particular 
interests and conditions, it acquires an independent dynamic that not only cannot be 
reduced to, but also transforms the very conditions and interests that gave birth to it in 
the first place. Thus the outcome of the hegemonic re-arrangement at the domestic 
level is far from being pre-determined. It is this independent and un-determined 
effect of the hegemonic discourse that breaks down the circular, self-proved 
explanation of the goodness of fit approach. Thus, the analysis of globalisation as a 
hegemonic discourse suggests an independent and significant reordering effect even 
on political economies that are ‘genealogically compatible’ with it. Consequently, 
although the nature of the political economy does affect the 
communication/materialisation process, it hardly determines it. Otherwise we end up
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with a closed, circular system that both analytically and conceptually is premised on 
the absence and the impossibility of social change.
Furthermore, even when the level of osmosis between a political economy and a 
hegemonic discourse is high, one would expect that social groups that are on the 
losing-side of the changes underway would protest and try to block the respective 
governmental policies. To put this differently, the fact that the contemporary Irish 
political economy belongs to the Anglo-Saxon model, does not mean that the changes 
in the domestic environment and the domestic distribution of power, produced by the 
hegemonic discourse would escape, if not public protest, at least public deliberation1. 
In this regard one must not conflate the (non-) power of an actor with its willingness 
to dispute or deliberate on existing and changing practices. For instance, the fact that 
the ICTU and its leaders and members were socialised within an Anglo-Saxon 
politico-economic environment, does not mean that when ICTU’s suggestions and 
preferences were marginalised in the policy process, ICTU would not protest, or 
would not, however unsuccessfully, try to block governmental policies that are 
disadvantageous for its members. The same goes for the ICTU’s preferences. For 
instance the fact that the Irish labour market was flexible compared to most of its 
European counterparts, does not mean that the labour force in this country had a fixed 
preference in favour of flexibility practices, and that it would steadily support policies 
that enhanced the flexibility of the labour market.
Finally, an uncritical emphasis on the role of the models of political economy runs the 
risk of reducing these models to ahistorical constructs, beyond change and social 
agency. For instance, in Britain in the 1980s, Thatcher was functioning within a 
traditional Anglo-Saxon political economy but, at the same time, was changing the 
nature of this political economy by, among other, reversing the long-established 
tradition of Keynesianism, putting an end to the powers of the trade unions, and 
minimising the welfare state provisions. Along the same lines, the rise of the social 
partnership in Ireland in 1987, although it took place within specific politico-
1 A parallel would be relevant here with the development of a discourse on globalisation in the United 
Kingdom, the par-excellence Anglo-Saxon political economy in Europe. Yet a full elaboration of this 
example and its evidential basis is beyond the scope of this thesis. For the development o f the 
globalisation discourse in the United Kingdom see Hay and Smith, 2005.
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economic arrangements, in fact transformed the Irish political economy, producing a 
new hybrid model. Thus, the models of political economy should always be 
examined in dynamic terms and not as end-products. This points to a weakness of the 
existing project that limits its focus only on the second half of the 1990s.
Based on this analysis it can be argued that the fact that Ireland was an Anglo-Saxon 
economy cannot fully account for the way in which the globalisation discourse was 
communicated/materialised. Thus although the importance of the nature of the 
political economy in the hegemonic discourse communication process is undisputable, 
a clear correlation between the nature of the political economy and the nature of the 
communication/materialisation of a hegemonic discourse cannot be established, or at 
least cannot be extracted from the case studies considered by this project.
To get a picture that can better account for the different facets of the hegemonic, one 
must qualify the role of the models of political economy with a study of the case and 
time specific (domestic) conditions that affect the capacity and willingness of the 
various actors to dispute or deliberate on the practices and policies generated by the 
hegemonic.
In this regard, the existence of a highly-institutionalised, well-functioning and ever- 
inclusive social partnership, at the heart of the politico-economic developments in 
Ireland cannot but be considered instrumental in the explanation of the 
communication of globalisation discourse in this country. Thus although Ireland is 
classified as an Anglo-Saxon political economy in the comparative political economy 
literature, it is very different from the ideal type of the Anglo-Saxon model, as its 
political economy has been characterised throughout the period under investigation 
by a strong and expanding consociational institutional base (a defining characteristic 
of the continental model of economy). It seems that this distinctive characteristic of 
the Irish political economy played a crucial role in the way in which the hegemonic 
discourse of globalisation was communicated at the national level. Thus, the effects 
that were generated by the production of new winners and losers, inherent in any 
hegemonic discourse communication process, were mediated, negotiated and resolved, 
at the level of this consociational mechanism, ever-dominant in the Irish politico- 
economic life. Finally, the fact that many heads or representatives of public
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institutions in Ireland, had grown up together or had personal/family relationships, 
due to the small size of the Irish society, must have facilitated the above dynamics2.
Consequently, it could be argued that it was on the one hand the genealogical 
compatibility between the globalisation discourse and the Irish political economy, and 
on the other hand the strong consociational base of the Irish political economy that 
led to the apolitical facet of the hegemonic, observed in the Irish case. Respectively, 
it could also be argued that the effects from the incompatibility between the 
hegemonic discourse of globalisation and the Greek political economy, were 
exacerbated by the overly fragmented and particularistic structure of interest 
representation that characterise the Greek politico-economic life, and this is why one 
observes so strong a political facet of the hegemonic in the Greek case.
The above combination of a general models-of-political-economy perspective with a 
case-specific, domestic-institutional-arrangements analysis appears to improve 
significantly our understanding of the nature of hegemonic discourse communication. 
It takes into consideration, not only factors concerning the degree of genealogical 
compatibility between hegemonic discourses and national political economies, but 
also factors concerning the way in which different societies negotiate social change 
domestically, i.e. whether there are strong or weak social mediation structures of 
interest-representation, and whether these structures promote consensus building, or 
rather enhance the reproduction of social divisions and antagonisms. This analysis 
leads to the following 2x2 matrix in the study of hegemonic discourse communication.
2 Personal interview with Peter Cassells, 27-06-2002.
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Table 1: Studying Hegemonic Discourse Communication: 
a Hypothesis on the Determinants of the Facets of the Hegemonic -  
The Case of Globalisation in the 1990s
Political Economy 
compatible with the practices 
and meanings, generated by 
the hegemonic discourse
Political Economy 
not compatible with the 
practices and meanings, 
generated by the hegemonic 
discourse
Consociational political 
economy with a strong 
and well functioning 
social partnership
0
‘Strong apolitical facet’: 
smooth, passive, imperceptive 
communication/materialisation 
process 
(e.g. Ireland)
0
(e.g. Austria, Sweden)
Non-consociational, 
fragmented political 
economy, with a weak 
or marginalised social 
partnership
E
(e.g. United Kingdom)
0
‘Strong political facet’: 
high politicisation and 
polarisation, increased 
controversy and contestation 
in the communication/ 
materialisation process 
(e.g. Greece)
Table 1 puts forward a number of hypotheses and research puzzles that are beyond 
the purposes of this thesis. For instance, one needs to conduct further research to 
double check the conclusions presented at boxes ‘A’ and ‘D \ In addition, one needs 
to extend the research to cases that fall under the categories ‘B’ (e.g. Austria and 
Sweden) and ‘C* (e.g. United Kingdom), in order to fill in the missing pieces of the 
jigsaw.
At any rate this matrix -  and its capacity to capture the hegemonic discourse 
communication process -  remains tentative, even with respect to the categories ‘A’ 
and ‘D \ It is indeed true that the structure of interest representation comes to 
complement the models of political economy analysis, thus significantly advancing 
our understanding of the determinants of the hegemonic discourse communication 
process. Yet while the structure of interest representation tells us important things
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about how a public discourse is reproduced, it tells us little about actors’ preferences 
and understandings. To put this more clearly, although the study of these mediation 
structures tells us much about where and with whom the actors speak, it tells us little 
about what they say. Thus it seems that the problem mentioned with regard to the 
models of political economy, applies also to the structures of interest representation. 
The fact that a political economy is based on consociational institutional 
arrangements does not mean that the social actors that are negatively affected by the 
hegemonic discourse will not react; it just means that their reactions will be brought 
into and negotiated within the framework of these institutional arrangements. This 
argument is also conducive with the recent findings of Vivien Schmidt (2000, 2001, 
2002) on the communication of ideas. Broadly interpreted, these findings are as 
follows. In political economies that are characterised by non-consociational 
institutional arrangements, the process of ideas-communication focuses on the 
attempt of key policy groups to persuade directly the public about the necessity and 
appropriateness of these ideas and the respective policies. On the other hand in 
consociational political economies the focus is on the attempt of policy groups to 
agree among themselves.
Vivien Schmidt’s hypothesis seems to be confirmed by the Greek case. All the key 
social actors seem to struggle to persuade the public about what is necessary, 
appropriate and desired. It is not, however, confirmed in the case of Ireland. Thus, 
although a broad, public debate on economic globalisation policies did not take place 
in Ireland, in accordance with the hypothesis, one finds no relevant debate in the 
interacting discourses of the relevant actors and forums (mainly the social 
partnership), as the hypothesis would have it. Thus, in Ireland, it is not that the social 
partners were negotiating economic globalisation policies among themselves, but 
rather that the promotion of these policies, let alone the policies themselves, were 
taken as a given; that is, they were beyond discussion and public or intra policy group 
deliberation3.
3 To address this issue Schmidt would refer to background assumptions of an uncontested ‘master 
discourse’ that, arguably, had dominated Irish public discourse in the 1980s (see Schmidt, 2002: 
Chapter 5). Such a historisation of the observed phenomenon is very important, yet still not capable 
of explaining why such debates did take place in the UK (for the latter case see for instance Hay and 
Smith, 2005).
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Accordingly, the Irish case suggests that the model of political economy and the 
mediation structure of interest representation cannot on their own account for all 
facets of the hegemonic; it cannot offer a conclusive explanation of the hegemonic 
discourse communication process. It seems that in order to grasp the apolitical facet 
observed in the Irish case, one needs to dig deeper into the reasons that affected social 
actors’ understandings, and their capacity and willingness to dispute or deliberate on 
the meanings and practices of the globalisation discourse. Following such a deep, 
case-specific, analytically bottom-up route it becomes apparent that the social 
technology (i.e. the hegemonic) that in the Greek case came at a certain historical 
period to be communicated and materialised by the ‘public’ as a new zone of 
contestation concerning the redistribution of wealth and power, in the Irish case was 
communicated and materialised by all strata of Irish society as a historically unique 
economic miracle, a social technology of prosperity and wealth-generation. 
Following this reasoning, it can also be argued that it was this economic miracle 
experience, that defined what was conceivable and what was non-conceivable, what 
was part of politics and what was beyond politics, what in general could be spoken of 
and how, within the Irish public discourse of the time. Additionally it can be argued 
that this prosperity was so deeply and widely felt in Ireland, that it marginalised or 
made (temporarily) irrelevant any social clash as to who gets what; i.e. the great 
majority of the population was experiencing so absolute a gain in the conditions of 
their everyday life, that until the end of the 1990s, relative-gains considerations 
remained beyond considerable public deliberation.
A significant question arises at this point: could the study of the model of political 
economy and/or the structure of interest representation account for the economic 
miracle and its impact on the Irish case? Our answer is negative; that is, the factor of 
an economic miracle has distinctive qualities that go beyond the more general factors 
discussed above. Thus, considering the nature of the hegemonic discourse, such a 
miracle could only (or most probably) have taken place within an Anglo-Saxon 
economy; and the existence of a (continental) well-functioning social partnership in 
Ireland played a crucial role in this miracle. But although these conditions appear 
necessary for the economic miracle, they cannot by any means be conclusively 
considered also sufficient for its emergence.
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Furthermore, one cannot easily generalise the findings of the Irish case, as the factor 
of economic progress and prosperity should not be expected to have exactly the same 
effects on just any public discourse or national context. In this regard, in the case of 
Ireland some further historical contextualisation adds important details on the nature 
of the communication of the hegemonic. Thus it seems that in the Irish case, this 
economic miracle disrupted the continuity of a generations-long collective memory
fhand social self-portraying that was driven by the potato-famine of the 19 century. 
Hence, it was the positive social shock produced by the above disruption that ‘placed’ 
the practices, mechanisms and policies of the economic miracle beyond the sphere of 
the socially contested and negotiable, beyond the sphere of the political.
To conclude, the nature of political economy and the nature of institutional 
arrangements that define how a society domestically negotiates social change seem 
indeed to be central to the hegemonic discourse communication process. Yet, the 
findings of this thesis suggest that no conclusive correlation can be established 
between specific types of national contexts and specific modes of hegemonic 
discourse communication. In this regard, more research on more cases could shed 
new light. The findings of the thesis, however, suggest that a complete reading and 
understanding of the different facets of the hegemonic cannot but finally rest upon 
certain, case-specific qualitative characteristics and historically specific factors. 
Consequently, it can be argued that understanding and studying the hegemonic entails 
moving beyond the general categories of models of political economy and 
institutional arrangements to more case and time specific factors that affect the 
dynamics between the ‘hegemonic’ and the ‘publics’. To this end, one cannot 
underestimate historical contingency, without underestimating the social realities 
under examination.
This section has attempted to explore and elucidate the nature of the hegemonic 
discourse communication process. In so doing it evaluated the role of the various 
factors engaged in this process, and pointed out how our findings contribute to 
various approaches and bodies of literature within international and comparative 
politics, and political economy. In this regard, in the evolving interdisciplinary 
debate among the various strands of institutional analysis, this thesis takes the part of 
the approaches that underline the crucial role of the translation process of
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international ideas, discourses, policies or paradigms, at the national level4. Yet, the 
thesis attempted to take a step further. It focused on a certain type of discourses that 
concern the production of (social) life itself, and argued that in the case of these 
discourses this ‘translation process’ is a constitutive part of the writing of the 
‘original text’. That is why the thesis employed a vocabulary based on the concepts 
of the hegemonic and of commumcation/materialisation, rather than one based on the 
concept of translation.
Having completed in the last two Chapters the juxtaposition of our case-studies and 
the analysis of what we can and cannot learn about the hegemonic discourse 
communication process, it is important to return to our definition of the hegemonic 
discourse. Thus, the main task at this final section is to outline the fundamentals and 
evaluate the potentials of a Hegemonic Discourse Approach (HDA).
Thoughts Towards a Hegemonic Discourse Approach
Hegemonic discourses have been defined in this thesis as historically specific, 
overarching social technologies concerning the (re)production of social life. In the 
approach proposed here, the stuff of hegemonic discourses is both material and non­
material5. For instance a hegemonic discourse can be equally manifested in the way a 
building is built or in the way in which a commercial transaction is conducted. 
Furthermore, and equally important, the meanings and practices of which a 
hegemonic discourse consists are not created in a laboratory. They are the product of, 
and reflect, specific material conditions, technological developments and power 
relationships, although they are not reducible to, or detachable from any of these 
factors.
4 A significant contribution to this debate is the edited volume The Rise o f  Neoliberalism and 
Institutional Analysis, published in 2001. There, John Campbell and Ove Pedersen (2001) gather and 
discuss contributions from all the strands of institutional analysis, namely rational choice, plus 
historical, organisational and discursive institutionalism. For the issue of national translations see the 
sophisticated chapter by Peter Kjaer and Ove Pedersen (2001) ‘Translating Liberalization: 
Neoliberalism in the Danish Negotiated Economy’.
5 Along these lines Ernesto Laclau argues: ‘by discourse we should not understand simply speech and 
writing, i.e. there is nothing specifically linguistic about it’. He also goes as far as to argue that ‘[t]he 
notion o f discourse could.. .be replaced by that of practice’ (see, Ernesto Laclau and Roy Bhaskar, 
1998: 9).
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Throughout the thesis our aim has been to suggest a way of conceptualising and 
analysing Hegemonic Discourses, i.e. the changing conditions of social-life 
reproduction. The basic premises of the proposed Hegemonic Discourse Approach 
(HDA) are as follows:
A Hegemonic Discourse Approach aims at explicating how the universe of world 
politics and economics (what can be defined as the international) is (re)produced and 
changes. It is important to stress here that HDA is not understood as a theory in its 
own right. Rather, it is put forward as a mode of social inquiry that offers a method 
of ‘isolating’ -  in a Foucaultian, archaeological sense -  the international, in order to 
study its conditions of production, reproduction and change. Thus, we propose HDA 
as an analytical framework for studying the biopolitics of the international, which is 
ultimately the power politics o f social life; the study of how social life, having entered 
‘into the order of knowledge and power’ of the international (see Foucault, 1978: 
141-142), becomes the main stake of politics.
Within this framework, the basic assumption of HDA is that each and every 
‘international’ is characterised by a certain hegemonic, i.e. a specific set of meanings 
and practices that dominate in the process through which the international is 
reproduced and thus changed. We suggest that this hegemonic can be thought of and 
studied as a social technology -  a mode of organising and producing societies, 
invented by human beings themselves. Thus it is suggested that in order to study and 
understand the international we need to study and understand the hegemonic; how it 
is structured, how it functions, where it is to be found and studied.
HDA suggests that the strategic field of the hegemonic is everyday life; in fact it is 
premised that the hegemonic is about the definition of a certain everydayness, i.e. of a 
certain way of everyday life reproduction. This definition of everydayness cannot be 
based on physical violence or direct imposition. It should be conceptualised as a
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process of ‘making up citizens’ (Rose and Miller, 1992); a process that invests in life- 
in-freedom rather than in life-in-subjugation6.
To capture this hegemonic the approach proposed here suggests that we need to turn 
to the domestic, and compare and contrast the reproduction of different societies 
during the same historical period. It further suggests that we need to focus on the 
social institutions that play a dominant role in the production of ideology at a national 
level (for instance political parties, religion institutions, organised interests, the press, 
the army; these institutions differ from case to case, from country to country).
At this point the question becomes, what can HDA offer to social research and 
practice? We would argue that a Hegemonic Discourse Approach favours a much 
needed bottom-up, agent-centric approach to world politics and economics. Thus, it 
is not that Greece and Ireland were forced to implement an external, already well- 
defined set of practices and meanings called globalisation. Instead, globalisation is 
what these countries have been pro-actively producing through their actions. The aim 
of such an approach is not to deny historically specific constrains and limitations. 
The aim is to avoid a bland, deterministic understanding of what is ‘out there’, and 
what this ‘out there’ does. In the policy process one very often comes across the 
argument that ‘this or that must be done due to external powers/pressures’. It is 
exactly these ‘powers/pressures’ and their relationship to the suggested course of 
action, that are under problematisation in a Hegemonic Discourse Approach. Thus, in 
policy terms HDA aims at questioning a narrow deterministic approach to policy­
making; it denies a policy-making that is deprived of politics. Furthermore, a 
Hegemonic Discourse Approach aims at opening, rather than closing, the question of 
what is possible in a specific historical period and what a state can do within a certain 
historical context.
The Hegemonic Discourse Approach offers also a useful analytical tool to study the 
dynamics of social change. In this regard, it can be argued that this project managed
6 Along these lines Rose and Miller (1992) argue in relation to biopower: ‘[It] is not so much a matter 
of imposing constraints upon citizens as of ‘making up’ citizens capable of bearing a kind o f regulated 
freedom. Personal autonomy is not the antithesis of political power, but a key term in its exercise, the 
more so because most individuals are not merely the subjects of power but play a part in its operations’ 
(Rose and Miller 1992: 174).
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to capture and study globalisation in action. By focusing on the reproduction of 
public discourses -  analytically independent from the globalisation discourse -  it 
managed to capture what globalisation is and when it emerged; and how it influenced 
the reproduction of these public discourses. In this way we get an anatomy of the 
hegemonic and its function, thus also getting a detailed picture of how human 
societies become what they are. In this way, HDA can offer a powerful tool for 
demystifying the ‘unchangeable’ or the ‘universal’ of what are in fact historically- 
specific social structures or practices.
More broadly, by conceptualising the hegemonic as a human technology, HDA 
aspires at opening an avenue of reflecting on the human condition as a condition of 
our own making, rather than as a condition externally given or otherwise externally 
determined. It thus aims at bringing the subject and its importance to the forefront of 
the theorising and practicing of world politics and economics. Milan Kundera opens 
his Book o f Laughter and Forgetting by saying that ‘the struggle of man against 
power is the struggle of memory against forgetting’. This thesis has tried to argue 
that power, the hegemonic, rather than being something external to human life, is a 
defining characteristic of the human condition. In this regard we very much share 
Foucault’s tireless effort to ‘understand how we have been trapped in our own 
history’ (Foucault, 1982: 210). Nevertheless, forgetting may remain a significant 
factor in the equation of social change. More often than not, people, human societies 
tend to take their everydayness as given and externally imposed, and mainly try to 
enjoy their life in their ‘free time’. We, many times, prefer to forget, or to externalise, 
the repetitiveness, the banality of our everydayness. If, however, the latter is merely a 
human technology, a human product, then it may be crucial to cease considering it as 
externally given, as the ‘system’, ‘real life’ etc. There may be more space for agency, 
change and imagination in human history. To this end, one must not underestimate 
the emancipatory potential of reflecting.
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EPILOGUE
The thesis: from fragments to an ontological point
The thesis aspired to open a new intellectual field, to raise an ontological point. 
Domestic structures and institutions, ideology production, discourse and (everyday) 
life were brought together in an attempt to reflect on the conditions of the production, 
reproduction and change of social life. Names (e.g. globalisation, Celtic tiger, 
deregulation), texts (e.g. political manifestos, annual reviews, newspapers), policies 
and practices (e.g. liberalisation, privatisation, deregulation, the institutionalisation of 
social partnerships, tax cuts, flexibility policies in labour markets), national actors and 
institutions (e.g. political and religious leaders, political parties, workers’ unions, the 
church, the press), publics (Greece and Ireland), international actors and institutions 
(e.g. EU, UNICE, ETUC, ELO) and discourses (e.g. globalisation, the Celtic tiger, the 
European social model, liberalisation, as well as the Greek and Irish public 
discourses) were brought together to compose a complex social universe, defined by 
multiple, and multiply interacting, discursive fields. Furthermore it was assumed that 
this social universe cannot but be based on a social/human technology; a technology 
developed, reproduced and changed by people. It is this social technology that the 
thesis conceptualises as the hegemonic, and essentially it is this conceptualisation and 
the interrelated suggested way of studying the hegemonic that are at stake in the 
thesis.
Existential preoccupations: ‘The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, But in 
ourselves that we are underlings ’ (William Shakespeare, Julius Caesar)
Why? What has been the motivation for this enterprise? To whom are the thesis and 
its themes speaking? There is an existential preoccupation to be found at the 
foundations of this project; a preoccupation that both guided and supported this thesis 
throughout its undertaking. What is ‘the system’ (that is blamed for everything), and 
how is it reproduced or/and changes? What is the stuff from which the ‘real world’
(that follows the years in school) is made? If most people would prefer an other way 
of living, an other everydayness, where and how do they submit themselves to and 
reproduce the system, the real world they accuse? What part of the social reality and 
the production of social life is of our own making and what is not? These were the 
preoccupations that led this thesis to engage in a strenuous effort to encroach upon, 
and learn to read, the socio-historical spiral of social reproduction (if only an 
infinitesimal moment of it), trying to understand the conditions of this (re)production 
and thus the conditions of social change.
Finding while walking: ‘When setting out upon your way to Ithaca, Wish always that 
your journey be long, Full o f adventure, Full o f lore. O f the Laestrygones and o f the 
Cyclopes, o f an irate Poseidon never be afraid ... Ithaca ... the marvelous journey. ’ 
(Constantine Cavafy, Ithaca)
The above project was not evolved linearly. It was rather an intellectual journey with 
many surprises and unexpected reorientations. A gap in the ideas literature in ER/IPE 
led us to hegemonic discourses. A lack of a serious engagement of the comparative 
institutionalism literature with the domestic aspects of the communication of ideas 
and discourses led to the question of how ideology is produced at the national level, 
and to the concept of public discourses. The synthesis of the above problems led to 
the development of a hegemonic-discourse-communication-model that is based on the 
interplay between public and hegemonic discourses. This analysis led to a finer 
elaboration of the relationship between the publics and the hegemonic; an elaboration 
through which the hegemonic came to be conceptualised as the social technology of 
the publics’ (re)production. This conceptual move proved very productive as it 
assertively pieced together the various fragments and elements of the research project 
(i.e. names, texts, policies, practices, actors and institutions and their discourses), 
creating a framework through which they could be studied and understood in their 
dynamic interplay. This development made the hegemonic the core stake of the thesis. 
The comparative nature of the research allowed us to dig further into the qualities and 
properties of the hegemonic, thus exemplifying the multiple ways of its 
communication/materialisation. An exploration of the reasons for these different 
facets of the hegemonic was the final step to be taken. This exploration demonstrated
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that although the role of domestic institutions and the nature of political economy are 
very important in the hegemonic communication/materialisation process, a complete 
understanding of this process requires also the accommodation of other case-specific 
factors, as well as, and maybe more importantly, historical contingency.
Silence is not always a statement; or issues arising...
The venture of conceptualising the hegemonic has led us to the importance of 
bringing the subject and everyday life back in the analysis of world politics and 
economics. This attempt brought us many times face to face with many long­
standing issues/problems in social and political theory. Unfortunately the limits of 
this thesis in terms of time, space and focus did not allow us to engage in-depth with 
these issues. Yet, here we should at least mention three of them.
(a) Hegemon, Hegemony and the In-Between: Q: Tea or Coffee? A: Yes, please
The thesis has outlined a political and a biopolitical approach to politics, and argued 
that in order to capture the conditions of existence and change of the 
international/social, both these traditions need to be taken into consideration. We 
need to examine power both as bombs and economic coercion (power without) and as 
a technology of the self (i.e. power within).
In discussing the hegemonic however, (also loosely referred to here as hegemony or 
empire), it became clear that this, i.e. the hegemonic, transcends/exceeds any entity 
that can be captured under the noun ‘hegemon’. Thus the two, i.e. the hegemony and 
the hegemon, must not be conflated, and the relationship between the two must not 
assumed to be in principle harmonious. Tensions between on the one hand the 
hegemon’s policies and practices and on the other hand the terms and forms of 
hegemony may lead to changes in the dominant practices and meanings (i.e. the 
hegemony) of which the hegemon has been an expression in the first place.
271
It was on this basis that ‘everyday life’ in general and the ‘subject’ in particular were 
proposed as the appropriate terrains for capturing and studying the hegemonic and its 
change. Along these lines it has been argued that hegemony is ‘here’, in the ‘inside’ 
and thus the main question is who is and produces what part of the hegemonic, when 
and how?
Does such an approach obfuscate the power relations that dominate in the 
international/social? By diffusing hegemony at the level of the subject, don’t we lose 
sight of the role and function of the hegemon? Are we losing our way in the search to 
understand how power is exercised in world politics and economics? Don’t we end 
up with a Gramscian hegemony without a hegemon?
No, or rather yes. Yes, we need not to lose sight of the hegemon and its role in the 
international, as manifested in the traditional approaches to politics. Thus yes, not 
talking about the hegemon does obfuscate dominant power relations. But this is only 
half of the story of life-in-the-intemational, and to present this half, as the whole story 
is equally misleading with neglecting the role of the hegemon.
In particular, it seems to us that for a long period of time this focus on the hegemon 
and the ‘power without’ has consciously or unconsciously acted as an alibi, that 
helped to obfuscate both the conditions of existence and the conditions of change of 
the system. Indeed, to accuse a hegemon has always been an easy and convenient 
answer and attitude in world politics and economics. The contention here is that it is 
time to move beyond the idea of the hegemon in order to understand change and 
continuity in the international/social. Within this framework, bringing the subject 
back in does not manifest a fear of politics, but rather the generalisation- 
universalisation of politics. Such an understanding does not allow hegemony/empire 
comfortably to lie ‘out there’ with a hegemon; it does not allow an extemalisation of 
the system, and thus an extemalisation of the responsibility for the system. The 
system lies with us, and is reproduced and changes through us, through the social 
subjects.
For sure such an analysis does not give us a centre, a clear target, an alibi (for 
instance, MNEs, the USA, financial capital, the economic etc.). But it is exactly this
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point that it aims to address; the hegemonic has no centre; the hegemonic is not 
reducible to the hegemon or any other of its properties. Even more controversially, 
there is no life beyond the hegemonic (as there is no hegemonic beyond life). The 
hegemonic just is; as life just is. Life is the (only) subject of the hegemonic; its 
condition of existence; its condition of change. These thoughts bring us to the second 
issue (not) encountered by the thesis, the sovereignty of the sovereign subject.
(b) Subject, Subjectivity and the Hegemonic: ‘Lukacs is trying to preserve...a 
Marxism which incorporates subjectivity into history without making it an 
epiphenomenon’ (Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 1973: 41)
The literature that deals with the issue of subjectivity is massive, and a critical 
engagement with it has been far beyond the scope and the purpose of this thesis1. Yet 
the conceptualisation of the subject and its place and role in the social universe has 
been central to our inquiry, and even if not immediately apparent, in essence, it 
defined the identity of this project.
We have argued that the constitution of the subject, what is usually referred to as 
socialisation, is by definition a hegemonic process. We have also argued that 
hegemony is (re)produced at the subject level. What we would like to make clear 
here is that these claims do not refute or reject an understanding of the subject as 
sovereign. For the put-together-subject is capable of reflecting on and changing the 
nature of the process that put it together in the first place, namely its ‘making’ 
apparatus. That is what makes the subject sovereign; its tragic -  in an ancient Greek 
understudying of the term -  freedom to reflect and act (or not) on the conditions of its 
existence. In this framework, the issue at stake is this making-apparatus and its 
place and conditions of existence in relation to the subject. To explain the stance
1 The primary literature on the subject extends from the antiquity to present. One could think of names 
such as Aristotle, Spinoza, Leibniz, Hegel, Heidegger, Lukacs, Foucault. For a recent and thoughtful 
review of the ‘persistence of the subject’ in French philosophy, see Williams, 2001. For a similar 
study, from an author critical towards the post-structuralist tradition, see The Era o f the Individual, 
Renaut, 1997.
2 Different theoretical traditions are referring to this apparatus as, the ‘hegemonic’, ‘history’, 
‘hegemony’, that which ‘exceeds’ etc.
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adopted by the thesis, it is important to return to the first stages of this research 
project.
At these initial stages the thesis greatly benefited from the writings of Ernesto Laclau, 
Chantal Mouffe and Judith Butler (Butler et al, 2000, Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). 
These writings suggest that globalisation should be conceived as an empty signifier , 
i.e. as a particularity that in a certain historical period assumed the representation of 
an universality, thus occupying the ‘ahistorical’, ‘empty’ and ‘ineradicable’ space of 
the social; the space which each historical hegemony comes to occupy, to fill in. 
(Butler, 2000: 31 on Laclau). Thus globalisation as an empty signifier was too 
substantial, rather than negligible, as the use of the metaphor ‘empty’ would have it. 
The thesis tried to push this analysis further. It argued that one needs to bring this 
ahistorical, empty and ineradicable space of the social, from ‘up’ and ‘out there’, to 
‘down’ and ‘in’ the subject. In this way our understanding of social change and 
continuity changes radically. The structuralism many times found in studies of 
discourse is transformed to an open social milieu that is multiple, dynamic and 
chaotic. In this context, every minor/unobservable and every major/expressive, 
action/inaction, talk/silence, movement/inertia, statement and repetition by the 
subject(s) has a role in a bigger picture. The more one wants to approach 
hegemony/history, the more one needs to search for those expressions, practices, 
understandings, habits that have exceeded/escaped the sphere of the 
conscious/disputable4. Hence, the aforementioned ‘making apparatus’ -  or, if one 
prefers, history, hegemony, the system etc. -  emerges, wanes and changes every day 
through us, through the subject. The sovereignty of the subject lies exactly in its 
ability to reflect on its life and change...change its life, that is, change its ‘making
3 For the concept o f ‘empty signifier’ see, Laclau, 1996.
4 A separate diatribe would be needed to talk about the ‘escape’/ ‘exceeding’ of the ‘everyday’ and its 
expressions. Here it may suffice to cite the inspiration of the thesis. Maurice Blanchot (1993/1969), in 
his short essay ‘Everyday Speech’, returns again and again to the phrase/conclusion, ‘The everyday 
escapes’. In his poetic manner he notes: ‘Hence the everyday must be thought as the suspect (and the 
oblique) that always escapes the clear decision of the law, even when the law seeks by way of 
suspicion to track down every indeterminate manner of being...The two sides always meet: the 
everyday with its tedious, painful, and sordid side (the amorphous, the stagnant); and the inexhaustible, 
irrecusable, constantly unfinished everyday that always escapes forms or structures...Whatever its 
other aspects, the everyday has this essential trait: it allows no hold. It escapes. It belongs to 
insignificance; the insignificant being what is without truth, without reality, and without secret, but 
also perhaps the site of all possible signification.. .by another trait, the everyday is what we never see 
for a first time but can only see again’ (Blanchot 1993/1969: 239-240).
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apparatus’, the conditions of its existence. It was this understanding of hegemony 
and the subject that informed how this thesis approached and conceptualised both its 
empirical material, and the nature and role of the examined social actors, institutions 
and discourses. In addition it was the above thoughts that made us to turn to 
everyday life as the strategic theatre of hegemony.
(c) Sovereign Subjects, Sovereign Power and Resistance
This conceptualisation of the relationship between the hegemonic and the subject has 
also a profound effect on how one understands the concepts of sovereign power and 
resistance. Thus, following this path, resistance is not conceptualised as an action 
that is formulated and organised against an external sovereign power, because such a 
power is to be found at the subject level in the first place. That is, the hegemonic is a 
condition of existence for the subject, and being so it cannot constitute an object of 
resistance by the subject. Within this framework, resistance should be conceptualised 
as a reflection on, and change of, this condition of existence, through the reproduction 
of life at the everyday. Thus resistance is not outside of the hegemonic; it does not 
act upon the hegemonic from a point exterior to it, but rather signifies specific 
moments/facts that have a transformative effect on the condition of its (re)production. 
Thus at an ontological level resistance is what leads, or aims at leading, to a certain 
transformation of our conditions of existence; and hence to a certain transcendence of 
the (always historically-specific) subject5.
How is this translated into strategy at the level of everyday life? The thesis has 
hardly something new to add in this regard. It would suggest looking back at the 
theories of social change in everyday life. It would point at the direction of the 
enactment of transformative moments in the everyday6. Different terms have been
5 Of course if the hegemon, rather than the hegemonic, is the point of departure of the analysis, one 
clearly conceptualises ‘resistance’ as an action external to the sovereign power, to the hegemon. The 
approach suggested here aims at enriching rather than ignoring such an exterior understanding of 
resistance, by placing it within a wider and more complex set of social relations, where ‘the system’ is 
not reducible to the hegemon, and is not external to the social actors. It is through this framework that 
this thesis subscribes to the statement that a ‘break with the everyday by means of festival -  violent or 
peaceful -  cannot endure’ (Lefebvre, 1987: 11).
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used to describe such moments. For instance the Situationists were advocating the 
need to construct situations in the everyday that would transform people’s 
understanding of the normal, the ordinary, the feasible, the desired (Guy Debord, 
1957). Such enactments would disrupt everyday practices and understandings that 
through repetition have escaped the sphere of the conscious, the sphere of the 
question ‘why’. The nature and effects of such transformative events have become 
the subject of what is broadly defined as the ‘theories of the event’ (see Verstraeten, 
1990). Alain Badiou’s work is central here. According to Badiou (1999: 105: quoted 
in Noys, 2003: 2) an event is ‘what-is-not-being-qua-being’. ‘The event punctures 
knowledge and leaves behind a trace’ (Noys, 2003: 2, on Badiou, 1999); it compels 
us to ‘a new way of being’ (Badiou 2001: 41 quoted in Noys, 2003: 4); it set off new 
social ethics (Badiou, 2001).
Here one could legitimately raise the question of where such events are coming from? 
For sure there cannot be a conclusive answer to this question. We would like, 
however, to think of this question as similar to its exact opposite, i.e. where these 
events are leading to? For both are based on a single field of problematique: the 
question of what is possible (in a given historical context)? To follow up the analysis 
of this thesis, the historically possible cannot be thought independently from the 
hegemonic, independently from its historical context. In this regard the historically 
possible is defined by the currently existing stock of knowledge and technology. Yet 
it is not determined by the latter. The past has shown that the human imaginary has 
the potential to transcend its historical context and to create new possibilities, opening 
new conceptual avenues. Furthermore, it was often this capacity to imagine that 
historically pushed the limit of the historical stock of the possible, directing human 
energy to the creation of new technology, whether this was money, employed labour, 
airplanes or cities. It is within this framework that this thesis would argue that 
‘events’ are coming from the sphere of the historical possible/potential and ending up
n
redefining this very sphere .
6 Here we borrow the concept of enactment from Jacques Ranciere’s work on the definition of politics. 
See Ranciere, 1988,2003.
7 The problematique of what is possible is central to Lefebvre’s philosophy. See for instance Lefebvre, 
1991/1958: 228-252. Moreover this discussion on ‘the possible’ as an integral part o f social reality is 
central to the currently ascending (philosophical) school of Critical Realism. For a well-elaborated 
application in the field of international relations see, Patomaki and Wight, 2000.
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Finally
Along these lines this thesis joins its forces and voice with the recently re-emerging 
interest in everyday life in social science research. Michael Gardiner (2000) in his 
book Critiques o f Everyday Life proposes that there exists a counter-tradition within 
everyday life theorising. ‘This counter-tradition has sought not merely to describe 
lived experience, but to transform it by elevating our understanding of the everyday to 
the status of a critical knowledge’. This thesis aspires to rejoin this counter-tradition. 
I think it is important to rearticulate our understanding of everyday life and its 
centrality in world politics and economics. It is important to re-read the social 
science picture that portrays everyday life as a space of ‘radical passivity’. For, if the 
analysis proposed here has any value, then everyday life is not a place of radical
o
passivity, but a space of passive radicality ; the strategic field of life’s production and 
change. Thus more work needs to be done in order to reclaim everyday life from the 
sphere of banality, irrelevance and indifference and reconnect it to human life and 
reason (no matter what the latter is perceived to be).
As a Way o f Closing: Reflections on the Methodology
The above thoughts indicate issues and avenues for further research which have 
emanated from the thesis. Along with these issues, the facets-of-the-hegemonic 
hypothesis also needs to be tested further. More public discourses need to be studied, 
and more regions of the world need to be included (e.g. Japan, China, Egypt, Iran, 
Saudi Arabia, Russia, India, Algeria, Congo, South Africa, Brazil), if more acute 
conclusions and qualified understandings of the hegemonic, and its interplay with the 
public, are to be reached. Such a regional and cultural opening of the methodology 
and the conclusions of the thesis could, for instance, produce findings that would 
transcend the political/apolitical facets of the hegemonic found in Greece and Ireland, 
within the European context.
8 For an interesting elaboration on the concept of ‘passivity’, albeit not an easily accessible one, see 
Thomas Carl Wall, 1999.
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Furthermore, such an extension of the research could also produce new insights on 
the interplay between international and comparative politics. In this regard one of the 
lessons drawn by the thesis is that the employment of the concept of the public seems 
too productive to be abandoned for a methodology which either would reduce the 
international to the public/domestic (in a crude comparative politics/economics 
manner), or would ignore the role of the latter in the production of the international 
(in a crude global politics/economics manner).
The relationship between theory and methodology is also important here. In 
particular, the decision of the thesis to invest in a theoretical framework that 
functioned as an acting research strategy, rather than as a passive ready-made theory, 
proved very useful, as it led from the outset to a clear and productive integration of 
the empirical material with the theoretical problematique of the thesis.
Finally, through the adopted methodology the thesis attempted to transcend the 
dichotomy between understanding and explaining in social sciences. It placed the 
emphasis on understanding the conditions of change in the international, in order to 
explain these conditions, in order to offer a standpoint, a way of influencing the 
direction of this change. We found no evidence to deny our belief that a way of 
explaining is a way of changing things on the basis of a certain understanding.
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Appendices
Appendix A: List of Interviews
Interviews in Greece
Professor Nikiforos Diamandouros, National Ombudsman of Greece (April 22, 2002).
Mr Pandelis Kapsis, Editor-in-Chief of the newspaper TA NEA (April 29, 2002).
Mr Giorgos Kirtsos, Editor-in-Chief and Publisher of the newspaper Eleftheros Typos (April 
27, 2002).
Professor Elias Nikolakopoulos, expert in Greek politics, and public opinion in Greece,
University of Athens (April 25, 2002).
Mr Dimitris Politis, Deputy General Secretary of the Greek General Confederation of Labour 
(GSEE), and Vice President of the Economic and Social Council of Greece (OKE) (May 2,2002).
Professor Sawas Robolis, Scientific Director of the Institute of Labour (INE) of the Greek 
General Confederation of Labour (GSEE) (April 29,2002).
Mr Iason Stratos, former President of the Federation of Greek Industries (SEV) (April 30, 2002). 
Interviews in Ireland
Mr Peter Cassells, Chairman of the National Centre for Partnership and Performance (NCPP) 
and former Secretary-General of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) (June 27,2002).
Mr Garret FitzGerald, former Prime Minister of Ireland (June 24, 2002).
Mr Paul Gillespie, Foreign Editor of the newspaper The Irish Times (June 26, 2002).
Dr Niamh Hardiman, expert in Irish politics and Irish political economy, University College 
Dublin (June 14,2002).
Professor Brigid Laffan, Director of the Dublin European Institute in the University College 
Dublin, and Advisor to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Irish Parliament (June 11, 2002).
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Appendix B: The Models of Political Economy through Selected Political Economy 
Indicators
Note: The data and rankings o f the following tables are used only indicative by the thesis.
The purpose is just to offer a diagrammatical depiction o f the classification o f Greece and Ireland to 
the South-European and Anglo-Saxon models respectively.
Therefore, UK and Ireland are always to the one end of the scale o f indicators as opposed to Greece, Italy and
Portugal for instance, which are to the other end.
Table I. Indicators of the Strictness of Employment Protection Legislation (EPL)1:
Selected European Countries
higher numbers indicate stricter EPL
Selected EU countries Overall Ranking2
United Kingdom (UK) 2
Ireland (IE) 3
Finland (FI) 9.5
Norway (NO) 11
Sweden (SE) 11
Greece (GR) 12
Austria (AT) 13
Italy (IT) 14
Portugal (PT) 16
UK IE FI NO S E G R AT IT P T
Source: OECD, 1994: 71
‘Employment protection refers both to regulations concerning hiring (e.g. rules favouring disadvantaged groups, 
conditions for using temporary or fixed-term contracts, training requirements) and firing (e.g. redundancy procedures, 
mandated prenotification periods and severance payments, special requirements for collective dismissals and 
short-time work schemes); see OECD, 2004: 50.
2 Counted against dismissals
Table II. Overall Strictness of Employment Protection Legislation in the EU1 : 
Shifts Between the Late 1980s & 1990s
- n t r r r • Portugal
Norway
G erm an y
O 1 2 A t 6
Lata 106 Os
Source: OECD, 2004: 61; ‘Average o f indicators for regular and temporary contracts.
280
Table III. Situation of Full- and Part-Time Employment: Selected European Countries
percentage o f the overall workforce
Selected EU countries Full-Time Jobs Part-Time Jobs
United Kingdom (UK) 78 21
Ireland (IE) 87 7
Italy (IT) 94 6
Portugal (PT) 94 5
Greece (GR) 97 2
Source: OECD (1994: 71)
Table IV. Ranking of Selected EU Countries According to their ‘State Control Domain’
0-6 indicator from least to more state control
Domain Sub-Domain
Country
United Kingdom (UK) 
Ireland (IE) 
Finland (FI) 
Norway (NO) 
Sweden (SE) 
Greece (GR) 
Austria (AT)
Italy (IT) 
Portugal (PT)
State Control
0.55
0.94
1.51
2.11
2.68
2.83
3.19
3.87
3.92
Public Ownership
0.03
1.32
3.28
3.72
2.25
3.39
2.36
4.44
2.69
Involvement in 
Business Operation 
1.22 
0.46 
1.90 
2.51 
0.55 
4.50 
1.77 
3.26 
3.02
4
3
2
1
0
Source: Nicoletti et al.
\ 1' 1 \
a  a  A a  i' \ 1 \ i \ /Ii J b
UK IE FI NO SE GR AT IT PT
(1999:23)
Table V. Overall Regulatory Approaches in Selected OECD Countries
0-6 indicator from least to most restrictive1
T n n n n n n n n n D n D f i r i l l  i h H - H
/ - ' / / / / /  / / / /  " / / / / s / s
5> £ J  *  4
Source: Nicoletti et al. (1999: 34)
1 The methodology for constructing the detailed indicators followed several steps. First, the raw information obtained from the 
questionnaire or other sources was transformed. The qualitative information was coded by assigning a numerical value to each of 
its possible modalities (e.g. ranging from a negative to an affirmative answer) while the quantitative information (such as data on 
ownership shares or notice periods for individual dismissals) was subdivided into classes. Second, the resulting coded information 
was normalised by ranking it on a common 0-6 scale, reflecting the increasing restrictiveness o f the regulatory provisions. Third, in 
some cases, several o f the normalized rankings corresponding to the various regulatory provisions were aggregated into a single 
measure.
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